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UNDERSTANDING. AN ENQUIRY 
SECT.  I.-Of  the Diferent  Species  of  Philomphy.  SECT. 
T 
A. 
MORAL  philosophy, or the science of  human  nature, may be  \- 
treated  after two different manners;  each  of  which has its 
peculiar  merit,  and  may  contribute  to the entertainment, 
instruction, and reformation of mankind.  The one considers 
man chiefly  as born  for  action; and  as  influenced  in his 
measures  by taste and sentiment ;  pursuing one object, and 
avoiding another, according to the value which these objects 
seem  to possess, and according  to the light in which they 
present themselves.  As  virtue, of  all  objects, is allowed to 
be the most valuable, this species  of  philosophers paint  her 
in the most amiable colours ;  borrowing all helps from poetry 
and  eloquence, and  treating their  subject in  an easy  and 
obvious  manner,  and  such as is best  fitted  to  please  the 
imagination,  and  engage  the affections.  They  select  the 
most striking observations and instances from common life ; 
place opposite characters in a proper contrast; and alluring 
us into the paths of  virtue by the Sews of glory and happi- 
ness, direct  our  steps  in these  paths by the soundest pre- 
cepts and most illustrious examples.  They make us feel  the 
difference between  vice and virtue ;  they excite and regulate 
our sentiments ;  and so  they call but bend our hearts to the 
love of  probity and true honour, they think, that they have 
fully attained the end of  all their labours. 
The other  species  of  philosophers  consider  inan  in thc 
light of a reasonable  rather then  an active being, and en- 
deavour to forin  his  understanding  more  than cultivate his 
manners.  They regard human nature as a subject of specu- 
lation;  and with  a  narrow  scrutiny  examine  it,  in  order 
to find  those  principles,  which  regulate our understanding, 4  CONCERNlNG HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING. 
SECT.  excite our sentiments, and  make  us approve  or  blame  any 
I  particular  object,  action,  or  behaviour.  They  think  it  a 
reproach  to all literature,  that philosophy  should  not  yet 
have  fixed,  beyond  controversy,  the foundation of  morals, 
reasoning, and criticism ;  and  should  for  ever talk of  truth 
and falsehood, vice  and virtue, beauty  and deformity, with- 
out being able to determine  the source of these distinctions. 
While they attempt this arduous task, they are deterred by 
no difficulties;  but proceeding  from  particular instances to 
general principles, they still push on their enquiries to prin- 
ciples more general, and rest not satisfied till they arrive at 
those  original  principles,  by  which,  in  every  science,  all 
human  curiosity must  be  bounded.  Though their specula- 
tions  seem  abstract,  and  even  unintelligible  to common 
readers, they aim at the approbation  of  the learned and the 
wise ; and  think  themselves  sufficiently  conlpensated  for 
the  labour  of  their whole  lives, if  they can  discover  some 
hidden  truths,  which  may contribute to the instruction of 
posterity. 
It  is certain  that the  easy and  obvious  philosophy will 
always, with the generality of  mankind, have the preference 
above the accurate  and  abstruse ;  and by many will be  re- 
commended,  not  only  as more agreeable,  but  more  useful 
than the other.  It enters more  into common  life ;  mouldv 
the heart  and  atiections ;  and, by touching those  principles 
which actuate men, reforms their  conduct, and brings them 
nearer to that model  of  perfection which  it describes.  On 
the  contrary, the abstruse  philosophy, being  founded  on  a 
turn of mind, which  ca,nnot enter into business and action, 
vanishes when  the philosopher leaves the shade, and comes 
into open day; nor  can  its principles  easily retain  any in- 
fluence  over  our  conduct  and behaviour.  The  feelings  of 
our  heart, the agitation  of  our  passions, the vehemence of 
our affections, dissipate  a'll its  conclusions, and reduce  the 
profound philosopher to a mere plebeian. 
This also inust be confessed, that the most durable, as well 
as justest  fame, has been  acquired by the  easy philosophy, 
and that abstract reasoners  seem  hitherto to have enjoyed 
only a momentary reputation, from the caprice or ignorance 
of their own age, but have not been able to support their re- 
nown with  inore  equitable  posterity.  It is easy for a pro- 
found philosopher to commit a mistake in his subtile reaon- 
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5gs  ;  and one mistake  is the necessary parent of  another, 
while he pushes  on  his  consequences, and is not deterred  *",? 
from embr&ing  any conclusion, by  its unusual  appearance, .+ 
or its contradiction  to popular opinion.  But a philosopher, 
lvho purposes  only to represent the common  sense of  man- 
kind  in more  beautiful  and more  engaging  colours,  if  by 
accident he falls  into error, goes  no  farther ;  but renewing 
his appeal to common sense, and the natural sentiments  of 
the mind, returns  into the right path, and secures  himself 
from any dangerous illusions.  The fame of  CICERO  flourishes 
at  present ;  but that of  ARIRTOTLE  is utterly decayed.  LA 
BRIJYEBE  passes the seas, and still maintains his reputation : 
But the glory of  MALEBRANCHE  is confined to  his own nation, 
and to his  own  age.  And  ADDISON,  perhaps, will be read 
with pleasure, when LOCKE  shall be entirely forgotten.' 
The mere philosopher  is a  character, which is commonly 
but little acceptable in the world, as being  supposed to con- 
tribute nothing either to the advantage or pleasure of  society ; 
while  he  lives remote from communication  with  mankind, 
and is wrapped up in principles and notions  equally remote 
from  their comprehension.  On  the other  hand,  the mere 
ignorant  is still more  despised ;  nor is any thing deemed a 
surer sign of an illiberal genius in  an age and nation where 
the sciences flourish, than to be entirely destitute of all relish 
for those noble entertainments.  The most perfect character 
is ~upposed  to lie between  those  extremes ;  retaining  an 
equal  ability and  taste for  books,  company, and business ; 
preserving  in  conversation  that  discernment  and  delicacy 
which arise from polite letters ;  and in business, that probity 
and accuracy which are the natural result  of  a just philoso- 
phy.  In order  to diffuse  and cultivate  so  accomplished a 
character, nothing can be more  useful  than compositions of 
the easy style and manner, which  draw not too  much  from 
life,  require no deep  application  or retreat to  be  compre- 
hended, and send back  the student among  mankind full of 
noble  sentiments  and  wise  precepts,  applicable  to  every 
exigence  of human life.  By  means  of  such  compositions, 
virtue becomes amiable, science agreeable, company instruc-  - 
tive, and retirement entertaining. 
l  pditions E and F add  the note :  and modest Reasoner.  'Tis only meant 
This is not intended any way to detract  to show the common Fate  of  such  ab- 
from the  herit of  Mr. Locke, who was  stract Philosophy.] 
really a great  Philosopher, and  a juet 6  CONCERNING  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING. 
m.  Man  is a  reasonable  being;  and as such, receives  from  '.  .  science his proper food and nourishment :  But so narrow are 
the bounds of  human understanding, that little satisfaction 
can be hoped for  in this  particular, either  from  the extent 
or security of  his  acquisitions.  Man  is  a  sociable, no less 
than a reasonable being:  But neither can  he  always  enjoy 
company agreeable and amusing, or preserve the proper relish 
for them.  Man is also an active  being ;  and from that dis- 
position, as well as from  the various  necessities  of  human 
life, must submit to business and occupation : But the mind 
requires some relaxation, and cannot always sueport its bent 
to  care  and  industry.  It  seems,  then,  that  nature  has 
pointed out a mixed kind of  life  as  most  suitable to human 
race,  and secretly admonished  thein to allow none of  tliesc 
biasses to draw too much, so as  to incapacitate them for otlier 
occupations  and entertainments.  Indulge your  passion for 
science, says she, but let your  science  be  buman, and such 
as may have a direct reference  to action  and society.  A b- 
struse thought and profound  researches  I prohibit,  and will 
severely  punish, by the pensive  melancholy which  they in- 
troduce,  by  the endless  uncertainty  in which  they iilvolvc 
you, and  by the cold  reception which  your  pretended  dis- 
coveries shall meet  with, when  communicated.  Be a philo- 
sopher ;  but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a inan. 
Were the generality of  mankind  contented  to prefer the 
easy philosophy to the abstract and profound, without throw- 
ing any blame  or  contempt on  the latter, it  might  not be 
improper, perhaps, to comply with this general opinion, and 
allow every man to enjoy, without  opposition, his oTvn  taste 
and sentiment.  But as the matter  is often  carried farther, 
even to the absolute rejecting of  all profound reasonings, or 
what is commo~ily  calied metaphysics, we  shall  now  proceed 
to consider what can reasonably be pleaded in their behalf. 
We may begin with observing, that one considerable ad- 
vantage, which results from the accurate and abstract pliilo- 
sophy, is, its subserviency to the easy and humane;  which, 
without the former, can never  attain a  sufficient  degree of 
exactness  in  its sentiments,  precepts,  or reasonings.  All 
polite  letters  are  nothing but  pictures  of  human  life  in 
various attitudes and situations ; and inspire us with different 
sentiments, of  praise or  blame, aiilrliration  or ridicule,  ac- 
cording to the qualities of  the  ol~ject,  which thcy sct bcfore 
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m.  An artist must  be  better  qualified  to succeed  in this  SECT. 
who,  besides  a  delicate  taste  and  a  quick 
apprellension,  possesses  an accurate  knowledge  of  the in- 
ternal  fabric,  the  operations  of  the  understanding,  the 
workings of  the passions, and the various  species of  senti- 
ment which discriminate vice and virtue.  How painful soever 
this inward  search  or enquiry may appear,  it becomes,  in 
some  measure, requisite  ;to  those, who would  describe with 
success  the  obvious  and outward  appearances  of  life  and 
manners.  The  anatomist  presents  to  the  eye  the  most 
hideous and disagreeable objects ;  but  his  science  is useful 
to the painter  in delineating  even  a VENUS  or  an HELEN. 
While tlie latter employs all the richest  colours  of  his art, 
and gives his figures the most  graceful  and engaging airs ; 
he must still carry his attention  to the  inward structure of 
the human  bod^-, the position  of  the muscles, the fabric of 
tlie bones, and the use  and  figure  of  every part or organ. 
Accuracy is, in every case, advantageous to beauty, and just 
reasoning  to  delicate  sentiment.  In vain would we  exalt 
the one by depreciating the other. 
Besides, we may observe, in every art or  profession, even 
those  which  most  concern  life  or  action, that  a  spirit of 
accuracy, however  acquired, carries all of  them nearer their 
perfection,  and renders them  more  subservient  to the in- 
terests  of  society.  And  though  a  philosopher  may  live 
remote from business, the genius of  philosophy,  if carefully 
cultivated by several, must gradually diffuse itself throughout 
the whole society, and bestow a similar correctness on every 
art and calling.  The politician  will  acquire  greater  fore- 
sight  and  subtility,  in  the  subdividing  and  balancing  of 
power ;  the lawyer more  method  and  finer principles in his 
reasonings ;  and the general more regularity in  his discipline, 
and more caution in his plans and operations.  The stability 
of modern governments above the ancient, and  the accnracy 
of modern philosophy, have improved, and probably will still 
improve, by similar gradations. 
Were there no advantage to be reaped froin these studies, 
beyond  the gratification of  an innocent curiosity, yet ought 
not even this to be despised; as being one accession to those 
few  safe  and  harmless pleasures,  which  are bestowed  on 
human race.  The sweetest and most inofleiisive patli of life 
leads  through  the  avenues  of  science  and lcnrl~il~g;  and 8  CONCERNING  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING.  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  SPECIES  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  9 
SECT.  wl~oever  can  either remove any obstructions in this way, or 
,  open  up any  new  prospect,  ought so far to be esteemed  a 
benefactor  to mankind.  And though these researches  may 
appear painful and fatiguing, it is with some minds  as wit11 
some  bodies,,  which being  endowed with vigorous and florid 
health,  require  severe exercise,  and  reap  a  pleasure  from 
what,  to the generality of  mankind, may seem burdensome 
and laborious.  Obscurity, indeed, is painful to the mind as 
well  as to the eye; but to bring light from  obscurity,  by 
whatever labour, must needs be delightful and rejoicing. 
But this obscurity in the profound and abstract philosophy, 
is objected to, not only as painful and fatiguing, but as the 
inevitable source of uncertainty and error.  Here indeed lies 
the justest and most  plausible  objection  against a consider- 
able part of  metaphysics, that they are not properly a science ; 
but  arise either from  the fruitless efforts of  human vanity, 
which would  penetrate  into subjects utterly innccessibi~  to 
the understanding, or from the craft of popular superstitions, 
which,  being unable  to defend  themselves  on fair  ground, 
raise  these intangling  brambles  to cover and protect their 
weakness.  Chacea from the open country, these robbers fly 
into  the forest,  and lie in wait to break in upon every un- 
guarded avenue of the mind, and overwhelm it with religious 
fears and prejudices.  The stoutest antagonist, if  he remit 
his watch  a  moment,  is  oppressed.  And  many,  through 
cowardice  and  folly,  open  the  gates  to the enemies, and 
willingly  receive  them  with  reverence  and submission, as 
their legal sovereigns. 
But is  this a  sufficient reason,  why philosophers  should 
desist  from  such researches, and leave superstition  still in 
possession of her retreat  P  Is it not proper to draw an oppo- 
site conclusion,  and perceive the necessity of  carrying tho 
war into the most secret recesses of the enemy?  In  vain do 
we hope, that men, from frequent disappointment, will at  last 
abandon such airy sciences, and discover the proper province 
of  human reason.  For, besides, that many persons  find too 
sensible  an interest  in perpetually  recalling  such  topics ; 
besides  this,  I say,  the.motive of  blind  despair can never 
reasonably have place in the sciences ;  since, however unsuc- 
cessful fbrmer attempts may have proved, there is still room 
to hope, that the industry, good fortune, or improved sagacity 
of succeeding generations may reach discoveries unknown to 
forlller ages.  Each  adventurous genius will still leap at the  SECT. 
prize,  and  find  himself  stimulated,  rather  than -A,. 
discouraged,  by the failures  of  his  predecessors ;  while  he 
hopes that the glory of  atchieving so hard  an adventure  is 
reserved for him alone.  The only method of freeing'leanling, 
at oace, from these abstruse questions, is to enquire seriously 
into the nature of  human understanding, and shew, from an 
exact  analysis  of  its powers  and capacity, that it is by no 
means fitted for such remote and abstruse subjects.  We  must 
to this fatigue,  in order to live  at ease ever after: 
And  must  cultivate  true  ~netaphysics  with  some  care,  in 
order to destroy the false and adulterate.  Indolence, ~hich, 
to some  persons, affords a  safeguard against this deceitful 
philosophy, is, with  others,  overbalanced  by curiosity ;  and 
despair, which, at some  moments, prevails,  may give  place 
afterwards to sanguine hopes and expectations.  Accurate-and 
just reasoning is the only catholic remedy, fitted for a11 persons 
and all dispositions ;  and is alone able to subvert that abstruse 
philosophy and metaphysical jargon, which, being mixed up 
with  popular  superstition, renders  it in a  manner impene- 
trable to careless reasoners, and gives it the air of  science 
and wisdom. 
Besides this advantage  of  rejecting, after  deliberate  en- 
quiry, the most uncertain and disagreeable  part of  learning, 
there  are  many positive  advantages, which  result from  an 
accurate  scrutiny  into the powers and faculties of  human 
nature.  It is remarkable concerning the operations  of  the 
mind, that, though most intimately present to us, yet, when- 
ever they become the object of reflection, they seem involved 
in obscurity;  nor can the eye  readily find  those  lines  and 
boundaries, which discriminate  and distinguish them.  The 
objects are too fine to remain  long in the same aspect or 
situation;  and must  be  apprehended  in  an instant,  by  a 
superior penetration, derived from nature, and improved  by 
habit and reflection.  It becomes, &erefore, no inconsiderable 
part of  science barely to know the different operations of the 
mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under 
their proper heads, and to correct all that seeming disorder, 
in which they lie involved, when  made the object  of  reflec- 
tion and enquiry.  This task of ordering and distinguishing, 
which has no merit, when performed with regard to external 
bodies,  the  objects  of  our  senses,  rises  in its value, when 10  CONCERNING  IIUMAN  UNDERSTANDING,  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  SPECIES  OF PHILOSOPHY.  11 
SECT,  directed towards the operations of the mind, in proportion to  .  J.  the difficulty and labour, which we meet with in performiug 
it.  And if we can go no farther than this mental geography, 
or delineation of  the distinct parts and powers of the mind, 
it is at least a satisfaction to go so far; and the more obvious 
this science  may appear (and it is by no means obvious) the 
more contemptible still must the ignorance of it  be esteemed, 
in all pretenders to learning and philosophy. 
Nor  can there remain any suspicion,  that this science is 
uncertain  and chimerical ;  unless we should entertain such 
a scepticism as is entirely subversive of  all speculation, and 
even action.  It cannot be doubted, that the mind is endowed 
with several powers and faculties, that these powers are dis- 
tinct from  each other,  that what  is really  distinct  to the 
immediate  perception  may be  distinguished  by  reflection ; 
and consequently, that there is a  truth and falsehood in all 
propositions  on  this  subject,  and  a  truth  and falsehood, 
which lie not beyond the compass  of  human understanding. 
There are many obvious  distinctions  of  this kind,  such as 
those between  the will  and understanding, the imagination 
and passions, which fall within the comprehension of  every 
human creature ;  and the finer and more philosophical dis- 
tinctions  are no less real and certain, though more difficult 
to be  comprehended.  Some  instances, especially late ones, 
of success in these enquiries,  may give us a juster notion of 
the certainty and solidity of  this branch  of  learning.  And 
shall we esteem it worthy the labour of a philosopher to give 
us a  true system of the planets,  and adjust the position and 
order  of  those remote bodies;  while  we  affect to overlook 
those, who, with so much success, delineate the parts of  the 
mind, in which we are so intimately concerned 2 
[Editions E and F append the note :  Nature of  Things, but is entirely rela- 
That  Faculty,  by  which  we  discern  tive to  the Sentiment or mental  Taste 
Truth and Falshood, and that by which  of  each  particular  Being ;  in the same 
we  perceive  Vice  and Virtue had long  Manner  as  the  Distinctions  of  sweet 
been  confounded with  each  other, and  and bitter, hot and  cold, arise from the 
all Morality was suppos'd  to  be  built  particular feeling of each Sense  or  Organ. 
on  eternal  and  immutable  Relations,  Moral Perceptions therefore, ought not 
which, to  every intelligent  Mind, were  to be class'd  with the Operations of  the 
equally  invariable as any Proposition  Understanding, but with the  Tastes or 
concerning  Quantity or Number.  But  Sentiments. 
a'  late Philosopher  has taught us,  by  It had been usual with  Philosopliers 
the most  convincing  Arguments,  that  to divide  all the Passions of  the Mind 
Morality  is  nothing  in  the  abstract  into two Classes, the selfish  and bene. 
But may we not hope, that philosophy, if  cultivated with  SECT.  I. 
care,  ltnd  encouraged  by the attention of  the public,  may ,, 
carny its researches  still farther,  and discover,  at least in 
some degree, the secret springs and principles, by which the 
human  mind  is  actuated in its operations ?  Astronomers 
had  long  contented  themselves  with  proving,  from  the 
ohienomena,  the  true  motions,  order,  and  magnitude  of 
;he  heavenly bodies : Till a  philosopher, at last, arose, who 
seems, from the happiest reasoning, to have also determined 
the laws and forces, by which the revolutions of  the planets 
are governed  and directed.  The like  has. been  performed 
with regard to other parts of  nature.  And there is no reason 
to despair of  equal success in our enquiries concerning  the 
mental powers and ceconomy, if prosecuted with equal capa- 
city and caution.  It  is  probable,  that one  operation  and 
principle  of  the mind depends on  another;  which,  again, 
may be resolved  into one Inore general and universal : And 
how far these researches may possibly be  carried, it will be 
difficult for us, before, or even  after, a careful trial, exactly 
to determine.  This is certain, that attempts of this kind are 
every  day made  even by  those  who  philosophize  the most 
negligently:  And  nothing  can be  more  requisite  than to 
enter upon the enterprize with thorough care and attention ; 
that, if it lie within the compass of human understanding, it 
may at last be  happily atchieved;  if  not, it may, however, 
volent, which  were  suppos'd  to  stand 
in  constant  Opposition  and  Contra- 
riety;  nor  was  it  thought  that  the 
latter  could  ever  attain  their proper 
Object but at  the Expense of  the former. 
Among the selfish Passions were rank'd 
Avarice,  Ambition,  Revenge :  Among 
the  benevolent,  natural  Affection, 
Friendship, Public spirit.  Philosophers 
may now1 perceive  the Impropriety  of 
this  Division.  It  has  been  prov'd, 
beyond  all  Controversy, that  even the 
Passions,  commonly  esteem'd  selfish, 
carry the Mind  beyond Self, directly to 
the Object ; that tho' the Satisfaction of 
these Passions gives us Enjoyment, yet 
the Prospect of  this  Enjoyment  is  not 
the Cause  of  the  Passion, but  on  the 
contrary the  Passion  is antecedent  to 
the Enjoyment, and without the former, 
the  latter  could  never  possibly  exist; 
that  the  Case  is  precisely  the  same 
with the Passions, denominated benevo- 
lent, and  consequently that  a  Man  is 
no more  interested when  he  seeks  his 
own Glory than when the Happiness of 
his Friend is the Object of  his Wishes; 
nor is he  any more  disinterested when 
ho  sacrifices  his  Ease  and  Quiet  to 
public Good  than  when he labours for 
the  Gratification of  Avarice  or  Ambi- 
tion.  Here therefore  is  a considerable 
Adjostment  in  the  Boundaries  of  the 
Passions,  which  had  been  confounded 
by  the  Negligence  or  Inaccuracy  of 
former Philosophers.  These  two  In- 
stances  may  suffice  to  show  us  the 
Nature and Importance of  this Species 
of Philosopby.] 
[Mr.  Hutchcson.] 
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SECT.  be  rejected  with  some  confidence  and security.  This last  -  :.  ,  conclusion, surely, is not desirable ;  nor ought it to be em- 
braced too rashly.  For how much must we  diminish from 
the beauty and value  of  this  species  of  philosophy,  upon 
such a supposition?  Moralists have hitherto been accustomed, 
when they  considered  the vast  multitude  and diversity  of 
those actions that excite our approbation or dislike, to search 
for some  common  principle,  on  which  this variety of  sen- 
timents  might depend.  And though they have  sometimes 
carried the matter too  far,  by  their passion  for some  one 
general principle; it must, however, be confessed,  that they 
are excusable in expecting  to find some  general principles, 
into which all the vices and virtues were justly to be resolved. 
The like has been  the endeavour of  critics, logicians,  and 
even  politicians :  Nor  have  their  attempts  been  wholly 
unsuccessful; though perhaps longer time, greater accuracy, 
and  more  ardent application may bring these sckmes still 
nearer their perfection.  To throw up at once all pretensions 
of  this kind may justly be deemed  more  rash,  precipitate, 
and dogmatical, than even the boldest  and most affirmative 
philosophy, that has ever attempted to impose its crude dic- 
tates and principles on mankind. 
What though these reasonings concerning human nature 
seem abstract, and of difficult comprehension P  This affords 
no presumption of their falsehood.  On the contrary, it  seems 
impossible, that what has hitherto escaped so many wise and 
profound  philosophers  can be very obvious  and easy.  And 
whatever  pains  these researches may cost us, we may think 
ourselves  sufficiently  rewarded,  not  only in point  of  profit 
but of pleasure, if, by that means, we can make any addition 
to our stock  of  knowledge,  in subjects of  such unspeakable 
importance. 
But as, after all, the abstractedness  of  these speculations 
is no  recommendatisn, but rather  a  disadvantage to them, 
and as this difficulty may perhaps be surmounted by care and 
art, and the avoiding of  all unnecessary detail, we have, in 
the following enquiry, attempted to throw some  light upon 
subjects, from which  uncertainty  has hitherto deterred  the 
wise,  and obscurity the ignorant.  Happy,  if we can unite 
the boundaries  of  the  different  species  of  philosophy,  by 
reconciling profound  enquiry with clearness, and truth with 
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dovelty !  And  atill more  happy, if, reasoning  in this easy  SECT. 
~nanner,  we  can undermine the foundations  of  an abstruse 
which  seems  to have hitherto served  only as a 
shelter to superstition, and a cover to absurdity and error I 
SECT.  11.-Of  the Origin of  Ideas. 
EVERY  one will  readily allow,  that there is  a  considerable 
dserence between the perceptions of  the mind, when a man 
feels the pain of  excessive heat, or the pleasure of  moderate 
warmth, and whei he afterwards recalls  to his memory this 
sensation, or anticipates it by his imagination.  These facul- 
ties may mimic or copy the perceptions  of  the  senses;  but 
they never can  entirely reach the force  and  vivacity of  the 
original sentiment.  The utmost we say of  them, even when 
they  operate  with greatest  vigour, is,  that they  represent 
their object in so lively a manner,  that we  could  almost  say 
we feel or see it :  But, except the mind be disordered by dis- 
ease  or madness,  they never  can arrive  at such a pitch  of 
vivacity, as to render these perceptions  altogether  undistin- 
guishable.  All the colours of  poetry, however  splendid, can 
never paint natural objects in such a manner as to make the 
description be  taken for a real  landskip.  The most  lively 
thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation. 
We may observe a like distinction to run through all the 
other perceptions of  the mind.  A man in a fit  of  anger, is 
actuated in a very different manner froin one who only thinks 
of  that emotion.  If you tell me, that any person is in love, 
1 easily understand your meaning, and form a just concep- 
tion of  his situation ;  but never can mistake that conception 
for the real disorders and agitations of  the passion.  When 
we reflect on our past sentiments and affections, our thought 
is a  faithful  mirror, and  copies  its objects  truly ;  but the 
colours which it employs are faint and dull, in comparison of 
those  in which  our  original  perceptions  were  clothed.  It 
requires no nice discernment or metaphysical head  to mark 
the distinctioii between them. 
Here therefore we may divide all the perceptions of the mind 
into two classes or species, which  are distinguished  by their 
different degrees of  force and vivacity.  The less forcible and 
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SECT.  other species want  a  name  in  our  language,  and  in  most 
,  ,  others ;  I suppose, because it was not requisite for  any, but 
philosophical purposes, to rank  them  under a general term 
or appellation.  Let us,  therefore,  use  a little  freedom, and 
call  them  IMPRESSIONS;  employing  that word  in a  sense 
somewhat different from the usual.  By the term impression, 
then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we  hear, 
or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or  desire, or will.  And  im- 
pressions are distinguished  from  ideas, which:  are  the  lesa 
lively perceptions, of which we  are conscious, when we reflect 
on any of  those sensations or movements above mentioned. 
Nothing, at first  view,  may seem  more  unbounded  than 
the  thought  of  man,  which  not  only  escapes  all  human 
power and authority, but is  not even restrained  within  the 
limits of  nature and  reality.  To  foru monsters, and join 
incongruous shapes and appearances, costs  the imagination 
no  more  trouble  than  to conceive  the most  natural  and 
familiar  objects.  And  while  the  body  is  confined  to one 
planet, along which it creeps  with  pain  and  difficulty;  the 
thought can in an instant transport us into the most  distant 
regions of  the universe ;  or even  beyond  the universe, into 
the unbounded  chaos,  where  nature  is  supposed to lie in 
total confusion.  What never was seen, or heard of, may yet 
be conceived ;  nor is any thing beyond the power of  thought, 
except what implies an absolute contradiction. 
But though our thought seems to possess  this  unbounded 
liberty, we  shall find, upon a nearer examination, that it is 
really confined within very narrow  limits, and that all this 
creative  power  of  the mind  amounts to no  more than the 
faculty of  compounding, transposing, augmenting, or dimin- 
ishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience. 
When  we  think of  a  golden  mountain,  we  only join  two 
consistent  ideas,  gold,  and  mountain,  with which we  were 
formerly  acquainted.  A  virtuous  horse  we  can conceive; 
because, from our own feeling, we can conceive  virtue ; and 
this we may unite to the figure and shape of  a  horse, which 
is an animal familiar to us.  In short, all the materials  of 
thinking are derived either from our outward or inward sen- 
timent :  The mixture and composition of these belongs alone 
to the mind and will.  Or, to express myself in philosophical 
language, all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies 
of  our ilnpressiens or more lively ones. 
To prove this, the two  following arguments  will, I hope,  SECT.  11. 
be  First, when we  analyse our thoughts or ideas, - . , 
however compounded or sublime, we  always find,  that they 
resolve themselves into such simple ideas as were copied from 
a precedent feeling or sentiment.  Even those  ideas, which, 
at first view, seem the most  wide  of  this  origin, are found, 
upon a, nearer scrutiny, to be derived  from it.  The idea of 
God,  as meaning  an infinitely intelligent,  wise,  and good 
Being, arises from reflecting  on  the operations  of  our own 
mind,  and augmenting,  without  limit,  those  qualities  of 
podness and  wisdom.  We may prosecute  this enquiry to 
what  length  we  please ; where  we  shall  always find, that 
everv idea  which we  examine is copied  from  a similar im-  -.  - 
pression. Those who would assert, that this position is not 
universally true nor  without  exception, have  only  one, and 
that an easy method of  refuting it ;  by producing that idea, 
which, in their opinion, is not derived  from this source.  It 
will then  be  incumbent  on  us, if  we  would  maintain our 
doctrine,  to produce  the impression  or  lively  perception, 
which corresponds to it. 
Secondly.  If it happen, from a defect of  the organ,  that 
a  man  is not  susceptible  of  any  species of  sensation,  we 
always find, that he is as little susceptible  of  the correspon- 
dent ideas.  A blind man can  form  no notion  of  colours; a 
deaf  man of  sounds.  Restore either of  them that sense, in 
which he is deficient ;  by opening this new inlet for his sensa- 
tions, you also open an inlet for the ideas;  and he  finds no 
difficulty in conceiving these objects.  The case is the same, 
if  the object, proper  for exciting  any  sensation, has never 
been applied  to the ofgan.  A  LAPLANDER  or NEGROE  has 
no notion of  the relish of  wine.  And  though  there are few 
or no  instances  of  a  like  deficiency in the mind, where  a 
person has never  felt or is wholly  incapable of  n sentiment 
or passion, that belongs to his species ;  yet we find the same 
observation to take place in a less  degree.  A  man  of  mild 
manners can form no idea  of  inveterate revenge or cruelty ; 
nor  can a selfish heart easily  conceive the heights of  friend- 
ship and  generosity.  It is readily allowed, that other beings 
nlay possess many sensee  of  which we  can  have  no  concep- 
tion; because the ideas of  them ha8ve  never been  introduced 
to US,  in the only manner, by which  an idea can have access 
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SECT.  There is, however, one contradictory phenomenon,  which  "-  may prove, that it is not absolutely  impossible for  ideas  to  +- 
arise,  independent  of  their correspondent  impressions.  I 
believe it will  readily be  allowed, that the several distinct 
ideas of  colour, which enter by the  eye, or  those  of  sound, 
which are conveyed by the ear, are really different from each 
other ;  though, at the same time, resembling.  Now  if this 
be true of  different colours, it must be no  less so of  the  dif- 
ferent shades of  the same colour;  and each  shade produces 
a distinct idea, independent of  the rest.  For  if  this should 
be denied, it is possible, by the continual gradation of shades, 
to run a colour insensibly into what is most remote from it; 
and if  you will not allow  any of  the ineans to be  different, 
you cannot, without absurdity, deny the extremes  to be  the 
same.  Suppose, therefore, a person to have enjoyed his sight 
for  thirty  years, and to have  become  perfectly  acquainted 
with colours of  all kinds, except one particular shade of blue, 
for instance,  which  it never  has been  his  fortune to meet 
with.  Let all the different shades of  that colour, except that 
single one, be placed before him, descending  gradually from 
the deepest to the lightest ;  it is plain, that he will  perceive 
a blank, where that shade is wanting, and  will  be  sensible, 
that there is a  greater  distance  in that place  between the 
contiguous colouri than in any other.  Now I ask, whether 
it be possible for him, from  his own  imagination, to  supply 
this deficiency, and raise up to himself the idea of  that par- 
ticular shade, though it had never been conveyed  to him by 
his senses?  I believe there  are few but  will  be  of  opinion 
that he can : And this may serve as a proof,  that the simple 
ideas are not always, in every instance, derived from the cor- 
respondent impressions ;  though this instance is so singular, 
that it is scarcely worth our  obeerving, and does  not  merit, 
that for it alone we  should alter our general maxim. 
Here,  therefore, is  a propo~i~ion,  which not  only  seems, 
in itself, simple and intelligible ;  but,  if  a  proper  use  were 
made of  it, might render  every dispute  equally  intelligible, 
and banish all that jargon,  which has so long  taken  posses- 
sion of  metaphysical  reasonings, and  drawn  disgrace upon 
them.  L411  ideas, especially abstract ones, are naturally faint 
and  obscure : The mind  has but a slender  hold  of  them : 
They are apt to be confounded with other resembling ideas ; 
and when we have often employed any term, though witl~out 
a distinct maning, we  are apt to imagine it  has a determinate  SECT. 
idea, annexed to it.  On the  contrary, all impressions,  that .  7.  - 
is, all sensations, either  outward or  inward, are strong and 
vivid :  The linlits between them are more exactly determined : 
Nor is it easy to Pall into any error  or  mistake  with  regard 
to them.  When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion, that 
a philosophical term is  employed  without  any  meaning  or 
idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, from what 
impression, is that supposed  iderc  derived ?  And if  it be  im- 
possible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion. 
By bringing ideas into so clear  a  light, we  may  reasonably 
hope to remove all dispute, which may arise, concerning their 
nature and reality.' 
SECT.  111.-Of  the 2Association of Ideas. 
IT  is evident, that there is a principle of  co~lnexion  between 
the different  thoughts or ideas  of  the mind,  and that,  in 
their appearance to the memory or  imagination, they intro- 
duce  each  other  with  a  certain  degree  of  method  and 
regularity.  In our  more serious thinking or  discourse, this 
is so observable,  that any particular thought, which breaks 
in upon  the regular tract or  chain of  ideas, is immediately 
remarked  and rejected.  And  even  in our wildest and most 
wandering  reveries, nay  in our very dreams, we  shall find, 
It is probable  that  no  more  was 
meant  by  those,  who  denied  innate 
ideas, than that all ideas were  copies of 
our impressions ; though it must be con- 
fessed, that the  terms, which  they em- 
ployed,  were  not  chosen  with  such 
caution,  nor  so exactly  defined,  as to 
prevent  all mistakes  about  their  cloc- 
trine.  For what  is meant  by  innate? 
If innate be equivalent  to natural, then 
all  the  perceptioi~s and  ideas  of  the 
mind  must be  allowed  to be  innate or 
natural, in whatever  sense we  take the 
latter word,  whether  in opposition  to 
what is uncommon, artificial, or miracu- 
lous.  If  by  innate  be  meant,  cotem- 
porary to our  birth, the dispute seems 
to be  frivolous;  nor  is it worth while 
to  enquire  at  what  time  thinking 
begins,  whether  before,  at,  or  after 
our  birth.  Again,  the  word  idea, 
seems  to be  commonly taken in a very 
loose  sense,  by  Locke  and  others : a8 
standing  for  any  of  our  perceptions, 
our  sensations  and passions, as well as 
thoughts.  Now in  this sense, I should 
desire to know, what can  be  meant by 
asserting, that self-love,  or resentment 
of  injuries, or the  passion between the 
sexes is not innate ? 
But  admitting  these  terms,  impres- 
sions and ideas, in the  sense above ex- 
plained,  and  understanding  by  ilznaie, 
what is original or copied from no pre- 
ceclentperception,  then  may we  assert, 
that all our impressions are innate, and 
our ideas not innate. 
To be ingenuous, I must own  it to be 
my opinion,  that  Mr.  LOCKE  was,  be- 
trayed into this question by the  school- 
men,  who,  making  use  of  undefined 
terms,  draw  out  their  disputes  to  a 
tedious  length,  without  ever  touching 
thd point in question.  A like ambiguity 
and circumlocution  seem to run through 
all that great philosopher's  reasonings 
on this as  well as most other subjects. 
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mm.  if  we  reflect,  that the  imagination  ran  not  altogether at  . ,  adventures,  but that there was  still  a  connexion  upheld 
among  the  different  ideas,  which  s~lcceeded  each  other. 
Were the loosest  and freest  conversation to be transcribed, 
there would immediately be observed something, which con- 
nected it in all its transitions.  Or  where this is wanting, 
the person, who broke  the thread of  discourse, might still 
inform you, that there  had  secretly revolved in  his mind  a 
succession  of  thought,  which  had  gradually  led  him from 
the  subject  of  conversation.  Among  different  languages, 
even where we cannot suspect the least connexion or commu- 
nication,  it is  found,  that the words,  expressive  of  ideas, 
the most  compounded,  do  yet  nearly  correspond  to each 
other :  A certain proof, that  the simple ideas, comprehended 
in the  compound  ones, were  bound  together by  some  uni- 
versal principle, which had an equal influence on all mankind. 
Though it be too obvious to escape  observation, that dif- 
ferent ideas are connected together ; I do not find, that any 
philosopher has attempted to enumerate or class all the prin- 
ciples of  association ;  a subject, however, that seems worthy 
of  curiosity.  To me, there appear to be only three principles 
of  connexion  among  ideas,  namely, Resemblcmce,  Contiguity 
in time or place, and Cause or E@t. 
That these principles  serve to connect ideas  will  not, I 
believe,  be much  doubted.  A  picture  naturally  leads our 
thoughts to the original :  *  The mention of one apartment in 
a building naturally introduces an enquiry or discourse  con- 
cerning the others : '  And if  we  think  of  a  wound, we  can 
scarcely  forbear  reflecting  on  the  pain  which  follows  it." 
But that this enumeration  is  compleat, and that there are 
no other principles of  association, except these, niay be diffi- 
cult to prove  to the satisfaction  of  the reader, or even  to a 
man's  own satisfaction.  All we can  do, in such cases, is to 
run over several instances, and  examine  carefully the prin- 
ciple, which binds the different thoughts to each other, never 
stopping till we render the principle  as general as possible.' 
The more instances we examine, and the more care we  em- 
1  Resemblance.  mixture of  Causation and R~emblance. 
2  Contiguity.  Where two objects are contrary, the one 
Cause and Effect.  destroys the other ; that is, the cause of 
4  For instance,  Contrast  or  Contra-  its annihilation, and the idea of the an- 
riety is also  a connexion among  Ideas :  nihilation of  an object, implies the idaq 
But it mav, perhaps, be considered as a  of its former existence. 
ploy,  the more assurance shall we acquire, that the enumera-  SECT. 
tion, which we form from the whole, is compleat and entire.l  .  a 
1  [In  Editions E to Q the Essay con-  event to bring it  under his original plan 
tjnues:  Instead of entering into a detail  or intention. 
of this kind, which would lead into many  An  annalist or  historian who should 
useless  subtilties,  we  shall  consider  undertake to  write the historj of EUROPE 
some  of  the effects  of  this connexion  during any century, would be influenced 
upon  the  passions  and  imagination ;  by theconnexion ofcontiguity in time and 
where we may open a field of speculation  place.  All events, which happen in that 
more  entertaining,  and perhaps  more  portion of  space, and period of time, are 
instructire, than the other.  comprehended  in  his  design,  tho'  in 
As  man  is a  reasonable  being,  and  other respects different and unconnected. 
is continually  in pursuit of  happiness,  They have still a species of  unity, amidst 
which he hopes to attain by the gratifi-  all their diversity. 
cation of  some passion  OI!  affection, he  But  the  most  usual  species of  con- 
seldom acts or speaks or thinks without  nexion among the different erents, which 
a purpose  and intention.  He has  still  enter into any narrative composition, ie 
some object  in view ; and however im-  that of  cause and effect:  while the his- 
proper  the  means  may  sometimes be,  torian traces the series of actions accord- 
which he chuses  for the attainment of  ing to their natural order, remount8 to 
his end, he never loses view of  an end,  their secret springs and principles, and 
nor  will  he  so much  as  throw away  delineates  their  most  remota  conse- 
his thoughts  or  reflections,  where  he  quences.  He chuses  for his subject a 
hopes not to reap any satisfaction from  certain  portion of  that great chain  of 
them.  events,  which  compose the  history  of 
In all compositions of genius, there-  mankind:  Each link in this chain  he 
fore, 'tis  rbquisite  that the writer have  endeavours to touch  in  his  narration. 
some  ulan or  object; aud  tho' he may  Sometin~es  unavoidable  ignorance ren- 
be hu&ied frorn  this plan by the vehe-  ders all  his attempts fruitlem: Some- 
mence of  thought, as in an ode, or drop  times, he supplies by conjecture what is 
it carelessly, as  in an epibtle  or essay,  wanting in  knowledge :  And always, he 
there must  appear  some aim  or inten-  is sensible, that Qe more unbroken the 
tinn in  his  first  setting .out, if  not  in  chain  is,  which  he  presents  to  his 
the camposition  of  the  whole  work.  readers, the more perfect is his produc- 
A production  without  a  design  would  tion.  He sees,  that the knowledge of 
resemble more the raring of a madman,  causes is not only the most satisfijctory ; 
than  the  sober  efforts of  genius  and  this relation  or  connexion  being  the 
learning.  strongest  of  all others;  but  also  the 
As this  rule admits of  no exception, it  most  instructive ; since  it is  by  this 
follows, that in narrative compositions,  knowledge alone, we are enabled to con- 
the events or actions, which the writer  troul events, and govern futurity. 
relates, must be connected  together, by  Here therefore  we  may  attain some 
some  bond  or  tye:  They must  be re-  notion  of  that Unity  of  Action, about 
lated to each  other in the imagination,  whirh all critics, after ARISTOTLR,  have 
and form  a  kind of  Unity, which may  talked so much : Perhaps, to little pur- 
bring them under one plan or view, and  pose, 'while they directed not their taste 
which may be the object  or  end of  the  or sentiment  Fy the accuracy of  philo- 
writer in his first undertaking.  sophy.  It appears; that in all prduc- 
This connecting  principle among the  tions, as well as in the epic and tragic, 
several events, which  form the subject  there  is  a  certain  unity  required, and 
of  a poem  or  history, may be very dif-  that, on no occasion, can our thoughts be 
ferent, according to thedifferent designs  allowed  to  run  at adventures,  if  we 
of  the  poet  or  historian.  O~ID  has  would produce  a work, which  will give 
formed  his  plan  upon  the connecting  any lastiug  eiitertainment  to mankind. 
principle of  resemblance.  Every fabu-  It appears also, that even a biographer, 
lous transformation,  produced  by  the  who  should writs the life of  ACHILLES, 
miraculous  power  of  the  gods,  falls  would  connect  the  events,  by shewing 
Within the compass of his work.  There  their  mutual dependence  and relation, 
needs but this one circumstance in  any  as much as a poet, who should make the CONCERNING  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING.  SCEPTICAL  DOUBTS, 
SFm.  SECT.  IV.-Sceptical  Doubts  concirning the  Operations of  the 
IV.  Understanding. 
PART I. 
ALL  the objects of  human  reason  or enquiry may naturally 
be divided into two  kinds,  to wit,  Relations  of  Ideas, and 
Matters  of  Pact.  Of  the  first  kind  are  the  sciences  of 
Geometry, Algebra,  and Arilhmetic ; and in  short,  every 
affirmation, which  is either  intuitively  or  demonstratively 
certain.  That the  square  of  the  hypothenuse  is eqzial  to  the 
square  of  the  two sides, is  a  proposition, which  expresses a 
anger  of  that hero, the subject  of  his 
narration.'  Not only  in  any  limited  x 
ortion of  life, a  man's  actions  have  a 
eyendence  on  each  other,  but  also 
during the whole period of his duration 
from the  credle to the grave ; nor is it 
possible to  strike  off  one link, however 
minute,  in this regular  chain, without 
affecting  the  whole  series  of  events, 
which  fbllow.  The  unity  of  action, 
therefore, which is  to be  found in bio- 
graphy or history, differs  from  that of 
epic poetry, not  in kind, but in degree. 
In  epic poetry, the connexion among the 
events is more close  and sensible:  The 
narration is not carried  on  thro' such a 
length of  time : And the actors  hasten 
to some remarkable period, which satis- 
fies  the  curiosity of  the reader.  This 
conduct  of  the  epic  poet  depends on 
that particular situation of  the Zmngi- 
nation  and  of  the Passions,  which  is 
@upposed  in that production.  The ima- 
gination, both  of  writer  and reader, is 
more  enlivened, and the passions more 
enflamed than in history, biography, or 
any species  of  narration, which confine 
themselves  to strict truth and reality. 
Let us consider  the effect of  these two 
circumstances,  an  enlivened  imagina- 
tion  and  enflamed  passions,  circum- 
stances, which  belong  to  poetry, espe- 
cially  the  epic  kind, above  any other 
species  of  composition;  and  let  us 
examine the rea: on why they require  a 
stricter and closer unity in the fable. 
First.  All  poetry,  baing  a  species 
of painting, approaches us nearer to the 
objects than  any other  species  of  nar- 
ration,  throws  a  stronger  light  upon 
them,  and  delineates  more  distinctly 
those minute circumstances,  which, tho' 
to the historian they seem  superfluous, 
serve mightily to enliven  the imagery, 
and  gratify the fancy.  If  it be  not 
necessary, as in the Iliad, to inform us 
each  time  the hero buckles his  shoes, 
and ties his garters, it will be'requisite, 
perhaps, to enter into  a  greater detail 
than  in  the  HENHIADE;  where  the 
events  are run over with such rapidity, 
that we  scarce  have  leisure to become 
acquainted  with  the  scene  or  action. 
Were  a poet, therefore, to  comprehend 
in  his  subject  any  great  compass  of 
time or series of  events, and  trace  up 
the  death  of  HECTOR  to  its  remote 
causes, in the rape  of  HELEN,  or the 
judgment  of  PARIS, he  must  draw out 
his poem to an immeasurable length, in 
order to fill this large canvas with just 
painting  and imagery.  The  reader's 
imagination, enflamed with such a series 
of  poetical  descriptions,  and  his  pas- 
bions, agitated by a continual sympathy 
with the actors, must flag  long before 
the period of  the  narration,  and must 
sinkinto lassitude and disgust, from the 
repeatedviolence of the samemovements. 
Secondly.  That an  epic  poet  must 
not  trace  the causes  to any great dis- 
tance, will farther appear, if we consider 
another reason, which is draws from a 
property of  the passions  still more re- 
Contrary  to  ARISTOTLE,  MVIOOS  8'  uupBaivc~,  d€ Zu  ZvIwv oir8iv ~UTLY  2v.  05710 
&71v  C~S,  O~X  Gurcp  ~ivhs  o2bv.rai,  ihv  62 KU~  apd€cis ivbs rohhaf ciaiu, 25  Gv  kfa 
wcpl2va $.  TOAA~  yhp ~al  tircipa T@  ydver  oGScpla ylve~ai  rpii€is, &c. Keg.$.  1450~. 
relation between these figures.  That three tima jive  is equal  SECT. 
to  the  half  of  thirty, expresses  a  relation  between  these . 
numbers.  Propositions of  this kind are discoverable by the  YABTI* 
markable and singular.  'Tis  evident, 
that in a just composition, all the affec- 
tions,  excited  by  the  different  events, 
described and represented, add  mutual 
force to each other ;  and that while the 
heroes are all engaged  in  one  common 
scene, and  each  action is strongly con- 
nected with  the whole, the concern  is 
continually  awake,  and  the  passions 
make an easy transition from  one  ob- 
ject to  another.  The strong connection 
of the events, as  it  facilitates the passage 
of  the thought or imagination from one 
to another, facilitates  also  the tmnsfu- 
sion of  the, passions,  and preserves the 
affections still in the same channel and 
direction.  Our  sympathy and concern 
for  EVE prepares  the way  for  a  like 
sympathy with  ADAM:  The affection is 
preserved  almost  entire in  the transi- 
tion ; and the 'mind  seizes immediately 
the  new  object as  strongly related to 
that which  formerly engaged  its atten- 
tion.  But  were  the poet  to  make  a 
total  digression  from  his subject,  and 
introduce a new actor, nowise connected 
with  the  personages, the  imagination, 
feeling a breach in the transition, would 
enter coldly into the  new  scene, would 
kindle by slow degrees ; ancl in return- 
ing to  the  main  subject of  the  poem, 
would  pass,  as it were,  upon  foreign 
ground, and  have  its concern to excite 
anew, in order  to take party with  the 
principal  actors.  The  same inconve- 
nience  follows  in  a  less degree, where 
the poet traces his events to too great a 
distance,  and  binds  together  actions, 
which tho' not  entirely disjoined,  have 
not so strong a connexion as is requisite 
to forward  the transition  of  the pas- 
sions.  Hence arises the artifice of  the 
oblique  narration,  employed  in  the 
Odyssq and Eneid; where  the hero is 
introduced, at first, near  the  period  of 
his designs, and afterwards  shows  us, 
as it were  in perspective, the more dis- 
tant events and causes.  Ry this means, 
the  reader's  curiosity  is  immediately 
excited : The  events follow withrapidity, 
and in a very close connexion : And the 
concern is  preserved alive,  and, by means 
of the near relation of  the objects, con- 
tinually increases, from  the  beginning 
to the end of the narration. 
The samc rule takes place in dramatic 
poetry;  nor  is it ever  permitted, in  a 
regular  composition,  to  introduce  an 
actor, who  has no  connexion, or but a 
small  one,  with  the  principal  per- 
sonages  of  the fable.  The  spectator's 
concern  must not  be  diverted  by  any 
scenes,  disjoined  and separated  from 
the rest.   his breaks the course of the 
passions, and prevents that communica- 
tion of  the  several  emotions, by which 
one  scene  adds  force  to another,  and 
tranfuses  the pity  and  terror,  which 
it excites, upon  each  succeeding  scene, 
'till the whole produces that rapidity of 
movement,  which  is  peculiar  to  the 
theatre.  How must it extinguish this 
warmth of  affection  to be  entertained, 
on a sudden, with a new action and new 
personages,  no  wise  related  to  the 
former; to find  so  sensible  a  breach 
or vacuity in the course of the passions, 
by means of  this  breach  in  the con- 
nexion of ideas ; and  instead of carrying 
the sympathy of one scene into the fol- 
lowing, to  be obliged every moment, to 
excite a new concern, and take party in 
a new scene of action ? 
'To  return to the comparison of  his- 
tory and epic  poetry, we may conclude, 
from the foregoing reasonings,  hat  as 
[Editions E to N  insert the follow- 
ing paragraph :-But  tho' this rule  of 
unity of  action be common to dramatic 
and'epic poetry ;  we may still  observe 
a  difference betwixt  them, which  may, 
perhaps,  deserve  our  attention.  In 
both  tbese  species  of  composition, 'tis 
requisite the action be  one  and simple, 
in order to preserve the concern or sym- 
pathy  entire  and undirerted ; but  in 
epic or narrative  poetry, this  rule  is 
also  e&ablish'd  upon  another  founda- 
tion, viz. the  necessity, thab is incum- 
bent on every writer, to form some plan 
or design, before  he  enter  on  any dis- 
course or narration, and to comprehend 
his  subject  in some  general aspect  or 
united view, which may be the constant 
object of  his attention.  As the author 
is entirely  lost  in  dramatic  composi- 
tions, and the spectator  supposes him- 
self  to be  really present, at  the actions 22  CONCERNING  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING.  SCEPTICAL  DOUBTS.  28 
SECT.  mere operation of  thought, without  dependence  on  what  ie 
any  where  existent  in the uniyerse.  Though  there  never 
PART  1.  were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths, demonstrated 
by  EUCLID,  would for ever  retain their certainty and  evi- 
dence. 
Matters of  fact, which  are the second  objects of  human 
reason,  are not ascertained in the same manner ;  nor is our 
a  certain  unity is requisite  in all pro- 
ductions, it callnot bo wanting to history 
more than to ally other ; that  in history, 
tlie connexion among tpe several events, 
which unites them into one body, is the 
relation  of  c;tuse  and effect, the  same 
which  takes  place  jn  epic poetry; and 
that in the latter composition, this con- 
nexion is only roquired to be closer and 
more sensiblo, on account of  tho  lively 
imagination and strong passions, which 
must be touched by the poet in his nar- 
ration.  The PELOPONNESIAN  war  is a 
proper subject for  history, the siege of 
ATHENS  for an epic poem, and the death 
of ~LCIBIA~ES  for a tragody. 
As  the difference, therefore, between 
history and epic poetry consists only in 
the degrees  of  connexion,  whicll  bind 
together those sereral events, of  which 
their  subject is  composed,  it  will  be 
difficult,  if not impossible, by worcls, to 
determine  exactly  the  bounds  which 
separate them  from  each other.  That 
is a matter of taste more than of reason- 
ing; and perhaps, this unity may often 
be  discovered  in  a  subject, where,  at 
first  view,  and from  an abstract con- 
sideration,  we  should  least  expect  to 
find it. 
'Tis  evident,  that  HOMER,  in  the 
course of  his narrdtion, exceeds the first 
proposition of  his subject; and that the 
anger  of  ACHILLES,  which  caused  the 
death of  HECTOR,  is not the same with 
that which  pro(1uced  so  many ills  to 
the GREEKS. But the strong connexion 
between tlieso two movements, the quick 
transition  from  one  to  another,  the 
contrast1 between the effects of  concord 
and discord among the princes, and the 
natural  curiosity  which  we  have  to 
see  ACHILLES  in  action,  aft~r  such 
long repose ; all  these  causes  carry on 
the  reader,  and  produce  a  sufficient 
unity in the sul?ject. 
It may be  objected to MILTON,  that 
he has traced up his causes to too great 
a  distance,  and  that  the  rebellion  of 
the angels produces the fall of  man by 
a  train  of  events,  which  is both  very 
long and very casual..  Not to mention 
that the creation  of  the world, which 
he  has  related at length, is no  more 
the  causo of  that catastrophe, than  of 
the  battle  of  PHARSALIA,  or any other 
represented;  this  reason  has no place 
with regard  to the stage; but any dia- 
logue or conversation may be iutroduc'd, 
which,  without  improbability,  might 
have pass'd  in that determinate portion 
of  space,  represented  by  the  theatre. 
Hence in all our ENGLISH  comedies, even 
those of  COXGREVE,  the unity of  action 
is never strictly observ'd ; but the poet 
thinks it sufficient, if his  personages be 
any way related to ewh other, Ly  blood, 
or by living in the same family ; ilnd he 
afterwards introduces them in particular 
scenes, where they display their humors 
and characters, without  much  forward- 
ing the mail:  action.  The double plots 
of  TEI~ENCE  itre  licenses  of  tlic  same 
kitid ; but in a lesser degree.  And tho' 
+is  conduct  be  not  perfectly  regular, 
it is not wliolly nnsuit;iblc to tlir n;ltlllSc 
of  cor:ledy,  1,-liorc tlic  niovonie~it>  ant1 
passions are not rais'd  to such a height 
as in tragedy;  at the  same time, that 
the fiction  or representation  palliates, 
in  some  degree,  such  licenses.  In a 
narrative poem, the first proposition or 
design confines  the author to one sub- 
ject ; and any digressions of this nature 
would, at first ~iew,  be  rejecte J as ab- 
surd and monstrous.  Neither BOCCACE, 
LA  FONTAINE,  nor  any author  of  that 
kind, tho' pleasantry be their chief  ob- 
ject, have ever indulg'd them.] 
1  Contrast  or  contrariety is  a  con- 
nexiol~  among ideas, whiah may, perhaps, 
be considereil, as a misture of causation 
and  rc semblance.  Where  two  objects 
are cont~ary,  the one dc~stroys  the other, 
i. e. is the cause of  its annihilation, and 
the idea of the annihilatioll  of  an object 
iinplitts llic idea of  its former existence. 
evidence of their truth, however great, of  a like nature with  8EcT. 
the foregoing.  The contrary of  every matter of  fact is still -  I:. 
possible ;  because  it  can never  imply  a  contradiction, and  PARTI- 
is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinct- 
ness, as if ever so conformable to reality.  That the sun will 
not  rise  to-morrow  is no  less  intelligible a  proposition, and 
implies no more  contradiction, than- the affiirnation,  that  it 
will rise.  We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demon- 
strate its falsehood.  Were it demonstratively false, it would 
imply a  contradiction,  and  could  never  be  distinctly  con- 
ceived by the mind. 
It may,  therefore,  be  a  subject worthy  of  curiosity,  to 
enquire  what is the nature of  that evidence, which  assures 
us bf any real existence and matter of  fact, beyond the pre- 
sent testimony of  our senses, or the records of  our memory. 
This part of  philosophy,  it  is observable,  has  been  little 
cultivated, either by the ancients or moderns ;  and therefore 
our doubts and errors, in the prosecution of  so important an 
enquiry,  may  be  the  more  excusable ; while  we  march 
through such difficult paths, without any guide or direction. 
They may even  prove  useful, by exciting curiosity, and de- 
stroying that implicit faith and security, which is the bane of 
event, that has ever happened.  But if 
we consider, on the other hand, that all 
these events, the rebellion of the angels, 
the creation of  the world, and the fall 
of  man,  resemble  each  other, in being 
miraculous  and  out  of  the  common 
course  of  nature;  that they are sup- 
posed  to be  contiguous  in  time; and 
thet  being  detached  from  all  other 
events,  and  being  the  onlf  original 
facts,  which  revelation  discovers, they 
strike  the  eye  at once,  and naturally 
recall each other to the thought or ima- 
gination : If we consider all these  cir- 
cumstances, I say,  we  shall find, that 
these  parts of  the  action  have a suffi- 
cient  unity  to make them be  compre- 
hended  in one fable  or narration.  To 
which  we may  add, that the  rebellion 
of  the angels and the fall of  man have 
a peculiar  resemblance,  as being  coun- 
terparts  to each  other, and presenting 
to  the  reader the  same  moral, of  obe- 
dience to our Creator. 
These  loose  hints  I have  thrown 
together, in order to excite the curiosity 
of  pllilosophers,  and  beget  a suspicion 
at least, if  not  a  full persuasion, that 
this  subject  is very copious,  and that 
many  operations  of  the  human  mind 
depend on the connexion or association 
of  ideas, which is here explained.  Par- 
ticularly,  the  sympathy  between  the 
passions and imagination will, perhaps, 
appear remarkable; while we  observe 
that the affections, excited by one  ob- 
ject,  pass  easily  to another  connected 
with it  ; but transfuse themselves with 
difficulty,  or  not at all, along  different 
objects, which have no  manner  of  con- 
nexion  together.  By introducing,  into 
any composition,  personages  and  ac- 
tions, foreign  to each  other, an injudi- 
cious  author loses that communication 
of  emotions,  by  which  alone  he  can 
interest the heart,  and raise  the pas- 
sions to their proper height and period. 
The  full explication of this principle and 
all its consequences would lead us into 
reasonings too profound and too copious 
for this enquiry.  'Tis sufficient, at  pre- 
sent, to have established this conclusion, 
that the three connecting  principles of 
all  ideas  are the  relatiow  of  Resem- 
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SECT.  all reasonSng and free enquiry.  The discovery of  defects in 
, 1v  the  common  philosophy,  if  any such there  be, will  not, I 
PART  I.  presume,  be  a  discouragement,  but  ra'ther  an incitement, 
as is usual, to attempt something more full and satisfactory, 
than has yet been proposed to the public. 
All  reasonings  concerning  matter  of  fact  seem  to  be 
founded  on  the relation  of  Cause  and Efect.  By ineans of 
that relation  alone we  can  go beyond  the evidence of  our 
memory  and  senses.  If you  were  to aslt  a  man,  why  he 
believes  any matter of  fact,  which  is absent; for instance, 
that his friend  is in the country, or in FRANCE  ;  he would 
give you  a reason ;  and this  reasoil  would  be  some  other 
fact ;  as a letter received from him, or the knowledge of  llis 
former resolutions and promises.  A man, finding a watch or 
any other machine  in a desart island, would conclude, that 
there had once been men in that island.  A11  our reasonings 
concerning fact are of the same nature,  And here it is con- 
stantly  supposed,  that there  is  a  connexion  between  the 
present fact and that which is inferred from it.  Were there 
nothing to bind them together, the inference  would  be  en- 
tirely precarious.  The hearing  of  an articulate voice and 
rational discourse  in the dark assures us of  the presence of 
some  person : XThy? because  these are the effects  of  the 
human make and fabric, and closely connected  with it.  If 
we  anatomize  all  the  other reasonings  of  this nature, we 
shall  find, that they are founded on  the relation of  cause 
and effect, and that this relation  is either near  or remote, 
direct or collateral.  Heat and light are collatera~l  effects of 
fire,  and the one  effect  may  justly  be  inferred  from  the 
other. 
If we  would  satisfy ourselves,  therefore,  concerning the 
nature  of  that  evidence,  which  assures  us  of  matters  of 
fact, we  must enquire  how  we  arrive at the knowledge  of 
cause and effect. 
I shall venture to affirm, as a  general proposition, which 
admits of ncl exception, that the knowledge of  this relation 
is not, in any instance, attained  by reasonings & priori ;  but 
arises  entirely  from  experience,  when  we  find,  that  any 
particular  objects are constantly conjoined  with each other. 
Let an  object  be  presented  to  a  man  of  ever  so  strong 
natural reason and abilities;  if  that object  be  entirely new 
to him, he will  not be able, by the most  accurate examina- 
tion of its sensible qualities, to discover  any of its causes or  SECT. 
effects.  ADAM,  though his rational faculties be supposed, at 2.- 
the very first, entirely perfect,  could  not have inferred from  PART  L 
the fluidity, and transparency of  water, that it would  suffo- 
cate him, or from the light and warmth of  fire, that it would 
consume  him.  No  object  ever  discovers,  by  the qualities 
which  appear to the  senses, either  the causes  which  pro- 
duced it, or the effects which  will arise from it ;  nor can our 
reason,  unassisted  by experience, ever  draw any  inference 
concerning real existence and matter of fact. 
This  proposition,  that  cazLses  and  e$ects  are discoverable, 
not by ,reason, but by experience, will readily be admitted with 
regard to such objects, as we  remember to have once been 
altogether unknown  to us;  since we  must be  conscious  of 
the utter inability, which we  then lay under, of  foretelling, 
what would arise from them.  Present two smooth pieces of 
marble to a man, who has no tincture of  natural philosophy ; 
he will never  discover,  that they will  adhere together,  in 
such a manner as to require  great force to separate them in 
a direct line,  while  they  make  so  small a  resistance  to a 
lateral pressure.  Such events, as bear little analogy to the 
common  course of  nature, are also  readily confessed  to be 
known only by experience ;  nor  does  any illan  imagine that 
the explosion of  gunpowder,  or the attraction of  a loadstone, 
could  ever  be  discovered  by  arguments  b priori.  In like 
manner, when an effect is supposed to depend upon an in- 
tricate machinery or  secret structure of  parts, we  make  no 
difficulty in attributing all our knowledge of it to experience. 
Who will assert, that he can  give  the ultimate reason, why 
milk  or bread  is proper  nourishment  for  a  man, not for a 
lion or a tyger? 
But the same truth may not appear, at  first sight, to have 
the same evidence with regard to events, which have become 
familiar to us from our first  appearance in the world, which 
bear  a  close  analogy  to the whole  course  of  nature,  and 
which  are supposed  to depend  on  the  simple  qualities  of 
objects, without any secret structure of  parts.  We are apt 
to imagine, that we could discover  these effects by the inere 
operation of our reason, without experience.  We fancy. that 
were we brought, on a sudden, into this world, we  could  at 
first have  inferred, tliat one  Billiard-ball  would  communi- 
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SECT.  not  to have waited  for  the event,  in order  to pronounce 
IV ,  with certainty concerning it.  Such is the influence of  cus- 
PUTL  tom,  that,  where  it is  strongest,  it  noti  only  covers  our 
natural  ignorance, but even  conceals  itself, and  seems not 
to take  place,  merely  because  it  is  found  in the highest 
degree. 
But to convince  us, that all the laws  of  nature, and all 
the operations of  bodies  without exception, are known only 
by experience, the following reflections may, perhaps, suffice. 
Were any object presented  to us,  and were  we  required  to 
pronounce concerning the effect, whioh  will  result  from it, 
without consulting past  observation ;  after what manner, I 
beseech you, must the mind proceed  in this operation P  It 
must invent or imagine some  event, which it ascribes to the 
object as its effect ;  and it is plain  that this invention must 
be entirely arbitrary.  The mind can never possibly find the 
effect in the supposed  cause, by the most  accurate scrutiny 
and examination.  For the effect  is  totally different  from 
the cause, and consequently can never  be  discovered  in it. 
Motion in the second  Billiard-ball  is a  quite distinct event 
from motion in the first; nor  is there any thing in the one 
to suggest the smallest hint of  the other.  A stone or piece 
of  metitl  raised  into the air, and left without any support, 
immediately falls : But to consider  the matter d  priori,  is 
there  any thing we  discover  in  this situation, which  can 
beget the idea of a downward, rather than an upward, or any 
other motion, in the stone or metal? 
And as the first imagination  or invention of  a  particular 
effect, in all natural operations, is arbitrary, where we con- 
sult not experience;  so  must we  also  esteem  the supposed 
tye or connection between  the cause and effect, which binds 
them together,  and renders  it iinpossible,  that any  other 
effect could result from the operation of  that cause.  When 
I see, for instance, a Billiard-ball  moving  in a straight line 
towards  another;  even  suppose motion  in the second ball 
should by accide~~t  he suggested to me, as the result of their 
contact or  impulse;  may I not  conceive,  that a  hundred 
different events might as well follow from that cause Y  May 
not both these balls remain  at absolute rest ?  May not the 
first ball return in a straight line, or leap off from the  second 
in  any line  or direction?  All  the  suppositions  are  con- 
sistent and conceivsble.  Why then should we give the pre- 
ference to one, which is no more  consist en^  or conceivable  SECT. 
than the rest?  All  our reasonings  ii  p~iM-i  will never  be .  Iv 
able to shew us any foundation for this preference.  PART  I. 
In a word, then, every effect  is a  distinct event from its 
cause.  It could not,  therefore, be  discovered  in the cause, 
and the first invention or conception of  it, b priori, must be 
entirely arbitrary.  And  even  after it is suggested, the con- 
junction of it with the cause must  appear equally arbitrary ; 
since there are always many other effects, which, to reason, 
must seem fully as consistent  and  natural.  In  vain, there- 
fore, should we  pretend  to determine  any aingle  event, or 
infer any cause or effect, without  the assistance of  observa- 
tion and experience. 
Hence  we  may discover the reason, why no philosopher, 
who  is  rational  and  modest, has  ever  pretended  to assign 
the  ultimate  cause  of  any  natural  operation,  or  to show 
distinctly  the  action  of  that  power,  which  produces  any 
single effect in the universe. It is confessed, that the ut~llost 
effort of  human reason is, to reduce  the principles, produc- 
tive  of  natural phsenomena, to a  greater simplicity, and to 
resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes, 
by means of reasonings from analogy, experiel~ce,  and obser- 
ration.  But  as to the causes  of  these  general causes, we 
should in vain attempt their discovery ;  nor shall we ever be 
able  to satisfy  ourselves,  by  any  particular  explication of 
them.  These  ultimate  springs  and principles  are totally 
shut up  from  human  curiosity  and  enquiry.  Elasticity, 
gravity, cohesion of  parts, communication of  motion by im- 
pulse ;  these are probably the ultimate causes and principles 
which we shall ever discover in nature ;  and we  may esteem 
ourselves  sufficiently  happy,  if,  by  accurate  enquiry  and 
reasoning, we can trace up the particular  phzerlomena to, or 
near to, these general principles.  The most  perfect  philo- 
sophy of  the natural kind only staves off  our  ignorance  a 
little longer : As perhaps the most perfect philosophy of  the 
moral or metaphysical  kind  serves  only to discover  larger 
portions  of  it.  Thus the observation  of  human  blindness 
and weakness  is the result of  all philosophy,  and meets us, 
at every  turn,  in  spite  of  our  endeavours  to  elude  or 
avoid  it. 
Nor is geometry, when taken into the asristsnce of natural 
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reasoning, for which  it is so justly celebrated.  Every part 
PUT I.  of  mixed  mathematics proceeds  upon  the supposition,  that 
certain  laws  are established  by  nature  in  her  operations ; 
and abstract reasonings are employed, either to assist expe- 
rience in the discovery of  these laws, or to determine their 
influence in particular instances, where it depends upon any 
precise degree of distance and quantity.  Thus, it is a law of 
motion, discovered  by experience, that the moment or force 
of any body in motion is in the  compound ratio or proportion 
of its solid contents and its velocity;  and consequently, that 
a small force may remove  the greatest  obstacle or raise the 
greatest weight, if, by any contrivance or machinery, we can 
encrease the velocity of  that force, so as to make it an over- 
match for its antagonist.  Geometry assists us in the appli- 
cation of this law, by giving us the just dimensions of  all the 
parts and figures, which  can  enter into any species  of  ma- 
chine ;  but still the discovery of the law itself is owing merely 
to experience, and all the abstract reasonings in the world 
could  never lead  us one  step towards the knowledge  of  it. 
When we reason & priori, and consider merely any object or 
cause, as it appears to the mind, independent of  all observa- 
tion, it never could suggest to us the notion of  any distinct 
object, such as its effect ;  much less, shew us the inseparable 
and inviolable connection  between  them.  A man must be 
very sagacious, who could discover by reasoning, that crystal 
is the effect of heat, and ice of cold, without being previously 
acquainted with the operation of these qualities. 
PART 11. 
But we  have  not, yet, attained any tolerable  satisfaction 
with regard to the question first proposed.  Each solution 
still gives rise to a new question as difficult as the foregoing, 
and leads  us on  to  farther  enquiries.  When it is asked, 
What is the nature of  all  our reasonings concerning  matter  of 
fact  ?  the proper  answer seems to be, that they ere  fvunded 
on the relation of  cause and effect.  When again it is asked, 
What is the foundatio9a  of  all  our  reasonings  and  conclusions 
concerning that relatiofa? it may be  replied  in one word, Ex- 
PERIENCE.  But if  we  still carry on  our sifting humour, and 
ask, What is the foundation  of all conclusions~rom  experience ? 
this implies a new question, which  may be of  more  difficult 
solution ana explication.  Philosophers, that give themselves  SECT. 
ats  of  superior wigdom  and sufticiency, have  a  hard task, ,  lTV. , 
when they encounter persons of  inquisitive dispositions, who  PART  11, 
push them from every corner, to which they retreat, and who 
are sure at last to bring them to some  dangerous dilemma.. 
The best expedient to prevent this confusion, is to be modest 
in our pretensions ;  and even  to discover the difficulty our- 
selves  before it is objected  to us.  By this means, we  day 
.make a kind of merit of our very ignorance. 
I shall content myself, in this section, with an easy task, 
*and  shall pretend only to  give a negative answer to the ques- 
tion  here  proposed.  I say then, that, even  after we  have 
experience of  the operations of  cause and effect, our conclu- 
sions from that experience  are not  founded on reasoning, or 
any  process  of  the understanding.  This answer  we  must 
endeavour, both to explain and to defend. 
It must certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us at a 
great distance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only 
the knowledge-of a few superficial qualities of objects ;  while 
she conceals from us those  powers  and principles, on which 
the influence  of  these objects entirely depends.  Our senses 
inform  us of  the  colour, weight, and consistence  of  bread ; 
but  neither  sense nor reason can  ever inform  us of  those 
qualities, which fit it for the nourishment  and support of  a 
human body.  Sight or feeling conveys an idea of the actual 
motion  of  bodies ;  but as to that wonderful  force or power, 
which would carry on a moving body for ever in a continued 
change of place, and which bodies never lose but by commu- 
nicating  it  to  others;  of  this  we  cannot  form the most 
distant  conception.  But notwithstanding this ignorance  of 
natural powers  and principles, we always presume, when we 
see like sensible qualities, that they have like secret powers, 
and expect, that effects, similar to those which we  have es- 
perienced, will  follow from them.  If a  body of  like colour 
and consistence  with  that bread,  which we  have  formerly 
eat, be  presented to us, we make no scruple of  repeating the 
experiment,  and  foresee,  with  certainty,  like  nourishment 
and support.  Now this is a process of the mind or thought, 
of  which I would  willingly  know  the  foundation.  It  is 
The  word,  Power,  is  here  used  gire additional evidence to this  argu- 
in  a  loose  and  popular  sense.  The  ment.  See Sec. 7.  [This note was added 
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.  between  the sensible  qualities  and th.  secret powers;  and 
PART  11.  consequently, that the mind is not led to form such a con- 
clusion concerning their constant and regular  conjunction, 
by any thing which it knows  of  their nature.  As  to past 
Ezperience, it can be allowed  to give direct and certain infor- 
mation of those precise  objects only, and that precise period 
of time, which fell under its cognizance : But why this expe- 
rience should be extended to future times, and to other ob- 
jects, which for aught we  know, may be only in appearance 
similar; this is the main  question  on which I would  insist. 
The bread, which I  formerly eat, nourished me ;  that is, a body 
of such sensible qualities, was, at  that  time, endued with such 
secret powers : But does it follow, that other bread must also 
nourish me at  another time, and that like sensible qualities 
must always be attended with like secret powers?  Tlie con- 
sequence  seems  nowise  necessary.  At  least,  it  must  be 
acknowledged,  that there is here a  consequence drawn by 
the mind; that there is a certain step taken ;  a  process  of 
thought,  and an inference,  which  wants  to be  explained. 
These two propositions  are far from being the same, I  have 
found  that such an, object has always been  attended with such an 
efect,  and I  foresee, that other objects, which are, in appearance, 
similar, will  be  attended  with similar  efects.  _I  shall allow, 
if you please, that the one proposition may justly be inferred 
from the other: I know in fact, that it always  is inferred. 
But  if  you  insist, that the inference is made by a chain of 
reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning.  The eon- 
nexion between these propositions is not intuitive.  There is 
required a medium, which may enable the niind to draw such 
an inference, if  indeed it be  drawn by reasoning and argu- 
ment.  What that medium  is, I must  confess,  passes  my 
comprehension ;  and it is incumbent  on those to produce it, 
who assert, that it really exists, and is the origin  of  all our 
conclwsienc! concerning matter of  fact. 
This negative argument must certainly, in process of time, 
become altogether convincing, if many penetrating and able 
philosophers shall turn their enquiries this way;  and no one 
be ever able to discover  any connecting proposition br inter- 
mediate step, which supports the understanding in this con- 
clusion.  But as the question  is yet new, every reader may 
not trust  so  far  to  his  own  penetration,  as  to conclude, 
because an argument escapes his enquiry,  that therefore it  SECT. 
does not really exist.  For this reason it may be requisite to  , 
venture upon a more difficult task; and enumerating all the  PART  IIa 
branches of human knowledge, endeavour to shew, that nolie 
of them can afford such an argument. 
A11 reasonings may be divided into two kinds, namely de- 
monstrative reasoning, or that concerning relations of ideas, 
and moral1 reasoning, or tllst concerning matter of fact and 
existence.  That there  are  no demoi~strative  arguments in 
the case, seems evident ;  since  it implies  no  coi~tradiction, 
that the course of  nature  may  change,  and that an object, 
seemingly  like  those  which  we  have experienced,  may kc 
attended with different or contrary effects.  May I not clearly 
and distinctly conceive, that a body, falling from the clouds, 
and which, in all other respects, resembles snow, has yet the 
taste of salt or feeling of  fire ?  Is there any more intelligible 
proposition than to affirm,  that all the trees will flourish in 
DECEMBER  and JANUARY,  and decay in MAY  and JUNE  ?  Now 
whatever  is  intelligible,  and  can  be  distinctly  conceived, 
implies no contradiction,  an2 can  never  be proved false by 
any demonstrative argument or abstract reasoning d priori. 
If we be, therefore, engaged  by arguments to put trust in 
past  experience,  and  make it the standard of  our  future 
judgment,  these arguments must be probable  only, or such 
as regard matter of fact and real  existence, according to the 
division above mentioned.  But that there is no argument of 
this kind, must appear, if  our  explication  of that species of 
reasoning be admitted as solid  and satisfactory.  We have 
said, that all argume~ts  concerning existence are founded on 
the relation of  cause and effect ;  that our knowledge of that 
relation is derived entirely from experience ;  and that all our 
experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition, that 
the future will be  conformable to the past.  To endeavour, 
therefore, the proof of this last supposition by probable argu- 
ments, or arguments regarding  existence, must be evider.tly 
going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the 
very point in question. 
In  reality, all arguments from experience are founded on 
the similarity, which we discover among natural objects, and 
by which we are induced to expect  effects  similar to those, 
which  we  have  found  to follow  from  such  objects.  And 
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'!'I  pute the authority of experience, or to reject that great guide 
PART  11.  of human life; it  may  surely  be  allowed  a philosopher to 
have so much curios it^. at least, as to examine the principle 
of  human nature, which  gives this mighty authority to ex- 
perience, and makes us draw advantage from that similarity, 
which  nature  has placed  among  different  objects.  From 
causes, which appear similar, we  expect similar effects.  This 
is the sum of  all our experimental conclusions.  Now it seems 
evident, that,  if  this conclusion were  formed by  reason, it 
would be ass  perfect at first, and upon  one instance, as after 
ever so  long  a  course  of  experience.  But the case is far 
otherwise.  Nothing so like as eggs ;  yet no one, on account 
of  this  appearing similarity,  expects  the same  taste  and 
relish in all of  them.  It  is only after a long course of uni- 
form experiments in any kind, that we  attain a firm reliance 
and sdeurity with regard to a particular event.  Now where 
is that process of reasoning, which, from one instance, draws 
a conclusion, so  different  fro111  that which it infers from a 
hundred instances, that are nowise different from that single 
one?  This question I propose as much  for the sake of in- 
formation,  as with  an  intention of  raising  difficulties.  I 
cannot find, I cannot  imagine  any  such reasoning.  But I 
keep  my  mind  still  open to  instruction;  if  any  one  will 
vouchsafe to bestow it on me. 
Should it be said, that, from a  number of uniform experi- 
ments, we infer  a  connection between  the sensible qualities 
and the secret powers;  this, I must confess, seems the same 
difficulty,  couched  in  different  terms.  The  question  still 
recurs, on what process of argument this inference is founded ? 
Where is the medium, the interposing ideas, which join pro- 
positions so very wide  of  each  other?  It  is confessed, that 
the colour, consistence, and other sensible qualities of bread 
appear  not, of  themselves, to have  any connexion with  the 
secret powers  of  nourishment  and support.  For otherwise 
-we could infer these secret powers from the first appearance 
of  these  sensible qualities,  without  the aid of  experience ; 
contrary to the sentiment  of  all philosophers, and contrary 
to plain  matter of  fact.  Here then  is our natural state of 
ignorance with regard  to the powers  and  influence of  all 
objects.  How is this remedied by experience ?  It  only shews 
us a number of uniform effects, resulting from certain objects, 
and teaches us,  that those  particular  objects, at that par-  SECT. 
titular  time,  were  endowed  with  auch  powers  and forces. 
When a new object, endowed with similar sehsible qualities,  PART  11. 
is produced, we  expect  similar  powers  and forces, and look 
for a like effect.  From a body of like colour and consistence 
with bread, we  expect  like nourishment  and  support.  But 
this surely is a step or progress of  the mind, which wants to 
be  explained.  When a man  says, I have found,  in all past 
instances,  such  sensible  qualities  conjoined  with  such  secret 
powers:  And  when  he  says,  similar  sensible  qualities will 
always be  conjoined with similar secret powers ;  he is not guilty 
of a tautology, nor are these  propositions in any respect the 
same.  You say that the one proposition is an inference from 
the other.  But you  must  confess that the inference is not 
intuitive ;  neither is it  demonstrative : Of  what nature is it 
then?  To say it is  experimental, is begging the question. 
For all inferences from experience suppose, as their founda- 
tion, that the future will resemble the past, and that similar 
powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities.  If 
there be any suspicion, that the course of nature may change, 
and that the past nlay be  no  rule  for  the future, all experi- 
ence becomes  useless,  and can  give  rise to no inference or 
conclusion.  It  is impqssible, therefore, that any arguments 
from experience can  prove  this  resemblance  of  the past to 
the future; since  all  these  arguments are founded  on the 
sul?~osition  of that resemblance.  Let  the  course  of  things 
be allowed hitherto ever so regular ;  that alone, without some 
new argument or inference, proves  not, that, for the future, 
it will continue so.  In vain do you pretend to have learned 
the nature of bodies from your past experience.  Their secret 
nature, and consequently, all their effects and influence, may 
change, without any change in their sensible qualities.  This 
happens sometimes, and with regard to some objects : Why 
may it not happen  always,  and  with regard to all objects ? 
What logic, what process of  argument  secures you against 
this supposition ?  My  practice, you  say, refutes my  doubts. 
But you mistake the purport of  my question.  As an agent, 
I am quite satisfied in the point ;  but as a philosopher, who 
bas some share of  auriosity, I will not say scepticism, 5  want 
to learn the foundation  of  this  inference.  No  reading, no 
enquiry has.yet been able to remove my difficulty, or give me 
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PART  11.  at  least, by  this means, be sensible of  our ignorance,  if  we do 
not augment our knowledge. 
I must confess, that a Inan is guilty of unpardonable arro- 
gance, who concludes, because  an  argument has escaped his 
own investigation, that therefore  it does  not really exist.  I 
must  also  confess, that, though  all the learned, for  several 
ages,  should have  employed  themselves  in  fruitless search 
upon any subject, it may still,  perhaps, be  rash to conclude 
positively, that the subject  must, therefore, pass  all human 
comprehension.  Even though we  examine all the sources of 
our knowledge, and conclude them  unfit for such a subject, 
there may still remain a  suspicion, that the enumeration is 
not compleat,  or the examination not accurate.  But with 
regard to the present subject, there are some considerations, 
which  seem to remove  all this accusation  of  arrogance or 
suspicion of mistake. 
It is certain, that the most  ignorant and stupid peasants, 
-nay  infants, nay even brute  beasts,  improve by  experience, 
and learn  the qualities of  natural objects, by observing the 
effects, which result from them.  When  a cbild has felt the 
sensation of pain froin touching the flame of a candle, he will 
be  careful not to put  his hand near any candle; but will 
expect a similar effect from  a  cause, which  is similar in its 
sensible qualities and appearance.  If you assert, therefore, 
that the understanding of the child is led into this conclusion 
by  any process of  argument or  ratiocination, I may justly 
.  require you  to produce  that  argument;  nor  have  you  any 
pretence to refuse so equitable a  demand.  You cannot say, 
that the argument is abstruse, and may possibly escape your 
enquiry ;  since you confess, that it is obvious to the capacity 
of a inere infant.  If you  hesitate,  therefore,  a  moment, or 
if, after  reflection, you  produce  any  intricate  or  profound 
argument, you, in a manner, give  up the question, and con- 
fess, that it is not reasoning which engages us to suppose the 
past resembling the future, and to expect similar effects from 
causes, which are, to appearance, similar.  This is the pro- 
position which I intended  to enforce in the present section. 
If I be  right, I pretend  not to have  made  any mighty dis- 
covery.  And if I be  wrong, I must  acknowledge myself to 
be indeed a very backward  scholar ;  since I cannot now dis- 
c-  an  argument, which, it seems,  was perfectly familiar  SECT. 
to me, long before I was out of my cradle.  IV.  - 
PABT  11. 
SECT.  V.-Sceptical  Solution of  these Doubts. 
PART  I. 
THE  passion  for  philosophy,  like  that for  religion,  seems 
liable  to  this  inconvenience, that,  though it aims  at the 
correction  of  our manners, and extirpation of  our  vices, it 
may  only  serve,  by  imprudent  management,  to  foster  a 
predominant  inclination,  and  push  the  mind,  with  more 
determined  resolution,  towards  that  side,  which  already 
draws too much, by the biass  and propensity of the natural 
temper.  It  is certain, that, while we  aspire  to  the magna- 
nimous firmness of  the  philosophic  sage; and endeavour  to 
confine our pleasures  altog~~ther  within  our  own  minds, we 
may, at last, render our philosophy like  that of  EPICTETUS, 
and other Stoics, only a  more  refined  system of  selfishness, 
and reason ourselves out of  all virtue, as well  as  social en- 
joyment.  While  we  study  with  attention  the  vanity  of 
human  life, and  turn  all our  thoughts towards the empty 
and transitory nature of riches and honours, we are, perhaps, 
all the while, flattering our natural indolence, which, hating 
the bustle of  the  world, and  drudgery of  businees, seeks a 
pretence  of  reason,  to  give  itself  a  full  and  uncontrouled 
indulgence.  There is, however,  obe  species of  philosophy, 
which seems little liable to this inconvenience, and t,hat be- 
cause 'it  st,rikes in with  no  disorderly passion of  the human 
mind, nor can iilingle itself with any natural affection or pro- 
pensity ;  and that is the ACADEMIC  or SCEPTICAL  philosophy. 
The academics always talk of  doubt  arrd  suspense of  judg- 
ment, of danger in hasty determinations, of confining to very 
narrow  bounds  the  enquiries  of  the understanding, and of 
renouncing all speculations which lie  not within the limits 
of  common  life  and  practice.  Nothing,  therefore,  can  be 
more contrary than such a philosophy to the supine iildolence 
of the mind, its rash arrogance, its lofty pretensions,  and its 
superstitious  credulity.  Every  passion  is  mortified  by  it, 
except the love of truth ; and that  never is, nor  can 
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PART  1.  groundless reproach  and obloquy.  Rut,  perhaps,  the very 
circumstance, which renders it so, innocent, is what chiefly 
exposes it to the public hatred and resentment.  Bydatter- 
ing no irregular passion, it gains few  partizans :  By oppog- 
ing so  many 'vices and follies, it raises to itself  abundance 
of  enemies,  who  stigmatize  it  as  libertine,  profane,  and 
irreligious. 
Nor need we fear, that this philosophy, while it  endeavours 
to limit our enquiries to common life, should ever undernline 
the reasonings of  common life, and carry its doubts so far as 
to destroy all  action, as well  as  speculation.  Nature will 
a!ways  maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over  any 
abstract reasoning whatsoever.  Though we should conclude, 
for instance, as in the  foregoing  section, that, in all reason- 
ings from  experience,  there is  a  step talien by the mind, 
which  is not supported by any argumept or  process of  the 
understanding,  there  is  nu  danger,  that these reasonings, 
on which almost all knowledge depends, will ever be affected 
by such a discovery.  If the mind be not engaged  by argu- 
ment  to make this step, it must  be  induced by some  other 
principle of  equal weight  and authority ;  and that principle 
will preserve its influence as long as human nature remains 
the same.  What that principle  is, may well  be worth  the 
pains of enquiry. 
Suppose  a  person,  though  endowed  with  the strongest 
faculties of reason and reflection, to be brought on a sudden 
into this world;  he would,  indeed,  immediately  observe  a 
continual  succession  of  objects,  and  one  event  following 
another; but he would  not be  able  to discover  any thing 
farther.  He would not,  at first, by  any reasoning, be  able 
to reach the idea of  cause  and  effect ;  since  the particular 
powers, by which all natural operations are performed, never 
appear  to the  senses ;  nor  is  it  reasonable  to  conclude, 
merely because one event, in one instance, precedes another, 
that therefore  the  one  is  the  cause,  the other the effect. 
Their conjur ction may be  arbitrary and casual.  There may 
be no reason to infer the existence  of  one from the appear- 
ance of the other.  And  in a  word, such a person, without 
more experience, could never  employ his conjecture  or rea- 
soning concerning any matter of  fact, or be  assured  of  any 
thing beyond what was immediately present  to his wemory  SECT.  V. 
and senses.  '- 
Suppose agsin, that he has acquired more experience, and  PARTI. 
has lived so long in the world  as to have  observed  similar 
objects or events to be  constantly conjoined together ;  what 
is  the  consequence  of  this  experience?  He immedibtely 
infers the existence of one object from the appearance of the 
other.  Yet he has not, by all his experience, acquired  any 
idea  or  knowledge  of  the secret  power, by which the one 
object produces the other ;  nor  is it, by any process of rea- 
soiling, he is engaged  to draw this inference.  But still he 
finds hiinself determined  to draw it : And though he should 
be  convinced,  that his understanding  has  no  part in the 
operation, he would nevertheless continue in the samecourse 
of thinking.  There is some other principle, which determines 
him to form such a conclusion. 
This  principle  is CUSTON  or  HABIT.  For wherever  the 
repetition of  any particular  act or operation produces a pro- 
pensity to renew the same  act or  operation, without being 
impelled by any reasoning or process of  the understanding ; 
we always say, that this propensity is the effect  of  Custom. 
By employing that word, we pretend  not  to have given the 
ultimate reason  of  such a propensity.  We only point out a 
principle  of  human  nature,  which  is  universally  acknow- 
ledged, and which is well known by its effects.  Perhaps, we 
can  push  our  enquiries  no  farther, or pretend  to give the 
cause of this cause; but must rest contented with it as the 
ultimate principle, which we  can assign, of  all  our conclu- 
sions from experience.  It is  sufficient  satisfaction, that we 
can go so  far ;  without repining  at the narrowness  of  our 
faculties, because  they will  carry us no  farther.  And it is 
certain we  here  advance  a  very intelligible  proposition  at 
least, if not a true one, when we  assert, that, after the con- 
stant conjunction of two objects, heat and flame, for instilnce, 
weight and  solidity, we  are  determined  by custoin alone to 
expect  the  one  from  the appearance  of  the  other.  This 
hypothesis seems even the only one, which explains the diffi- 
culty, why we draw, from a thousand instances, an inference, 
which we are not able to draw from  one instance, that is, in 
no respect, different from them.  Reason is incapable of any 
such variation.  The condusions, which  it draws from coil- 
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SECT.  surveying  all  the  circles  in  the  universe.  But  no  man,  v  . ; having  seen  only  one  body move  after  being  impelled by 
PARTI- another, could infer, that every other body will move after a 
like impulse.  A11  inferences  from experience, therefore, are 
effects of custom, not of reas0ning.l 
Nothing  is more  usual  than  for 
writers, even on moral, political, or phy- 
sical  subjects,  to  distinguish  between 
reason and experience, and to  suppose, 
that these species of  argumentation are 
entirely different from each other.  The 
former are taken for the mere result of 
our intellectui~l  faculties, which, by con- 
*idering (G  priori the  nature of  things, 
and  examining  the  effects, that  must 
follow  from  their  operation,  establish 
particular  principles  of  science  and 
philosophy.  The  latter  are  supposed 
to be  derived  entirely from  sense  and 
observation,  by which  we  learn  what 
has actually  resulted  from the  opera- 
tion of particular objects, and are  thence 
able to infer, what will, for  the future, 
result from  them.  Thus, for instance, 
the ,limitations and restraints of  civil 
government,  and a  legal  constitution, 
may  be  defended,  either from  reason, 
which reflectiw on the great frailty and 
corruption  of  human  nature,  teaches, 
that no man can  safely be  trusted with 
unlimited authority ;  or from experience 
and history,  which  inform  us  of  the 
enormous  abuses,  that  ambition,  in 
every age and country, has  been  found 
to make of so imprudent a confidence. 
The same distinction between  reason 
and experience is maintained in all our 
deliberation8 concerning the conduct  of 
life ; while  the experienced  statesman, 
general,  physician,  or  merchant  is 
trusted and followed ; and  the unprac- 
tised  novice,  with  whatever  natural 
talents endowed, neglected and despised. 
Though it be  allowed, that reason may 
form  very  plausible  conjectures  with 
regard  to the consequences  of  such  a 
particular  conduct in  such  particular 
circumstances ; it is still supposed im- 
perfect, without the assistance of  expe- 
rience,  which  is  alone  able  to  give 
stability and certainty ta the  maxims, 
derived from study and reflection. 
But notwithstanding  that  this  dis- 
tinction  be  thus  universally  received, 
both in the active ant1 speculative scenes 
of  life, I shall not scruple to pronounce, 
that  it is,  at  bottom,  erroneous,  at 
least, superficial. 
If  we  examine  thosc  arguments 
which,  in  any of  the  sciences  above- 
mentioned, are supposed to be the mere 
effects of  reasoning and reflection, thcy 
will be  found  to  terminate, at last, in 
some  general  principle  or  conclusion, 
for which we can  assign  no reason but 
observation and experience.  The only 
difference  between  them  and  those 
maxims,  which  are vulgarljr  esteemed 
the result  of  pure experience, is, that 
the former cannot be  established with- 
out some process  of  thought, and some 
reflection on what we have  observed, in 
order  to distinguish its circumstiinces, 
and trace  its  consequences : Whereas 
in the latter, the  experienced event is 
exactly and fully similar t,o  that which 
we infer as the result of  any particular 
situation.  The history of a TIBERIUS  or 
a NERO  makes  us dread a like tyranny, 
were  our  monarchs freed from  the re- 
straints of laws and senatss :  But theob- 
servation of any fraud or cruelty in pri- 
vate life  is suffiicient, with the aid of  a 
little thought, to give us the same appre- 
hension ;  while it serves as  an instance of 
the general corruption of human nature, 
and shews us the danger which we must 
incur by reposing  an entire confidenw 
in mankind.  In  both  cases, it is expe- 
rience which  is ultimately the founda- 
tion of our inference and conclusion. 
There is no man  so young and unex- 
perienced,  as not  to have formed, frop! 
observation,  many  general  and  just 
maxims  concerning  human  affairs  and 
the coilduct of life ; but it must be con- 
fessed, that, when  a  man comes to put, 
these in  practice, he will  be  extremely 
liable to  arror,  till  time  and- f'irthcr 
experience both  enlarge these  maxims, 
and  teach  him  their  proper  use  and 
application.  In every  situation or in- 
cident, therp  are  many  particular  and 
~eemingly  'ininute circumstances, which 
the man  of  greatest, talents is, at first, 
apt  to  overlook,  though  on  them  the 
justness of  his  conclusions,  pnd  conse- 
quently  the  prudence  of  his  conduct, 
entirely depend.  Not to mention, that, 
to a  young beginner, the general obser- 
vations and  maxims  occur  not  always 
on the proper  occasions, nor can be im- 
mediately  applied  with  due  calmness 
Custom, then, is the great guide of human life.  It is that  sEcT. 
principle alone, which  renders  our  experience  useful to us, .A, 
and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of  events  PARTI. 
with those which have appeared  in the past.  Without, the 
influence of custom, we  should be  entirely ignorant of  every 
matter of  fact, beyond what  is  immediately present  to the 
memory and senses.  We should  never know  how to adjust 
means to ends, or to employ our natural powers in the pro- 
duction of  any effect.  There would  be  an end  at once  of 
all action, as well as of the chief part of speculation. 
But  here  it may be  proper  to remark, that though  our 
conclusions from  experience  carry  us  beyond  our  memory 
and senses, and assure us of  matters of fact, which happened 
in the most distant places and most  remote  ages ;  yet some 
fact must always be present  to the senses or  memory, from 
which we may first proceed in drawing these conclusions.  A 
man,  who bhould  find in a  desert country the remains of 
pompous  buildings, would  conclude, that the  count*  had, 
in  ancient  times, been  cultivated  by civilized inhabitants ; 
but did nothing of  this nature occur to him, he could never 
form  such  an  inference.  We learn the events  of  former 
ages from history;  but then we must peruse the volumes, in 
which this instruction is contained, and thence carry up our 
inferences from  one  testimony to  another, till we  arrive at 
the eye-witnesses and spectators of these distant events.  In 
a word, if  we  proceed  not  upon  some  fact, present  to the 
memory  or  senses, our reasonings  would  'be  merely hypo- 
thetical; and however the  particular  links  might  be  con- 
qnected with each other, the whole chain of  inferences would 
have nothing to support it, nor  could we  ever, by its means, 
arrive at  the knowledge of any real existence.  If I ask, why 
ydu believe any particular matter  of  fact, which  you relate, 
you must tell me some reason ;  and this reason will be some 
other fact, connected  with  it.  But  as you  cannot  proceed 
after this manner, in infiniturn, you must at l~st  terminate in 
some fact, which  is present  to  your  memory or senses ;  or 
must allow that your belief is entirely without foundation. 
What then  is  the conclusion  of  the  whole  matter?  A 
qnd distinction.  The truth is, an unex-  racter  to any one, we mean it only in 8 
pericnced reasoner could be  no reasoner  comparative  sense,  and  slippose  him 
at  all,  were  he  absolutely  unexpe-  possessed  of  experience,  in  a  emaller 
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SECT.  simple  one ;  though,  it  must  be  confessed,  pretty  remote 
from the common  theories  of  philosophy.  All  belief  of 
PARTI*  matter of fact or rtd  existence is derived merely from some 
object, present  to the  memory or  senses, and  a  cust,omary 
conjunction  between  that  and  some  other  object.  Or  in 
other words ;  llaviug found, in many instances, that any two 
kinds of objects, flame and heat, snow and cold, have always 
been conjoined together;  if flame or snow be  presented anew 
to the seuses, the-mind  is  carried  by customto expect heat 
or  cold, and  to believe,  that such a  quality does  exist, and 
will discover itself  upon  a  nearer  approach.  This belief is 
the necessary result  of  placing  the mind  in such  circum- 
stances.  It is  an  operation  of  the soul,  when  we  are  so 
situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of  love, when 
we receive benefits : or hatred, when we  meet with injuries. 
All these operations are a species of natural instincts, which 
no reasoning or process  of the thought  and  understanding 
is able, either to produce, or to prevent. 
At this point, it mould be very allowable for us to stop our 
philosophical researches.  In most  questions, we can never 
make a single  step farther; and in all  questions, we  must 
terminate here at last, after  our  most  restless  and curious 
enquiries.  But still our  curiosity will  be  pardonable, per- 
haps commendable, if it  carry us on to still farther researches, 
and make  us  examine  more  accurately the  nature of  this 
belief,  and of  the customary conjunction, whence it is derived. 
By  this means  we  may  meet  with  some  explications and 
analogies, that will give satisfaction ;  at  least to such as love 
the abstract sciences, and can be  entertained with specula- 
tions, which, however  accurate, may still  retain a degree of 
doubt and uncertainty.  As  to readers  of  a  different taste ; 
the reinaining part of this section is not calculated for them, 
and the following enquiries may well  be  understood, though 
it be neglected. 
PART 11. 
Nothing is more free than t,he inlagination of  man ;  a1u.l 
though it  callnot exceed that original stock of ideas, furnished 
by the inier~al  aiid  external st:nses,  it has unlimited power 
of  mixing,  compounding,  separating,  and  dividing  these 
ideas, in all the varieties of  fiction and vision.  It can feign 
a train of  events. with all tlle appearance  of  reality, ascribe 
to  them a particular time and place, conceive them as ex-  SECT. 
istent, and paint them out to itself  with every circumstance,  --J 
that belongs to any historical fact, which it believes with the  PART  11. 
greatest  certainty.  Wherein, therefore,  consists the  diffe- 
rence between such a fiction  and belief?  It lies not merely 
in any peculiar idea, which is annexed to such a conception 
as  commands  our  assent,  and which  is wanting  to  every 
known  fiction.  For as the mind has authority over all its 
ideas, it could  voluntarily annex this particular idea to any 
fiction,  and  consequently  be  able  to  believe  whatever  it 
pleases ;  contrary to what we find by daily experience.  We 
can, in our conception, join  the head  of  a man to the body 
of a horse;  but it is not in our power  to believe, that such 
an animal has ever really existed. 
It  follows, therefore,  that the  difference  between Jictiolz 
and belief lies in some sentiment or feeling, which is annexed 
to the latter, not to the former, aiid which  depends not on 
the will,  nor can be  commanded  at pleasure.  It must be 
excited by nature, like all other sentiments ;  and must arise 
from the particular situation, in which the mind is placed at 
any particular juncture.  Whenever any object is presented 
to the memory  or senses, it  immediately, by  the  force  of 
custom, carries the imagination to conceive that object, which 
is usually conjoined  to it; and this conception is attended 
with a feeling or sentiment, different from the loose reveries 
of  the fancy.  I11  this consists the whole  nature of  belief. 
For as there is no matter of fact which we believe so firmly, 
that we  cannot  conceive  the cont~ary,  there would  be  no 
difference between the conception assented to, and that which 
is rejected, were  it  not for  some  sentiment,  which  distin- 
guishes  the  one  from  the other.  If I see  a  billiard-ball 
moving towards another, on a smooth table, I can easily con- 
ceive it to stop upon contact.  This conception  implies  no 
contradiction ;  but  still it feels  very  differently  from  that 
conception, by which I represent  to myself the impulse, and 
the communication of motion from one ball to another. 
Were we  to attempt a  deJinition  of  this  sentiment,  we 
should, perhaps, find it a very difficult, if  not an impossible 
task ;  in  the  same manner as if we should endeavour to define 
the feeling  of  cold  or passion  of  anger, to a  creature who 
never had any experience of  these sentiments.  BELIEF  is the 
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SECT.  a loss to know the meaning of  that term ;  because every man 
v  .  .  is every moment  conscious  of  the sentiment represented by 
PARTII~  it.  It inay not, however, be  improper  to attempt a descrip- 
tion  of  this  sentiment; in  hopes we  map,  by  that means, 
arrive  at some analogies, which  may afford  3 more  perfect 
explication of  it.  I say then, that belief  is nothing but  a 
more  vivid,  lively,  forcible,  firm,  steady  conception  of  an 
object, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain. 
This variety of ternis, which may seem so unphilosophical, is 
intended only to express that act of  the mind, which renders 
realities, or what is taken for  such, Inore present to us than 
fictions,  causes  them  to weigh  more  in the  thought,  and 
gives them a superior influence on the passions and the ima- 
gination.  Provided  we  agree about  the thing, it is need- 
less to dispute  about the terms.  The imagination  has the 
command over all its ideas, and can join  and mix  and vary 
them, in all the ways  possible.  It may  conceive  fictitious 
objects with all the circumstances of place and time.  It may 
set them, in a manner, before our eyes, in their true colours, 
just  as they might have  existed.  But as it is impossible, 
tliat this  faculty of  imagination  can  ever,  of  itself,  reach 
belief, it is evident, that belief  consists not in the peculiar 
nature or order of  ideas, but in the manner of  their concep- 
tion, and in their feeling  to the mind.  I confess, that it is 
inipossible perfectly to explain this feeling or manner of con- 
ception.  We may make USE: of  words, which express some- 
thing near it.  But its true and proper name, as we observed 
before, is belief;  which is a term, that every one sufficiently 
understands in common life.  And in philosophy,  we can go 
no farther than assert, that belief  is eomething felt by the 
mind, which  distinguishes the ideas  of  the judgment from 
the fictions of  the imagination.  It gives them more weight 
and influence ;  inakes  them  appear  of  greater importance ; 
inforces them in the mind ;  and renders thern the governing 
principle  of  our actions.  I hear at present, for instance, a 
person's  voice, with whom I am acquainted ;  and the sound 
comes as from the next room.  This impression of nly senses 
immediately  conveys  my  thought  to  the  person,  together 
with all the surrounding objects.  I paint them out to my self 
as existing at present', with the same qualities and relations, 
of which I formerly knew them possessed.  These ideas take 
faster hold of  my  mind, than ideas of  an enchanted castle. 
They  are very  different  to the feeling,  an$  have  a much  SECT. 
v.  greater influence  of  every kind, either  to give  pleasure  or  .-,-@ 
pain, joy or sorrow.  PART  11. 
Let us, then, take in the whole  compass  of  this doctrine, 
and allow, that the sentiment of  belief is nothing but a con- 
ception more intense and steady than what attends the mere 
fictions of  the imagination, and that this manner  of  concep- 
tion arises from a customary conjunction  of  the object with 
something present  to the memory or  senses : I believe that 
it mill not be difficult, upon  these suppositions, to find other 
operations of the mind analogous to it, and to trace up these 
phznomena to principles still more general. 
We have  already  observed,  that nature  has established 
connexions among particular ideas,  and that no sooner one 
idea occurs to our thougkts than it introduces its correlative, 
and carries our  attention towards it, by a gentle and insen- 
sible movement.  These principles of connexion or association 
we  have reduced  to three,  namely, Resemblance, Contiguity, 
and  Causation;  which  a're the only  bonds,  that unite  our 
thoughts together, and beget that rekular train of  reflection 
or discourse, which,  in a greater  OP  less  degree, takes place 
among all mankind.  Now here arises a question, on which 
the solution  of  the present difficulty will depend.  Does  it 
happen, in all these relations, that, when  one  of  the objects 
is presented to the senses or memory, the mind is not only 
carried  to the conception  of  the correlative, but  reaches a 
steadier and stronger conception  of  it than what otherwise 
it would have  been  able to attain?  This  seems  to be the 
case with that belief, which arises from the relation of  cause 
and effect.  And if the case be the same with the other rela- 
tions or principles of  association, this yay be established as 
a general law, which takes place in all the operations of the 
mind. 
We may, therefore, observe, as the first experiment to our 
present purpose, that, upon the appearance of  the picture gf 
an absent; friend, our idea of  him  is evidently enlivened  by 
the resemblance,  and  that  every  passion,  which  that idea 
occasions, whether  of  joy or  sorrdw, acquires new force and 
vigour.  In  producing  this  effect, there concur  both a rela- 
tion and a present impression.  Where the picture bears him 
no resemblance,  at least was  zrot  intended  for him, it never 
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SECT.  absent, as well  as the person;  though the mind  may  pass 
-  y.  .  from the thought of the one to that of  the other ;  it feels its 
PART 11.  idea to be rather weakened than enlivened by that transition. 
We take a pleasure in viewing the picture of  a friend, when 
it is set before us ;  but when  it is removed, rather chuse to 
consider hini directly, than by reflection  in an image, which 
is eq1:ally  distant and obscure. 
The ceremonies  of  the ROMAN  CATHOLIC  religion  may be 
considered  as instances  of  the same nature.  The devotees 
of that 'superstition usually plead in excuse for the mumme- 
ries, with which they are upbraided, that they feel the good 
effect of  those external motions, and  postures, and actions, 
in enlivening their  devotion  and  quickening their fervour, 
which otherwise mould  decay, if  directed  entirely to distant 
and immaterial objects.  We shadow out the objects  of  our 
faith,  say  they,  in  sensible  types  and images, and render 
them more present to us by the immediate presence of  these 
tjpes, than it is possible for us to do, merely by an intellec- 
tual view and contemplation.  Sensible  objects have  always 
a  greater influence on  the fancy than any other;  and this 
influence they  readily convey to those  ideas, to which  they 
are related,  and which  they  resemble.  I  shall  only  infer 
from these practices,  and this reasoning, that the effect of 
resemblance in enlivening the ideas is very common ; and as 
in every case a resemblance  and a  present impression  must 
concur, we are abundantly supplied wit4 experiments to prove 
the reality of the foregoing principle. 
We may  add  force to these  experiments  by  others of  a 
different kind, in considering the effects of  contiguity as well 
as of resemblance.  It is certain, that distance diminishes the 
force of every idea, and that, upon  our approach to any ob- 
ject;  though it does  not  discover  itself  to our  senses;  it 
operates upon the mind with an influence, which imitates an 
immediate  impression.  The thinking on any object  readily 
transports the mind to  what is contiguous ;  but it is only the 
actual presence of  an object, that transports it  with a superior 
vivacity.  When I am  a few  miles  from  home,  whatever 
relates to it touches me  more  nearly than when 1  am two 
hundred leagues distant ;  though  even  at that distance the 
reflecting on any thing in the neighbourhood of  my friends 
or family natura,lly  produces  an idea  of  them.  But 8,s  in 
1  [That strange superstition : Editions E and F.] 
this latter case, both the objects of the mind are ideas ;  not-  SECT. 
withstanding there is an easy transition between them ;  that -La 
transition alone is not able to give a superior vivacity to any  PUT I*+ 
of the ideas, for want of some immediate impressi0n.l 
No one  can  doubt but causation has the same influence 
as the other two  relations  of  resemblance  and contiguity. 
Superstitious people  are fond  of  the reliques  of  saints and 
holy men, for the same reason,  that they seek after types or 
images, in order to enliven their devotion,  and give them a 
more  intimate and  strong conception  of  those  exemplary 
lives, which they desire to imitate.  Now it is evident, that 
one  of  the best  reliques,  which  a  devotee  could  procure, 
would be the handywork of  a saint ;  and if his clonths and 
furniture are ever to be considered in this light, it is because 
they were once at his disposal, and were moved and affected 
by him; in which  respect  they are to be considered as inl- 
perfect effects, and as connected with him by a shorter chain 
of  consequences  than any of  those,  by which  we  learn the 
reality of his existence. 
Suppose, that the son of a friend, who had been long dead 
or absent, were presented to us ;  it is evident, that this object 
would instantly revive  its correlative  idea,  and recal to our 
thoughts all past intimacies and familiarities, in more lively 
colours  th'an  they  would  otherwise  have  appeared  to us. 
This is  another  ph~nomeuon,  which  seems  to prove  the 
principle above-men tioned. 
We may observe, that, in  these phienomena, the belief of 
the correlative object is always presupposed ;  without which 
the relation  could  have  no  effect.  The  influence  of  the 
picture supposes, that we  believe  our friend to have once ex- 
isted.  Contiguity to home  can  never  excite  our  ideas  of 
home, unless we believe  that it really exists.  Now I assert, 
that this belief,  where  it  reaches  beyond  the memory  or 
1  Naturane  nobis,  inquit,  datum 
dicam, an errore quodam,  ut, cum  ea 
loca videamus, in quibus memaria dig- 
nos viros acceperimus multum esse ver- 
satos, mitgis moveamur, quam siquando 
eorum ipsorum  aut facta audiamus aut 
scriptum aliquod  legamus ?  Velut  ego 
nunc moveor.  Venit enim mihi PLATO- 
NIS in mentem, quem accepimus primum 
hit disputare solitum : Cujus etiam  illi 
hortuli propinqui  non  memoriam solum 
mihi  afferunt,  sed  ipsum  videntur  in 
conspectu meo  hk  ponere.  Hic  SPEU- 
SIPPUS,  hie XENOCRATES,  liic ejus auditor 
POLEMO  ;  CU~US  ipsa illa sessio fuit, quam 
videamus.  Equidem etiam  curiam nos- 
tram HOSTILIAM  dico, non  hanc noram, 
qnae mihi  minor esse ridetur postquam 
est  major, solebaln  intuens, SCIPIONEM, 
CATOXEM,  ~LIUM,  nostrum  vero  in 
primis  acum  cogitare.  Tanta  ris ad- 
monitionis  est  in  locis ; ut non  sine 
causa  ex his memoriae  deducta sit dis- 
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SECT.  senses, is of a similar nature, and arises from similar causes,  .  ,  with the transition of thought and vivacity of  conception here 
PART  n.  explained.  When I throw a piece  of  dry wood  into a fire, 
my mind is immediately carried to conceive, that it augments, 
not extinguishes the flame.  This transition of  thought from 
the cause to the effect proceeds not from reason.  It derives 
its origin adtogether from custom and experience.  And as it 
first begins from an object,  present  to the senses, it renders 
the idea or conception of  flame more  strong and lively than 
any  loose, floating  reverie  of  the imagination.  That iden, 
arises immediately.  The thought moves  instantly towards 
it, and conveys to it all  that force  of  conception, which is 
derived from the impression present to the senses.  When a 
sword is levelled at my  breast,  does not the idea of wound 
and pain strike me more qtrongly, than when a glass of wine 
is presented to me, even though by accident this idea should 
occur after the appearance of  the latter object P  But what 
is there in this whole matter to cause such a shrong concep- 
tion, except, only a present object and a customary transition 
to the idea of  another object, which we have been accustomed 
to conjoin with the former?  This is the whole operation of 
the mind, in all our  conclusions concerning  matter of  fact 
and existence ;  and it  is a satisfaction to find some analogies, 
by which it may be explained.  The transition from a present 
object does in ill cases give strength and solidity to the re- 
lated idea. 
Here, then, is a kind of  pre-established harmony between 
the course of  nature  and the  succession of  our ideas;  and 
though the powers and forces,  by  which  the former is go- 
verned, be wholly unknown to us ;  yet our thoughts and con- 
ceptions have still, we  find, gone  on  iu the same train with 
the  other works  of  nature.  Custom  is that principle,  by 
which this correspondence has been effected ;  so necessary to 
the subsistence of  our species, and the regulation of our con- 
duct, in  every circumstance  and  occurrence  of  human life. 
Had not the presence of  an object  instantly excited the ides 
of those objects, commonly conjoined with it, all our know- 
ledge must have been  limited  to the narrow  sphere of our 
memory and senses ;  and we  should never have been able to 
adjust means to ends, or  employ  our natJural powers, either 
to the producing of  good, or  avoiding  of  evil.  Those, who 
delight in  the discovery and  contemplation  of  $rial  causes, 
have  here  ample  subject  to employ their  wonder and ad-  SECT. 
miration.  -  V. 
1  shall add,  for a further confirmation  of  tJhe foregoing  PART  11. 
theory,  that,  as this  operation  of  the  mind,  by  which we 
infer like effects from like causes, and vice versa; is so essen- 
tial to the subsistence of  all human  creatures, it is not pro- 
bable, that it could be trusted to the fallacious deductions of 
our reatson, which is slow in its operations;  appears not, in 
any degree, during the first years of infancy ;  and at  best is, 
in every age and period  of  human  life, extremely liable to 
error and mistake.  It is more  conformable to the ordinary 
wisdom of nature to secure  so necessary an act of the mincl, 
by some instinct or mechanical  tendency, which may be in- 
fallible in its operations, may  discover itself  at the first ap- 
pea.rance of life and thought, and may be  independent of all 
the laboured  deductions  of  the understanding.  As  nature 
has taught us  tshe use  of  our  limbs,  without  giving us the 
knowledge of  the  muscles  and  nerves,  by  which  they  are 
actuated;  so  has  she  implanted  in us an instinct,  which 
carries forward  the thought  in  a  correspondent  course to 
that  which  she  has  established  among  external  objects : 
though we  are ignorant of those powers and forces, on which 
this regular course and succession of objects totally depends. 
SECTION  V1.-Of  Probability.' 
THOUGH  there be no such thing as Chance in the world ;  our 
ignorance of  the real cause  of  any event h~s  the  same  in- 
fluence on the  understanding, and begets  a  like  species of 
belief  or opinion. 
There is certainly a probability, which arises from a supe- 
riority of  chances on any side ;  and according as this  supe- 
riority  encreases, and  surpasses  the opposite  chances,  the 
probability  receives a  proportionable  encrease,  and begets 
still a higher degree of  belief or assent to that side, in which 
me  discover the superiority.  If a dye were marked with one 
figure or number  of  spots  on  four  sides, and with  another 
Mr.  LOCKE  divides  all arguments  we  ought  to divide arguments into de- 
into demonstrative  and  probable.  In  monstrations,  proofs,  and probabilities. 
this viow, we  must  say, that  it is only  By  proofs  'meaning  such  arguments 
probable all men  nlust  die, or that the  experience  as  leave  no room  for 
sun will  rise  to-morrow.  But to con-  doubt or opposition. 
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SFCT.  figure  or  number  of  spots on  the two remaining  sides, it 
V1  would be more probable,  that the former would turn up than 
CI-T-d 
the latter ;  though, if it had a thousand sides marked in the 
same  manner,  and only one  side  different,  the probability 
would be much higher,  and our belief  or expectation of  the 
event more steady and secure.  This process of  the thought 
or reasoning may seem trivial and obvious ;  but to  those who 
consider it more narrowly, it may, perhaps, afford matter for 
curious speculation. 
It seems  evident, that, when  the mind  looks  forward  to 
discover the event, which may result from the throw of  such 
a dye, it considers the turning up of  each particular side  as 
alike probable;  and  this  is the  very  nature  of  chance, to 
render all the pnrticular events, comprehended in it, entirely 
equal.  But finding a greater number of  sides  concur in the 
one event than in the other, the mind  is carried  more  fre- 
quently to that event, and meets it oftener, in  revolving the 
various possibilities or chances, on which the ultimate result 
depends.  This concurrence of several views in one particular 
event begets immediately,  by an inextricable contrivance  of 
nature,  the sentiment of  belief,  and gives  that event  the 
advantage over its antagonist, which is supported by a smaller 
number of  views, and recurs less frequently to the mind.  If 
we allow, that belief  is nothing but a  firmer  and stronger 
conception of  an object than what attends  the mere fictions 
of  the  imagination,  this  operation  may, perhaps,  in some 
measure be accounted for.  The concurrence of  these several 
views  or glimpses  imprints  the idea more  strongly on  the 
imagination ;  gives it superior force and vigour ;  renders  its 
influence on the passions and affections  more  sensible ;  and 
in a word, begets that reliance or security, which constitutes 
the nature of  belief  and opinion. 
The case is the  same  with  the probability of  causes, as 
with that of  chance.  There are some causes, which are en- 
tirely uniform and constant in producing a particular  effect ; 
and no instance has ever yet  been  found  of  any  failure or 
irregularity in their operation.  Fire has always burned, and 
water suffocated every human creature : The production  of 
lilotion by impulse and gravity is an universal law, which has 
hitherto  admitted of  no  exception.  But  there are  other 
causes, which have been found more irregular and uncertain ; 
nor has rhubarb always proved a purge, or opium a soporific 
to every one, who  has  taken  these  medicines.  It  is  true, 
when any cause fails of producing its usual effect, philosophers  SECT. 
ascribe not this to any irregularity in  nature ; but suppose, -VL 
that some secret causes, in the particuiar structure of  parts, 
have  prevented  the  operation.  Our  reasonings,  however, 
and coilclusioi~s  concerning the event are the same as if this 
principle  had  no  place.  Being  determined  by  custolil  to 
transfer the past to the future, in all our  inferences ;  where 
the past has been  entirely regular  and uniform,  we  expect 
the event with the greatest assurance, and leave no roorn for 
any contrary supposition.  But where  different effects  have 
been found to follow  from  causes, which  are  to appearance 
exactly similar, all these various  effects  must  occur  to tlie 
mind in transferring the past to the future, and  enter  into 
our  consideration,  when we determine tlle probabilit,y of the 
event.  Though we  give  the  preference  to that which  has 
been found most usual, and believe that this effect will exist, 
we must not overlook the other  effects, but  must  assign to 
each of them a particular weight and authority, in proportion 
as we have found it to be more or less frequent.  It is more 
probable, in almost every country of  Europe, that there will 
be frost sometime in JANUARY,  than that the weather  will 
continue  open  throughout that whole  month ; though  this 
probability  varies  according  tc the different  climates,  and 
approaclles  to a certainty in  the more  northern  kingdoms. 
Here then it seems evident, that, when we  transfer the past 
to the future, in  order to determine  the  effect, which  will 
result froill any cause, we transfer all the different events, in 
the same proportion as they have appeared in the past, and 
conceive one to have  existed a hundred  times, for  instance, 
another ten times, and another once.  As a great number of 
views do here concur  in one  event, they fortify and confirm 
it to the  imagination, beget  that sentiment  which  we  call 
belief, and give its object the preference  above  the contrary 
went, which is not supported by an  equal number of  experi- 
ments, and recurs not so frequently to the thought in trans- 
ferring the past to the future.  Let any one  try to  account 
for this operation of  the mind upon any of  the received  sys- 
tems of  philosophy,  and he will he sensible of  the difficulty. 
For my part, I shall think it sufficient, if  the present  hints 
excite the curiosity of  philosgphers, and make them seilsible 
how defective all  colnmon  theories  are i11  treating  of  such 
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VII.  SECT.  VI1.-Of  the Idea1 of  Necessay Connexion,  - 
PUT I.  PART I. 
THE  great advantage of the mathematical sciences above the 
moral consists in this, that the  ideas  of  the  former, being 
sensible, are always clear and determinate, the smallest dis- 
tinction between them  is  immediately perceptible, and the 
same terms are  still  expressive of  the  same ideas, without 
ambiguity or variation.  An  oval  is  never  mistaken  for  a 
circle, nor an hyperbola  for  an ellipsis.  The isosceles and 
scalenum are  distinguished  by boundaries more  exact than 
vice and virtue, right  and wrong.  If any term  be  defined 
in geometry, the mind readily, of  itself, substitutes,  on all 
occasians, the definition for the term defined : Or even when 
no definition is employed, the object itself  may be presented 
to the senses,  and by that means  be  steadily and  clearly 
apprehended.  But the finer  sentiments of  the mind, the 
operations  of  the  underskanding, the various  agitations of 
the passions,  though  really  in theinselves  distinct,  easily 
escape  us,  when  surveyed  by  reflection;  nor  is  it in our 
power to recal the original object, as often as we haJve occa- 
sion  to  contemplate  it.  Ambiguity,  by  this  means,  is 
gradually  introduced  into our reasonings : Similar  objects 
are readily taken  to be  the  same : And the conclusion be 
comes at last very wide of the premises. 
One may safely, however, affirm, that, if we consider these 
sciences in a  proper light, their  advantages  and  disadvan- 
tages nearly compensate each other, and reduce both of them 
to a state of  equality.  If the mind,  with  greater facility, 
retains the ideas of  geometry clear and determinate, it must 
carry on a much longer and more  intricate chain of reason- 
ing, and compare ideas much wider  of  each  other, in order 
to reach the abstruser truths of  that science.  And if  moral 
ideas are apt, without  extreme  care, to fall  into obscurity 
and  confusion, the  inferences  are always  much  shortctr in 
these  disquisitions,  and  the  intermediate  steps,  which 
lead  to the conclusion,  much  fewer  than in  the  sciences 
which treat of  quantity and number.  In  reality,  there is 
scarcely a proposition in EUCLID  so simple, as not to consist 
1  [Of  Power or, kc. : Editions E and F.] 
of more parts, than are to be  found  in  any moral reasoning  SEOT. 
VII.  which runs not into chimera  and conceit.  Where we  trace .-,-. 
tlle principles of  the human  mind  through  a few  steps, we  PART*. 
may be  very  well  satisfied with  our progress;  considering 
how soon nature throws a bar to all our enquiries concern- 
ing  causes,  and  reduces  us  to an acknowledgment  of  our 
ignorance.  The  chief  obstacle,  therefare,  to our improve- 
ment in the moral  or  metaphysical sciences is the obscurity 
of  the ideas,  and  ambiguity of  the terms.  The principal 
difficulty in the mathematics is  the length of inferences and 
compass of thought, requisite to the forming of any conclusion. 
And, perhaps, our progress  in natural philosophy is chiefly 
retarded by the want of  proper experiments and phzenomena, 
which are often discovered  by chance,  and cannot always be 
found, when requisite, even by the most diligent and prudent 
enquiry.  As moral  philosophy seems  hitherto  to have re- 
ceived less  improvement than  either geometry  or physics, 
we may conclude, that, if there be  any difference in this re- 
spect among these  sciences, the  difficulties, which  obstruct 
the progress of the former, require superior care and capacity 
to be surmounted. 
There  are no  ideas,  which  occur  in metaphysics,  more 
obscure and uncertain, than those of  power, force,  energy, or 
necessary connexion, of  which  it  2s  every moment necessary 
for us to treat in all our disquisitions.  We shall, therefore, 
endeavour,  in this  section,  to fix,  if  possible,  the  precise 
meaning of  these  terms, and thereby remove  some  part of 
that obscurity, which is so much complained of in this species 
of philosophy. 
It seems a proposition, which will  not admit of much dis- 
pute, that all our  ideas  are nothing but  copies  of  our im- 
pressions, or, in other words, that it  is ilnpossible for US to 
think of  any thing,  which  we  have  not  antecedently felt, 
either  by  our  external  or  internal  senses.  I  have  en- 
deavoured '  to explain and prove  this.  proposition, and have 
expressed my hopes, that, by a proper application of  it, men 
may reach a greater clearness and precision in philosophical 
reasonings, than what they have hitherto been able to attain. 
Complex  ideas may, perhaps,  be  well  known  by definition, 
which  is  nothing but  an  enumeration  of  those  parts  or 
silnple ideas, that compose them.  But when we have pushed 
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PART  1.  sessed  of 'r'  By  what  invention  can  we  throw  light  upon 
these ideas, and render  them  altogether  precise and deter- 
minate  to our intellectual view P  Produce  the impressions 
or  original  sentiments,  from  m-hich the ideas are  copied. 
These impressions are all strong and sensible.  They admit 
not of  anlbiguity.  They are not only placed  in a full  light 
themselves,  but  may  throw  light  on  their  correspondent 
ideas, which lie in obscurity.  And  by this  means, we may, 
perhaps, attain  a  new  microscope  or species  of  optics, by 
which,  in the moral  soiences, the most  minute,  and most 
simple ideas may be so enlarged as to fall readily under our 
apprehension, and be  equally known with  the grossest and 
most sensible ideas, that can be the object of our enquiry. 
To be fully acquainted, therefore, with the idea of  power 
or necessary connexion, let us examine its impression;  and 
in order to find the impression with greater certainty, let us 
search for it in all the sources, from which  it may possibly 
be derived. 
When we look about us towards external objects, and con- 
sider the operation of  causes, we  are never  able, in a single 
instance,  to discover  any poiver  or  necessary  connexion; 
any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders 
the one  an  infallible  consequence  of  the other.  We only 
find, that the one  does  actually, in fact,  follow  the other. 
The impulse of  one billiard-ball  is  attended with motion in 
the second.  This is the whole that appears  to the outward 
senses.  The mind  feels  no  sentiment or inward impression 
from this succession  of  objects : Consequently, there is not, 
in  any single, particular  instance  of  cause  and  effect, any 
thing which can suggest the idea of power or necessary con- 
nexion. 
From the first appearance of an object, we never can con- 
jecture what effect will result from  it.  But were the power 
or energy of  any cause  discoverable  by the  mind, we  could 
foresee  the  effect, even  without  experience ; and might, at 
first, pronou-~ce  with  certainty concerning it, by  the mere 
dint of thought and reasoning. 
In  reality, there is no part  of  matter, that does ever, by 
 it^ sensible  qualities, discover  any power or energy, or give 
us ground to imagine, that it could produce any thing, or be  SECT. 
followed  by  any other  object, which  we  could  denominate .L!fi, 
its  effect.  Solidity, extension,  motion ;  these  qualities are  PART  I. 
all complete in themselves, and never  point  out  any other 
event  which  may  result  from  them.  The  scenes  of  the 
universe  are  continually  shifting,  and  one  object  follows 
another  in an  uninterrupted  succession;  but the power  or 
force,  which  actuates the whole  machine,  is entirely  con- 
cealed  from  us,  and  never  discovers  itself  in  any of  the 
sensible qualities of  body.  We know, that, in fact, heat is 
a constant attendant  of  flame ;  but what  is the connexion 
between them, we have no room so  much as to conjecture or 
imagine.  It is in~possible,  therefore, that the idea of  power 
can be  derived  from  the  contemplation of bodies, in single 
instances  of  their  operation;  because  no  bodies  ever  dis- 
cover any power, which can be the original of this idea.' 
Since, therefore,  external  objects  as  they appear  to the 
senses, give us no idea of  power  or  necessary connexion, by 
their operation in particular  instances, let  us  see, whether 
this idea be derived from  reflection on the operations of  our 
own minds, and be copied from  any internalimpression.  It 
may be said, that we  are every moment conscious of internal 
power ;  while we  feel, that, by the simple conlmand  of  our 
will,  we  can  move  the organs  of  our  body,  or  direct  the 
facult'ies of our mind.  An act of  volition produces motion 
in our limbs, or raises a new idea in our imagination.  This 
influence of  the will we  know  by consciousness.  Hence we 
acquire the idea  of  power  or  energy ;  and are certain, that 
we ourselves and all  other intelligent beings  are possessed 
of power.2  This idea,  then, is an idea of  reflection,  since it 
arises from reflecting  on  the operations  of  our  own  mind, 
and on the co~nmand  which  is exercised  by will, both over 
the organs of the body and hculties of the asoul. 
We shall proceed  to examine this pretension ;' and first 
with regard to the influence  of  volition  over  the organs of 
Nr. LOCKE,  in his chapter of  power  sopher himself  confesses.  This, there- 
says,  that,  finding  from  experience,  fore, can never be the origin of that idea. 
that there  are sereral new  productions  [Editions  E  and F add:  However 
in  mittter, and  concluding  that there  this may be, the Operations and mutual 
nut  somewhere be a  power capable of  Influence  of  Bodies  are, perhaps, suf- 
yrodncing them, we  arrive  at last by  ficient to prove, that they also are POS- 
this reasoning at the idea 9f power.  But  sess'd  of it.] 
no reasoning can  ever  give  us a  new,  [Of  the Mind : Editions E to Q.] 
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.-,-  like all other natural events, can be  known  only by experi- 
PaRTI-  ence, and can never  be  foreseen  frorn  any apparent energy 
or power in the cause, which  connects it with the effect, and 
renders the one an infallible consequence of  the other.  The 
motion of our body follows  upon  the command of  our will. 
Of  this we  are every moment  conscious.  But the means, 
by  which  this is  effected; the energy,  by  which the will 
perfornls  so  extraordinary an operation ;  of  this we  are so 
far from being immediately conscious, that, it must for  ever 
escape our most diligcnt enquiry. 
For fist ;  is there any principle  in all nature  more mys- 
terious than the union  of  soul with body ;  by which a sup- 
posed spiritual substance  acquires  such an influence over  a 
material one, that the most refined thought is able to actuate 
the  grossest  matter?  Were  we  empowered,  by  a  secret 
wish, to remove mountains, or  control  the planets  in their 
orbit; this  extensive  authority  would  not  be  more  extra- 
ordinary, nor  more  beyond  our  comprehension.  But if  by 
consciousness we perceived any power  or energy in the will, 
we  must know  this power;  we  must  know  its connexion 
with the effect ;  we must know the secret union of  soul and 
body, and the nature of both these substances;  by which the 
one is able to operate, in so  many instances, upon the other. 
Secondly, We are not able to move all the organs of  the 
body with  a  like authority ;  though we  cannot  assign  any 
reason  besides  experience,  for  so  remarkable  a  difference 
between one and the other.  Why has  the will an influence 
over the tongue  and fingers, no;  over  the heart  or  liver? 
This question would never  embarrass  us, were we conscious 
of a power in the former case, not in the latter.  We should 
then perceive, independent of  experience, why the authority 
of will over  the organs of  the body is circumscribed within 
such particular limits.  Being  in that case fully acquainted 
with  the power  or force, by which  it operates,  we  should 
also know, why its influence reaches  preoisely to such boun- 
daries, and no farther. 
proceed to examine this Pretension, and  found Subjects. 
shall endeavour to  avoid, as far  as we  I assert, then,'  in theFrst Place, that 
are able, all Jargon  and  Conf~~sion,  in  the Influence of Volition over the  0rg;tnu 
treating of  such subtile and such  pro-  of  the Body, is a Fact, &c.] 
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A  man, suddenly  struck with  a  palsy in the leg or  arm,  SECT.  VIL 
or who had newly lost those members, frequently endeavours, .-, 
at first,  to  move  them,  and  employ  them  in  their  usual  PAP*  1- 
offices.  Here he is as much conscious of power to command 
such  limbs,  as a  man  in perfect  health  is  conscious  of 
power  to actuate any member which  remains in its natural 
state  and  condition.  But  consciousness  never  deceives. 
Consequently, neither  in the one case  nor  in the other, are 
we ever conscious of  any power.  We learn the influence of 
our will from experience alone.  And experience only teaches 
us, how one event  constantly follows  another ;  without  in- 
structing  us  in  the  secret  connexion,  $which binds  them 
together, and renders them inseparable. 
Thirdly,  We learn  from  anatomy,  that  the  immediate 
object  of  power  in voluntary  motion,  is not  the member 
itself which  is moved, but certain muscles, and nerves, and 
animal spirits, and,  perhaps,  something  still more  minute 
and more unknown, through which the motion is successively 
propagated, ere it reach the member  itself whose motion is 
the immediate  object  of  volition.  Can  there  be  a  inore 
certain proof, that the power, by which this whole operation 
is performed, so far from  being  directly and fully known by 
an inward sentiment or consciousness, is, to the last degree, 
mysterious and unintelligible ?  Here the mind wills a cer- 
tain  event : Immediately  another  event,  unknown  to our- 
selves,  and  totally  different  from  the  one  intended,  is 
produced : This event  produces  another, equally unknown : 
Till at last, through  a  long  succession, the desired event is 
produced.  But if  the original  power were  felt, it must be 
known :  Were it known, its effect must also be known ;  since 
all power  is relative  to its  effect.  And  vice  versa,  if  the 
effect be not known, the power  cannot be  known  nor  felt. 
How indeed can we  be  conscious  of  a  power  to move  our 
limbs, when we have no such power;  but only that to move 
certain  animal  spirits,  which, though  they produce  at last 
the motion of our limbs, yet operate  in such a manner as ia 
wholly beyond our comprehension ? 
We may,  therefore,  conclude  from  the  whole, I  hope, 
without any temerity, though with assurance ;  that our idea 
of power is not  copied  from  any sentiment or conscionsnesu 
of  power  within  ourselves,  when  we  give  rise  to  silirnal 
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.--v-4  matter  of  common  experience, like  other  natural events: 
PARTI*  But the power  or  energy by which  this is effected, like that 
in other natural events, is unknown and inconceivable.' 
Shall we  then  assert, that  we  are  conscious  of  a  power 
or energy in  our  own  minds, when, by  an act or command 
of our will, we raise up  a  new idea, fix the mind to the con- 
templation of  it, turn  it  on  all  sides, and at  last dismiss it 
for some other  idea, when we  think  that we  have  surveyed 
it with sufficient accuracy?  I believe  the same  arguments 
will prove, that even this command  of  the will gives us  no 
real idea of  force or energy. 
First,-It must  be  allowed,  that,  when  we  know a power, 
we know that very circumstance in the cause, by which it is 
enabled to produce the effect : For these  are supposed to be 
synonimous.  We must, therefore, know both the cause and 
effect, and  the  relation  between  them.  But  do  we  pre- 
tend to be  acquainted with  the nature of  the human soul 
and the nature-of an idea, or the aptitude of  the one to pro- 
duce the other ?  This  is  a  real creation ;  a production of 
something out of  nothing :  Which implies a power so great, 
tbat it may  seeni,  at first  sight,  beyond  the reach  of  any 
being, less than infinite.  At least  it  must be owned, that 
such-a power is not felt, nor known, nor even conceivable by 
the mind.  We only  feel the event,  namely, the existence 
of an idea,  consequent  to a  command  of  the will : But the 
manner, in which this operation is performed ;  the power, by 
which it is produced;  is entirely beyond our comprehension. 
Secondly, The command of  the mind over itself is limited, 
as well as its command over  tlie body ;  and these limits are 
' It  may be  pretended, that the re- 
sistance which we  meet with in bodies, 
obliging us frequently to exert our force, 
and call up all our power, this gives us 
the idea of  force and power.  It is this 
nisus or strong endeavour, of  which we 
are conscioue, tlint  is  the original im- 
pression from wi:ich  this idea is copied. 
But, first, we att-ibute power  to a vast 
number of  objec, s, where we never can 
suppose  this resistance  or exertion  of 
force  to  take place;  to  the  Supreme 
Buing, who  never  meets  with  any  re- 
sistance ; to the mind  in  its commnud 
over  its  ideas and  limbs,  in  common 
thinking and motion, mllerc  the  effect, 
follows  immediately  upon  the  will, 
withont any exertion or summotling up 
of  force ; to inanimate matter, which is 
not capable of  this sentiment. Scaondiy, 
This sentiment.of an endeavour to over- 
come resistance has no known connrxion 
with  any event:  What follows it,  we 
know  by  experience;  but  could  not 
know it b priori.  It must, however. be 
confessed, that the animal  nwus, which 
we experience,  though it  'can afford  no 
accnrate precise  idea of  power,  enters 
very much into that vulgar, inaccurate 
idea, which is formed  of  it.-[The  last 
sentence i~ not in  Editions E and F.] 
not known  by  reason, or  any  acquaintance with the nature  SECT. 
VII.  of cause and eFct ;  but only by experience and observation,  ,., 
as in all other  natural events  and  in the operation of ex-  *UT  I* 
ternnl  objects.  Our  authority  over  our  sentiments  and 
passions is much weaker than that over our ideas ;  and even 
the latter authority  is  circumscribed  within  very  narrow 
boundaries.  Will any  one pretend  to assign  the ultimate 
reason of these boundaries,  or  show why  the power is defi- 
cient in one case and not in another. 
Thirdly, This self-command is very  different  at different 
times.  A man in health possesses more of  it, than one lan- 
guishing with sickness.  We are more master of our thoughts 
in the morning than in the evening:  Fasting, than after a 
full  meal.  Can  we  give  any  reason  for  these  variations, 
except experience ?  Where then is the power, of  which we 
pretend  to  be  conscious?  Is there  not  here, either in a 
spiritual or material substance, or both, some secret mecha- 
nism or structure  of  parts,  upon  which the effect depends, 
and which, being entirely unknown  to us, renders the power 
or energy of the will equally unknown and incomprehensible P 
Volition is surely an act of  the mind, with which we  are 
sufficiently acquainted.  Reflect upon it.  Consider it on all 
sides.  Do you find anything in it like this creative power, 
by which it raises from nothing a new idea, and with a kind 
of FIAT,  imitates the onlnipotence  of  its Maker, if I may be 
allowed so to speak, who  called forth into existei~ce  all the 
various  scenes of  nature P  So far from being conscious of 
this energy in the will, it requires  as certain experience, as 
that of  which  we  are possessed, to convince us,  that suck 
extraordinary  effects do  ever  result  from  a  simple  act  of 
volition. 
The  generality  of  mankind  never  find  any difficulty  in 
accounting for the more columon and familiar operations of 
nsture ;  such as the descent of  heavy bodies, the growth  of 
plants,  the  generation  of  animals,  or  the nourishment  of 
bodies  by food : But  suppose, that, in  all  these  cases, they 
perceive the very force or energy of  the cause, by which it is 
connected with its effect, and is for ever infallible in its ope- 
ration.  They acquire, by  long  habit,  such a turn of  mind, 
that,  upon  the appearance  of  the cause, they immediately 
expect with  assurance its usual  attendant, and  hardly con- 
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SECT.  It  is  only  on  the discovery  of  extraordinary phrenomena, 
VII  .'-  such as earthquakes,  pcstilence,  and ~rodigies  of  any kind, 
PART  I*  that they find themselves at a loss  to assign  a proper cause, 
and to explain the manner, in  which the effect  is  produced 
by it.  It is i~sual  for men,  in  such difficulties, to have  re- 
source to some invisible intelligent  principle,'  as the irnme- 
diate cause of  that event, which  surprises them, and which, 
they think, cannot be accounted for from the common powers 
of  nature.  But philosophers,  who  carry  their  scrutiny a 
little farther, immediately  perceive, that, even  in the most 
familiar events, the energy of  the cause is  as unintelligible 
as in the most unusual, and that we only learn by experience 
the frequent  CONJUNCTION  of  objects,  without  being ever 
able to comprehend any thing like CONNEXION  between them. 
Here then, many philosophers  think  themselves  obliged  by 
reason to have recourse,  on all occasions, to the same  prin- 
ciple, which  the  vulgar  never  appeal to but in cases, that 
appear  miraculous  and supernatural.  They acknowledge 
mind  and intelligence  to be,  not  only  the  ultimate  and 
original cause of  all things, but the immediate and sole cause 
of  every event, which appears in nature.  They pretend, that 
those objects, which  are  commonly denominated  causes, are 
in reality nothing but occasions ;  and that the true and direct 
principle of  every effect is not any power or force in aature, 
but a volition of  the  Supreme  Being, who  wills, that such 
particular  objects  should, for  ever, be  colijoined  with each 
other.  Instead  of  saying,  that one  billiard-ball  moves 
another, by a force, which it has derived  from the author of 
nature ;  it is the Deity himself, they say, who, by a particular 
volition,  moves  the  second  ball,  being  determined  to this 
operation by the impulse of  the first ball:  in consequence of 
those general laws, which he has laid down to himself  in  the 
government  of  the  universe.  But philosophers  advancing 
still in their enquiries, discover, that, as we are totally igno- 
rant of  the power, on which  depends  the  mutual  operation 
of  bodies, we are no less  ignorant of  that power, on which 
depends the operation of  mind on body, or of body on mind ; 
nor are we  able, either  from our  senses or  consciousness, to 
assign the ultinlate prillciple  in one case, inore  than in the 
other.  The same ignorance, therefore, reduces them  to the 
Bcbs i~b  pqxav6s.  [Ecl. E reads : Qzbnsi  Deus esmnchinn.  F adds the re- 
ference : Cic. de Nat. Deorum.] 
same conclusion.  They assert, that the Deity is the imme- 
SECT  VII. 
diate cause of  the union  between  soul and body ;  and that  ,-T-d 
they are not the organs of  sense, which, being  agitated by  PART  1- 
external objects, produce  sensations in the mind ;  but that 
it is a  particular  volition  of  our  omnipotent  Maker, which 
excites such a sensation, in consequence of  such a motion in 
the organ.  In  like manner, it is not any energy in the will, 
that produces local motion in our members : It is God him- 
self,  who is pleased  to second  our will,  in itself  impotent, 
and to command that motion, which we erroneously attribute 
to our own power and efficacy.  Nor do philosophers stop at 
this conclusion.  They sometimes extend the same inference 
to the mind  itself, in its internal operations.  Our  mental 
vision or conception of  ideas is nothing but a revelation made 
to us by our Maker.  When we voluntarily turn our thoughts 
to any object, and raise up its image in the fancy ; it is not 
the will which creates that idea : It is the universal Creator, 
who discovers it to the mind, and renders it present to us. 
Thus, according to these philosophers, every thing is full 
of  God.  Not content with the principle, that nothing exists 
but by his will, that nothing possesses any power but by  his 
concession :  They rob nature, and all created beings, of every 
power, in order to render their dependence on the Deity still 
more sensible and  immediate.  They consider  not, that, by 
this theory, they diminish, instead of  magnifying, the gran- 
deur of  those attributes, which they  affect so much to cele- 
brate.  It  argues surely more power in the Deity to delegate 
a certain degree of  power to inferior  creatures, than t'o pro- 
duce every thing by his own  immediate volition.  It argues 
more wisdom to contrive at first' the fabric of  the world with 
such  perfect  foresight,  that,  of  itself,  and  by  its  proper 
operation, it may serve all the purposes  of  providence, than 
if the great Creator were obliged every moment to adjust its 
parts, and animate by his breath all the wheels of  that stu- 
pendous machine. 
But if  we would have a more philosophical  confutation  of 
this  theory,  perhaps  the  two  following  reflections  may 
suffice. 
First, It  seems  to  me,  that this theory of  the universal 
energy and operation of  the Suprelne Being, is too bold ever 
to carry conviction with it to a man, sufficiently apprized  of 
the weakness  of  human  reason, and  tile  narrow  limits, to CONCERNING  HnAN UNDERSTANDING. 
SECT.  which it is confined in all its operations.  Though the chain 
VII  -  ,  .  of arguments, which conduct to it, were ever so logical, there 
PAPTI. must arise a strong suspicion, if  not an  absolute  assurance, 
that it has carried us quite beyond the reach of  our faculties, 
when it leads to conclusions so extraordinary, and so remote 
from common life  and  experience.  We are  got  into fairy 
land, long ere we  have reached the last steps of  our  theory; 
and there we  have no reason to trust our common method  of 
argument,  or  to  think that our  usual  analogies  and ,pro- 
babilities have any authority.  Our line is too short to  fathom 
such immense  abysses.  And  however  we  may flatter our- 
selves, that we  are guided, in  every step which we  take,  by 
a kind of  verisimilitude and experience;  we  may be assured, 
that this fancied experience has no authority, when we  thus 
apply  it to subjects, that lie  entirely out  of  the sphere of 
experience.  But on  this we  shall have  occasion to touch 
afterwards.' 
Secondly, I cannot perceive any force in the arguments, on 
which this theory is founded.  We are ignorant, it is  true, 
of  the manner in which bodies operate on each other :  Their 
force or energy is entirely incomprehensible :  But are we not 
equally ignorant  of  the manner or force  by which a mind, 
even the supreme mind, operates either on itself or on body? 
Whence, I beseech you, do we  acquire any idea  of  it ?  We 
have no sentiment  or  consciousness of  this power  in our- 
selves.  We have no  idea of  t,he Supreme Being but what 
we learn  from  reflection  on  our  own  faculties.  Were  our 
ignorance, therefore, a good reason  for  rejecting  any thing, 
we should be  led into that principle of  denying all energy in 
the Supreme Being as much as in the grossest  matter.  We 
surely comprehend as little the operations  of  one  as of  the 
other.  Is it more difficult to conceive, that motion may arise 
from impulse, than that it may arise from volition?  All we 
know is our profound ignorance in both  casesea 
1 Section XII. 
* I need  not  examine  at length the 
vis inertice which  is so much  talked  of 
in the new  philosophy,  and  which  is 
ascribed to matter.  We find  by expe- 
rience, that a body at  rest  or in motion 
continues for ever  in its present  state, 
till put from it  by some new cnusc? :  And 
that a  body  impelled takes  as  much 
motion  from  the impelling  body as it 
acquires itself.  These are facts.  When 
we call this a zis  inertice, we only mark 
these facts, without pretending to have 
any idea of the inert pu wer ;  in the same 
manner as, when we talk of  gravity, we 
mean  certain  effects  without  compre- 
hending  that  active  power.  It  was 
never the meaning  of  SIR ISAAC  NEW- 
TON to rob1 second causes of  a,ll force 
or energy ;  though some of his followers 
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PART 11.  SEC'I!. 
VII.  But to hasten to a conclusion of  this  argument, which  is . , 
already drawn out to too  great a length : We have  sought  PART  119 
in vain for an idea  of  power  or necessary  connexion, in all 
the sources from which we  could  suppose  it tqo be  derived. 
It appears, that,  in  single  instances  of  the operation  of 
bodies, we never  can, by-our utmost  scrutiny, discover  any 
thing but one event following another; without being able to 
comprehend any force or power, by which the cause operates, 
or any connexion between  it and-  its supposed effect.  The 
same difficulty occurs in contemplating thebperations of mind 
on body;  where we  observe the motion of  the  latter to fol- 
low  upon  the volition  of  the  former;  but  are not  able to 
observe or conceive the tye, which binds together the motion 
and volition, or the energy by which the mind produces  this 
effect.  The authority of  the will over its own  faculties  and 
ideas is not a whit more comprehensible : So that, upon  the 
whole, there appears not, throughout all nature, any one in 
stance of  connexion, which is conceivable by us.  All events 
seem entirely loose and separate.  One event follows another ; 
but we  never can observe any tye between them.  They seem 
conjoined, but never connected.  And as we can have  no  idea 
of  any thing, which never appeared to our outward sense or 
inward sentiment, the necessary conclusion seems to be, that 
we have no idea of  conllexion or power at all, and that these 
words are absolutely without  any meaning,  when  employed 
either in philosophical reasonings, or common life. 
But there still remains one method  of  avoiding this con-  - 
elusion, and one  source which we  have  not  yet  examined. 
When any natural object  or  event is  it is impos- 
sible for us, by any sagacity or  penetration, to discover, or 
even conjecture, without  experience, what  event will  result 
have  encleavoured  to  establish  that 
theory  upon  his  authority.  On  the 
contrary,  that  great  philos~pher  had 
recourse  to an etherial active  fluid  to 
explain his universal attraction ;  though 
he  was  so cautious  and modest  as to 
allow, that it was  a  mere  hypothesis, 
not to be insisted on, without more  ex- 
periments.  I must confess, that thero 
is something in the fate  of  opinions a 
little  extraordinary.  Dm CARTES  in- 
sinuated that doctrine of  the  univers:ll 
and eole efficacy of  the Deity,  without 
insisting  on  it.  MALEBRANCHE  and 
other CARTESIANS  made  it the founda- 
tion  of  all their philosophy.  It had, 
however,  no  authority  in  ENGLAND. 
LOCKE,  CLARKE,  and CUDWORTH,  never 
so much as take notice  of  it, but sup- 
posed all along, that matter has a real, 
though subordinate and derived power. 
By what means has it become  so  pre- 
valent  among  our modern  metaphysi- 
ci:~ns  ? 
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SECT.  from it, or to carry our foresight beyond that object, which  .  v!l-  ,  is  immediately  present  to the memory  and  senses.  Even 
PART  11.  after one instance  or experiment, where we  have observed a 
particular event to follow upon another, we are not entitled 
to form a general rule, or foretel what will  happen  in like 
cases ;  it,  being justly esteemed an unpardonable temerity to 
judge of the whole course  of  nature from one single experi- 
ment, however accurate or certain.  But when one particular 
species of  event has always, in all instances, been conjoined 
with another, we  make  no longer  any scruple of  foretelling 
one upon the appearance of the other, and of employing that 
reasoning, which can alohe assure us of  any matter of fact or 
existence.  We then call the one object, Cause;  the other, 
Efect.  We suppose, that there is some  connectio.n  between 
them; some  power  in the one, by which  it infallibly pro- 
duces the other, and operates with the greatest certainty and 
strongest necessity. 
It appears, then, that' this idea of  a  necessary connexion 
among  events  arises  from  a  number  of  similar  instances, 
which occur, of the constant conjunction of these events ;  nor 
can that idea ever be suggested by any one of these instances, 
surveyed in all possible  lights  and positions.  But  there is 
nothing in a number of instances, different from every single 
instance, which  is supposed  to be  exactly  similar; except 
only, that after a repetition of  similar instances, the mind is 
carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect 
its usual  attendant, and to believe, that it will exist.  This 
connexion, therefore, ~vllich  we feel  in the mind, this custo- 
mary transition  of  the imagination from one  object  to its 
usual attendant, is the sentiment  or impression, from which 
we form the idea of power or necessary connexion.  Nothing 
farther is in the case.  Contemplate the subject on all sides; 
you will  never  find any other  origin of  that idea.  This is 
the sole difference between one instance, from which we can 
never receive the idea of  connexion, and a number of  similar 
instances, by which  it is suggested.  The first  time a man 
saw  the  communication  of  motion  by  impulse,  as  by  the 
shock of two billiard-balls, he could not pronounce that the 
one event was connected:  but only that it was conjoined with 
the other.  After he had observed  several  instances  of  this 
nature,  he then  pronounces  them to be  connected.  What 
alteration has happened  to give rise to this new idea of con- 
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nexion ?  Nothing but that he now feels  these events to be  SECT. 
connected in his imagination, and  can readily foretel the ex- 2'- 
istence of one from the appearance  of  the other.  When we  PARTII. 
say, therefore, that one  object is connected with another, we 
mean  only,  that they  have  acquired  a  connexion  in  our 
thought, and give rise to this inference, by which they be- 
come proofs  of  each  other's  existence : A conclusion, which 
is  somewhat  extraordinary ;  but  which  seems  founded  on 
sufficient  evidence.  Nor  will  its evidence be weakened  by 
any general diffidence of  the understanding, or sceptical sus- 
picion concerning every conclusion, which is new and extra- 
ordinary.  No conclusions can be more agreeable to  scepticisin 
than such as make  discoveries  concerning the weakness and 
narrow limits of human reason and capacity. 
And what stronger  instance can be produced  of  the sur- 
prising ignorance  and weakness  of  the understanding, than 
the present P  For  surely, if  there be  any relation  among 
objects, which it imports to us to know perfectly, it is that 
of  cause and effect.  On this are founded  all our reasonings 
concerning matter of fact or existence.  By means of it slons 
we  attain any assurance  concerning  objects, which  are re- 
moved from the present testimony of our memory and senses. 
The only immediate utility of all sciences, is to teach us, how 
to control and regulate future events by their causes.  Our 
thoughts  and enquiries  are,  therefore, every  moment,  em- 
ployed  about  this relation: Yet  so  imperfect are the ideas 
which we  form  concerning it, that it is inlpossible  to give 
any just definition of cause, except what is drawn from some- 
thing extraneous and foreign to  it.  Similar objects are always 
conjoined with similar.  Of this we have experience.  Suitably 
to this experience, therefore, tve  may define a cause to be an 
object, followed  by  another, and where  all the objects, similar to 
the Jirst,  are followed  by  objects similar to  the second.  '  Or, in 
other words, wheve, if  the Jirst  object  had not been,  the second 
never had existed.  The appearance of a cause always conveys 
the mind, by a customary transition, to the idea of the effect. 
Of  this  also we  have experience.  We may, therefore, suit- 
ably to this experience, form another definition of  cause ;  and 
call it, an object followed  by  n,notker, and  whose  appearance 
always  conveys  the  thought  to  that  other.  But though both 
these definitions be drawn from circumstances foreign to the 
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SECT.  cause, we  cannot  remedy this inconvenience, or  attain any  .  more  perfect  definition, which  may  point  out that circum- 
P~T  11-  stance in the cause, which gives it a connexion with its effect. 
We  have  no idea  of  this Fonnexion;  nor  even  any distinct 
notion what it is we  desire to know,  when we endeavour at  a 
conception of it.  We say, for instance, that the vibration of 
this string is the cause  of  this particular sound.  But what 
do we  mean by that affirmation P  We either mean, that  this 
vibration is followed  by  this sound, and that all similar vibra- 
tions have been followed  by  similar sounds :  Or, that this vibra- 
tion is  followed  by  this sound, and that upon the appearance of 
one,  the mind  anticipates the senses, and fomns  immediately an 
idea of  the other.  We may consider the relation of  cause and 
effect  in either of  these two  lights ;  but beyond these,  we 
have no idea of it.' 
To recapitulate, therefore, the reasonings  of  this section : 
Every idea is copied from some preceding impression or sen- 
tinlent; and where we  cannot find  any impression, we  may 
be certain that there is no  idea.  In  all single instances of 
the operation of  bodies or minds, there is nothing  that pro- 
1 According to these explications and 
definitions, the idea of power is relatire 
as much as that of cause; and both have 
a reference to an  effect, or some  other 
event constantly conjoined with the for- 
mer.  When we consider the unknown 
circumstance of  an object., by which the 
degree or quantity of  its effect  is fixed 
and determined, we call that  its power : 
And  accordingly, it is allowed  by  all 
philosophers,  that the effect is the mea- 
.  swe of  the  power.  But if  they had 
any idea of power, as it is in itself, why 
could  not  they  measure  it in itself? 
The dispute whether the force of a body 
in motion be as  its velocity, or the square 
of  its velocity;  this  dispute,  I  say, 
needed  not  be  decided by  comparing 
its effects  in equal  or unequal  times; 
but by a direct mensuration  and com- 
parison. 
As to the frequent  use of  the words, 
Force, Power, Energy, &c. which  every 
where occur in common conversation, as 
well as in philosophy ; thaiis no proof, 
that we are acquainted, in any instance, 
with the  connecting  principle  between 
c:inse  and  effect, or  can  account  ulti- 
mately for the production of  one thing 
Ly another.  These words, as  commonly 
used.  have  very  loose  meanings  an- 
nexed to them ;  and their ideas are vorg 
uncertain  and  confused.  No  animal 
can put external bodies in motion with- 
out the sentiment of  a nisus or endea- 
vour ;  and every animal hrzs a sentiment 
or feeling from  the stroke or blow  of 
an external object,  that is in motion. 
These  sensations,  which  are  merely 
animal, and from which we can hpriori 
draw no inference, we are apt to transfer 
to inanimate objects,  and to  suppose, 
that  they  have  some  such  feelings, 
whenever they transfer orreceivemotion. 
With regard to energies, which are ex- 
erted, without  our  annexing  to them 
any idea  of  communicated  motion,  we 
consider  only the constant experienced 
conjunction  of  the  events; and as we 
.feel  a customary connexion between the 
ideas,  we transfer  that feeling to the 
objects ;  as nothing is more usual  than 
to apply to  external  bodies  every  in- 
term1 sensation, which they occasion. 
[.This  note  was  added  in  Ed.  F: 
wh~ch,  however, reads  in place  of  the 
second paragraph :- 
A Catcse is different from a Sign ; as 
it  implies Precedency  and  Contiguity 
in Time  and Place, as well as constant 
Conjunction.  A Sign is nothing but a 
correlative Effect from the =me  Cause.] 
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duces  any  impression,  nor  consequently  call  suggest  any  SECT. 
VII.  idea,  of  power  or  necessary  connexion.  But  when  many  . 
uiiiform instances appear, and the same object is always fol-  PART  11. 
lowed  by tlie  same  event; we then begin  to entertain tl~e 
notion  of  cause and connexion.  T7STe then fecl a new senti- 
ment  or  impression, to wit,  a  customary  connexion in the 
thought  or  imagination  between  one  object  and  its usual 
attendant ;  and  this sentiment is the original of  that idea 
which we  seek for.  For as this idea arises from a nuinber of 
similar instances, and not from any single instance ;  it must 
arise from  that circumstance, in which the number  of  in- 
stniices differ from  every individual instance.  But this cus- 
tomary connexion or transition of the imagination is the only 
circumstance, in which they differ.  In every other particular 
they are alike.  The first instance which we  saw of  motion, 
co~nrnunicated  by the shoclr  of  two billiard-balls (to return 
to this obvious illustration) is exactly similar to any instance 
that may, at present, occur to  us ;  except only, that we could 
not, at first,  infer  one  event  from the other; which we  are 
enabled to do at present, after  so long a course of  uniform 
experience.  I know not, whether the reader will readily ap- 
prehend this reasoning.  I am afraid, that, should I multiply 
words about it, or throw it into a greater variety of  lights, it 
would  only become  more  obscllre  and intricate.  In all ab- 
stract reasonings, there is one poilit of view, which, if we  can 
happily hit, we shall go farther towards ill~stra~ting  the sub- 
ject, than by all the eloquence and copious expression in the 
world.  This point  of  view we  should  endeavour to reach, 
aid reserve  the flowers of  rlietoric  for  subjects  which are 
Inore adapted to them. 
SECTION  VII1.-Of  Liberty and Necessity. 
IT  might rea,sonably be  expected, in  questions,  which  have 
been canvassed and disputed with  great eagerness, since the 
first origin of  science a,nd philosophy, that the meaning of 
all the terms, at least, should have been agreed upon  among 
the  disputants;  and  our  enquiries,  in the course  of  two 
t8housand  years, been able to pass froni words to the true and 
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SECT.  to give exact definitions of  the terms employed in reasoning,  .  'I!'.  and make these definitions, not the mere sound of words, the 
PARTI object of  future scrutiny and examination P  But if  we con- 
sider the m'atter more  narrowly, we  shall be  apt to  draw a 
quite  opposite  conclusion.  From  this  circumstance alone, 
that a controversy has been  long kept on  foot, and remains 
still undecided, we may presume, that there is some ambiguity 
in the expression, and that the disputants affix different ideas 
to the terms employed in the controversy.  For as the facul- 
ties of  the mind are supposed to be  naturally alike in every 
individual ;  otherwise nothing could  be inore  fruitless than 
to reason  or  dispute  together;  it were  impossible, if  men 
affix the same ideas to their terms, that they could  so  long 
form different opinions of  the same subject; especially when 
they communicate  their  views, and  each  party turn them- 
selves on all sides, in search  of  arguments, which  may give 
them the victory over  their  antagonists.  It is true ;  if men 
attempt the discussion of qnestions, which lie entirely beyond 
the reach of  human  capacity, such as those  concerning  the 
origin of worlds, or the oecononly of the intellectual system or 
region of spirits, they may long beat the air in their fruitless 
contests,  and never  arrive  at any determinate conclusion. 
But if  the question regard  any subject of  common  life  and 
experience ; nothing, one  would  think,  could  preserve  the 
dispute so long undecided,  but  some ambiguous expressions, 
which keep the antagonists  still  at a  distance, and hinder 
them from grappling with each other. 
This  has  been  the case  in the long  disputed  question 
concerning  liberty and  necessity; and to so  remarkable  a 
degree, that, if I be not much  mistaken, we shall find, that 
all mankind, both learned and ignorant, have always been of 
the same opinion with regard to this subject, and that a few 
intelligible definitions would  immediately have  put an  end 
to the whole controversy.  I own, that this dispute has been 
so much  canvassed  on  all hands, and has led  philosophers 
into  such  a  labyrinth  of  obscure  sophistry,  that it is  no 
wonder, if a sensible reader indulge his ease so far as to turn 
a deaf ear to t'he proposal of  such a question, from which he 
can expect neither instruction nor entertainment.  But the 
state of  the argument here proposed  may, perhaps, serve to 
renew his attention ;  as it has more novelty, promises at  least 
some decision of  the controversy, and will not much disturb 
his ease by any intricate or obscure reasoning. 
I hope,  therefore,  to make it  appear, that all men  have  SECT. 
ever agreed in the doctrine both of  necessity and of  liberty,  _  ''!I-  , 
according to any reasonable sense, which can be put on these  Pam I. 
terms ;  and that the whole controversy has hitherto turned 
merely upon  words.  We shall  begin  with  examining the 
doctrine of necessity. 
It is universally allowed, that matter, in all its operations, 
is actuated by a necessary force, and that every natural effect 
is so precisely determined by the energy of its cause, that no 
other effect, in such particular circunlstances, could possibly 
have resulted  from it.  The  degree  and direction  of  every 
motion is, by the laws of nature, prescribed with such exact- 
ness, that a living creature may as soon arise from the shock 
of  two  bodies, as motion, in  any other degree or direction 
than what is actually  produced  by  it.  Would  we, there- 
fore, form a just and precise  idea of  necessity, we must con- 
sider  whence  that  idea  arises,  when  we  apply  it  to  the 
operation of bodies. 
It  seems  evident,  that, if  all the scenes  of  nature were 
continually shifted in such a manner, that no two events bore 
any resemblance to each other, but every object was entirely 
new, without any similitude to  whatevsr had been seen before, 
we should never, in that case, have attained the least idea of 
necessity, or of a connexion among these objects.  We might 
say, clpon  such a  supposition, that one object or event has 
followed another;  not that one was  produced  by the other. 
The relation of cause and effect must he utterly unknown to 
mankind.  Inference  and reasoning  concerning  the opera- 
tions of nature would, from that moment, be at an end ;  and 
the memory and senses remain the only canals, by which the 
knowledge  of  any real existence  could possibly have access 
to the mind.  Our idea, therefore, of necessity and causation 
arises entirely from  the uniformity, observable in the opera- 
tions of  nature; where similar objects  are constantly con- 
joined  together, and  the  mind  is determined by custom to 
infer the one from the appearance  of  the other.  These two 
circumstances  form  the whole  of  that necessity, which we 
ascribe t,o matter.  Beyond the constant conjunction of similar 
objects, and the  consequent  inference from one to the other, 
we have no notion of any necessity, or connexion. 
If it appear, therefore, that all mankind have ever allowed, 
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-vlfl*  #  tions  of  mind;  it must follow, that all mankind  have ever 
PABT  I.  agreed in the doctrine  of  necessity,  and  that they  have 
hitherto disputed, merely for not understanding each other. 
As to the first circumstance, the constant and regular con- 
junction of  similar events ;  we may possibly satisfy ourselves 
by the following  considerations.  It  is universally acknow- 
ledged, that there is a great uniformity among  the a,ctions 
of men, in all nations  and ages, and that human nature re- 
mains still the same,  in its principles  and operations.  The 
same motives  always produce  the same actions:  The same 
events follow from the same causes.  Ambition, avarice, self- 
love, vanity, friendship, generosity, public  spirit ;  these pas- 
sions,  mixed  in  various  degrees,  and  distributed  through 
society, have been, from tho beginning of the world, and still 
are, the sonrce of  all the actions and enterprizes, which have 
ever been  observed  among mankind.  Would you  know the 
sentiments,  inclinations,  and  course  of  life  of  the GREEKS 
and ROMANS  P  Study well  the temper  and  actions  of  the 
FREBCH  and ENGLISH  : YOU  cannot  be  much  mistaken in 
transferring to the former most  of  the observations, which 
you have made with regard  to the latter.  Mankind are so 
much the same, in all times and places, that history informs 
us of  nothing new or strange in this particular.  Its chief 
use is only to discover the constant and universal principles 
of  human nature, by shewing men in all varieties of  circum- 
stances  and  situations,  and furnishing  us with  materials, 
fro111 which we  niay form  our observations, and beconie  ac- 
quainted  with  the  regular  springs  of  human  action  and 
behaviour.  These records  of  wars, intrigues,  factions,  and 
revolutions, are so many collections of  experiments, by which 
the politician or moral philosopher fixes the principles of his 
science ;  in the same  manner  as the physician or natural 
philosopher  becomes  acquainted with the nature of  plants, 
minerals, and other external objects, by the experiments, which 
he fornis coricerning  them.  Nor  are the earth, water,  and 
other elements, examined  by ARISTOTLE,  and HIPPOCRATES, 
more like to -chose, which  at present lie under  our observa- 
tion, than the men, described by POLYBIUS  and TACITUS,  are 
to those, who now govern the world. 
Sllould a traveller, returning from a far country, bring us 
an account of men, wholly different from any, with whom we 
were  ever  acquainted; men,  who  were  entirely  divested  of  SECT. 
VIII.  avarice,  ambition,  or revenge;  who  knew  no  pleasure  but .-A 
friendship,  generosity, and public  spirit ;  we  should imme-  Pm* I* 
diately, from these  circunlstances, detect the falsehood, and 
prove him a liar, with the same certainty as if he had stuffed 
his narration with  stories  of  centaurs and dragons, miracles 
and prodigies.  And if we would explode any forgery in his- 
tory, we cannot  make use  of  a  more  convincing argument, 
than to prove, that the actions, ascribed to any person, are 
directly contrary to the course of nature, and that no human 
motives, in such circumstances, cculd ever induce him to such 
a conduct.  The veracity of  QUIKTUS  CURTIUS  is as much to 
be suspected, when he describes the supernatural courage of 
ALEXANDER,  by which  he was  hurried  on singly to attack 
multitudes, as when he describes his supernatural force and 
activity, by which he was able to resist them.  So readily and 
universally  do we  acknowledge a  uniformity in  human 1.110- 
lives and actions as well as in the operations of body. 
Hence likewise the benefit of  that experience, acquired by 
long life and a variety of  business  and company, in order to 
instruct us in the principles  of  human nature, and regulate 
our future conduct, as well as speculation.  By means of this 
guide, we mount up to the knowledge of  men's  inclinations 
and motives, from  their  actions, expressions, and even  ges- 
tures;  and again,  descend  to  the  interpretation  of  their 
actions from our knowledge of their motives and inclinations. 
The general observations, treasured up by a course  of  expe- 
rience, give us the clue  of  human  nature, and teach us to 
unravel  all  its  intricacies.  Pretexts  and  appearances  no 
longer deceive us.  Public declarations pass for the specious 
colouring  of  a  cause.  And  though  virtue  and honour  be 
allowed their proper weight and authority, that perfect disin- 
terestedness, SO often pretended to, is never expected in mul- 
titudes and parties ;  seldom  in their leaders ;  and scarcely 
even in individuals  of  any rank or station.  But were there 
no uiliformity in human actions, and mere every experiment, 
which we  could form  of this kind, irregular and anomalous, 
it were impossible  to  collect  any general  observations  con- 
cerning  mankind ; and no  experience,  however  accurately 
digested by reflection, would ever serve to any purpose.  Why 
is the aged husbandman more  skilful in his calling than the 
young beginnel;  but because there is a certain uniformity in CONCERNING  IIUMAN  UNDERSTANDING.  OF LIBERTY  AND  NECESSITY.  71 
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PARTI. titioner  the rules, by which  this operation is governed and 
directed ? 
We must  not,  however,  expect,  that this  uniformity  of 
human actions should be carried to such a length, as that dl 
men, in the same circumstances, will  always act precisely in 
the same  manner,  without making  any allowance  for  the 
diversity  of  characters,  prejudices,  and opinions.  Such a 
uniformity in every particular, is found in no part of nature. 
On  the contrary, from  observing  the variety of  conduct  in 
different men, we  are enabled  to form  a  greater variety  of 
maxims,  which  still suppose  a  degree  of  uniformity  and 
regularity. 
Are the manners of  men different  in different  ages and 
countries P  We learn thence the great force  of  custoin and 
education, which mould  the human  mind  from  its infancy, 
and form it into a fixed  and established  character.  Is the 
behaviour and conduct of the one sex very unlike that of the 
other P  It is thence we become acquainted with the different 
characters, which nature has impressed upon th8 sexes, and 
tmhicll she preserves with constancy and regularity.  Are the 
actions of  the same person much diversified  in the different 
periods  of  his life, from  infancy to old  age ?  This affords 
room for many general observations  concerning the gradual 
change of  our sentiments and inclinations, and the different 
maxims, which prevail in the different ages of  human crea- 
tures.  Even  the  characters,  which  are  peculiar  to  each 
individual, have  a  uniformity in their  influence ;  otherwise 
our acquaintance with the persons  and our  observation  of 
their conduct, could never teach us their clispositions, or serve 
to direct our behaviour with regard to them. 
I grant it possible to find some actions, which seem to  have 
no  regular connexion with any known motives, and are ex- 
ceptions  to all the measures  of  conduct, which  have ever 
been established for the government of men.  But  if we would 
willingly know, what judgment should be formed of such irre- 
gular and extraordinary actions ;  we may consider the senti- 
ments, colnnioilly entertained with  regard to those irregular 
events,  whicli  appear  in  the  course  of  nature,  and  the 
operatioils of  external objects.  All causes are not conjoined 
to their usut~l  effects, with like uniformity.  An artificer, who 
handles only dead matter, may be disappointed of  his aim, as  SECT 
VIII.  well as the politician, who directs the conduct of sensible and  --A 
intelligent agents.  PABT  1. 
The  vulgar,  who  take  things  according  to  their  first 
appearance, attribute the uncertainty of  events to such an 
uncertainty in the causes  as makes the latter often fail of 
their usual iafluence ;  though they meet with no impediment 
in their operation.  But philosophers, observing, that, almost 
in every part of  nature, there is  contained a vast variety of 
springs  and  principles,  which  are  hid,  by  reason  of  their 
ininuteness or remoteness, find, that it is at  least possible the 
contrariety of events may not proceed from any contingency 
in the cause, but from the secret r peration of contrary causes. 
This possibility is converted  into certainty by fa'rther obser- 
vation;  when they remark, that, upon  an exact scrutiny, a 
contrariety of effects always betr; ys a contrariety of  causes, 
and proceeds from their mutual  opposition.  A peasant can 
give no better reason for the st01 ping of  any clock or watch 
than to say that it does  not  cc mmonly go  right :  But an 
artist easily perceives, that the same force  in the spring or 
pendulum has always the same influence on the wheels;  but 
fails of its usual effect, perhaps by reason of  a grain of  dust, 
which puts a stop to the whole movement.  From the obser- 
vation  of  several  parallel  instances,  philosophers  form  a 
maxim, that the connexion between  all  causes and effects is 
equally necessary, and that  its seeming uncertainty in some in- 
stances proceeds from the secret opposition of  contrary causes. 
Thus for instance,  in the human  body, when  the usual 
symptoms of  health  or sickness disappoint our expectation; 
when medicines operate not with their wonted powers ;  when 
irregular events follow from any particular cause ;  the philo- 
sopher  and physician  are not  surprized  at the matter, nor 
are ever tempted  to deny, in general, the necessity and uni- 
formity of  those principles, by which the animal aeconomy is 
conducted.  They know,  that a  human  body  is a  mighty 
complicated machine : That nlarp secret powers  lurk in it, 
which are altogether beyond our compreheiision : That to us 
it must  often  appear very uncertain  in its operations :  And 
that therefore the irregular events, which outwardly discover 
themselves, can be no proof, that the laws  of  na,ture are not 
observed with the greatest regularity in its internal opera- 
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'Iff  , reasoning to the actions  and volitions of  intelligent agents. 
PART  1.  The most irregular and unexpected resolutions of  men may 
frequently be accounted for by those, who know every parti- 
cular circumstance of their character and situation.  A Derson 
L  of  an obliging  disposition  gives a peevish  answer:  Rut  he 
has the tootbake,  or has  not dined.  A stupid fellow dis- 
covers  an uncommon alacrity in his carriage :  But he has 
met with a sudden piece of  good fortune.  Or even when an 
action,  as  sometimes  happens,  cannot  be  particularly  ac- 
counted for, either by the person  himself  or by others ;  we 
know, in general, that the characters of men are, to a certain 
degree, inconstant  and irregular.  This is, in a manner, the 
constant character of  human nature ;  though it be applicable, 
in a more particular  manner, to some persons, who have no 
fixed  rule  for  their  conduct,  but  proceed  in  a  continued 
course of caprice  and inconstancy.  The internal principles 
and motives may operate in a uniform manner, notwithstand- 
ing these seeming irregularities ;  in the same manner as the 
winds, rain, clouds, and other variations  of  the weather are 
supposed to be  governed  by  steady principles ;  though  not 
easily discoverable by Luman sagacity and enquiry. 
Thus it appears,  not  only that the conjunction  between 
motives  and voluntary actions is as regular  and uniform, as 
that between the cause and effect in any part of nature;  but 
also that this regular conjunction  has been  universally ac- 
knowledged among mankind, and has never been the subject 
of dispute, either in philosophy or common life.  Now, as it 
is frotn past experience, that we  driw all inferences concern- 
ing the future, and  as we  conclude, that objects mill always 
be  cor~joined  together,  which we  find to have  always been 
conjoined ;  it may seem superfluous to prove, that this expe- 
rienced uniformity in human actions is a' source, whence we 
draw inferences  concerning them.  But in order to throw the 
argument into a greater variety of lights, we  shall also insist, 
though briefly, on this latter topic. 
The mutual dependence of men is so great, in all societies, 
that scarce any human action is entirely compleat  in itself, 
or  is  performed  without  some  reference  to the  actions  of 
others, which are requisite to make it answer fully the inten- 
[Thc 5uorc.c of  id1 the iderences,  which wo  form  concerning them.-Eilithne 
E to1  .I 
tion of  the agent.  The poorest artificer, who labours alone,  SECT-  VIII. 
expects at least the protection  of  the magistrate, to ensure  h-,4 
him the enjoyment of  the fruits of  his labour.  He also ex-  PART  I. 
pects, that, when he carries his goods to market, and offers 
them  at a  reasonable  price, he shall find purchasers ;  and 
shall be able, by the money he acquires, to engage others  to 
supply him with  those commodities, which  are requisite for 
his subsistence.  In  proportion as men extend their dealings, 
and render  their intercourse with  others more  complicated, 
they always comprehend, in their  schemes of  life, a greater 
variety  of  voluntary  actions,  which  they expect,  from  the 
proper  motives, to co-operate with their  own.  In all these 
conclusions, they take their measures  from past  experience, 
in the same manner as in their reasonings  concerning exter- 
nal objects;  and firmly believe, that men, as well  as all the 
elements, are to continue, in their operations, the same, that 
they have ever found  them.  A manufacturer  reckons  upon 
the labour of his servants, for the execution  of  any work, as 
much  as upon  the tools, which  he employs, and would  be 
equally  surprized,  were  his expectations  disappointed.  In 
short, this experimental inference  and reasoning concerning 
the actions of others enters so much into human life, that no 
man, while  awake, is ever  a moment without  employing it. 
Have we  not reason, therefore, to affirm, that all mankind 
have always agreed i11  the doctrine of necessity, according to 
the foregoing definition and explication of it  P 
Nor have philosophers ever entertained a different opinion 
frot~l  the people in this particular.  For not to mention, that 
alniost every action of their life supposes that opinion ;  there 
are even few of  the speculative parts of  learning, to which it 
is not essential.  What would become of  history, had we not 
a dependence on the veracity of  the  historian, according to 
the experience, which we have had of mankind ?  How could 
politics be  a science,  if  lsws and forms of  government had 
not a uniform influence upon society P  Where would be the 
foundation of morals, if particular characters had no certain or 
determinate power  to produce  particular sentiments, and if 
these sentiments had no constant operation on actions ?  And 
with what pretence could we  employ our criticism upon any 
poet or polite author, if  we  could 11ot pronounce the conduct 
and sentiments of  his actors, either natural or unnatural, to 
such  characters,  nncl  i11  such  circumstances 2  It seems 74  CONCERNING  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDIh a.  OF LLBERTY  AND  NECESSITY.  76 
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VIII  action  of  any kind, without  acknowledging the doctrine of 
PARTI- necessity,  and  this  inference  from  motives  to  voluntary 
actions ;  from characters to conduct. 
And indeed, when we  coirsider how aptly natural and moral 
evidence link together, and form only one chain of argument, 
we shall make no scruple to allow, that they are of  the same 
nature, and derived  from  the same principles.  A prisoner, 
who  has neither  money nor  interest, discovers the impossi- 
bility of  his escape, as well when he considers the obstinacy 
of  the gaoler, as the walls and bars, with which  he is sur- 
rounded ;  and, in all attempts for his freedom, chuses rather 
to work upon the stone and iron  of  the one, than upon  the 
inflexible  nature  of  the other.  The  same  prisoner,  when 
conducted  to the  scaffold, foresees  his  death  as  certainly 
from the constancy and fidelity of  his guards,  as from  the 
operation of the ax or wheel.  His mind runs along a certain 
train of  ideas : The refusal  of  the soldiers to consent to his 
escape ;  the action of  the executioner ;  the separation of the 
head  and body ; bleeding,  convulsive  motions,  and  death. 
Here is a  connected  chain  of  natural causes and voluntary 
actions ; but  the mind  feels no  difference between then], in 
passing from one link to another : Nor is it less certain of the 
future event than if it were connected with the objects present 
to the memory  or  senses,  by  a  train of  causes,  cemented 
together by what we  are pleased to call a physical necessity. 
The same experienoed union has the same effect on the mind, 
whether the united objects be motives, volition, and actions; 
or figure and motion.  We may change the names of things; 
but their nature  and their operation on the understanding 
never change. 
Were a man, whom I know to be honest and opulent, and 
with whom  I live  in  intimate friendship, to come  into my 
house,  where  I am  surrounded  with  my  servants, I rest 
assured, that lie is not to stab me before he leaves it, in order 
to rob me of  my  silver standish ;  and I no more suspect this 
event, than the falling of  the house itself which is new, and 
solidly built and founded.-But  he  may have been  seized with a 
sudden and unknown frenzy.-So  may a sudden  earthquake 
arise,  and  shake  and  tumble my  house about  my  ears.  I 
shall therefore  change  the  suppositions.  I shall say, that 
[This paragraph  wi~s  added in Edition R.] 
I know with certainty, that he is not to put his hand into 
SECT.  VIII. 
the fire,  and hold  it there,  till it be  consumed:  And  this  .-,-a 
event, I think I can foretell with  the same  assurance,  as  PARTI. 
that, if  he throw himself out at the window, and meet with 
no obstruction, he will  not remain  a  momei~t  suspended  in 
the air.  No  suspicion of  an unknown  frenzy can  give the 
least possibility to the former event, which is so contrary to 
all the known  principles  of  human nature.  A man who at 
noon  leaves  his  purse  full  of  gold  on  the  pavement  at 
Charing-Cross, may as well  expect  that it will fly away like 
a  feather,  as that he will find it  untouched  an hour after. 
Above one half of human reasonings contain inferences of a 
similar  nature, attended with more  or  less  degrees  of  cer- 
tainty, proportioned  to our experience of  the usual conduct 
of mankind in such particular situations. 
I have  frequently considered, what  could  possibly be  the 
reason,  why  all  mankind, though they have  ever,  without 
hesitation,  acknowledged the doctrine of  necessity, in their 
whole  practice  and  reasoning,  have  yet  discovered such a 
reluctance  to  acknowledge  it  in words,  and  have  rather 
shewn  a  propensity,  in all  ages,  to profess  the  contrary 
opinion.  The matter, I think, may be accounted  for, after 
the following manner.  If we examine the operations of  body, 
and the production  of  effects  from  their  causes, we  shall 
find, that all our  faculties can never carry us farther in our 
knowledge of  this relation, than barely to observe, that par- 
ticular objects are constantly conjoined together, and that the 
mind is carried, by a customary transition, from the appearance 
of one to the belief of the other.  But though this conclusion 
concerning human ignorance be  the result of  the strictest 
scrutiny of  this subject, men still entertain a strong propen- 
sity to believe, that they penetrate farther into the powers of 
nature, and perceive  something like a  necessary connexion 
between  the cause  and the effect.  When  again they turn 
their reflections towards the  pera at ions of  t.heir own  minds, 
and feel  no  such connexion of  the motive and the action ; 
they are thence  apt to suppose, that there  is  a  difference 
between  the effects, which  result  from  material force, and 
those which arise from thought and intelligence.  Bnt being 
once  convinced, that we know nothing  farther  of  causation 
of any kind, than merely the constant conjunction of  objects, 
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SECT.  and finding,  that these  two  circumstances  are universally 
VIII  .--  allowed to have place in voluntary actions ;  we may be more 
PART  1-  easily led to own  the same necessity common to  all causes. 
And  though this reasoning  may contradict the systems of 
many philosophers, in ascribing necessity to the determina- 
tions  of  the will,  we  shall find,  upon  reflection,  that they 
dissent from it in words  only,  not i.u their  real sentiment. 
Necessity, according to the sense, in which it is here taken, 
has never yet been rejected, nor can ever, I  think, be rejected 
by any philosopher.  It  may  only,  perhaps,  be pretended, 
that the mind can perceive, in the operations of matter, some 
farther connexion between the cause and effect;  and a con- 
nexion that has not place in the voluntary actions of intelli- 
gent beings.  Now whether  it be so or not, can only appear 
upon examination ;  and it is incumbent on these philosophers 
to make good their assertion,  by defining or describing that 
necessity, and pointing it out to us in the operations ofmate- 
rial causes. 
It would seem,  indeed, that men begin  at the wrong end 
of  this question  concerning liberty and necessity, when they 
enter upon  it  by  examining the faculties  of  the soul,  the 
influence of the understanding, and  the operations of the will. 
Let them first discuss a more  simple question,  namely, the 
operations  of  body and of  brute unintelligent matter ;  and 
try whether they can there form  any idea of  causation and 
necessity, except that of  a constant  conjunction of  objects, 
and subsequent inference  of  the mind from one to another. 
If these  circumstances  form,  in  reality,  the whole  of  that 
necessity, which we  conceive in matter, and if these circum- 
stlances be also universally acknowledged to take place in the 
operations  of  the mind, the dispute is at an end; at least, 
must be owned to be thenceforth merely verbal.  But as long 
as we  will rashly suppose, that we  ha.ve some farther idea of 
necessity and causation in the operations of external objects ; 
at the same time, that we  can find  notl~ing  farther, in the 
voluntary  actions  of  the  mind ;  there is  no  possibility  of 
bringing  the question  to any determinate  issue,  while we 
proceed  upon so erroneous a supposition.  The only method 
of undeceiving us, is, to mount up  higher ;  to examine the 
narrow  extent of  science when  applied  to material causes ; 
and to convince ourselves, that all we know of  them, is, the 
constant  coiljunction and infel-cncc above  mentioned.  We 
may, perhaps, find, that it is with difficulty we  are induced  SECT. 
to fir  such narrow limits to human understanding : But we .  V"l.d 
can afterwards find no difficulty when we  come to apply this  PARTI. 
doctrine to the actions of the will.  For as it is evident, that 
these have a regular  conjunction with  motives  and circum- 
stances  and  characters,  and  as we  always  draw inferences 
from one to  the other, we must be obliged to acknowledge in 
words,  that  necessity,  which  we  have  already  avowed,  in 
every deliberation of  our lives, and in every step of  our con- 
duct and behaviour. ' 
But to proceed  in this reconciling project with regard to 
the question of  liberty and necessity ;  the most contentious 
question,  of  metaphysics,  the most  contentious  science; it 
will not require many words to prove, that all mankind have 
ever  agreed  in the doctrine of  liberty as well  as in that of 
necessity, and that the whole  dispute,  in this respect  also, 
has been  hitherto merely  verbal.  For  what  is  meant by 
liberty,  when  applied  to voluntary  actions ?  MTe  cannot 
surely  mean,  that  actions  have  so  little  connexion  with 
motives,  inclinations,  and circumstances, that one  does not 
The prevalence  of  the doctrine of 
liberty  may  be  accounted  for,  from 
another cause, viz.  a false sensation  or 
seeming  experience  which  we have,  or 
may lhavo, of  liberty or indifference, in 
many of  our actions.  The necessity of 
any action,  whether  of  matter  or of 
mind,  is  not,  properly  speaking,  a 
quality in the agent, but in any thinking 
or intelligent  being, who  nlay consider 
the action ;  and  it consists  chiefly  in 
the  determination  of  his thoughts to 
infer the existence of  that action  from 
some preceding objects ;  as liberty, when 
opposed to necessity,  is nothing but the 
want of  that determihation, and a  cer- 
tain looseness or indifference, which we 
feel, in passing, or not passing, from the 
idea of  one object  to that of  any suc- 
ceeding  one.  Now  we  may  observe, 
that,  though,  in  rejecting  on  human 
actions, we seldom feel such a looseness 
or indifference,  but  are commonly able 
to  infer  them  with  considerable  cer- 
tainty from their motives, arid from the 
dispositions  of  the  agent ; yet  it fre- 
quently  happens,  that,  in performi9zg 
the actions themselves, we are sensible 
of  something like it : And as all resem- 
bling object,s are readily taken for each 
other,  this  has  been  employed  as  a 
demonstrative and even  intuitive  proof 
of  human  liberty.  We  feel,  that  our 
actions are subject to our will, on  most 
occasions ;  and imagine we feel, that the 
will itself is subject to nothing, because, 
when by a denial of  it  we are provoked 
to try, we  feel,  that  it moves  easily 
every  way, and produces  an image  of 
itself, (or a  Velleity,  as  it  is  called in the 
schools) even on that side, on  which  it 
did  not  settle.  This image,  or faint 
motion,  we  persuade  ourselves,  could, 
at  that time, have been compleated into 
the thing itself;  because,  should that 
be denied, we find, upon a second  trial, 
that, at  present, it can.  We consider 
not, that the fantastical desire of  shew- 
ing liberty, is  here the  motive  of  our 
actions.  And  it seems  certain, that, 
however  we  may  imagine  we  feel  a 
liberty within ourselves, a spectator can 
commonly  infer  our  actions  from our 
motives and character ;  and even where 
he cnnnot, he concludes in general, that 
he might, were he perfectly acquainted 
with  every circumstance  of  our  situa- 
tion  and  temper.  and  tlie  most  secret 
springs  of  our  complexion  and  dis- 
position.  Now this is the very essence 
of  necessity, according to the foregoing 
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SECT.  follow with a certain degree of  uniformity from the other, 
I 
.  vl:l- ,  and that one affords no inference  by which we can conclude  . 
PART  I.  the existence of the other.  For these are plain and acknow- 
ledged  matters of fact.  By liberty, then, we can only mean 
a power of  acting or not acting, acco~ding  to  the determinations 
of  the will ;  that is, if we chuse to remain at rest, we may ;  if 
we  chuse to  move,  we  also  may.  Now  this  hypothetical 
liberty is universally  allowed  to belong  to every  one,  who 
is not a prisoner  and in chains.  Here then is no subject of 
dispute. 
Whatever definition we  nlay give of  liberty, we  should be 
careful to observe two  requisite  circumstances ;  Jirst,  that it 
be consistent with plain matter of  fact ;  secondly, that it be 
consistent  with itself.  If we  observe these  circumstances, 
and render  our  definition  intelligible, I am persuaded that 
all mankind will be found of one opinion with regard to it. 
It  is universally  allowed,  that nothing exists  without  a 
cause  of  its existence,  and that  chance, when  strictly ex- 
amined, is a  mere negative wrd, and means not any real 
power, which  has any where, a being  in  nature.  But it is 
pretended,  that some  causes  are necessary, Mome  not neces- 
sary.  Here then is the advantage of  definitions.  Let any 
one deufilte a cause, without  comprehending, as a part of  the 
definition, a necessary connexion wit11  its effect ;  and let him 
shew distinctly the origin of  the idea, express'ed by the defi- 
nition ;  and I shall readily give  up the whole  controversy. 
But if  the foregoing  explication of  the matter be received, 
this must be  absolutely  impracticable.  Had not ~bjects  a 
regular  conjunction with  each other, we  should never have 
entertained any notion of  cause and effect ;  and this regnla,r 
conjunction produces  that inference  of  the understanding, 
which is the only connexion, that we  can have  any compre- 
hension of.  Whoever  attempts a definition of  cause, exclu- 
sive of these circumstances, will be obliged, either to employ 
unintelligible terms, or such as are synonimous to the term, 
which he endeavours to define.'  And if the definition abore 
1  Thus,  if  a  cause be  defined,  thnt  Had it been  saiit, that a cause is titnt 
q~~hichprodztces  a77y  thing ; it is easy  to  after which anythifzg constantly  exists ; 
observe, that producing  is  synonimous  we should have  undersfood  the  terms. 
to causi?zg.  In  like manner, if  a cause  For this is, indeed, all we  know of  tho 
be defined. that by  which anything exists ;  matter.  And  this constancy forms the 
this is liable to the same ot)jection.  For  very essence  of  necessity, nor  have we 
whi~t  is meant by :hese  words, @ which  ?  any other idea  of  it. 
mentioned be admitted ;  liberty, when  opposed  to necessity,  SECT. 
not to constraint, is the same thing with chance;  which  is  V1,ll.  - 
universally allowed to have no existence.  PART  I. 
PART 11. 
There is no method of  reasoning  more  common, and yet 
none more blameable, than, in philosophical  disputes, to en- 
deavour the refutation of any hypothesis, by a pretence of its 
dangerous  consequences to religion  and  morality.  When 
any opinion  leads to absurdities, it is certainly false ;  but it 
is not certain that an opinion  is false, because it is of  dan- 
gerous consequence.  Such topics, therefore, ought entirely 
to be forborne;  as serving nothing to the discovery of truth, 
but oiily to makg the person  of  an antagonist odious.  This 
I observe in general, without pretending to dram any adran- 
tage  froin  it.  I frankly submit to an examination of  this 
kind, and shall venture to affirm, that the doctrines, both of 
necessity  and of  liberty,  as above  explained,  are not  only 
consisteilt with '  morality, but are absolutely essential to its 
support. 
Necessity may be  defined  two  ways, conformably  to the 
two definitions of  cause, of which it makes an essential part. 
It consists either in the constant conjunction of  like objects, 
or in the inference of  the understanding from one object  to 
another.  Now necessity, in both these senses, (which, indeed, 
are, at  bottom, the same) has universally, though tacitly, in 
the schools, in the pulpit, and in common  life, been  allowed 
to belong to the will of  man; and no one has aver pretended 
to deny,  that we  can  draw  inferences  concerning  human 
actions, and that those  inferences  are founded on the expe- 
rienced union of like actions, with like niotives, inclinations, 
and  circumstances.  The only particular, in which  any one 
can differ, is, that either, perhaps, he will  refuse to give the 
name of necessity to this propebty of human actions : But as 
lo11g as the meaning is understood, I hope  the word can do 
no  harm :  Or  that he will maintain it possible  to discover 
something farther in the operations of  matter.  But this, it 
rrlust be acknowledged, can be of no consequence to morality 
or  religion,  whatever  it may  be  to natural  philosophy  or 
metaphysics.  We may here be mistaken in asserting, that 
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SECT.  there is no idea of  any other necessity or conncxion in the 
VIII.  actions of body : But surely we ascribe nothing to the actions  - 
PART  11.  of the mind, but what every one does, and must readily allow 
of.  We change no  circumstance in the received  orthodox 
system with regard to the will, but only in that with regard 
to material objects  and causes.  Nothing therefore  can be 
more innocent, at least, than this doctrine. 
All laws being founded  on  rewards and punishments, it is 
supposed as a fundamental principle, that these motives have 
a regular and uniform  influence on the mind, and both pro- 
duce the good  and prevent  the evil  actions.  We may give 
to this influence what name we  please ;  but, as it is uiually 
conjoined with the action, it must be  esteemed a cause, and 
be  looked  upon  as an instance  of  that necessity, which we 
would here establish. 
The only proper object of hatred or vengeance, is a persoil 
or creature, endowed with thought  and consciousness ;  and 
when any criminal  or injurious  actions excite that passion, 
it is only by their relation  to the person, or connexion with 
him.  Actions  are,  by  their  very  nature,  temporary  and 
perishing;  and where  they proceed  not from some  cause in 
the character  and disposition  of  the person who  performed 
them, they can neither redound  to his honour, if  good ;  nor 
infamy, if  evil.  The actions  themselves  may be blameable ; 
they may be contrary to all the rules of morality and religion : 
But the person is not answerable for them ;  and as they pro- 
ceeded  from nothing  in him, that is durable  and constant, 
and leave  nothing of  that nature  behind them, it is impos- 
sible he can, upon their account, become the object of punish- 
ment  or vengeance.  According  to the priilciple, therefore, 
which denies necessity, and consequently causes, a man is as 
pure and untainted, after having committed the most horrid 
crime, as at the first moment of  his birth, nor is his charac- 
ter any wise  concerned  in his  actions ;  since they are not 
derived from it, and the wickedness  of  the one can never be 
used as a proof of  the depravity of the other. 
Men  are not  blamed  for  such  actions,  as they perform 
ignorantly and casually, whatever  may be the consequences. 
Why  P  but because  the principles  of  these actions are only 
momentary,  and  terminate in them  alone.  Men  are  less 
blamed for such actions as they perform  hastily and unpre- 
meditately, than for such as proceed from deliberation.  For 
what reason ?  but because a hasty temper, though a constant  SECT. 
cause or principle in the mind, operates  only  by  intervals,  .vl!l* 
and  infects  not  the whole  character.  A gain,  repentance  PART  11. 
wipes  off  every crime, if  attended with a reformation of  life 
and manners.  How is this to be accounted  for  P  but by as- 
serting, that actions render a person criminal, merely as they 
are proofs of  criininal principles in the mind; and when, by 
an alteration of these principles, they cease to be just proofs, 
they  likewise  cease to be  criminal.  But, except upon  the 
doctrine of necessity, they never were just proofs, and conse- 
quently never were criminal. 
It will be equally easy to prove, and from the same argu- 
ments, that liberty, according to that definition  above men- 
tioned, in which  all men agree, is also essential to morality, 
and that no human actions, where it is wanting, are suscep- 
tible  of  any moral qualities, or can be the objects  either  of 
approbation  or dislike.  For  as  action^  are objects of  our 
moral  sentiment, so far only as they are indications of  the 
internal character, passions, and affections ;  it is impossible 
that they can give rise either to praise or blame, where they 
proceed not from these principles, but are derived altogether 
from external violence. 
I pretend not to have  obviated  or removed all objections 
to this theory, with regard  to necessity and liberty.  I can 
foresee other objections,  derived from topics, which have not 
here been  treated of.  It may be  said, for instance, that, if 
voluntary actions be  subjected to the same laws of  necessity 
with the operations of  matter, there is a continued  chain of 
necessary causes, pre-ordained and pre-determined, reaching 
from  the  original  cause  of  all, to every  single  volition  of 
every human creature.  No  contingency any where in the 
universe ; no indifference ; no liberty.  While we  act,  we 
are, at  the same time, acted upon.  The ultimate Author of 
all our volitions is the Creator of the world, who first bestowed 
motion on this immense  machine, and placed  all beings in 
that particular position, whence  every subsequent  event, by 
an inevitable necessity, must result.  Human actions, there- 
fore, either can have no moral turpitude at all, as proceeding 
from  so good  a  cause;  or if they have  any turpitude,  they 
must involve our Creator  in the same guilt, while he is ac- 
knowledged to be their ultimate cause and author.  For as a 
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SECT.  whether the train he employed be long or short ;  so wherever 
VIII  . . .  a  continued  chain of  necessary causes  is fixed, that Being, 
PABTII. either finite  or  infinite, who  produces  the first, is likewise 
the author of  all the rest, and must both bear the blame and 
acquire the praise,  which  belong  to them.  Our  clear  and 
unalterable  ideas of  morality  establish this rule,  upon un- 
questionable reasons, when we  examine  the consequences of 
any human action ;  and these reasons must still have greater 
force, when applied to the volitions and intentions of a Being, 
infinitely wise and  powerful.  Ignorance or impotence  may 
be pleaded  for  so  limited a creature as man ; but those im- 
perfections  have  no  place  in  our Creator.  He foresaw,  he 
ordained, he intended all those actions of  men, which we  so 
rashly pronounce criminal.  And we  must therefore conclude, 
either that they are not criminal, or that the Deity, not man, 
is accountable for them.  But. as eitqher  of  these  positions is 
absurd and impious, it follows, that the doctrine, from which 
they are deduced, cannot  possibly be true, as being liable to 
all the same objections.  An  absurd consequence, if  neces- 
sary, proves the original  doctrine to be absurd;  in the same 
manner  as  criminal  actions  render  criminal  the  original 
cause,  if  the  connexion  between  them  be  necessary  and 
inevitable. 
This objection  consists  of  two part?, which we  shall ex- 
amine separately ;  First, that, if human actions can be traced 
up, by a  necessary chain, to  the  Deity,  they  can never  be 
criminal ;  on account of  the infinite perfection of that Being, 
from whom  they  are derived, and who  can intend nothing 
but what is  altogether  good  and laudable.  Or, Secondly, if 
they be criminal, we  must retract the attribute of perfection, 
which we  ascribe to the Deity, and must acknowledge him to 
be the ultimate author of  guilt and moral turpitude in all his 
creatures. 
The answer to the  first  objection  seems obvious and con- 
vincing.  There are many philosophers, who,  after an exact 
scrutiny of  all the phsenomena  of  nature, conclude, that the 
WHOLE, considered  as one  system, is, in every  period of  its 
existence,  ordered with perfect  benevolence ;  and that the 
utmost  possible  happiness  will,  in  the end,  result  to  all 
created beings, without  any mixture of positive  or  absolute 
ill  and  misery.  Every  physical  ill,  say  they,  makes  an 
essential part of  this benevolent  system, and ~ould  not pos- 
sibly be removed, even by the Deity himself, considered as a  SECT. 
wise agent, without giving entrance to greater ill, or exclud-  -vlfl~ , 
ing greater  good,  which  will  result  from  it.  From  this  PARTII. 
theory, some philosophers, and the ancient Stoics among the 
rest,  derived  a  topic  of  consolation  under  all  afflictions, 
while they taught their pupils, that those  ills, under whirli 
they laboured, were, in reality, goods  to the universe ;  and 
that  to  an  enlarged  view,  which  could  comprehend  the 
whole system of  nature, every event  became an object of joy 
and exultation.  But though this topic be specious and sub- 
lime, it was  soon  found  in practice  weak  and  ineffectual. 
You would surely more  irritate, than  appease a man, lying 
under the racking pains of  the gout, by preaching up to him 
the rectitude of  those  general  laws,  which  produced  the 
malignant humours in his body, and led  them  through the 
proper  canals, to the sinews  and nerves,  where  they  now 
excite such acute torments.  These  enlarged views  may, for 
a moment, please the imagination of a speculative man, who 
is placed  in ease  and security;  but  neither can they dwell 
with  constancy  on  his mind, even  though  undisturbed  by 
the emotions of pain  or passion ;  much less  can they main- 
tain their ground, when  attacked  by such powerful antago- 
nists.  The  affections take  a  narrower  and  more  natural 
survey of  their object ;  and by an  ceconomy, more  suitable 
to the infirmity of  human  minds,  regard  alone  the beings 
around us,  and  are actuated by such events as appear good 
or ill to the private system. 
The case  is  the  same with moral as with physical ill.  It 
cannot reasonably be supposed, that those remote considera- 
tions,  which  are found  of  so  little  efficacy with  regard to 
one, will have  a  more powerful i~ifluence  with regard to the 
other.  The mind of man is so formed by nature, that, upon 
the  appearance  of  certain  characters,  dispositions,  and 
actions, it immediately  feels  tlie  sentiment of  approbation 
or blame ;  nor are there  any emotions more essential to its 
frame and constitution.  The characters, which  engage our 
approbation, are chiefly such as contribute to the peace and 
security of  human society ;  as  the characters, which excite 
blame, are chiefly such as tend to public detriment and dis- 
turbance : Whence it may reasonably be  presumed, that the 
moral  sentiments  arise,  either  mediately  or  immediately, 
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SECT.  philosophical  meditations  establish  a  different  opinion  or 
VIII  _  ,  conjecture;  that every  thing  is  right  with  rega,rd to the 
PART  11.  WHOLE,  and thai the qualities, which  disturb society,  are, in! 
the  main, as beneficial, and  are  as suitable to the primary 
intention of nature, as those which nlore directly prolrlote its 
happiness  and welfare P  Are  such  remote  and  uncertain 
speculations  able  to counterbalance  the sentiments,  which 
arise  from the natural and immediate view of  the objects? 
A man who  is robbed  of  a  considerable  sum; does he  find 
his  vexation  for  the  loss  any  wise  diminished  by  these 
sublime reflections P  Why  then should his moral resentment 
against the crime be supposed incompatible with them P  Or 
why  should  not the acknowledgment  of  a  real distinction 
between vice  and virtue  be  reconcileable  to all speculative 
systems of  philosophy, as well  as that of  a  real distinction 
between  personal  beauty  and  deformity?  Both  these  dis- 
tinctions are founded in the natural sentiments of  the human 
mind :  And  these  sentiments  are not  to be  controuled  or 
altered  by  any philosophical  theory  or  speculation  what- 
soever. 
The second objection admits not of  so easy and satisf'rtctory 
an answer; nor is it possible to explain  distinctly, how the 
Deity can  be  the mediate  cause  of  all the actions of  men, 
without being the author of  sin and moral turpitude.  These 
are mysteries, which  mere  natural and unassisted reason is 
very unfit  to  handle ; and whatever  system  she embraces, 
she  must  find  herself  involved  in inextricable  difficulties, 
and even contradictions,  at every step which she takes with 
regard to such subjects.  To reconcile the indifference and 
contingency of  human actions with prescience ;  or to defend 
absolute decrees, and yet free the Deity fro111 being the author 
of  sin, has been  found  hitherto  to exceed  all the power of 
philosophy.  Happy, if she be thence sensible of her temerity, 
when she pries  into these  sublime mysteries ;  and leaving a 
scene  so  full  of  obscurities  and  perplexities,  return,  with 
suitable modesty, to her true and proper  province, the ex- 
amination  of  common  life; where  she will  find  difficulties 
enow  to employ  her  enquiries,  without  launching  into  so 
boundless an ocean of doubt, uncertainty, and contradiction ! 
SECTION  1X.-Of  the Reason of  Animals. 
ALL  our reasoniiigs concerning matter of fact are founded on 
a  species of  ANALOGY,  which  leads us  to expect  from  any 
cause  the  same  events,  which  we  have  observed to result 
from similar causes.  Where the causes are entirely similar, 
the analogy is perfect, and  the  inference, drawn  from  it, is 
regarded as certain and conclusive : Nor does any inan ever 
entertain a doubt, where  he sees a piece of  iron, that it will 
hare weight and cohesion of parts;  as in all other instances, 
which  have  ever  fallen under his  observation.  But where 
the objects have not so exact a similarity, the analogy is less 
perfect, and the inference  is less conclusive ;  though still it 
has some force, in proportion to the degree of  similarity and 
resemblance.  The anatomical observations, formed upon one 
animal,  are,  by  this  species  of  reasoning,  extended to all 
animals ;  and it is certain, that when  the circulation of  the 
blood,  for  instance,  is clearly proved  to have place in one 
creature,, as a  frog, or  fish, it forms a strong presumption, 
that the same principle  has place  in all.  These analogical 
observations may be  carried farther, even to this science, of 
which we  are now  treating; and any theory, by  which  we 
explain  the  operations of  the understanding, or  the origin 
a,nd connexion of  the passions in man, will acquire additional 
authority, if we  find, that the same theory is requisite to ex- 
plain  the  same phaenomena in all other animals.  'CVe  shall 
inake trial of  this, with regard  to the hypothesis, by which, 
we  have, in the foregoing  discourse, endea~oured  to account 
for  all experimental  reasonings;  and it is hoped, that this 
new point of view will serve to  confirm all our former obser- 
vations. 
First, It seems evident, that animals, as well as men, learn 
many things from experience, and infer, that the same events 
will always follow from  the same causes.  By this principle 
they  become  acquainted with the  more  obvious  properties 
of external objects, and gradually, from their birth, treasure 
up a knowledge  of  the nature of  fire, water, earth,  stones, 
heights, depths, &c. and  of  the effects,  which  result  from 
their  operation.  The ignorance  and  inexperience  of  the 
young are here plainly distinguishable from the cunning and 
SECT. 
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SECT.  sagacity of  the old, who have  learned, by long observation,  .  IX.  .  to avoid what  hurt them, and to pursue what  gave ease or 
pleasure.  A horse, that has been  accustomed to the field, 
becomes  acquainted with the proper  height, which  he  can 
leap,  and will  never  attempt  what  exceeds his  force  and 
ability.  An old greyhound will trust the more fatiguing part 
of the chase to the younger, and will place  himself  so  as to 
meet the hare in her doubles ;  nor are the conjectures, which 
he forms on this occasion, founded in any thing but his ob- 
servation and experience. 
This is still more evident from the effects of discipline and 
education on animals, who, by the proper  application  of  re- 
wards and punishments, may be taught any course of action, 
the most contrary to their natural instincts and propensities. 
Is it  not  experience, which  renders  a  dog  apprehensive of 
pain, when you menace him, or lift up the whip to beat him P 
Is it not  even experience, which  makes  him  answer  to his 
name,  and infer,  from  such  an arbitrary  sound,  that you 
mean him rather  than  any of  his fellows, and intend to call 
him, when you pronounce it in a  certain manner,  and with a 
certain tone and accent ? 
In all these cases, we  may observe, that the animal infers 
some fact beyond what  immediately strikes his senses ;  and 
that this inference is altogether  founded on past experience, 
while the creature expects from the present object the same 
consequences, which it has always found in its observation 
to result from similar objects. 
Secondly, It is impossible, that  this inference of the animal 
can be founded on any process of  argument or reasoning, by 
which he concludes, that like events must follow like objects, 
and that the course of  nature will  always be regular in its 
operations.  For if there be in reality any arguments of  this 
nature,  they  surely lie too  abstruse for  the observation  of 
such imperfect understandings ;  since it may well employ the 
utmost care and attention of a philosophic genius to discover 
and  observe  them.  Animals, therefore,  are not  guided  in 
these inferences by reasoning :  Neither are children :  Neither 
are the generality of  mankind, in their ordinary actions and 
conclusions : Neither  are philosophers  themselves,  who,  in 
all the active parts of  life, are, in the main, the same with 
the vulgar, and are governed by the same maxims.  Nature 
must have provided some other principle, of  more ready, itnit 
more  general use  and application ;  nor can an  operation of  SEOT. 
such immense consequence in life, as that of inferring effects . 
from causes, be trusted to the uncertain procebs of reasoning 
and argumentation. Were this doubtful with regard to men, 
it seems to admit  of  no  question with  regard  to the brute 
creation ;  and the conclusion being  once  firmly established 
in the one, we  have a strong presumption, from all the rules 
of  analogy, that it ought to be unirersally admitted, without 
any exception or reserve.  It  is cust,om alone, which engages 
animals, from every object, that strikes their senses, to infer 
its usual attendant, and carries their imagination, from the 
appearance of  the one, to conceive the other, in that parti- 
cular mann.er, which we  denominate  belief.  No other expli- 
cation can be  given  of  this operation, in all the higher, as 
well as lower classes of sensitive beings, which fall under our 
notice and observation.' 
Since all reasonings concerning facts  their consequences. 
or causes is  derived merely from custom,  3.  One  man  is  able to carry  on  a 
it  may be  asked  how  it happens, that  chain  of  consequences  to  a  greater 
men so much surpabs animals in reason-  length than another. 
ing, and  one  man  so much  surpasses  4.  Few men can  think long without 
another?  Has not  the  same  custom  running  into a confusion of  ideas,  and 
the same influence on all  ?  mistaking  one  for  another; and there 
We shall here endeavour briefly to ex-  are various degrees of  this infirmity. 
plain the great difference in human un-  5.  The  circumstance,  on  which  the 
derstandings :  After which the reason  effect depends, is frequently involved in 
of  the difference between men and ani-  other circumstances, which are foreign 
mals will easily be comprehended.  and  extrinsic.  The  separation  of  it 
1.  When we have lived any time, and  often requires great attention, accuracy, 
have been accustomed to the uniformity  and subtilty. 
of  nature, we acquire  a  general habit,  6. The formingof general maxims from 
by which we always transfer the known  particular  observation  is  a  very nice 
to the unknown, and conceive the latter  operation ;  and nothing is more  usual, 
to resemble  the former.  By means of  from haste or a  narrowness  of  mind, 
this  general  habitual principle, we re-  which  sees  not  on  all sides,  than  to 
gard even one experiment  as the foun-  commit mistakes in this particular. 
dation of reasoning, and expect asimilar  7. When we  reason  from  analogies, 
event  with  some  degree  of  certainty,  the  man, who  has  the  greater  expe- 
where  the  experiment  has  been made  rienre  or the  greater  promptitude  of 
accurately,  and  free  from  all foreign  suggesting analogies, will be  the better 
circumstances. It  is therefore considered  reasoner. 
as a matter  of  great importance to ob- 
serve the consequences of  things ;  and as 
one man may very much surpass another 
in attention and memory and observa- 
tion,  thie  will  make  a very  great  dif- 
ference in their reasoning. 
2.  Where  there is a complication of 
causes to produce  any effect, one  mind 
may be much larger than  another, and 
hetter  able  to comprehend  the  whole 
system  of  objects,  and to infer justly 
8.  Byasse~  from prejudice, education, 
passion,  party,  &c,  hang  more  upon 
one mind than another.  -. 
9.  After we  have  acquired  a  confi- 
dence  in  human testimony, books  and 
conversation  enlarge  much  more  the 
sphere  of  one  man's  experience  and 
thought than those of  another. 
It  would  be  easy  to discover  many 
other circumstances  that  make  a  dif- 
ference in the anderstJandings of  men.' 
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SECT.  But though animals learn many parts  of  their knowledge  .  IX  from observation, there are also maqy parts of  it, which they 
derive from the original hand of  nature ;  which much exceed 
the share of  capaoity  they possess  on  ordinary  occasions; 
and in which they improve, little or nothing, by the longest 
practice  and experience.  These we  denominate INSTINCTS, 
and are so  apt to admire, as something very extraordinary, 
and inexplicable by all the disquisitions of human understand- 
ing.  But our wonder mill, perhaps, cease or diminish ;  when 
we  consider, that the experimental  reasoning  itself,  which 
we possess in common with beasts, and on which the whole 
conduct  of  life depends, is nothing but a species of  instinct 
or mechanical power, tha%  acts in us unknown  to ourselves ; 
and in its chief operations, is not directed by any such rela- 
tions or conlparisons of ideas, as are the proper objects of our 
intellectual faculties.  Though  the instinct be different, yet 
still it is an instinct, which  teaches a man to avoid the fire; 
as much as that, which teaches a bird, with such exactness, 
the art of  incubation,  and the whole ceconomy and order of 
its nursery. 
SECTION  X.-Of  Miracles.' 
PART  I. 
THERE  is, in Dr. TILLOTSON'S  writings,  an argument against 
the real presence, which is as concise, and elegant, and strong 
as any argument can possibly be supposed against a doctrine, 
so little worthy of  a serious refutation.  It is acknowledged 
on  all hands,  says that learned  prelate, that the authority, 
either of  the scripture  or of  tradition, is founded merely in 
the testimony of the apostles, who were eye-witnesses to those 
miracles of  our Saviour, by which he proved his divine mis- 
sion.  Our  evidence,  then,  for  the truth  of  the Christian 
religion is less than the evidence for the truth of our senses; 
because, even in the first  authors of  our  religion, it was  nb 
greater ;  and it is evident it mast diminish in passing from 
them to their disciples ;  nor can any one rest such confidence 
in their testimony, as in the immediate object of  his senses. 
But  a weaker  evidence  can never  destroy a  stronger;  and 
therefore,  were  the  doctrine  of  the real  presence  ever  so 
[For the history of  this Section see '  History of  the Editions,' Vol iii. p. 50.  Ed.] 
clearly revealed  in scripture, it were directly contrary to the  SECT.  x. 
rules  of  just  reasoning to give our assent to it.  It contra-  .-,-& 
diets  sense, though  both  the  scripture  and  tradition,  on  PART*. 
which it is supposed to be built, carry not such evidence with 
them as sense ;  when they are considered merely as external 
evidences, and are 11ot  brought  home to every one's breast, 
by the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit. 
Nothing is so convenient  as a  decisive  argument of  this 
kind, which must at least silence  the most arrogant bigotry 
and superstition, and free  us  from  their impertinent solici- 
tations.  I flatter myself, that I have discovered an argument 
of a like nature, which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, 
be an everlasting check to all kinds of  superstitious delusion, 
and consequently, will be useful as long as the world endures. 
For  so long, I presume, will  the accounts  of  miracles  and 
prodigies be found in all history, sacred and profane.' 
Though  experience  be  our  only guide in reasoning con- 
cerning matters  of  fact ; it must be acknowledged, that this 
guide is not altogether infallible, but in some cases is apt to 
lead us into errors.  One, who in our climate, should expect 
better weather  in any week  of JUNE  than in one of  DEUEN- 
BEE,  would  reason  justly,  and  conformably to experience ; 
but it is certain, that he may happen, in the event, to find 
himself  mistaken.  However, we  niay observe, that, in such 
a case, he would have  no  cause  to complain of  experience ; 
because it  commonly  informs  us  beforehand  of  the uncer- 
tainty, by that contrariety  of  events,  which we  may learn 
from a diligent observation.  A11  efFects follow not with like 
certainty  from  their  supposed  causes.  Sonle  events  are 
found, in a11  countries and all ages, to have been constantly 
conjoined together:  Others are  found  to  have  been  more 
variable, and sometinles to disappoint our  expectations ;  so 
that, in our reasonings  concerning  matter of  fact, there are 
all imaginable  degrees  of  assurance,  from the highest  cer- 
taintly  to the lowest species of  moral evidence. 
A wise  man, therefore, proportions  his belief to the evi- 
dence.  In  such conclusions as are founded  on an infallible 
experience,  he  expects  the event  with  the last degree of 
assurahce, and regards  his  past  experience  as a full proof 
of the future  existence  of  that event.  In other  cases, he 
proceeds with more caution :  He weighs the opposite expcri- 
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SECT.  ments :  He considers which side is supported by the greater 
&  number of  experiments : To that side he inclines, with doubt 
PART  1-  and hesitation ;  and when at last he fixes his judgment,  the 
evidence exceeds not what we  properly call probability.  All 
probability, then, supposes an opposition of  experiments and 
observations, where the one side is found to overbalance  the 
other, and to produce a degree of  evidence, proportioned  to 
the superiority.  A hundred instances or experiments on one 
side, and  fifty on  another, afford  a doubtful  expectation  of 
any event ;  though a hundred uniform experiments, with only 
one that is  contradictory, reasonably beget  a  pretty strong 
degree of  assurance.  In  all cases, we must balance the oppo- 
site experiments,  where they are  opposite, and deduct the 
smaller number from the greater, in order to know the exact 
force of  the superior evidence. 
To apply these principles to a particular instance ;  we may 
observe, that there is no species  of  reasoning more common, 
more  useful,  and even necessary to human  life, than that 
which is derived from the testimony of  men, and the reports 
of  eye-witnesses  and spectators.  This species of  reasoning, 
perhaps, one may deny to be founded on the relation of  cause 
and  effect.  I shall  not  dispute  about a word.  It  will  be 
sufficient to observe, that our assurance in any argument of 
this kind is derived froni no other principle than our observa- 
tion of  the veracity of  human  testimony,  and of  the usual 
conformity of  facts to the reports  of  witnesses.  It  being  a 
general maxim, that no  objects have  any discoverable  con- 
nexion together, and that all the  inferences, which  we  can 
draw from one to another, are founded  merely on  our  exye- 
rience of  their constant and regular  conjunction ;  it  is  evi- 
dent, that we ought not to make an exception to this maxirn 
in  favour  of  human testimony, whose  connexion  with  any 
event seems, in itself, as little necessary as any other.'  Were 
not the menlory tenacious to a certain degree ;  had not. men 
commonly an inclination to truth and a principle of probity ; 
were  they not  sensible  to shame, when detected in a false- 
hood : Were not these, I say, discovered  by experience  to be 
qualities, inherent in human nature, we should  never  repose 
the least confidence in human testimony.  A man delirious. 
[Editions E to K substitute:  Did not  Men's  Imagination naturally follow 
their  Memory.] 
or  noted  for  falsehood  and  villany,  has no  manner  of  SECT. 
authority with us.  -  x. 
And as the evidence, derived  from  witnesses  and human  PARTI* 
testimony, is founded on  past  experience, so it  varies  with 
the experience, and is regarded  either as a  proof  or a pro- 
bability, according as the conjunction between any particular 
kind of  report and any kind of  object  has been found  to be 
constant or variable.  There are a number  of  circumstances 
to be taken into consideration in all judgments of  this kind; 
and the ultimate  standard, by which  we  determine all dis- 
putes,  that may  arise concerning them,  is  always  derived 
from experience and observation.  Where this experience  is 
not entirely uniform on any side, it is attended with an un- 
avoidable contrariety in our judgments, and with  the same 
opposition and mutual destruction  of  argument as in every 
other kind of  evidence.  We frequently hesitate  concerning 
the reports  of  others.  We balance  the opposite  circum- 
stances, which  cause any doubt  or  uncertainty;  and when 
we  discover a superiority on  any side, we  incline to it; but 
still  with a  diminution  of  assurance,  in proportion  to the 
force of  its antagonist. 
This contrariety of  evidence, in the present  case, may be 
derived from several different causes ;  from the opposition of 
contrary testimony;  from  the character or number of  the 
witnesses ;  from  the manner  of  their delivering their testi- 
mony ;  or from the union  of  all these  circumstances.  We 
entertain a  suspicion  concerning.  any matter  of  fact, when 
the witnesses contradict each other; when they are but few, 
or of  a doubtful character;  when  they have  an interest in 
what  they affirm ;  when  they deliver  their  testimony  with 
hesitation, or on the contrary, with too violent asseverations. 
There are many other particulars  of  the same kind, which 
may diminish or destroy the force of  any argument, derived 
from human testimony. 
Suppose, for instance, that the fact, wliich  the testimony 
endeavours to establish, partakes  of  the  extraordinary and 
the marvellous ;  in that case,  the  evidence,  resulting  from 
the testimony,  admits  of  a  diminution,  greater  or  less, in 
proportion as the fact is more or  less unusual.  The reason, 
why we place any credit in witnesses  and historians, is riot 
derived  from  any  co~u~exion,  which  we  perceive  h  priori, 
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SEm.  tomed  to find  a conformity between  them.  But  when the 
X 
-.+  fact attested  is such a one  as has seldom  fallen  under  our 
Pa  1,  observation, here is a contest of  two opposite experiences ;  of 
which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and 
the superior can only operate on the mind by the force, which 
remains.  The very same principle of  experience, which gives 
us a certain degree of  assurance in the testimony of witnesses, 
gives us also, in this case, another degree of  assurance against 
the fact, which they endeavour to establish ;  from which con- 
tradiction there necessarily arises a counterpoise, and mutual 
destruction of  belief  and authority. 
I  shozlld not  believe such a story were  it told  me  by  CATO  ; 
was a proverbial saying in ROME,  even during the lifetime of 
that philosophical  patri~t.~  The incredibility  of  a  fact, it 
was allowed, might invalidate so great an authority. 
The INDIAN  prince, who refused to believe the first rela- 
tions concerning the effects of  frost, reasoned justly;  and it 
naturally required very strong testimony to engage his assent 
to facts, that arose from a state of nature, with which he was 
unacquainted,  and  which  bore  so  little  analogy  to  those 
events, of which he had had constant and uniform experience. 
Though they were not contrary to his experience, they were 
not conformable to it." 
But in order to encrease the probability against the testi- 
1 [This paragraph was added in Edi- 
tion K.] 
2  PLUTARCH,  in vita Catonis Min. 19. 
3  [This paragraph was added in Edi- 
tion F.] 
No INDIAN,  it  is evident, could have 
experience that water did not freeze  in 
cold  climates.  This is placing  nature 
in a situation quite unknown  to  him ; 
andit  isimpossible for him to tell.&  priori 
what will result from it;.  It  is making 
a new  experiment, the consequence of 
which  is always  uncertain.  One may 
sometimes conjecture from analogy what 
will  follow; but  still this  is but con- 
jecture.  And it must be confessed, that, 
in the present case of freezing, the event 
follows contrary to the rules of  analogy, 
and is such as a rational INDIAN  would 
not  look  for.  The  operations  of  cold 
upon water are not  gradual,  according 
to  the degrees  of  cold ; but whenever 
it comes to the freezing point, the water 
passes  in  a  moment, from  the utmost 
liquidity to perfect  hardness.  Such an 
event, therefore,  may  be  denominated 
extraordinary,  and  requires  a  pretty 
strong testimony, to  render  St credible 
to people in a warm  climate:  But still 
it is not miraculous, nor contrary to uni- 
form experience of  the course of nature 
in cases where all the circumstances are 
the same.  Theinhabitants of  SUMATRA 
have  always  seen water fluid  in  t.heir 
own climate, and the freezing  of  their 
rivers  ought  to  be deemed a prodigy : 
But they nerer saw water in Mrjscov~ 
during  the winter;  and  therefore they 
cannot, reasonably be positive what  would 
there be the consequence.' 
[This note first appears in the last 
page  of  Edition F, whh  the  preface : 
The distance  of  the Author  from  the 
Press is the Cause, why the followi?g 
Passage arriv'd  not  in  time to he in- 
serted in its proper Place.] 
mony of  witnesses, let us suppose, that the fact, which  they  SECT. 
affirm, instead of being only marvellous, is really rniracnlous ; . 
and suppose also, that the  testimony, considered  apart  and  PART  1- 
in itself, amounts to an entire proof;  in that case, there is 
*  proof  against proof, of which tLe strongest must prLvail, but 
still with a diminution of  its force, in proportion to that of 
its antagonist. 
A miracle is a violation of  the laws of  nature ; and as  a 
firm and unalterable experience has  established  these  laws, 
the  proof  against a miracle,  from  the very  nature  of  the 
fact, is as entire as any argument from experience  can  pos- 
sibly be imagined.  Why is  it more  than probable, that all 
men must die ;  that  lead cannot, of  itself, remain suspeiided 
in the air ;  that fire consunles wood, and is  extinpisied by 
water ;  unless it be, that these events are found agreeable to 
the laws of  nature, and there is required a violation of these 
laws, or in other words, a miracle to prevent them P  Nothing 
is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happen in the cominon course 
of  nature.  It is no miracle  that a man, seemingly in good 
health, should die on a sudden :  because such a kind of death, 
though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently 
observed  to happen.  But it  is a miracle, that a dead ban 
should come to life ;  because that has never  been  observed, 
in any age or country.  There must, therefore, be a uniform 
experience  against  every  miraculous  event,  otherwise  the 
event would not merit that appellation.  And as an uniform 
experience amounts to a  there is here a direct and full 
*roof,  from the nature of the fact,  against  the existence  of 
any  miracle;  nor  can  such  a  proof  be  destroyed,  or  the 
miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite proof, which is 
superior. 
Sometimes  an  event  may  not, in 
itself, seem to be contrary to the lawdof 
tiature, and yet, if it  were real, it  might, 
by  reason  of  some  circumstances,  be 
denominated  a  miracle ; because,  in 
fact,  it is contrary to these laws.  Thus 
if a person, claiming a divine authority, 
should command a sick person to  be well, 
a healthful man  to fall down dead, the 
clouds to pour rain, the winds to  blow, 
in  short,  should  order  many  natural 
events, which  immediately follow upon 
his  command; these  might  justly  be 
esteemed  miracles,  becau~e  they  are 
rally, in this case, contrary to the laws 
of  nature.  For if  any  suspicion  re- 
main, that the event and command con- 
curred by,accident, there is no  miracle 
and  no  t.ransgression  of  the laws  of 
nature.  If this suspicion  be removed, 
there  is  evidently  a  miracle,  and  a 
transgression  of  these  laws ; because 
nothing can be more contrary to nature 
than  that the voice  or command  of  a 
man  should  have  such  an  influence. 
A miracle may be accurately defined, n 
transgression  of  a  law  of  nature by  a 
particular  volition  of  the  Deity, or  by 
the iltterposition of  some invisible agent. 
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SECT.  The plain consequence is (and it  is a general maxim worthy 
X  .  ,  of  our attention), '  That no testimony is sufficient to establish 
PUT 1.  '  a miracle, unless the testimony be of  such a kind, that it8 
'  falsehood would be more miraculous, than  the fact, which  it 
'  endeavours to establish :  And even in that case  there is a 
'  mutual  destruction  of  arguments,  and the superior  only 
'  gives us an assurance suitable to  that degree of force, which 
'  remains, after deducting the inferior.'  When any one tells 
me, that he saw a dead  man restored to  life, I immediately 
consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this 
person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, 
which he relates, should really have happened.  I *eigh  the 
one miracle against the other; and according to the supe- 
riority,  which  I  discover,  I  pronounce  my  decision,  and 
always reject the greater miracle.  If the falsehood of  his 
testimony would be more miraculous, than the event which 
he relates ;  then, and  not till then, can he pretend to command 
my belief  or opinion. 
PART 11. 
In the foregoing  reasoning  we  have  supposed,  that the 
testimony, upon  which  a  miracle  is  founded,  may possibly 
amount  to an entire  proof, and  that the falsehood of  that 
testimony would be a real prodigy : But it is easy to shew, 
that we have been a great deal too liberal in our concession, 
and that there never  was a miraculous event1 established on 
so full an evidence. 
For frst,  there is not to be found in all history, any miracle 
attested by a sufficient number of men, of  such unquestioned 
good-sense, education, and learning, as to secure us against 
all delusion in themselves ;  of  such  undoubted integrity, as 
to place them beyond all suspicion of  any design to deceive 
others; of  such credit and reputation  in the eyes  of  man- 
kind, as to have a great deal to  lose in  case  of  their being 
detected in any falsehood ;  and at the same time, attesting 
facts, performed in such a public manner, and in  so celebrated 
a part of  the world, as to render the detection unavoidable : 
by  men  or not.  This  alters  not  its  requisite for  that  purpose, is as real a 
nature and essence.  The  raising  of  a  miracle, though not so sensible with re- 
house or ship into the air  is a  visible  gard to us. 
miracle.  The raising of a feather, when  [In any History :  Editions E and F.] 
the, wind wants ever so little of  a force 
811 which circumstances are requisite to give us a full assu-  SECT. 
rance in the testimony of  men.  X. - 
Secondly.  We may observe in human  nature a principle,  PART  11. 
which, if  strictly examined,  will  be  found  to diminish  ex- 
tremely the assurance, which we  might, from  human  testi- 
mony, have, in any kind of  prodigy.  The maxim, by  which 
we  commonly conduct  ourselves  in our  reasonings, is, that 
the objects, of  which we have no experience, resemble those, 
of  which  we  have;  that what  we  have found  to be  most 
usual is always most probable ;  and that where  there is an 
opposition of  arguments, we ought to give the preference  to 
such as are founded on the greatest number of  past observa- 
tions.  But though, in proceeding  by this  rule, we  readily 
reject any fact which is unusual and incredible in an ordinary 
degree;  yet  in advancing  farther,  the mind  observes  not 
always  the  same  rule ; but when  anything  is  affirmed 
utterly absurd  and miraculous,  it  rather  the more  readily 
admits of  such a fact, upon account of that  veq  circumstance, 
which  ought  to destroy all its authority.  The  passion  of 
surprize and wonder, arising from miracles, being an agreeable 
emotion,. gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of those 
events, from which it is derived.  And this goes sa  far, that 
even those who cannot enjoy this pleasure  immediately, nor 
can believe  those  miraculous  events, of  which  they are in- 
formed, yet love to partake of  the satisfaction at second-hand 
or by rebound, and place a pride and delight in exciting the 
admiration of  others. 
With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of  tra- 
vellers received, their descriptions of  sea and land monsters, 
their relations  of  wonderful  adventures,  strange men,  and 
uncouth manners? But if the spirit of  religion join  itself to 
the love  of  wonder, there is an end of  common  sense;  and 
hurnan testimony,  in these  circumstances, loses  all preten- 
sions to authority.  A religio~ist  may be an enthusiast, and 
imagine he sees  what  has  no  reality:  He may know  his 
narrative to be  false, and yet persevere  i11  it, with the best 
intentions in the world, for  the sake of  promoting  so holy 
a cause : Or even where  this delusion  has not place, vanity, 
excited  by so  strong a  temptation,  operates  on  him  more 
powerfully than on the rest of mankind in any other circum- 
stances;  and  self-interest  with equal  force.  His  auditors 
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SECT.  to canvass his evidence : What judgment they have, they re- 
x.  d  nounce by principle, in these sublime and mysterious subjects: 
PART  11.  Or if they were ever so willing to employ it, passion  and a 
heated imagination  disturb the regularity of  its operations. 
Their credulity encreases his impudence :  And his impudence 
overpowers their credulity. 
Eloquence, when at its highest pitch, leaves little room for 
reason  or reflection ; but addressing  itself  entirely  to the 
fancy or the affections, captivates  the willing hearers,  and 
subdues their understanding.  Happily, this pitch it seldom 
attains.  But what a TULLY  or a DEMOSTHENES  could scarcely 
effect over a ROMAN  or ATHENIAN  audience, every Capuchin, 
every itinerant  or  stationary teacher can  perform over  the 
generality  of  mankind, and in a higher degree, by touching 
such gross and vulgar passions. 
The many instances of  forged  miracles, and prophecies, 
and supernatural events, which, in all ages, have either been 
detected by contrary evidence, or which detect themselves by 
their  absurdity,  prove  sufficiently the  strong propensity of 
mankind to the extraordinary and the marvellous, and ought 
reasonably to beget  a suspicion against all relations of  this 
kind.  This is our natural way of thinking, even with regard 
to the most common and most credible events.  For instance: 
There is no kind of report, which rises so easily, and spreads 
so quickly, especially in country places and provincial towns, 
as  those  concerning  marriages ;  insomuch  that two young 
persons  of  equal condition  never  see each  other twice, but 
the whole  neighbourhood  immediately join  them  together. 
The pleasure of telling a piece of news so interesting, of pro- 
pagating it, and of being the first reporters of it, spreads the 
intelligence:  And  this  is  so  well  known, that no  man  of 
sense gives attention  to these reports, till he find them con- 
firmed by some greakr evidence.  Do not the same passions, 
and others still stronger, incline the generality of  mankind 
to believe and report, with the greatest vehemence and assur- 
ance, all religious miracles P 
Thirdly.  It forms a strong presumption against all super- 
natural  and  miraculous  relations,  that  they  are  observed 
chiefly to abound among ignorant and barbarous nations ;  or 
if a civilized people has ever given admission to any of  them, 
1 [This paragraph wa8 printed as a note in Editions E to P.] 
that people will be found to have received them from ignorant  SEW. 
and barbarous  ancestors, who  transmitted  them with  that  +  *. , 
inviolable  sanction  and authority, which  always attend re-  PART  11. 
ceived opinions.  When we  peruse  the  first  histories  of  all 
nations, we  are  apt to imagine ourselves transported  into 
some new world;  where  the whole frame  of  nature  is dis- 
jointed,  and  every  element  performs  its  operations  in  a 
different manner, from what it does at present.  Battles, re- 
volutions, pestilence, famine, and death, are never the effect 
of  t'hose natural  causes,  which  we  experience.  Prodigies, 
omens,  oracles, judgments,  quite  obscure  the  few  natural 
events, that are intermingled with them.  But as the former 
grow thinner every page, in proportion as we advance nearer 
the enlightened  ages, we  soon  learn, that there is  nothing 
mysterious or supernatural in the case, but that all proceeds 
from the usual propensity of  mankind  towards  the marvel- 
lous,  and that,  though this  inclination  may  at intervals 
receive  a  check  from  sense  and learning, it  can never  be 
thoroughly extirpated from hurnan nature. 
It is strange, a judicious  reader  is apt to say, upon the 
perusal  of  these  wonderful historians,  that  such  prodigious 
evmts never happen  in our days.  But it  is nothing  strange, 
I hope, that men  should  lie  in all ages.  You must surely 
have seen instances enow of  that frailty.  You have yourself 
heard many such lnarvellous relations  started, which, being 
treated with scorn by all the wise and judicious, have at last 
been abandoned even by the vulgar.  Be assured, that those 
renowned lies, which  have  spread and flourished to such a 
monstrous  height,  arose  from  like  beginnings ; but being 
sown  in a  more proper  soil, shot up at last into prodigies 
almost equal to those which they relate. 
It was a wise policy in that  false prophet, ALEXANDER,  who, 
though  now forgotten, was  once  so famous, to lay the first 
scene of  his  impostures  in PAPHLAGONIA,  where, as LUCIAN 
tells us, the people were  extremely ignorant and stupid, and 
ready to  swallow even  the grossest  delusioh.  People  at a 
distance, who  are weak  enough  to think the matter at all 
worth enquiry, have no opportunity of receiving Setter infor- 
mation.  The stories come magnified to them by a hundred 
circumstances.  Fools  are industrious  in  propagating  the 
imposture; while  the wise  and  learned  are contented,  in 
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SECT.  general,  to deride  its absurdity,  without informing  them-  .  x. .  selves of  the particular facts, by which  it may be  distinctly 
PART  IT-  refuted.  And thus the impostor above-mentioned was enabled 
to proceed, from his ignorant PAPHLAGONIANS,  to the enlist- 
ing of  votaries, even  among the GRECIAN  philosophers,  and 
men  of  the most  eminent rank  and distinction in ROME: 
Nay, could engage the attention of the sage emperor MARCUS 
AURELIUS  ;  SO far as to make him trust the iuccess of  a mili- 
tary expedition to his delusive prophecies. 
The advantages  are so  great,  of  starting  an imposture 
among  an ignorant  people, that, even  though the delusion 
should  be  too  gross  to  impose  on  the generality of  them 
(which,  though seldom,  is sometimes  the  case) it has a  much 
better  chance  for  succeeding  in remote  countries,  than if 
the first scene has been  laid in  a city renowned for arts and 
knowledge.  The most ignorant  and barbarous of these bar- 
barians carry the report abroad.  None of  their countrymen 
have a large correspondence, or sufficient  credit and autho- 
rity to contradict and beat down the delusion.  Men's  incli- 
nation to the marvellous has full opportunity to display itself. 
And thus a story, which is universally exploded in the place 
where it was first started, shall pass for certain at a thousand 
miles distance.  But had ALEXANDER  fixed  his residence at 
ATHENS,  the philosophers of  that renowned mart of  learning 
had immediately spread, throughout  the whole  ROMAN  em- 
pire, their sense of  the matter; which, being  supported by 
so great authority, and displayed  by all the force  of  reason 
and eloquence, had entirely opened the eyes of mankind.  It 
is  true ;  LUCIAN,  passing  by  chance  through PAPKLAGONIA, 
had an opportunity  of  performing  this  good  office.  But, 
though much  to be wished, it does not always  happen, that 
every ALEXANDER  meets with a LUCIAN,  ready to expose and 
detect his impostures.l 
I may add as a fowth reason, which diminishes the autho- 
rity of  prodigies, that there is no testimony  for  my, even 
[Editions E to P append the follow- 
ing note :  It  may here, perhaps, be  ob- 
jected, that I proceed  rashly, and form 
my notions of  ALEXANDER  merely from 
the account given of  him by LUCIAN,  a 
professed  enemy.  It were,  indeed, to 
be  wished, that some  of  the accounts 
published by his followarp  and accom- 
plices  had  remained.  The  opposition 
and contrast between the character and 
conduct of  the same man, as drawn  by 
friend  or  enemy, is  as strong, even in 
common life, much more in these religi- 
ous matters, as  that betwixtany two men 
in the world,  betwixt ALEXANDER  and 
St,. Pam. for instance.  See a letter  to 
GILBERT  WEST,  Esq ; on the conversion 
and apostleship of  St. PAUL.] 
those  which  have  not  been  expressly detected, Lliat  is not  SECT. 
opposed by an infinite number of witnesses ; so that not only . 
the  miracle  destroys  the credit of  testimony, but the testi-  PART  11. 
mony destroys itself.  To  make  this the better understood, 
let us consider, that, in matters of  religion, whatever is dif- 
ferent is contrary ;  and that it is impossible the religions of 
ancient ROME,  of  TURKEY,  of  SIAM,  and of CHINA  should, all 
of  them,  be  established  on  any  solid  foundation.  Every 
miracle, therefore, pretended to have been  wrought  in any 
of these religions (and all of them abound in miracles), as its 
direct scope is to establish the particular  system to which it 
is attributed ; so lias it the same force,  though  more  indi- 
rectly,  to overthrow  every  other  system.  In destroying a 
rival system, it likewise destroys the credit of  those miracles, 
on which  that system was established;  so that all the pro- 
digies of  different  religions  are to be  regarded as contrary 
facts, and the evidences of  these prodigies,  whether weak or 
strong, as opposite to each other.  According to this method 
of  reasoning, when we  believe  any miracle  of  MAHOMET  or 
his  successors, we  have  for  our warrant the testimony of  a 
few barbarous ARABIANS  : And on the other hand, we  are to 
regard  the authority of  TITUS  LIVIUS,  PLUTARCH,  TACITUS, 
and,  in short,  of  all  the authors and  witnesses,  GRECIAN, 
CHINESE,  and ROMAN  CATHOLIC,  who have related any miracle 
in their particular religion ; I say, we  are to regard  their 
testimony in the same light as if  they had mentioned that 
MAHOMETAN  miracle,  and had  in express terms contradicted 
it, with the same certainty as they have for the miracle they 
relate.  This argument may appear over subtile and refined ; 
but is not in reality different from the reasoning of  a judge, 
who supposes, that the credit of two witnesses, maintaining a 
crime against any one, is destroyed by the testimony of  two 
others, who  affirm  him to have been two  hundred  leagues 
distant, at the same instant when the crime  is said to have 
been committed. 
One of the best  attested miracles in all profane history, is 
that which TACITUS  reports of VESPASIAN,  who cured a blind 
man in ALEXANDRIA,  by means of his spittle, and a lame man 
by the mere  touch of  his foot; in obedience  to u vision  of 
the god SERAPIS,  who had enjoined them to have recourse to 
the Emperor, for these miraculous cures.  The story may be 100  CONCERNING  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING). 
SECT.  seen in that fine historian ; where every circumstance seems  - :-  ,  to add weight  to the testimony, and might be displayed at 
PABT  11.  large with  all the force  of  argument and eloquence, if  any 
one were now concerned to enforce the evidence of  that ex- 
ploded  and  idolatrous  superstition.  The  gravity,  solidity, 
age, and probity of  so  great an emperor, who, through the 
whole course of  his life, conversed in a familiar manner with 
his friends and  courtiers, and never affected those extraor- 
dinary airs of  divinity assumed  by ALEXANDER  and DEME- 
TRIUS.  The  historian,  a  cotemporary  writer,  noted  for 
candour  and veracity,  and withal,  the  greatest  and most 
penetrating  genius,  perhaps,  of  all antiquity; and  so  free 
from any tendency to credulity, that he even lies under the 
contrary imputqtion, of  atheism  and profaneness : The per- 
sons, from  whose authority he related  the miracle, of  esta- 
blished character fdr judginent  and veracity, as we may well 
presume;  eye-witnesses  of  the  fact,  and confirming  their 
testimony,  after the FLAVIAN  family  was  despoiled  of  the 
empire, and could no longer give any reward,  as the price of 
a lie.  Utrumpue, pui interfuere,  nunc puopue  memorant, post- 
puam  nullzcm  melzdacio  pretium.  To  which  if  we  add  the 
public nature of  the facts, as related, it will appear, that no 
evidence can well be  supposed  stronger for  so gross and so 
palpable a falsehood. 
There  is also a memorable  story related  by  Cardinal  DE 
RETZ,  which  niay  well  deserve  our  consideration.  When 
that intriguing politician  fled into SPAIN,  to avoid the per- 
secution  of  his enemies, he passed  through  SARAGUSSA,  the 
capital of  ARRAGON,  where he was shewn, in the cathedral, a 
man, who had served  seven years as a door-keeper, and was 
well:  known  to every body in town, that had ever  paid his 
devotions  at that church.  He had been seen, for so long s 
time, wanting a leg; but recovered that limb by the rubbing 
of  holy oil upon  the  stump ;  and  the cardinal assures us 
that he saw him with  two legs.  This miracle was vouched 
by all the cs~nonsl  of  the church ;  and the whole  company in 
town were appealed to for a confirmation of  the fact ;  whom 
the cardinal found, by their zealous devotion, to be thorough 
1  Hist.  lib.  v.  eap.  8.  SUETONIUS  [Editions E and F substitute : And 
gives nearly the same accouut  in  vita  when the Cardinal examin'd it, he found 
VESP. 7.  [The  reference  to Suetonius  it to  be  a  true natural Leg,  like tho 
was added in the Errata to Ed. F.]  other.] 
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believers  of  the miracle.  Here the relater was also  cotem-  SECT. 
X.  porary to the supposed prodigy, of  an incredulous and liber- .-• 
tine character, as well as of  great genius ;  the miracle of  so  PART  I1. 
singular  a  nature  as could  scarcely admit of  a co~nterfeit, 
and the witnesses very numerous, and all of  them, in a man- 
ner, spectators of the fact, to which they gave their testimony. 
And what adds mightily to the force of the  evidence, and may 
double  our surprize  on this occasion,  is,  that the cardinal 
himself, who relates the story, seems not to give any credit to 
it, and consequently cannot be suspected of  any concurrence 
in the holy fraud.  He considered justly,  that it was not re- 
quisite, in order  to reject  a  fact of  this nature, to be able 
accurately to disprove  the testimony, and to trace its false- 
hood, through all the circumstances of  knavery and credulity 
which produced it.  He knew, that, as this was  commonly 
altogether impossible at  any small distance of  time and place ; 
so was it extremely difficult, even where one was immediately 
present, by reason  of  the bigotry, ignorance,  cunning,  and 
roguery  of  a  great  part of  mankind.  He therefore  con- 
cluded,  like a just reasoner, that such an evidence  carried 
falsehood upon the very face of it, and that a miracle supported 
by any 6uman testimony,  was  more  properly  a  subject  of 
derision than of  argument. 
There surely  never  was  a  greater  number  of  miracles 
ascribed to one person, than those, which were lately said to 
have been wrought in FRANCE  upon the tomb of  Abbe PARIS, 
the famous JANSENIST,  with whose sanctity the people were so 
long deluded.  The curing of  the sick, giving hearing to the 
deaf, and sight to the blind, were every where talked of  as the 
usual effects of  that holy sepulchre.  But what is more  ex- 
traordinary ;  many of  the miracles were immediately proved 
upon  the spot, before judges  of  unquestioned integrity, at- 
tested by witnesses of credit and distinction, in a learned age, 
and on  the most  eminent theatre that is now in the world. 
Nor  is this all : A  relation of  them was  published and dis- 
persed every where ;  nor were  the Jesuits, though a  learned 
body,  supported by  the  civil  magistrate,  and determined 
enemies to those opinions, in whose favour the ~iracles  were 
said to have  been  wrought,  ever  able  distinctly  to refute 
or  detect them.'  Where shall we find such a number of cir- 
l  This book  was writ by Mons. M:ONT-  liament of  PARIS, a man of  figure and 
Q*%oN,  ~ounsellor  or judge of  the par-  character, who was also a martyr to the 102  CONCERNING  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING.  OF  MIRACLES.  103 
SECT.  cumstances, agreeing to the corroboration  of  one fact  P  And 
x. ,  what  have we to oppose  to such a  cloud of  witnesses, but 
cause, and is now said to be somewhere  This was  accompanied  with a  solemn 
in a dungeon on account of  his book.  and earnest appeal to  the parliament. 
There is another  book in  three vol-  But the parliament were  forbidden  by 
umes  (called  Recueil  des  Miracles de  authorih to meddle in  the affair.  It 
CAhhd  PARIS)  giving an account of many  was  at last observed, that where  men 
of  these  miracles,  and  accompanied  are heated by zeal and enthusiasm, there 
with  prefatory  discourses,  which  are  is no  degree  oP  human  testimony  SO 
very  well  written.  There  runs, how-  strong as may not  be procured  for the 
ever,  through  the  whole  of  these  a  greatest absurdity :  And those who will 
ridiculous  comparison  between  the  be KO  silly as to examine  the affair  by 
miracles of our Saviour and those of the  that medium, and seek particular flaws 
Abbk;  wherein  it  is asserted, that the  in the testimony, are almost sure to be 
evidence for the latter is equal  to that  confounded.  It  must be a miserable 
for the former : As if  the  testimony of  imposture, indeed, that does not prevail 
men could  ever  be  put in  the  balance  in that contest. 
with  that  of  God  himself,  who  con-  All  who have been in FRANCE  about 
ducted the pen of  the inspired writ&.  that time have heard of  the reputation 
If these writers, indeed, were to be con-  of  Mons.  HERAUT,  the  lieutenant  de 
siclered merely as human testimony, the  Police,  whose  vigilance,  penetration, 
FRENCH  author is very moderate in his  activity, and extensive intelligence have 
comparison : since he might, with some  been much talked of.  This magistrate, 
appearance of  reason, pretend, that the  who by the nature of his office is almost 
JANSENIST  miracles  much  surpass the  absolute, was invested with full powers, 
other in evidence  and author it,^.  The  on purpose to suppress or discredit these 
following circumstances are  drawn from  miracles ;  and he frequently seized im- 
authentic papers, inserted in the above-  mediately, and examined the witnesses 
mentioned book.  and subjects d  them: But never could 
Many of  the miracles of  Abbe PARIS reach  any thing  satisfactory  against 
were proved  immediately  by  witnesses  them. 
before  the  officiality or bishop's  court  In  the case of Madamoiselle THIBAUT 
at PARIS, under  the  eye of  cardinal  he  sent  the famous DE SYLVA  to ex- 
NOAILLES,  whose character for integrity  amine  her ; whose  evidence  is  very 
and capacity mas never  contested  even  curious.  The physician  declares, that 
by his enemies.  it  was impossible she could  have  been 
His 'successor  in the archbishopric  so  ill  as was  proved  by  witnesses; 
was an  enemy to the  JANSENISTS,  and  because it was impossible she could, in 
for that reason promoted to the see by  so short a time, have recovered  so per- 
the court.  Yet 22 rectors or curds  of  fectly as he  found her.  He reasoned, 
PARIS, with  infinite  earnestness, press  like  a  man  of  sense,  from  natural 
him to  examine  those  miracles,  which  causes ;  but the'opposite party told him, 
they assert to be  known  to the whole  that the whole was a miracle, and that 
world, and undisputably certain : But  his evidence was the very best proof of 
he wisely forbore.  it. 
The MOLINIST  party had tried to dis-  The MOLINISTS  were in a sad dilemma. 
credit these miracles  in  one  instance,  They durst not assert the absolute in- 
that of  Madamoiselle le FRANC.  But,  sufficiency of  human evidence, to prove 
besides that their proceedings  were in  a miracle.  They were  obliged  to  say, 
many respects the most irregular in the  that these  miracles  were  wrought  by 
world, particularly in citing only a  few  witchcraft  and  the  devil.  But they 
of  the JANSENIST  witnesses, whom they  were told, that this was the resource of 
tampered  with :  Besides  this, I say,  the JEWS  of  old. 
they soon found themselves overwhelmed  No JANSENIST  was ever  embarrassed 
by a cloud  of  new witnesses, one hun-  to  account  for  the  cessation  of  the 
dred  and twenty in  number,  most  of  miracles,  when  the  church-yard  was 
them persons of  credit and substance in  shut up by the king's  edict.  It  was the 
PARIS,  who  gave oath  for the miracle.  touch  of  the  tomb,  which  produced 
a  [M.  de Ventimil1e.-ED.  1 
the absolute impossibility or miraculous nature of the events,  SECT. 
which  they  relate?  And  this  surely,  in  the  eyes  of  all -5 
reasonable  people,  will  alone  be  regarded  as  a  sufficient  PA~TII* 
refutation. 
Is the consequence just,, because some human testimony 
has the  utmost  force and  authority in some  cases, when it 
relates  the  battle  of  PHILIPPI  or PHARSALIA  for  instance ; 
that therefore all kinds of  testimony must, in all cases, have 
equal  force  and  authority P  Suppose  that the  C~ESAREAN 
and  POMPEIAN  factions  had,  each  of  them,  claimed  the 
victory  in these  battles,  and that the historians of  each 
party  had  uniformly  aacribed the  advantage  to their  own 
side ;  how could mankind, at this distance, have been  able 
theso  extraordinary effects;  and when 
no one  could  approach  the  tomb,  no 
effects coulcl be expected.  God, indeed, 
could have thrown down the walls in a 
moment ; but he is master of  his  own 
graces and works, and it belongs not to 
us  to account for  them.  He did not 
throw down the walls of  every city like 
those  of  JERICHO,  on  the  sounding of 
the rams' horns, nor break up the prison 
of  every apostle, like that of  St. PAUL. 
No  less  a  man,  than  the  Duc de 
CHATILLON,  a duke and peer of FRANCE, 
of  the highest  rank  and family,  gives 
evidence  of  a  miraculous  cure,  per- 
formed upon a servant of  his, who  had 
lived several years in his house with a 
visible and palpable infirmity. 
I shall conclude with  observing, that 
no clergy are more celebrated for strict- 
ness of  life and manners than the secu- 
lar clergy of  FRANCE,  particularly  the 
rectors  or curks  of  PARIS, who  bear 
testimony to these impostures. 
The  learning, genius, and probity of 
the gentlemen, and the austerity of  the 
nuns  of  PORT-ROYAL,  have been much 
celebrated all  over EUROPE. Yet  they 
a11 give evidence for a miracle, wrought 
on  the niece  of  the  famous  PASCAL., 
whose  sanctity of  life,  as well  as ex- 
traordinary  capacity,  is well  known.' 
The famous RACINE  gives an account of 
this miracle  in his  famous  history  of 
PORT-ROYAL,  and  fortifies  it with all 
the proofs, which a multitude  of  nuns, 
priests,  physicians,  and  men  of  the 
world, all of  them of  undoubted credit, 
could bestow upon  it.  Several men  of 
letters, particularly the bishop of TOUR- 
NAY,  thought this miracle so certain, as 
to  employ it  in the refutation of atheists 
and  free-thinkers.  The queen-regent 
of  FEWCE,  who  was  extremely pre- 
judiced  against the PORT-ROYAL,  sent 
her own physician to examine the mira- 
cle, who returned  an absolute convert. 
In  short, the  supernatutal cure was  so 
uncontestable, that it  saved, for a time, 
that  famous  monastery  from  the ruin 
with  which  it was  threatened  by the 
JESUITS.  Had it  been  a cheat, it had 
certainly  been  detected by such saga- 
cious  and  powerful  antagonists,  and 
must have hastened the ruin of the con- 
trivers.  Our divines, who can build up 
a formidable castle from such despicable 
paterials;  what  a  prodigious  fabric 
could they have reared from these  and 
many other circumstances, which I  have 
not  mentioned ! How  often  would  the 
great  names  of  PASCAL,  RACINE,  AR- 
NAUD,  NICOLE,  have  resounded  in  our 
ears?  But if they  be  wise,  they had 
better  adopt  the  miracle,  as  being 
more worth, a thousand  times, than all 
the rest  of  their  collection.  Besides, 
it may serve very much to their purpose. 
For that miracle was  really performed 
by  tlie  touch  of  an  authentic  holy 
prickle  of the  holy thorn, which  com- 
posed  the  holy  crown,  which,  &c. 
[This note was added in Ed. F.] 
[?tion  F  adds : Tho' he also was  of  being  inform'd  of.  See  his Life. 
a Believer, in  that and  in many other  Here Ed. F stops.] 
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SECT.  to  determine  between  them?  The  contrariety  is equally  .  x. ,  strong between the miracles related by HERODOTUS  or  PLU- 
PARTI=. TARCH,  and  those  delivered  bj MARIANA,  BEDE,  or  my 
monkish historian. 
The wise lend a very academic faith to every report which 
favours  the passion  of  the reporter;  whether it magnifies 
his  country,  his  family,  or  himself, or  in  any  other  way 
strikes  in with  his  natural  inclinations  and  propensities. 
But what greater temptation than to appear a  missionary, a, 
prophet, an ambassador from heaven?  Who would not en- 
counter  many dangers and difficulties, in order to attain SO 
sublime  a  character?  Or if, by  the help  of  vanity  and a 
heated imagination, a man has first made a convert of  him- 
self,  and  entered  seriously  into  the  delusion;  who  ever 
scruples to make use of  pious  frauds, in support  of  so  holy 
and meritorious a cause ? 
The  smallest  spark may  here  kindle  into the  greatest 
flame ; because  the  materials  are always prepared  for  it. 
The avidurn genus auricz~Zarurn,~  the gazing populace, receive 
greedily, without examination, whatever sooths superstition, 
and promotes wonder. 
How many stories of  this  nature, have, in all ages, been 
detected and exploded in their  infancy?  How many more 
have  been  celebrated  for a time, and have  afterwards sunk 
into neglect and oblivion  P  Where  such  reports, therefore, 
fly about, the solution  of  the ph~nomenon  is  obvious ;  and 
we  judge  in conformity  to regular  experience  and obser- 
vation, when we  account for it  by the  known  and natural 
principles  of  credulity and delusion.  And  shall we,  rather 
than  have  a  recourse  to so  natural a solution, allow  of  a 
miraculous violation of  the most established laws of nature? 
I need not mention  the difficulty of  detecting a falsehood 
in any private or even public history, at the place, where it 
is said to happen; much  more when the scene is removed to 
ever  so  small a distance.  Even a court  of  judicature, with 
all  the autLority,  acouracy,  and judgment, which they can 
employ, find themselves often at a loss to distinguish between 
truth and falsehood in  the most  recent  actions.  But  the 
matter never comes to any issue, if  trusted  to the  corninon 
method  of  altercation  and  debate  and  flying rumours ; 
LUCRET.  iv. 504.-[This  reference  was  added in Ed.  F;  and  the  mistrans- 
lation was inserted in the text in Ed. M.] 
especially when  men's  passions  have  taken part  on  either  SECT. 
side.  X. - 
In the intncy of new religions, the wise and learned com-  PA~TII~ 
inonly esteem Ihe matter too inconsiderable to deserve their 
attention  or  regard.  And  when  afterwards  they would 
willingly detect the cheat, in order to undeceive the deluded 
multitude, the season is now past, and the records and wit- 
nesses,  which  might  clear  up  the  matter,  have  perished 
beyond recovery, 
No  means  of  detection remain, but those which must be 
drawn from the very testimony itself  of  th!,  reporters : And 
these, though always sufficient with the judicious and know- 
ing, are  commonly too fine to fall under  the comprehension 
of  the vulgar. 
Upon  the whole,  then, it appears, that no testimony  for 
any  kind  of  miracle  has ever  amounted to a  probability, 
much less to a proof;  and that, even supposing it amounted 
to a proof,  it  would  be  opposed  by another  proof; derived 
from  the very nature of  the fact, which it would  endeavour 
to establish.  It is experience only, which  gives authority to 
human  testimony ;  and it  is  the  same  experience,  which 
assures us of the laws of nature.  When, therefore, these two 
kinds of  experience are contrary, we have nothing to do but 
substract the one from the other, and embrace an opinion, 
either on one  side or the other, with that assurance which 
arises  from the remainder.  But  according to the principle 
here explained, this substraction, with regard to all popular 
religions, amounts  to an entire annihilation :  and therefore 
we  may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can 
have  such  force as to  prove a miracle, and make it a just 
foundation for any such system of  religion. 
I beg the limitations here made may be remarked, when I 
say, that a miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foun- 
dation  of  a  system of  religion.  For I own, that otherwise, 
there  may possibly be  miracles, or  violations  of  the usual 
course of  nature, of  such a kind as to  admit  of  proof  from 
human testimony ;  though, perhaps, it, will be  impossible to 
find any such in all the records  of  history.  Thus,  suppose, 
all authors, in all languages, agree, that,  from  the first  of 
[Can  ever  possibly  amount  to :  graphs are given as a note  in  Editions 
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X 
.-#  earth  for eight  days:  Suppose that the tradition  of  this 
'I-  extraordinary  event  is  still  strong  and lively  among  the 
people : That all travellers, who  return from foreign coun- 
tries, bring  us  accounts  of  the same tradition, without the 
least variation or contradiction : It is evident, that our pre- 
sent  philosophers,  instead  of  doubting  the fact,  ought to 
receive  it  as  certain,  and ought to search  for  the causes 
whence it might be  derived.  The decay,  corruption,  and 
dissolution  of  nature,  is  an event  rendered probable  by  SO 
many analogies, that any phajnomenon, which seems to have 
a tendency towards that catastrophe, comes within the reach 
of  human testimony, if that testimony be very extensive and 
uniform. 
But  suppose,  that all the historians  who treat of  ENG- 
LAND,  should agree, that, on the first of JANUARY  1600, Queen 
ELIZABETH  died; that both  before and after her death she 
was  seen by  her physicians and the whole court, as is usual 
with persons of  her rank; that her  successor was  acknow- 
ledged  and proclaimed  by  the parliament;  and that,  after 
being  interred a  month,  she  again appeared,  resumed  the 
throne, and governed ENGLAND  for three years : I must con- 
fess that I should be surprized at the occurrence of  so many 
odd circumstances, but fihould not have the least inclination 
to believe so miraculous an event.  I  should not doubt of her 
pretended death, and of those other public circumstances that 
followed it : I should  only assert it. to have been  pretended, 
and that it neither was, nor possibly  could  be  real.  You 
would in vain object to me the difficulty, and almost impos- 
sibility  of deceiving the world  in an affair of  such  conse- 
quence ;  the wisdom a and solid judgment  of  that renowned 
queen;  with the little or no advantage which she could reap 
from  so  poor  an artifice : A11  this might astonish me; but 
I would  still  reply, that  the  knavery and folly of  nien  are 
such common ph~nomena,  that I should rather believe  the 
most  extraordinary  events  to arise  from their concurrence, 
than admit of  so signal a violation of  the laws of  nature. 
But should this mirade be ascribed  to any new system  of 
religion ;  men, in all  ages, have  been  so much  imposed on 
by  ridiculous  stories  of  that kind,  that this very  circum- 
[This sentence was added in Ed. K.]  [And integrity : Editions E to P.] 
stance would be a full proof  of  a  cheat, and sdcient, with 
Sy.TT. 
all men of  sense, not only to make them reject the fact, but  -- 
reject it without farther examination.  Though the Being to  P*RT  11* 
whom the miracle is ascribed, be, in this  case, Almighty, it 
does not, upon that account, become a whit  more  probable ; 
since it is impossible for us to know the attributes or actions 
of such a Being, otherwise than from the experience which we 
have of his productions, in the usual course of  nature.  This 
still reduces us to  past observation, andobliges us to  con~pare  the 
instances of  the violation of  truth in the testimony of  men, 
with those of the violation of  the laws of  nature by miracles, 
in order to judge which of  them is most likely and probable. 
As the violations of truth are more common in the testimony 
concerning  religious  miracles, than in that concerning  any 
other  matter of  fact; this  must  diminish  very  much  the 
authority  of  the  former  testimony,  and  make  us  form  a 
general  resolution, never  to lend  any attention  to it,  with 
whatever specious pretence it may be covered. 
Lord BACON  seems to have embraced the same principles 
of  reasoning.  '  We  ought,'  says he, '  to make  a  collection 
or particular history of all monsters and prodigious births or 
productions,  and in  a word  of  every  thing  new,  rare, and 
extraordinary in nature.  But this must be  done with the 
most severe scrutiny, lest we depart from truth.  Above all, 
every relation must be considered  as suspicious,  which  de- 
pends in any degree upon religion, as the prodigies of  LIVY  : 
And no less so, every thing that is to be found in the writers 
of  natural magic or alchimy, or such authors, who  seem, all 
of them, to have an unconquerable appetite for falsehood and 
fable.' 
I am the better pleased with the method of reasoning here 
delivered,  as I think it nlay serve to confound those  dan- 
gerous friends or disguised enemies to the Christian Religion, 
who have undertaken to defend it by the principles of human 
reason.  Our most holy religion is founded on Faith, not on 
reason;  and it is a sure method of  exposing it to puk  it  to 
such  a  trial  as it  is, IJY  no  means, fitted  to endure.  To 
make  this  more evident, let us  examine those miracles, re- 
lated  in  scripture ;  and  not to lose  ourselves in  too wide 
*  [This  paragraph,  which  is  not  quoted in Latin in Editions K to Q.] 
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SECT:  a field, let  us  confine ourselves to such  as we  find in the  .  .  Pentateuch, which we  shall  examine, according  to the prin- 
PART  11.  ciples of  those pretended Christians, not as the word  or tes- 
timony  of  God  himself,  but  as  the production  of  a  mere 
human writer and historian.  Here then we are first to con- 
sider a book, presented  to us  by a  barbarous  and ignorant 
people, written  in  an age when  they  were  still more  bar- 
harous, and in all probability  long  after the facts which it 
relates, corroborated  by  no  concurring  testimony,  and re- 
sembling those fabulous accounts, which  every nation  gives 
of  its  origin.  Upon  reading  this  book,  we  find it full  of 
prodigies andmiracles.  It gives an account of  a state of  the 
world and of  human nature entirely different from  the pre- 
sent: Of  our  fall  from that state:  Of  the age of  man, ex- 
tended to near a thousand  years :  Of  the destruction of  the 
world by a deluge:  Of  the arbitrary choice of  one people, as 
the favourites  of  heaven:  and that people the countrymen 
of  the author : Of  their  deliverance  from  bondage  by pro- 
digies the most astonishing  imaginable : I desire any one to 
lay his hand upon his heart, and after a serious consideration 
declare, whether he thinks that the falsehood of  such a book, 
supported by such a testimony, would  be more extraordinary 
and miraculous  than  all the  miracles  it relates ;  which is, 
however,  necessary to make it be received, according to the 
measures of  probability above established. 
What we  have  said  of  miracles  may be  applied, without 
any variation, to prophecies ;  and indeed, all prophecies  are 
real miracles, and as such only, can be admitted as proofs of 
any revelation.  If it did not exceed the capacity of  human 
nature to foretel future events, it would be absurd to employ 
any prophecy as an argument for a divine mission or  autllo- 
rity from heaven.  So that, upon the whole, we may conclude, 
that the Christian Religion not only was at  first attended with 
miracles, but  even  at this  day  cannot  be  believed by  any 
reasonable person without one.  Mere reason  is  insufficient 
to convince us  of  its veracity:  And  whoever is moved  by 
Faith to assent to it, is conscious  of  a continued  miracle in 
his own person, which subverts all the principles  of  his  un- 
derstanding, and gives him a determination  to believe  what 
is most contrary to custom and experience. 
SECT. 
XI. 
SECTION  XI.-Of  a Particular  Providence  and of  a Future - 
State.' 
I  was  lately  engaged  in conversation  with  a  friend  who 
loves sceptical paradoxes ;  where, though he advanced many 
principles, of  which I can by no means approve, yet as thFy 
seem to be curious, and to bear some relation to the chain of 
reasoning carried  on throughout  this  enquiry, I shall here 
copy them from my memory as accurately as I can, in order 
to submit them to the judgment of  the reader. 
Our  conversation  began  with  my admiring the singular 
good  fortune  of  philosophy,  which,  as  it  requires entire 
liberty above all other privileges, and chiefly flourishes from 
the free opposition of  sentiments and argumentation, received 
its first birth in an age and  country of  freedom  and tolera- 
tion, and was  never cramped, even  in its  most  extravagant 
principles, by  any creeds, confessions, or penal statutes.  For, 
except  the  banishment  of  PROTAGORAS,  and the death of 
SOCRATES,  which  last  event  proceeded  partly  from  other 
motives, there are scarcely any instances to be  met with,  in 
ancient history,  of  this  bigotted jealousy, with which  the 
preserit age is so much infested.  EPICURUS  lived at ATHENS 
to an advanced age, in peace and tranquillity : EPICUREANS 
were even admitted to receive the sacerdotal  character, and 
to officiate at the altar, in the niost sacred rites of the estab- 
lished religion : And the public encouragement3 of  pensions 
and salaries was  afforded  equally, by  the wisest  of  all the 
ROMAN   emperor^,^ to the professors of every sect of philosophy. 
How requisite such kind of  treatment was  to philosophy,  in 
her early youth, will easily be  conceived, if  we  reflect,  that, 
even at present, when she  may be supposed more hardy and 
robust, she bears with much difficulty the inclemency of  the 
seasons, and those harsh winds of  calumny and persecution, 
which blow upon her. 
You admire, says my friend, as the singular good fortune 
of  philosophy, what seems to result  from the natural course 
of  things, and to be  unavoidable  in every age and nation. 
This pertinacious bigotry, of  which you complain, as so fatal 
[Of  the  Practical  Consequences of  LUCIANI  ~vvoir~os.  3. 
Natural Religion : Ed. E.]  '  Id. & Dic. 
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SECT.  to philosophy, is really her offspring, who, after allying  with 
superstition, separates himself  entirely from the interest  of 
his parent, and becomes her most inveterate enemy and per- 
secutor.  Speculative dogmas  of  religion, the present occa- 
sions of  such furious dispute, could not possibly be conceived 
or admitted in the early ages of  the world;  when  mankind, 
being  wholly  illiterate,  formed  an idea  of  religion  more 
suitable  to their weak  apprehension,  and  composed  their 
sacred tenets of  such tales chiefly as were the objects of tra- 
ditional belief, more than of argument or disputation.  After 
the first alarm, therefore, was over, which arose from the new 
paradoxes and principles of  the philosophers ;  these teachers 
seem ever after, during the ages  of  antiquity, to have lived 
in great harmony with the  established superstition, and to 
have  made a fair partition  of  mankind  between  them ;  the 
former claiming all the learned and wise, the latter  possessing 
all the vulgar and illiterate. 
It seems then, say I, that you leave politics entirely out of 
the question, and never suppose, tliat a wise  magistrate  can 
justly be jealous of certain tenets of philosophy, such as those 
of  EPICURUS,  which, denying a  divine  existence,  and con- 
sequently a  providence and a  future state, seem  to loosen, 
in a great  measure, the ties  of  morality, and may be  sup- 
posed, for that reason, pernicious to the peace of civil society. 
I know, replied he, that in fact these persecutions  never, 
in any age, proceeded from calm reason, or from  experience 
of  the pernicious  consequences  of  philosophy ; but  arose 
entirely from passion and prejudice.  But what if I should 
advance  farther,  and  assert,  that, if  EPICURUS  had  been 
accused  before  the people, by any of  the  sycophants  or in- 
formers  of  those  days, he  could  easily  have  defended his 
cause, and proved his principles of  philosophy to be as salu- 
tary as those of  his adversaries, who endeavoured, with such 
zeal, to expose him to the public hatred and jealousy. 
I wish, said 1,  you would try your  eloquence upon  so ex- 
traordinary a topic, and make a speech for EPICURUS,  which 
might satisfy, not the mob of  ATHENS,  if YOU  will allow that 
ancient and polite city to have  contained  any mob, but the 
more philosophical  part of  his audience, such as might be 
supposed capable of  comprehending his arguments. 
The matter would  not be  difficult, upon  such  conditions, 
replied  he : And  if  you  please,  I  shall  suppose  myself 
EPICURUS  for  a  moment,  and  make  you  stand  for  the  SECT. 
ATHENIAN  people, and shall deliver you such an  harangue as . 
will fill all the urn with white  beans, and leave  not a black 
one to gratify the malice  of  my adversaries. 
Very well : Pray proceed upon these suppositions. 
I come hither, 0 ye ATHENIANS,  to justify in your asseinbly 
what I maintained in my school, and I find myself impeached 
by furious antagonists, instead of  reasoning  with  calm  and 
dispassionate enquirers.  Your deliberations, which  of  right 
should be directed  to questions  of  public  good, and the in- 
terest of  the commonwealth, are diverted to the disquisitions 
of  speculative  philosophy ;  and these magnificent,  but per- 
haps fruitless esquiries, take place of  your more familiar but 
more  useful  occupations.  But  so  far as in me lies, I will 
prevent this abuse.  We shall not here  dispute  concerning 
the origin and goveriilnent of worlds.  We  shall only enquire 
how Car  such questions concern the public interest.  And  if 
I can persuade you, that they are entirely indifferent to the 
peace of  society and security of government, I hope that you 
will presently send us back to our schools, there to examine, 
at  leisure, the question, the most  sublime, but, at the same 
time, the most speculative of  all philosophy. 
The religious philosophers, not satisfied with the tradition 
of  your forefathers, and doctrine of  your priests (in which I 
willingly acquiesce), indulge a rash  curiosity, in trying how 
far they can establish religion upon the principles of reason ; 
and  they  thereby  excite, instead  of  satisfying, the doubts, 
which naturally arise from a diligent and scrutinous enquiry. 
They  paint,  in  the  most  magnificent  colours,  the  order, 
beauty,  and wise arrangement of  the universe ;  and then ask, 
if  such a glorious display of  intelligence could proceed from 
the fortuitous concourse of  atoms, or if chance could produce 
what  the greatest  genius can never  sufficiently admire.  I 
shall  not  examine  the justness  of  this argument.  I shall 
allow it to be  as solid  as my antagonists  and accusers  can 
desire.  It is sufficient, if I can prove, from this very reason- 
ing, that the question is entirely speculative, and that, when, 
in my philosophical disquisitions, I deny a providence and a 
future state, I undermine not the foundations of  society, but 
advance principles, which  they themselves, upon  their  own 
topics, if  they argue consistently, must allow to be solid and 
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SECT.  You then, who  are my accusers, have acl~nowledged,  that  "'.  the chief or sole  argument for a divine  existence  (which I 
never questioned) is derived from tho order of nature ;  where 
there appear such marks of intelligence and design, that yo11 
think it extravagant to assign for its cause, either chance, or 
the blind  and unguided  force  of  matter.  You  allow, that 
this is an argument drawn from effects to calises.  From the 
order of the work, you infer, that there must have been pro- 
ject and forethought in the workman.  If you  cannot make 
out this point, you allow, that  your conclusion fails ;  and you 
pretend not to establish the  conclusion in a greater latitude 
than the phaenomena of  ntxture will justify.  These are your 
corrcessiol~s.  I desire you to mark the consequences. 
When we  infer  any pa'rticular cause  from  an effect,  we 
must  proportion  the one  to  the other,  and can  never  be 
allowed  to ascribe to the cause any qualities, but what are 
exactly sufficient to produce the effect.  A body of ten ounces 
raised in any scale may serve a.s a proof, that the counter- 
balancing weight  exceeds ten ounces ;  but can never afford 
a reason that it exceeds a hundred.  If the cause, assigned 
for any effect, be not sufficient to produce it, we must either 
reject that cause, or add to it such qualities as will  give it a 
just proportion to the effect.  But if we  ascribe to it farther 
qualities, or affirm it capable of  producing  other effects, we 
can only indulge  the licence  of  conjecture,  and arbitrarily 
suppose the existence of qualities and energies, without reit- 
son or aut,hority. 
The same rule holds, whether the cause  assigned be brute 
unconscious  matter, or a rational  intelligent being.  If the 
cause be known only by the effect, we never ought to ascribe 
to it any qualities, beyond  what  are precisely  requisite  to 
produce the effect : Nor can we,  by any rules of  just reason- 
ing, return back froni the cause, and infer  other effects from 
it, beyond those by which alone it is known to us.  No one, 
merely  from  the sight of  one  of  ZEUXIS'S  pictures,  could 
know, that he was  also  a  statuary or architect, and was an 
artist no  less  skilful  in stone  and marble than in  colours. 
The talents and taste, displayed in the particular work before 
us; these  we  niay safely conclude the workman  to be  pos- 
sessed  of.  The  cause  must  be  proportioned  to the effect ; 
and if we exactly and precisely proportion  it, we shall never 
find in it any qualities, that point  farther, or afford an in- 
ference concerning any other design or performance.  Such  SECI. 
qualities must be soniewhat  beyond what is merely requisite  y. , 
for producing the effect, which we examine. 
Allowing, therefore, the gods to be the authors of  the ex- 
istence or order of the universe ;  it follows, that they possess 
that precise  degree  of  power, intelligence, and benevolence, 
which  appears  in their workmanship; but nothing farther 
can ever  be  proved, except we  call in the assistance of  ex- 
aggeration and flattery to supply  the defects  of  ai-gmnent 
and reasoning.  So  far  as  the traces  of  any attributes, at 
present,  appear, so far may we  conclude these  attributes to 
exist.  The supposition of  farther attributes is mere hypo- 
thesis ;  much more the supposition, that, in distant regions 
of  space or periods of time, there has been, or will be, a more 
magnificent display of  these attributes, and a scheme  of  ad- 
ministration more  suitable  to such imaginary virtues.  We 
can  never  be  allowed  to mount up froni the universe,  the 
effect, to JUPITER,  the cause ;  and then  descend downwards, 
to infer  any new effect  from  that cause ;  as if  the present 
effects alone were  not entirely worthy of  the glorious  attri- 
butes, which we ascribe to that deity.  The knowledge of the 
eanse being derived  solely from  the effect, they must be ex- 
actly adjusted to each other;  and the one can  never refer to 
any thing farther, or be the foundation of  any new inference 
and conclusion. 
You find certain phaenomena in nature.  You seek a cause 
or  author.  You  imagine that you  have  found him.  You 
afterwards become  so  enamoured  of  this offspring  of  your 
brain,  that you  imagine it impossible, but he must produce 
sonlething greater  and more  perfect  than the presknt scene 
of things, which  is so  full of  ill  and disorder.  You forget, 
that this superlative intelligence and benevolence are entirely 
imaginary,  or,  at least, without  any foundation in reason ; 
and that you have no ground to ascribe to him any qualities, 
but what you  see  he has actually exerted  and displayed  in 
his  productions.  Let your gods, therefore, 0 philosophers, 
be suited to the present appearances of  nature : And presume 
not to alter these appearances  by arbitrary suppositions, in 
order  to suit them  to the attributes, which you  so fondly 
ascribe to your deities. 
When priests  and poets, supported by your  authority, 0 
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SECT.  the present state of vice and misery, I hear them with atten- 
W  .  ,  ' ,  tion and with reverence.  But .when philosophers,  who pre- 
tend to neglect  authority, and to cultivate reason, hold the 
same discourse, I pay them not, I own, the same obsequious 
submission and pious  deference.  I ask ;  who  carried them 
into the celestial regions, who  admitted them into the coun- 
cils of  the gods, who opened to them the bqok  of  fate, that 
they thus rashly affirm, that their deities have  executed, or 
will execute, any purpose beyond what has actually appeared2 
If they tell me, that they have  mounted  on the steps or by 
the gradual  ascent  of  reason,  and by  drawing  inferences 
from  effects to causes, I still insist,  that they have  aided 
the a ascent of reason by the wings of inlagination ;  otherwise 
they could not thus  change their manner of  inference, and 
argue from causes to effects ;  presuming, that a more perfect 
production  than the present world would  be  more suitable 
to such perfect  beings as the gods, and forgetting that they 
have no reason  to ascribe to these celestial beings any per- 
fection or any attribute, but what can be found in the present 
world. 
Hence all the fruitless industry ,to accollrlt for the ill ap- 
pearances of nature, and save the honour of the gods; while 
we  must  acknowledge  the reality of  that evil and disorder, 
with which the world so much abounds.  The obstinate  and 
intractable qualities of matter, we are told, or the observance 
of general Iaws, or some such reason, is the sole cause, which 
controlled the power and benevolence of JUPITER,  and obliged 
him to create mankind and every sensible creature so imper- 
fect and so unhappy.  These  attributes, then, are, it seems, 
beforehand,  taken  for  granted,  in their  greatest latitude. 
And  upon  that supposition,  I own,  that such  conjectures 
may, perhaps, be  admitted  as  plausible  solutions  of  the ill 
phaenomana.  But still I ask; Why take these attributes for 
granted, or why ascribe  to the cause any qualities but what 
actually  appear in the effect  P  Why torture your  brain  to 
justify  the course  of  nature upon  suppositions, which,  for 
aught you  know, may  be  entirely imaginary, and of  which 
there are to  be found no traces in the course of nature ? 
The religious  hypothesis,  therefore,  must  be  considered 
only  as a  particular  method  of  accounting for  the visible 
[On the Steps or Scale of  Reason : Ed. E.1  *#.[Scale  : Ed. E.] 
pllsenomena of  the universe :  But no just reasoner will ever  SECT. 
presume  to infer from it any single fact., and alter or  add .  X,l. 
to the ph~nomena,  in any single particular.  If you think, 
that the appearances of things prove such causes, it is allow- 
able for you to draw  an inference concerning the existence 
of  these  causes.  In such  complicated  and  sublime  sub- 
jects,  every one should be  indulged in the liberty of  conjec- 
ture and  argument.  But here you  ought to rest.  If you 
come backward, and arguing from your inferred causes, con- 
clude, that any other fact has existed, or will  exist, in the 
collrse of nature,  which may serve as a fuller display of  par- 
ticular attributes ; I must  admonish you, that you  have de- 
parted from the method of reaspning, attached to the present 
subject, and have certainly added something to the attributes 
of  the cause, beyond what appears in the effect;  otherwise 
you  could  never, with tolerable  sense or propriety, add any 
thing to the effect, in order to render it  more worthy of  the 
cause. 
Where, then, is the odiousness  of  that doctrine, which I 
teach  in my school, or rather, which I examine  in my gar- 
dens ?  Or what do you  find in this whole question, wherein 
the security of gbod morals, or the peace and order of society 
is in the least concerned? 
I heny a  providence, you  say, and supreme governour  of 
the world, who guides the course of  events, and punishes the 
vicious  with infamy  and disappointment,  and  rewards  the 
virtuous with honour  and success, in all their undertakings. 
But surely, I deny not the course itself  of  events, which lies 
open  to every  one's  enquiry and  examination.  I acknow- 
ledge, that, in the present order of things, virtue is attended 
with more peace  of  mind  than vice, and meets with a more 
favourable  reception  from  the world.  I am sensible, that, 
according  to the past experience  of  mankind, friendship is 
the chief joy of  human  life, and moderation the only source 
of tranquillity and hwpiness.  I never balance  between the 
virtuous and the  vicious course of life ;  but am sensible, that, 
to a well  disposed  mind, every  advantage  is on the side of 
the forriler.  And what can you  say more, allowing all your 
suppositions and reasonings ?  You tell me, indeed, that this 
disposition  of  things proceeds from intelligence and design. 
But whatever it proceeds from, the disposition itself, on which 
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SECT.  duct and deportment in life, is still the same.  It is still open 
XI  , .  for me,  as well as you, to regulate  my behaviour, by my ex- 
perience  of  past  events.  And  if  you  affirm, that, while  a 
divine providence is allowed, and a supreme distributive jus- 
tice in the universe, I ought  to expect some more particular 
reward of the good, and punishment  of  the bad, beyond  the 
ordinary  course  of  event's ; I here  find  the same  fallacy, 
which I have before  endeavoured to detect.  You persist in 
imagining, that, if we  grant, that divine  existence, for which 
you so earnestly contend, you  may safely infer consequences 
from it, and add something to  the experienced order of nature, 
by arguing from  the  attributes which  you  ascribe to  your 
gods.  You seem not to remember, that all your reasonirigs 
on this subject can only be drawn from effects to causes ;  and 
that every argument, deduced  from  causes  to effects, must 
of  necessity be  a. gross  sophism;  since it is impossible for 
you  to know  any thing of  the cause,  but what you have 
antecedently, not inferred, but  discovered to the full, in the 
effect. 
But what must a philosopher think of those vain reasoners, 
who, instead of  regarding the present scene of  things as the 
sole  object  of  their contemplation, so far reverse the whole 
course of  nature, as to render this life  merely a  passage  to 
something farther; a porch,  which  leads  to a  greater, and 
vastly different  building;  a  prologue,  which  serves only to 
introduce the piece, and give it more grace and propriety P 
Whence, do you  think, can  such philosophers  derive  their 
idea of  the gods P  From their own conceit and imagination 
surely.  For if  they derived it from the present phanomena, 
it would never point to anything farther, but must be exactly 
adjusted to them.  That the divinity may possibly  be  en- 
dowed with  attributes, which we  have  never  seen  exerted; 
may be governed  by  principles of  action,  which we  cannot 
discover to be satisfied : All this will freely be allowed.  But 
still this is mere possibility and hypothesis.  We can never 
have reason .to infer  any attributes, or any principles of action 
in him, but eo far as we know them to have been exerted and 
satisfied. 
Are  there any  marks  of  a distribut6ue justice in the world 8 
If you  answer  in the  affirmative, I conclude,  that,  since 
justice here exerts itself, it is satisfied.  If you  reply in the 
negative, I conclude, that you have then no reason to ascribe 
justice,  in our sense of it, to the gods.  If you hold a medium  SECT. 
between sftirrnation and negation, by saying, that the justice .  ",Ia 
of  the gods, at  present, exerts itself  in part, but not in its 
full extent; I answer, that you have no reason to give it any 
particular extent, but only as far as you  see  it,  at  present, 
3xert itself. 
Thus I bring the dispote, 0 ATHENIANS,  to a  short issue 
with my antagonists.  The course of nature lies open  to my 
contemplation  as well  as  to theirs.  The experienced train 
of  events is the great standard, by  which we all regulate our 
conduct.  Nothing else can be appealed to in the field, or in 
the senate.  Nothing  else  ought ever to be heard of  in the 
school, or in the closet.  In vain would  our  limited  under- 
standing break  through these  boundaries,  which  are  too 
narrow for our fond imagination.  While we argue from the 
course  of  nature, and  infer  a  particular  intelligent  cause, 
which first bestowed, and still preserves order in the universe, 
we embrace a principle, which is both uncertain and useless. 
It is uncertain;  because the subject lies  entirely beyond the 
reach  of  human  experience.  It  is  useless ; because  our 
knowledge  of  this  cause  being  derived  entirely  from  the 
course of 'nature, we  can never, according to the rules of just 
reasoning,  return  back  from  the  cause with  any new  in- 
ference, or making additions to the common and experienced 
course  of  nature, establish  any  new  principles  of  conduct 
and behaviour. 
I observe (said I, finding he had  finished  his  harangue) 
that you neglect not the artifice of  the demagogues of  old ; 
and as  you mere  pleased  to make  me stand for the people, 
you  insinuate  yourself  into  my favour  by embracing those 
principles, to which,  you  know, I have always  expressed  a 
particular attachment.  But allowing you to make experience 
(as  indeed I think  you  ought) the  only  standard  of  our 
judgment concerning this, and all other questions of  fact; I 
doubt not but, from the very same experience, to which  yo11 
appeal, it may be  possible  to refute  this reasoning,  which 
jell have  put into the mouth of  EPICURUS.  If YOU saw, for 
instance, a half-finished  building, surrounded with  heaps  of 
brick  and  stone  and  mortar,  and  all  the  instruments  of 
masonry ; could  you  not iw1fer fi-on1 the effect, that it  was 
a worlc of  design and contrivance :3  And could  yo11  not  re- 
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SECT.  the effect, and conclude, that the building  would  soon be 
XI.  . ,  finished, and receive all the filrther improvements, which art 
could bestow upon  it?  If you  saw upon  the sea-shore the 
print  of  one  human foot, you  would  conclude, that a  man 
had passed thak way,  and that he had also left  the traces of 
the other foot, though effaced by the rolling of  the sands or 
inundation of the waters.  Why then do you refuse to admit 
the same  method  of  reasoning with regard- to the order of 
nature?  Consider  the world  and the  present life  only as 
an imperfect building, from which  you can infer  a  superior 
illtelligence ; and arguing from that superior  intelligence, 
which  can  leave nothing imperfect; why may you not infer 
a more finished scheme or plan, which will receive its com- 
pletion  in  some  distant point  of  space  or time?  Are not 
these  methods  of  reasoning  exactly  similar?  And  under 
what pretence can you embrace the one, while you reject the 
other ? 
The  infinite  difference of  the  subjects,  replied  he,  is a 
sufficient foundation  for  this difference in my  conclusions. 
In works  of  human art and  contrivance, it is  allowable to 
advance  from  the effect  to  the cause, and returning  back 
from the cause, to form new inferences concerning the effect, 
and examine  the alterations, which it has probably under- 
gone, or may still undergo.  But what  is the foundation of 
this  method  of  reasoning?  Plainly  this ; that man  is  s 
being,  whom  we  know  by  experience,  whose  motives  and 
designs we  are acquainted with, and whose  projects and  in- 
clinations have a certain connexion and coherence, according 
to the laws which nature has established for the government 
of such a creature.  When, therefore, we  find, that any work 
has proceded from the skill and industry of  man ;  as we  we 
otlherwise acquainted with the nature of  the animal, we  can 
draw a hundred inferences concerning what may be expected 
from  him ;  and  these  inferences will  all  be  founded in ex- 
perience and observation.  But  did we  know  man only from 
the single work or production which we  examine, it were im- 
possible for us to argue in this inaniier ;  because our  know- 
ledge of  all the qualities, which we ascribe to him, being  in 
that case derived from the production, it is  impossible they 
could point to any thing farther, or be the foundation of  any 
new  inference.  The  print  of  a foot in the sand can only 
prove, when  considered  alone,  that there was  some  figure 
adapted to it, by which it was produced : But the print of  a  SEm. 
human  foot  proves likewise, from our other experience, that -xzl., 
there was probably another foot, which  also left its impres- 
sion, though  effaced by time  or  other  accidents.  Here we 
mount  from  the effect  to the cause;  and descending again 
+om  the cause, infer alterations in the effect;  but this is 
not  a  continuation of  the same  simple chain of  reasoning. 
We  comprehend  in this  case  a  hundred  other experiences 
and observations, concerning  the umul figure  and members 
of that species of animal, without which this method of argu- 
ment must be considered as fallacious and sophistical. 
The  case is  not the  same with our  reasonings  from  the 
works of  nature.  The Deity is known to us only by his pro- 
ductions, and is a single being in the universe, not  compre- 
hended under any species or  genus, from whose  experienced 
attributes or qualities, we can, by analogy, infer any attribute 
or quality in him.  As the universe shews wisdom and good- 
ness, we infer wisdom and goodness.  As it shews a particular 
degree of  these  perfections, we infer  a  particular  degree of 
them,  precisely  adapted  to  the effect  which  we  examine. 
But farther  attributes or farther degrees of  the same attri- 
butes, we can nePter be authorised to infer or suppose, by any 
rules of just reasoning.  Now, without  some such  licence of 
supposition, it is impossible for us to argue from the cause, or 
infer  any alteration in the effect, beyond what has immedi- 
ately fallen under our observation.  Greater good produced by 
this Being must still prove a greater degree of  goodness :  A 
more impartial distribution of rewards and punishments must 
proceed from  a greater regard to justice and equity.  Every 
supposed addition to the works of  nature makes an addition 
to  the attributes of the Author of nature;  and consequently, 
being entirely unsupported  by any reason  or  argument, can 
never be admitted but as mere conjecture and hypothesis.' 
The  great  source  of  our  mistake  in this subject, and of 
In  general, it may, I think, he  es- 
tablished  as a maxim, that where  any 
:ause  is  known  only by  its particular 
effects, it must  be  impossible  to infer 
any new effects from that cause ; since 
the qualities, which are requisite to pro- 
duce these  new  effects  along with  the 
former,  must  either  be  different,  or 
superior,  or  of  more  extensive opera- 
tion, than those which simply prr~duced 
the  effect,  whence  alone  the cause  is 
supposed to be  known to us.  We can 
nerer,  therefore,  have  any  reason  to 
suppose the existence of  these qualities. 
To  say, that  the  new  effects proceed 
only from  a  continuation  of  the  same 
[Editions  E and F print in the text as far as '  qualities,'  and throw the rest 
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the unbounded  licence  of  conjecture, which we indulge, is, 
XI  .---  that we  tacitly  consider  ourselves, as  in the  place  of  the 
Supreme Being, and conclude, that he will, on every occasion, 
observe the  same conduct, which we  ourselves, in his situa- 
tion, would have embraced as reasonable and eligible.  But, 
besides that the ordinary course of  nature may convince us, 
!hat  almost everything is regulated by principles and maxims 
very different from ours ;  besides this, I say, it must evidently 
appear contrary to all  rules  of  analogy to reason, from  the 
intentions  and projects  of  men, to those of  a  Being so dif- 
ferent, and so much superior.  In  human nature, there  is a 
certain  experienced  coherence of  designs and inclinations ; 
so that when, from any fact, we  have  discovered one  inten- 
tion of any man, it may often be reasonable, from experience, 
to infer  another, and draw a  long chain of  conclusions con- 
cerning  his past  or  future conduct.  But  this  method  of 
reasoning  can  never have  place with regard to a  Being, SO 
remote and incomprehensible, who bears much  less  analogy 
to any other being in the universe than the sun to a waxen 
taper, and who  discovers himself  0111~-  by  some faint traces 
or outlines, beyond which we have no authority to ascribe to 
hinl  any  attribute  or  perfection.  What we  imagine  to 
be a superior  perfection,  may  really be  a  defect.  Or were 
it  ever so  much  a  perfection,  the  ascribing  of  it  to  the 
Supreme  Being, where  it appears not  to have been really 
exerted, to the full, in his works, savours more of flattery and 
panegyric,  than  of  just  reasoning  and sound  philosophy. 
All the philosophy, therefore, in the world, and all the reli- 
gion, which is nothing but a species of philosophy, will never 
be able to carry us beyond the usual course of  experience, or 
give  us  measures  of  conduct  and behaviour  different from 
those  which  are  furnished  by  reflections on common life. 
No new fact can ever be  inferred  from  the religious  hypo- 
thesis ;  no event foreseen or foretold ;  no  reward or punish- 
ment expected or dreaded, beyond what is already known by 
energy,  which  is  already known  from 
tile  first  effects,  will  not  remove  the 
difficulty.  For w:en  granting this to be 
the citse (which can seldom be supposed), 
the vevy continuation and  exertion of  a 
like energy (for it 1s impossible it can I)u 
absolutely the same), I say, this exertion 
of  a like energy, in a different pc>riod  of 
bpace and time, is a very arbitrary sup- 
position, and what there cannot possibly 
be  any  traces  of  in the effects,  from 
which all our knowledge of  the cause is 
originally  clerived.  Let the infeerreed 
cause  be  exactly  proportioned  (as it 
should be) to the known effect ;  and it  is 
impossible  that  it can  possess  any 
q~i;~litit's,  from  which  new or  different 
effects caben  i@  rred. 
practice and observation.  So that my apology for EPICURU~  SECT. 
will still appear solid and satisfactory ;  nor have the political -*- 
interests  of  society  any connexion  with  the  philosophical 
disputes concerning metaphysics and religion. 
There is still one circumstance, replied I, which  you seem 
to have overlooked.  Though I should allow  your  premises, 
I must deny your conclusion.  You  conclude, that religious 
doctrines  and  reasonings  can  have  no  influence  on  life, 
beca~lse  they ought to have no  influence ;  never considering, 
that men reason not in the same manner as you do, but draw 
many consequences  from  the belief  of  a  divine  Existence, 
and  suppose  that the Deity would  inflict  punishments  on 
vice,  and bestow rewards  on virtue, beyond what  appear  in 
the ordinary course of  nature.  Whether this  reasoning of 
theirs  be just  or  not, is  no matter.  Its influence on their 
life  and  conduct  must  still be  the same.  And, those, who 
attempt to disabuse them of  snch prejudices, may, for aught 
I know, be  good  reasoners, but I camot allow them to be 
good citizens and politicians ;  since they free  men  from  one 
restraint upon their passions, and make the infringement  of 
the laws of  society, in one respect, more easy and secure. 
After all, I may, perhaps, agree to your general coiiclusion 
in favour  of  liberty,  though  upon  different  premises  from 
those, on which you endeavour to found it.  I think, that the 
state ought to tolerate every principle of  philosophy ;  nor is 
there  an instance, that any government  has suffered in  its 
political interests by such indulgence.  There is no enthusiasm 
among philosophers ;  their doctrines are not very alluring to 
the people ;  and no  restraint can be put upon  their reason- 
ings,  but  what  must  be  of  dangerous  consequence to the 
sciences, and even to the state, by paving the way for perse- 
cution  and oppression  in points,  where  the  generality  of 
ma'nkind are more deeply interested and concerned. 
But there occurs to me  (continued I)  with regard to your 
main topic, a  difficulty, which I shall just  propose  to you, 
without insisting  on it; lest it lead  into reasonings  of  too 
nice  and  delicate  a  nature.  In a  word,  I  much  doubt 
whether it be  possible  for a cause  to be  known  only by its 
effect (as you have all along supposed) or to be of  so singular 
aria particular a nature as to have no  parallel alnd no  simi- 
larity with  any other  cause  or  object,  t'hat has ever  fallen 
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SECT.  are found to be  constantly conjoined, that we  can  infer the 
XI  -_'.  one from ,the other; and were an effect presented,  which was 
elltirely singular, and could not be comprehended  under any 
Ianown  species, I do  not  see, that we  could  form  any con- 
jecture or ilif'erence at  all co~icerning  its cause.  If experience 
i~~~ld.  observation  and  analogy  be,  indeed,  the oilly  guides 
which we  can reasonably follow in inferences of  this nature; 
120th tlie effect and cause must  bear a similarity and resem- 
blance to other effects and causes, which we know, and which 
we have found, in many instances, to be conjoined with each 
other.  I leave it to your own reflection to pursue the con- 
sequences of  this  principle.  I  shall just  observe,  that, as 
the antagonists  of  EPICURUS  always suppose the  universe, 
an effect quite singular and  unparalleled, to be the proof  of 
a Deity.  a  cause  no  less  singular and  unparalleled ;  your 
reasonings,  upon  that supposition,  seem, at least, to merit 
our attention.  There is, I own, some difficulty, how we  can 
ever return from the cause to the effect, and, reasoning froin 
our ideas of' the former, infer any alteration on the latter, or 
any addition to it. 
SECTION  XI1.-Of  the  Acaclemical or iSceptica1 Philosophy. 
PART I. 
THERE  is not a greater number o£ philosophical  reaeenings, 
displayed  upon  any  subject,  than those,  which  proae  the 
existence of a Deity, and refute the fallacies of  Atheists ;  and 
yet the most religious pllilosophers  still dispute  whether any 
lnan can be so blinded as to be a speculative  atheist.  How 
sliall we reconcile these contradictions ?  The knights-errant, 
who wandered about to clear the world of  dragons and giants, 
never entertained the least doubt with  regard to the exist- 
ence of  these monsters. 
The Sceptic is  another  enemy of  religion, who  naturally 
provokes  the indignation  of  all divines  and  graver  philo- 
sophers ;  though it is certain, that no man ever inet with any 
such absurd creature, or conversed  with a 1nan1, who had  no 
opinion or principle  concerning any subject, either of  action 
or speculation.  This begets a very natural question ;  What 
is ineant by  a sceptic P  And how  far it is possible  to push 
these philosophical principles of  doubt and uncertainty P 
There is a species of scepticism, a~~tececlent  to all study and 
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which  is  much  inculcated by DES  CARTES  and  SECT. 
XTI.  ~thers,  as  a  sovereign  preservative  against  error  and pre- . 
cipitate judgment.  It reconmends an universal  doubt, not  PART  1. 
~nly  of  all our former opinions and principles, but also of our 
very faculties; of  whose  veracity, say they, we  must assure 
ourselves,  by  a  chain  of  reasoning,  deduced  from  some 
original  principle,  which  cannot  possibly  be  fallacious  or 
deceitful.  But neither is there any such  original principle, 
which has a prerogative  above  others, that are  self-evident 
and convincing:  Or if  there were, could  we  advance  a  step 
beyond it, but by the use of those very faculties, of  which we 
are supposed to be already diffident.  The CARTESIAN  doubt, 
therefore, were it ever possible to be attended by any human 
creature (as it plainly is not)  would  be  entirely incurable; 
and no reasoning could ever bring us to a state of  assurance 
and conviction upon any subject. 
It must, however, be confessed, that this species of  scepti- 
cism,  when  more  moderate,  may  be  understood  in  a  very 
reasonable sense, and is a necessary preparative to the study 
of  philosophy,  by  preserving  a  proper  impartiality in  our 
judgments, and weaniug our mind froni all those prejudices, 
which we may have imbibed froni education or rash opinion. 
To begin with clear and self-evident principles, to advance 
by timorous and sure steps, to review frequently our conclu- 
sions, and examine accurately all their consecluences ;  though 
by  these  means  we  shall  make both  a  slow  and  a  short 
progress  in  our  systems ; are  the only methods,  by which 
we can ever hope to reach truth, and attain a proper stability 
and certainty in our determinations. 
There is another species of scepticism, consequent to science 
and  enquiry,  when  men  are  supposed  to have discovered, 
either the absolute fallaciousness of their mental faculties, or 
their unfitness to reach any fixed determination  in all those 
curious  subjects of  speculatiop, about  which  they are com- 
monly employed.  Even our very senses are brought into dis- 
pute, by a certain species of  philosophers ;  and the maxims 
of  common life are subjected to the same doubt as the most 
profound  principles  or  conclusions  of  metaphysics  and 
theology.  As these paradoxical tenets (if they may be called 
tenets)  are  to be  met  with  in some  philosophers, and the 
refutation  of  them  in  several,  they  naturally  excite  our CONCERNING  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING. 
SECT.  curiosity, and make us enquire into the arguments, on which 
XI1  ,,  they may Ly,be  founded. 
1.  I need not insist upon the more trite topics, employed  by 
the sceptics in all ages, against the evidence of  sense ;  such 
as those  which  are derived from  the illlperfection and fal- 
laciousness  of  our  organs,  on  numberless  occasions ; the 
crooked appearance of  an oar in water ;  the various aspects 
of  objects, according to their different distaaces ;  the double 
images which  arise  from  the pressing one eye ;  with many 
other appearances of  a like nature.  These  sceptical topics, 
indeed, are only sufficient to prove, that the senses alone are 
not implicitly to be depended on ;  but that we  must  correct 
their evidence by reason, and by considerations, derived from 
the nature of  the medium, the distance  of  the object, and 
the disposition of  the organ, in order to render them, within 
their  sphere,  the  proper  criteria  of  truth  and  falsehood. 
There are other more profound arguments against the senses, 
which admit not of  so easy a solution. 
It seems evident, that men  are carried, by a  natural in- 
stinct or prepossession, to repose faith in  their  senses ;  and 
that, without any reasoning,  or even almost  before  the use 
of  reason,  we  always  suppose  an external universe,  which 
depends not on our perception, but would  exist, though  we 
and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated.  Even 
the animal creation are governed by a like opinion, and pre- 
serve  $his belief  of  external objects, in  all their thoughts, 
designs, and actions. 
It  seems  also  evident, that, when  men  follow this blind 
and powerfyl  instinct  of  nature,  they always  suppose the 
very  images,  presented  by  the  senses, to be  the external 
objects, and never entertain  any suspicion, that the one are 
nothing but representations of  the other.  This very table, 
which we  eee white, and which  we feel hard, is  believed  to 
exist, independent  of  our perception,  and  to be  something 
external  to  our  mind,  which perceives it.  Our  presence 
bestows not being on it:  Our  absence  does not annihilate 
it.  It preserves its existence  uniform  and  entire, indepen- 
dent of  the situation of intelligent beings, who  perceive or 
contemplate it. 
But this universal and primary opinion of  all men is soon 
destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that 
nothing  can  ever  be  present  to the mind  but an image or 
perception, and that the senses are only the  inlets, through  SE~. 
which these images a-re  conveyed, without being able to pro-  LXtl~ 
duce any iininediste intercourse  between the mind  and the  PART  I. 
object.  The table, which we  see, seems  to diminish, as we 
remove farther from it : But the real table, which  exists in- 
dependent  of  us,  suffers no  alteration : It  was,  therefore, 
nothing but  its  image,  which  was  present  to  the  mind. 
These are tlle obvious dictates of  reason ;  and no  man,  who 
=eflects, ever  doubted,  that the existences,  which  we  con- 
sider, *hen  we  say, this house  and that tree,  are nothing  but 
perceptions  in the mind, and fleeting  copies or  representa- 
tions  of  other existences, which rernain  uniform  and inde- 
pendent. 
So far, then, are we  necessitated by reasoning to contradict 
or depart  from the primary instincts  of  nature, and to em- 
brace a new system with regard to the evidence of  our senses. 
But here philosophy finds herself extremely embarrassed, when 
she would justify this new system, and obviate the cavils and 
objections of  the sceptics.  She can no  longer plead  the in- 
fallible and irresistible instinct of  nature : For that led us to 
a quite different system, which is acknowledged  fallible and 
even erroneous.  And to justify this pretended philosophical 
system,  by a chain  of  clear  and  convincing  argument,  or 
even any appearance of  argument,  exceeds the power of  all 
human capacity. 
By what argument can it be  proved, that the perceptions 
of the mind muet  be caused by external objects, entirely dif- 
ferent  from  them, though  resembling them (if that be pos- 
sible) and could not arise either from the energy of  the mind 
itself, or from the suggestion of some invisible and unknown 
spirit, or from  some other cause  still  more unknown to us? 
It is acknowledged, that, in fact, many of  these  perceptions 
arise not  from  any thing  external, as  in dreams, madness, 
and other  diseases.  And nothing can be  more inexplicable 
than the  manner,  in  which  body  should  so  operate upon 
mind as ever to convey an image of itself to a substance, sup- 
posed of so different, and even contrary a nature. 
It is  a  question  of  fact, whether  the  perceptions  of  tlle 
senses be  produced  by external  objects,  resembling  thein: 
How  shall  this  question  be  determined?  By  experience 
surely ;  as all other questions of a like nature.  But, liere ex- 
perience is, and must be erltil-el?-  , ilent.  The mind has never 
any thing present  to it but the iw~ceptions,  and cannot pos- 126  CONCERNING  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING. 
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SECT.  sibly  reach any experience of  their connexion with  objects.  .  Xy. .  The supposition of  such a  connexioi~  is, therefore,  without 
PART  1-  any foundation in reasoning. 
To have  recourse  to the veracity of  the stlpreme  Being, 
in  order to  prove  the veracity  of  our  senses,  is  surely 
making n very unexpected  circuit.  If his veracity were  at 
all concerned  in  this matter, our  senses would  be  entirely 
infallible ;  because it is not possible that he can ever deceive. 
Not to mention, that, if  the external  world  be  once  called 
in question, we shall be at a loss to find arguments, by which 
we  may  prove  the existence  of  that Being  or any of  his 
attributes. 
This is  a topic, therefore,  in which  the profounder  and 
more  philosophical  sceptics will  always triumph, when they 
endeavour to ilitrod~zce  an universal doubt into all  subjects 
of  human  knowledge  and enquiry.  Do  you  follow the in- 
stincts and propensities of nature, may they say, in assenting 
to the veracity of sense ?  But these lead you to believe, that 
the very perception or sensible image is the external object. 
Do you  disclaim this principle, in order  to embrace a  more 
rational opinion, that the perceptions  are oilly  representa- 
tions of  something external?  You  here  depart from  your 
natural propensities and more obvious sentiments ; and yet 
are not able to satisfy your reason, which can never find any 
convincing argument from experience to prove, that the per- 
ceptions are connected with any external objects. 
There is another sceptical  topic of  a  like nature, derived 
from the most profound philosophy;  which  might merit our 
-  attention, were it requisite to dive  so deep, in order to dis- 
cover arguments and reasonings, which can so little serve to 
any  serious  purpose.  It  is universally allowed  by  modern 
enquirers, that all the sensible qualities  of  objects, such as 
hard, soft, hota cold, white, black, &c., are merely secondary, 
and exist not in the objects themselves, but are perceptions 
of the mind, without any external archetype or model, which 
they represent.  If this be allowed, with regard to secondary 
qualities, it must  also follow, with  regard tg  the supposed 
primary qualities of  extension and solidity ;  nor can the latter 
be any more  entitled to that denomination than the former. 
The idea of  extension is entirely acquired from  the senses of 
sight and feeling ;  and if  all the qualities, perceived by the 
senses, be in the mind, not in the object, the same conclu- 
sion mnst reach  the idea of  extension, which  is wholly de- 
pendent  on  the  sensible  ideas  or the  ideas  of  secondarv  SECT. 
"  XII.  qualities.  Nothing can save us from this conclusion, but the  ,  fl 
that the ideas of  those  primary qualities  are at-  PUT 
tained by  Abskaction ;  an opinion, which,  if  we examine  it 
accurately, we shall find  to be unintelligible,  and even ab- 
surd.  An extension, that is neither tangible nor visible, can- 
not possibly be conceived :  And a tangible or visible extension, 
which  is neither  hard  nor  soft, black  nor white, is equally 
beyond the reach of  human conception.  Let  any man try to 
conceive a  triangle in general, which  is neither Isoceles nor 
,!3calenum, nor has any particular length or proportion of sides ; 
and he will soon  perceive the absurdity of  all the scholastic 
notions with regard to abstraction and general ideas.' 
Thus the first philosophical  objection  to the evidence of 
sense or to the opinion of external existence consists in this, 
that such an opinion, if rested on natural instinct, is contrary 
to  reason, and if referred to reason, is contrary to natural in- 
stinct, and at the same time carries no rational evidence with 
it, to convince an impartial enquirer.  The second objection 
goes  farther,  and  represents  this  opinion  as contrary to 
reason:  at least, if  it be  a p~inciple  of reason, that all sen- 
sible qualities are in the mind, not in the object.  'Bereave 
matter  of  all  ita  intelligible  qualities,  both  primary  and 
secondary, you in  a manner annihilate it,  and leave  only a 
certain unknown,  inexplicable  something, as the cause of our 
perceptions ;  a notion so imperfect, that  no sceptic will think 
it worth while to contend against it. 
PART 11. 
It may seem a very extravagant attempt of  the sceptics to 
destroy reason by argument and ratiocination ;  yet is this the 
grand scope  of  all their enquiries and disputes.  They en- 
This argument  is drawn  from  Dr. 
BERKELEY;  and  indeed  most  of  the 
writings of  that very isgenious author 
form  the  best  lessons  of  sceptic?ism, 
which are to be found either anlong the 
ancient or modern philosophers, BAYLE 
not  excepted.  He  professes,  however, 
in his title-page (and undeubtedly with 
peat  truth) to liava composed his book 
against the sceptics as well  as against 
the  atheists  and  free-thinkers.  But 
that all his arguments, though otherwise 
intended,are, in reality, merely sceptical, 
appears from this, that tl~cy  admit of  no 
nnswer  and  produee  no  conaictio~a. 
Their only effect  is to cause  that  mo- 
mentary  amazement  and  irresolution 
and confusion, which  is  the  result  of 
scepticism. 
[This  sentence was  added  in  Ed 
R.1 128  CONCERNING  IIUMAN  UNDERSTANDING,  ACADEMICAL  OR  SCEPTICAL  PHILOSOPHY.  129 
SECT.  deavour to find  objections, both  to our abstract reasonings,  .  X!l~  and to those which regard matter of  fact and existence. 
PUT 11.  The chief  objection against all  abstract  reasonings is de- 
rived  frorn  the ideas  of  space and  time ; ideas, which,  in 
common life and to a careless view, are very clear and iritel- 
ligible, but when they pass through  the scrutiny of  the pro- 
found sciences (and they are the chief object of  these sciences) 
afford principles, which  seeill full  of  absurdity and contra- 
diction.  No  priestly dogmas, invented  on  purpose to tame 
and subdue the rebellious reason  of  mankind, ever  shocked 
common  sense more than the doctrine of  the infinite divisi- 
bility of  extension, with its consequences ;  as they are poin- 
pously  displayed  by  all  geometricians and metaphysicians, 
with  a  kind  of  triumph and  exultation.  A  real  quantity, 
infinitely less than any finite  quantity, containing quantities 
infinitely less than itself, and so on  in infinitum ;  this is an 
edifice  so  bold  and prodigious, that it  is too  weighty  for 
any pretended  demonstration  to support, because it  shocks 
the clearest  and most natural principles of  human reason.' 
But what  renders the matter  more  extraordinary, is,  that 
these  seemingly absurd  opinions  are supported  by  a  chain 
of  reasoning, the clearest and most natural;  nor is it pos- 
sible for us  to  allow  the premises  without admitting  the 
consequences.  Nothing can be more convincing  and satis- 
factory than all the conclusions concerning the properties of 
circles and triangles ;  and yet, when these are once received, 
how can we deny, that the angle of  contact between a circle 
and its tangent is infinitely less  than any rectilineal  angle, 
-  that as you may encrease the diameter of the circle in infini- 
turn, this angle of contact becomes still less, even in infiniturn, 
and that the angle of contact between other curves and their 
tangents may be infinitely less than those between any circle 
and its tangent, and so on, in infiniturn ?  The demonstration 
of  these principles  seems  as unexceptionable as that which 
proves the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right 
Whatever disputes theye  may  be 
about  mathematical  points,  we  must 
allow  that  there  are physical  pints; 
that is, parts of  extension, which  can- 
not be  divided or lessened, either by the 
eye  or  imagination.  These  images, 
then, which are present to the fancy or 
senses,  are  absolutely  indivisible,  and 
consequently  must  be  allowed  by 
mathematicians  to  be  infinitely  less 
than  any real part  of  extension; and 
yet  nothing  appears  more  certain  to 
reason, than that an infinite number  of 
them  composes  an  infinite  extension. 
How much more an infinite  number of 
those infinitely small parts of extension, 
which are still supposed  infinitely di1-i- 
sible  ? 
ones, though the latter opinion be natural and easy, and the  SECT. 
XII.  former big with  ~ont~radiction  and  absurdity.  Reason  here . , 
seems to be thrown into a kind of  amazemeht and suspence,  PART  11. 
which, without  the  suggestions  of  any sceptic, gives -her a 
uitlidence of  herself, and of the ground on which she treads. 
She  sees a  full light, which illuminates  certain places ;  but 
that light borders upon  the most  profound  darkness.  And 
between  thcse she is  so  dazzled  and  confounded, that she 
scarcely  can  proilounce with  certainty and  assurance  con- 
cerning any one object. 
The absurdity of these bold determinations of the abstract 
sciences seems to  become, if possible, still more palpable with 
regard to time than  extension.  An  infinite number of  real 
pits  of time, passing in succession, and exhausted one after 
another, appears  so evident a  contradiction, that no man, 
one should think, whose  judgment is not corrupted, instead 
of  being  improved,  by  the sciences, would  ever  be  able to 
admit of  it. 
Yet still reason  must  remain  restless, and  unquiet, even 
with  regard  to that  scepticism, to which  she is driven by 
these seeming absurdities and contradictions.  How any clear, 
distinct  idea  can  contain  circumstances, contradictory  to 
itself,  or to any other clear, distinct  idea,  is  absolut,ely in- 
comprehensible;  and is, perhaps,  as  absurd  as any propo- 
sition, which can be formed.  So  that nothing can  be more 
sceptical,  or  more  full  of  doubt  and hesitation,  than  this 
scepticism itself, which  arises from  sorne of  the paradoxical 
coi~clusions  of geometry or the science of quantity.' 
It  seems to me  not impossible to 
aroid  these absurdities  and contradic- 
tions, ~f it  be admitted, that there is no 
such thing as abstract or general  ideas, 
properly speaking ; but that all general 
itlkns  are,  in reality,  particular  ones, 
attached to a general term, which recalls, 
upon  occasion,  other  particular  ones, 
that rest mble, in certain  circumstances, 
the idea,  present  to the  mind.  Thus 
when the term Horse,  is pronounced, \vc 
immediately figure to ourselres t,hc idca 
of a black or a white animal, of  a  par- 
ticular size or figure : But as that term 
is  also  usual17  applied  to animals  of 
other  colours,  figures and  sizes, these 
idt>as, though  not  actually  present  to 
tlie imagination, are easily recalled ;  and 
our reasoning and conclusion proceecl in 
the same way, as if  they were  nctually 
present.  If this bz admitted (as seems 
reasonable) it follows that all the ideas 
of quantity, upon which mathem:~tici;l:  s 
reason, are nothing hnt particular, and 
such as are suggrstetl by the senses and 
imagination,  and consequently,  c:inn,,t 
be infinitely divisi1,le.'  It is sufficicnt 
' [E(litions E and F insert : In rrene-  being so exact or determinate a;;  to  I,* 
ral, we  may pronounce, that the Ideas  the 1:ounclwtion  of  wch  extroortli~~:~~,~ 
of yrcnter, less, or equal, which are the  Inferences.  Ask i~ >kit I~rrniltiria~~  u'~I,L~ 
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The  sceptical  objections  to  moral  evidence,  or  to  the 
XII.  .-  reasonings  concerning  matter of  fact, are either popular  or 
PUT **  philosophical.  The popular  objections are derived  from the 
natural  weakness  of  human  understanding ; the  contra- 
dictory opinions, which have been  entertained  in different 
ages and nations ;  the variations of  our judgment in csickaess 
and health, youth and old age, prosperity and adversity ;  the 
perpetual  contradiction  of  each  particular  man's  opinions 
and sentiments ;  with  many other  topics  of  that kind.  It 
is needless to insist farther on this head.  Tlrese  objections 
are but  weak.  For  as, in  common  life,  we  reason  every 
moment concerning fact and existence, and cannot  possibly 
subsist, without continually employing this species  of  argu- 
ment, any popular  objections: derived  from thence, must be 
insufficient to destroy that evidence.  The great subverter of 
Pyrrhonism or the excessive principles of  scepticism, is action, 
and employment, and the occupations of  common life.  These 
principles may flourish and triumph in the schools ;  where it 
is, indeed, difficult;, if not impossible, to re'fute them.  But as 
soon as they leave the shade, and by the presence of the real 
objects, which actuate our passions  and  sentiments, are put 
in opposition to the more powerful principles  of  our nature, 
they vanish like smoke, and leave the most determined scep- 
tic in the same condition as other mortals. 
The sceptic, therefore, had better keep  within his  proper 
sphere, and display those philosophical objections, which arise 
from  more  profound  researches.  Here he  seems to have 
ample matter of  triumph;  while  he justly  insists, that all 
our evidence for  any matter  of  fact, which  lies  beyond  the 
testimony of  sense or  memory, is  derived  entirely from  the 
relation of cause and effect ;  that we  have no  other  idea  of 
this relation than that of  two objects, which have been  fre- 
quently conjoined  together;  that we  have  no  argument to 
convince us, that objects, which have, in our experience, been 
to have  dropped this hint at present,  and contempt of  the ignorant by their 
without prosecuting it any farther.  It  conclusions ;  and this seems the readiest 
certainly concerns  all lovers  of  soience  solution of  these  difficulties. 
not to expose themselves to the ridicule 
Quantities to be equal, and he must say,  it.  Now  this  is  an  Appeal  to  the 
that the Idea  of  Equality  is  one  of  general  Appearances  of  Objects to the 
those, which cannot be clefin'd,  and that  Imagination or Senses, and consequently 
'tic; sufficient  to place two  equal Quali-  can nerer afford Conclusions so directly 
ties before any one, in order to suggest  contrary to these Etculties.] 
frequently conjoined, will likewise, in other instances, be con-  SECT. 
joined in the same  manner; and  that nothing  leads  us  to  X".  , 
this inference but custom or a certain instinct of our nature ;  PART  11. 
which it  is indeed  difficult to resist, but  which,  like other 
instincts, may be fallacious and deceitful.,  While the sceptic 
insists upon these topics, he shews his force, or rather, indeed, 
his,own and our weakness ; and seeins, for the time at least, 
to destroy all assurance and  conviction.  These  arguments 
might  be displayed  at greater  length, if  any durable  good 
or benefit to society could ever  be  expected to result from 
them. 
For here is the chief and most  confounding  objection to 
ezcessive  scepticism,  that no durable  good  can  ever result 
from it ;  while it remains in its full force  and vigour.  We 
need  only  ask  such a sceptic,  What his  meaning  is? And 
what he proposes  by  all these  curious  researches ?  He is im- 
mediately  at a  loss,  and  knows  not  what  to answer.  A 
COPERNICAN  or PTOLEMAIC,  who supports each his different 
system  of  astronomy,  may  hope  to  produce  a conviction, 
which will remain constant and durable, with  his  audience. 
A  STOIC  or EPICUREAN  displays  principles, which  may not 
only be durable, but  which  have  an  effect  on  conduct and 
behaviour.  But  a  PYRRHONIAN  cannot  expect,  that  his 
philosophy will  have  any constant influence on  the mind : 
Or if it had, that its influence would be  beneficial to society. 
On  the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge 
ally thin ,  that all human life must perish, were his principles 
universal  7  y and steadily to prevail.  All discourse, all action 
would immediately cease ;  and men remain in a total lethargy, 
till the necessities of  nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their 
miserable existence.  It is true ; so  fatal an event  is very 
little to be  dreaded.  Nature  is always too strong for  prin- 
ciple.  And  though  a  PYRRHONIAN  may throw  hilnself  or 
others into a  momentary amazement  and confusion  by  his 
profound reasonings ;  the first and most trivial event in life 
will put to flight all his doubts and  scruples, and leave him 
the same, in every point of  action and speculation, with  the 
philosophers  of  every other  sect, or  with  those  who  never 
concerned themselves in any philosophical researches.  When 
he awakes from his dream, he will be  the first to join  in the 
laugh against himself, and to confess, that all his  objections 
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SECT.  to show the whimsical condition  of  n~ankind,  who  must act 
XI1  -  ,  ' .  and reason and believe ;  though tliey are not  able, by their 
PUT 11.  -most diligent enquiry, to  satisfy themselves  concerning the 
foundation of  these operations, or to remove the objections, 
which may be raised against them, 
PAR'P  111. 
There is, indeed, a more mitignted scepticism or academicnl 
philosophy, which may be both ilura1)le and nseful, and which 
may, in part, be tlie result  of  this PYRRHONISM,  or  excessive 
scepticism,  when  its  undistinguished  doubts  are,  in some 
measure, corrected by  common  sense  and reflection.  The 
greater part of  mankind are natnrally apt to be  affirinative 
and dogmatical in their opinions ; and while they see objects 
only on one side, a,nd have no idea of  any counterpoising wgu- 
ment, they throw themselves precipitately into the principles, 
to which they are  inclined ;  nor  have  they any  indulgence 
for those who entertain opposite sentiments.  To hesitate or 
balance perplexes their understanding, checks their passion, 
n,ncl  suspends  their  action.  Thcy  are, therefore, impatient 
till they escnpe  from a state, which  to them  is  so  uneasy.; 
and they think, that they can never  remove  themselves  far 
enough  from  it,  by the violence  of  their  affirmations  ancl 
obstinacy  of  their  belief.  But  could  such  dogmatical 
reasoners become sensible of  tllc strnl~ge  infirmities of human 
understanding,  even in its most perfect state, and when niost 
accurate and cautious in its determin:ltions ;  such a reflection 
would naturally inspire them with inore modesty and reserve, 
and diminish their fond opinion of themselves, and their pt-e- 
judice against antagonists.  Tlie illiterate nlay reflect on the 
disposition of  the learned, who, amidst all the advantages of 
study  and  reflection, are commonly  still  diffident  in  their 
determinations : And if  any of  the learned be inclined, from 
their natural temper, to haughtiness and obstinacy, a  small 
tillcture of  PYRRHONISM  might abate their pride, by shewing 
tllcm, that the few advantages, which tliey may have attained 
over their fellows, are but inconsiderable, if  compared  with 
the universal perplexity and confusion, which  is illherent in 
human nature.  In  general, there is a degree  of  doubt, and 
c;lutioll,  and modesty, which,  in all  kinds  of  scrutiny and 
(lecision, ought for ever to accompany a. just reasoner. 
Another species of  mitigated scepticism, which  may be  of  SECT. 
advantage to mankind, and which may be the natural result  Xtl~ , 
of  the PYRRHCNIAN  doubt and scruples, is the limitation of  PABT  LII. 
our  enquiries  to such  subjects as are best  adapted to the 
narrow capacity of  human understanding.  The imagi~aation, 
of  man is naturally  sublime,  delighted  with  whatever  is 
remote  and extraordinary,  and running,  without  controul, 
into the most  distant  parts  of  space  and time in order  to 
avoid the objects, which  custom has rendered  too familiar 
to it.  A correct Judgment observes a contrary method, and 
avoiding  all  distant  and high  enquiries,  confines  itself  to 
cominoii life, and to such subjects as fall under daily practice 
and experience ;  leaving the more sublime topics to the em- 
bellish~nent  of  poets and orators, or to the arts  of  priests and 
politicians.  To  bring  us  to  so  salutary a  determination, 
nothing can be more serviceable, than to be once thoroughly 
convinced of  the force of  the PYRRHONIAN  doubt, and of the 
impossibility, that any thing, but the strong power of natural 
instinct, could free us from it.  Those who have a propensity 
to philosophy,  will still continue  their  researches;  because 
they reflect, that, besides the immediate pleasure, attending 
such an occupation, philosophical decisions are  nothing but 
the reflections  of  common  life,  methodized  and correct4ed. 
But they will never be tempted to go beyond comnlon life, so 
long  as they  consider  the imperfection of  those  faculties 
which they employ, their narrow reach? and their inaccurate 
operations.  While we cannot give a satisfactory reason, why 
we  believe, after a thousand  experiments, that a stone  will 
fall, or fire  burn ;  can  we ever  satisfy ourselves  concerning 
any determination, which we  may form, with regard to the 
origin  of  worlds, and the situation  of  nature, from, and to 
eternity P 
This  narrow  limitation,  indeed,  of  our  enquiries,  is,  in 
every  respect,  so  reasonable,  that it suffices  to  make  the 
slightest examination into the natural powers  of  the human 
mind, and to compare them with  their  objects, in order  to 
recommend it to us.  We shall then find what are the proper 
subjects of  science and enquiry. 
It  seems  to me,  that the  oilly  objects  of  the  abstract 
sciences or of  demonstration are quantity and number, 2nd 
that all  attempts to  extend  this  more  perfect  species  of 
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SECT.  illusion.  As the component  parts  of  quantity and  number 
XI1  .  '  are entirely similar, their relations become  intricate and in- 
PART  1x1-  .valved ;  and nothing can be more curious, ns well  as useful, 
than to trace, by a variety of  illediums, their equality or  in- 
equality, through their  different  appears4nces.  But  as  all 
other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other, 
we  can never advance  farther, by our  utmost scrutiny, than 
to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reflection, pro- 
nounce  one  thing  not to be  another.  Or  if  there  be  any 
difficulty  in these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the un- 
determinate meaning !of words, which is corrected  by  juster 
definitions.  That the  sqzcare  of  the  hypothenuse  is equal  to 
the squares  of  the  other two  sides, cannot be  known, let  the 
terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of reasoning 
and enquiry.  But  to convince  us  of  this proposition, that 
where there is no property,  there can  be  no injustice, it is only 
necessary to define the terms, and explain injustice to be  a 
violation of  property.  This propositioil  is, indeed, nothing 
but a more imperfect definition.  It  is  the same  case with 
all those  pretended  syllogistical  reasonings, which  may  be 
found in every other branch of  learning, except the sciences 
of  quantity and number ;  and these  may safely, I think, be 
pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demon- 
stration. 
,411  other enquiries of  inen regard only matter of  fact and 
existence ;  and these are evidently incapable of demonstration. 
Whatever is may not be.  No negation  of  a fact can  involve 
a  contradiction.  The izon-existence of  any being, without 
exception, is as clear and  distinct an idea  as  its existence. 
The proposition, which affirms  it not to be,  however false, is 
no less conceivable and intelligible, than that which  affirms 
it to be.  The case is different with the sciences, properly so 
called.  Every proposition, which is not  true, is  there con- 
fused and unintelligible.  That the cube root  of  64 is equal 
to the half  of  10, is  a  false  proposition, and  can  never  be 
distinctly conceived.  But that CBSAR,  or the angel GABRIEL, 
or  any being  never  existed, may be a false  proposition, but 
still is perfectly conceivable, and implies no contradiction. 
The existence, therefore, of  any being  can only be  proved 
by arguments froin its cause or its effect ; and these  argu- 
ments  are  founded  entirely on  experience.  If we  reason 
[However false : aclded in Ed. F.] 
6 priori,  any thing may appear  able  to produce  any thing.  SECT. 
The falling of  a pebble may, for aught we  know, extinguish ,  X!l. 
the sun ;  or the wish of  a inan controul the planets in their  PUT 111. 
orbits.  It is only experience, which  teaches  us  the nature 
and bounds of  cause and effect, and enables  us to infer  the 
existence of  one obje,ct from that of  another.'  Such is the 
foundation of  moral reasoning, which forins the greater part 
of  human knowledge, and is the source of  all human  action 
and behaviour. 
Moral reasonings are either concerning particular or general 
ficts.  All  deliberations  in life  regard  the former;  as also 
all disquisitions  in history, chronology, geography,  and as- 
tronomy. 
The  sciences,  which  treat of  general  facts,  are politics, 
natural philosophy, physic, chymistry, &c.  where the qualities, 
causes and effects of  a whole species of  objects are enquired 
into. 
Divinity or Theology, as it proves the existence of a Deity, 
and the immortality of  souls, is  composed  partly of  reason- 
ings concerning particular,  partly concerning  genera,l  facts. 
It has  a  foundation  in  reason, so  far as it is supported by 
experience.  But its best and most solid  foundation  is fcLith 
and divine revelation. 
Morals  and  criticism  are not  so  properly objects  of  the 
understanding as of  taste  and sentiment.  Beauty, whether 
moral or natural, is felt,  more  properly than  perceived.  Or 
if  we reason, concefning it, and endeavoclr to fix its standard, 
we  regard a new fact, to wit, the general  taste  of  mankind, 
or some such fact, which may be the object of  reasoning and 
enquiry. 
When we  run over libraries, persuaded of  these principles, 
what havoc must we  make P  If we  take  in our  hand  any 
volume ;  of  divinity or school m~taphysics,  for instance ;  let 
us  ask,  Does  it  contain  any  abstract  reasoning  concerning 
quantity or number ?  No.  Does it contain  any  experimental 
reasoning concerning matter of fact  and existence ?  No.  Coni- 
mit it then to the flames : For  it can  contain  nothing  but 
sophistry and illusion. 
That impious waxim of  the ancient  of the sliprerile Being may create matter ; 
philosophy,  Ex  nihilo,  nihil  fit, by  but,  for aught  we  know  & priori, the 
which  the  creation  of  matter  was  ex-  will of  ally other being might create it, 
cluded, ceases to be a maxim, according  or  itny other cause, that the most whim- 
to this philosophy.  Not  only  tlie  will  ,.;ic;tl  in~nginatioii  can assign. DISSERTATION 
ON THE 
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SECT.  I.  SECT. 
I. 
1. SOME  objects produce i~nnlediately  an agreeable sensation, - 
by the  original  structure  of  our organs, and are thence de- 
nominated GOOD  ;  as others, from their immediate disagree- 
able sensation, acquire the appellation of  EVIL.  Thus mode- 
rate warmth is agreeable and  good ;  excessive heat  painful 
and evil. 
Some objects  again,  by  being  naturally  conformable  or 
contrary to passion, excite an agreeable or painful sensation ; 
and are thence called Good or Evil.  The punishment  of  an 
adversary, by gratifying revenge, is  good ;  the sickness of  a 
companiori, by affecting friendship, is evil. 
2.  All good or evil, whence-ever it arises, produces various 
passions  and affections, according to the light in which it is 
surveyed. 
When good is certain or very probable,  it  produces  JOY : 
When  evil  is in the  mlne situation, there  arises  GRIEF  or 
SORROW. 
When either good or evil is uncertain, it gives rise to FEAR 
or HOPE,  according to the degree of  uncertainty on one side 
or the other. 
DESIRE  arises  from  good  considered  simply; and AVER- 
SION,  hm  evil.  The WILL exerts itself, when  either  the 
presence of  the good or absence of  the evil may be  attained 
by any action of  the mind or body. 
3.  None  of  these  passions  seem  to  contain  any  thing 
curious or remarkable, exaept  Hope  and Pear, which,  being 
derived from the probability of  any good  or evil, are mixed 
passions, that merit our attention. 
Probability arises from an apposition  of  contrary chances 
or causes, by which the mind  is not allowed to fix on  either 
side ;  but is  incessantly tossed  from  one to another, and is 
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SECT.  and another moment as the  contrary.  The  imagination  or 
I  .  ;  understanding, call  it which  you  please, fluctuates between 
. the opposite  views;  and  though  perhaps  it may be oftener 
turned  to one  side than the other, it is impossible for it, by 
reason  of  the opposition  of  causes  or  chances, to rest  on 
either.  The pro and con of  the question alternately prevail ; 
and the mind, surveying the objects in their opposite causes, 
finds  such a contrariety as  destroys  all  certainty or  estab- 
lished opinion. 
Suppose, then, that  the  object, concerning  which we  are 
doubtful, produces  either  desire  or  aversion ; it is evident, 
that, according  as  the mind  turns itself  to one side or the 
other, it must feel a momentary impression of  joy  or sorrow. 
An object, whose existence we desire, gives satisfaction, when 
we think of those causes, which produce it ;  and for the same 
reason, excites grief  or  uneasiness  from  the  opposite  con- 
sideration.  So that, as the understanding, in probable ques- 
tions, is  divided  between  the  contrary points  of  view,  the 
heart must in the same manner be divided between opposite 
emotions. 
Now, if  we  consider the human  mind, we  shall  observe, 
that, with regard  to the passions, it is not like a wind in- 
strument of  music, which, in running over all the notes, im- 
mediately loses the sound when the breath ceases ;  but rather 
resembles a string-instrument, where, after each  stroke, the 
vibrations  still  retain  some  sound,  which  gradually  and 
insensibly  decays.  The imagination is extremely quick  and 
agile ;  but the passions, in cornparipon, are slow and restive : 
For which  reason, when  any object  is  presented,  which af- 
fords a variety of views to the one and emotions to the other; 
though the fancy may change its views with  great celerity ; 
each stroke will not produce a clear and distinct note of  pas- 
sion,  but  the  one  passion  will  always be  mixed  and  con- 
founded  with  the other.  According  as the prohbilitg- in- 
clines to good or evil,  the  passion  of  grief  ar joy predorni- 
nates  in  the composition ;  and  these passions  being  inter- 
mingled by means of  the contrary views of  the imagination, 
produce by  the union the passions of  hope or fear. 
4.  As  this  theory seems to carry its own  evidence along 
with it, me  shall be  more concise in our proofs. 
'Ihe passions of fear and hope may arise, when the chances 
;LYC C'C~U~LI  on both sides, and no superiority can be discovered 
ill oile above the oilier.  Nay,  in this sit~~:~t~ioii  t'he psssioils 
are rather the strongest, as the mind has then the least foun-  SECT. 
dation to rest upon, and is tost with the greatest uncertainty.  +  !- 
Throw in a superior degree of probability to the side of grief, 
you immediately see that passion diffuse itself  over the com- 
position, and tincture it into fear.  Encrease the probability, 
and by that means the grief; the fear prevails still more and 
more, 'till at last it  runs insensibly, as the joy  continually 
diminishes, into pure  grief.  After  you  have brought it to 
this situation, diminish the grief, by a contrary operatioil to 
tliat, which encreased  it, to wit, by diminishing the proba- 
bility on the melancholy side ;  and you will see the passion 
clear  every moment,  'till  it  changes  insensibly  into hope; 
which again runs, by slow degrees, into joy,  as you encrease 
that part  of  the  composition, by the encrease  of  the pro- 
b~bility. Are not these as plain  proofs, that tlie pa>ssions  of 
fear and hope me mixtures of  grief and joy,  as in optics it is 
a proof, that a coloured ray  of  the  sun,  passing  through  a 
prism, is a composition of  two others, when, as you diminish 
or  encrease  the  quantity of  either, you find  it prevail  pro- 
portionably, more or less, in the composition? 
5.  Probability is of  two kinds ;  either when  the object is 
itself  uncertain, and to be  determined by chance : or  when, 
though the object be already certain, yet it is uncertain to our 
judgment, which  finds a number  of  proofs  or presuinptions 
on  each  side  of  the  question.  Both  these  kinds  of  pro- 
bability cause fear and hope ;  which must proceed from that 
property, in which they agree ;  namely, the uncertainty and 
fluctuation which they bestow  on  the passion, by tliat  con- 
trariety of  views, which is common to both. 
6. It is a  probable  good  or evil, which  commonly causes 
hope or fear; because probability,  producing  an inconstant 
and wavering survey of  an object, occasions  naturally a,  like 
mixture  and uncertainty  of  passion.  But we may observe, 
that, wherever, from other causes, this mixture can  be  pro- 
duced, the passions of  fear and hope will arise, even  though 
there be no probability. 
An evil, conceived as barely  possible, sometimes  produces 
fear; especially if  the  evil  be  very  great.  A  man  cannot 
think on excessive pain and torture without trembling, if  he 
runs the least risque  of  suffering  them.  The smallness  of 
the probability is compensated by the greatness of  the evil. 
But even impossible evils cause fear; as  when  we  tremble 
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SECT.  in perfect  security, and have  it  in  our  choice, whether  we 
I  .  . - will advance a step farther.  The immediate presence of the 
. evil  influences the imagination  and produces  a  species  of 
belief;  but being opposed by the reflection on  our  security, 
that belief  is immediately  retracted,  and causes the  same 
kind  of  passion,  as  when, from  a  contrariety  of  chances, 
contrary passions are produced. 
Evils, which are certain, have sometimes the same effect as 
the possible or impossible.  A man, in a strong prison, with- 
out the least means of  escape, trembles  at the thoughts of 
the rack, to which he is sentenced.  The evil is here fixed in 
itself; but the mind has not courage to fix upon it ;  and this 
fluctuation gives rise to a passion of a similar appearance with 
fear. 
7.  But it is not only where good or evil is uncertain as to 
its existence, but also as to its kind, that fear  or hope  arises. 
If any one were told that one of  his sons is suddenly killed ; 
the passion, occasioned by this event, would  not  settle into 
grief, 'till he got certain information  which  of  his  sons  he 
had lost.  Though each side of  the  question  produces  here 
the same passion ; that passion  cannot  settle, but  receives 
from the imagination, which is unfixed, a tremulous unsteady 
motion, resembling the mixtureand contention of grief and joy. 
8.  Thus all kinds of  uncertainty have a strong connexion 
with fear, even though they dq not  cause  any opposition  of 
passions, by the opposite  views, which  they  present  to  11s. 
Should I leave a  friend  in  any malady, I should  feel more 
anxiety upon his account, than if  he  were  present : though 
perhaps I am  not only incapable  of  giving  him  assistance, 
but likewise of  judging concerning the event of his sickness. 
There are a thousand  little  circun~stances  of  his  situation 
and condition, which I desire to know;  and  the knowledge 
of  them xould prevent  that fluctuation  and  uncertainty, so 
nearly allied to fear.  HORACE  has remarked this phznom- 
enon. 
Ut assidens implumihzcs pulls azrisi 
SmpentOm a2lapsus timet, 
Magis relictis ;  num, ut adsit, auxig 
Latura plus prcesentibas. 
A virgin on her bridal-night goes to bed  full  of  fears  and 
apprehensions,  though  she  expects  nothing  but  pleasure.  SECT 
The confusion of  wishes and joys,  the newness and greatness . I. 
of  the unknown event, so embarrass the mind, that it knows 
llot in what image or passion to fix itself. 
9.  Concerning the mixture  of  affections, we  may remark, 
in general, that when  contrary passions  arise  from  objects 
nowise connected together, they take place alternately.  Thus 
when a man is afflicted for the loss of  a law-suit, and joyful 
for the birth of  a son, the mind, running from the agreeable 
to the calamitous object ;  with whatever celerity it may per- 
form this motion, can scarcely temper the one affection with 
the other, and remain between them in a state of indifference. 
It more easily attains that calm situation, when  the  same 
event is of  a mixed nature, and contains something adverse 
and something prosperous in its different circumstances.  For 
in that case, both the passions, mingling with each other by 
means  of  the  relation,  often  become  mutually destructive. 
and leave the mind in perfect tranquillity. 
But suppose, that the object  is  not a compound  of  good 
and evil, but is considered as probable or  improbable in any 
degree ;  in that case, the contrary passions will both of them 
be present at once in the soul, and instead of  balancing  and 
tempering  each  other,  will  subsist  together,  and by  their 
union produce a third impression or affection, such  as hope 
or fear. 
The  influence of  the  relations  of  ideas (which we  shall 
explain more fully afterwards) is plainly seen  in this  affair. 
In contrary passions, if  the objects be  totally  diferent,  the 
passions  are like  two  opposite  liquors  in different  bottles, 
which have no influence'on each  other.  If the objects be 
intimately connected, the passions  are like an  alcnli  and  an 
acid, which, being mingled, destroy each other.  If the rela,- 
tion be more imperfect, and consist in the contradictory views 
of the  same  ~bject,  the  passions  are like  oil and vinegar, 
which, however mingled, never  perfectly unite  and incorpo- 
rate. 
The effect of  a lhixture bf  passions, when  one of  them  is 
predominant, and swallows up the other, shall  be  explained 
afterwards. 
1 [In the Treatise, Vol. ii.  . 222, the  tium.'  Hume's  quotations  from  Latin 
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SECT.  . 
11.  SECT.  11. 
--I  1. Besides  those passions  above-mentioned,  which  arise 
from a direct pursuit of  good and aversion to evil, there are 
others which  are of  a  more complicated  nature, and imply 
more than one view or consideration.  Thus Pride is a certain 
satisfaction in ourselves, on account of some accomplishment 
Gr possession, which we enjoy : Humility, on the other hand, 
is a dissatisfaction with ourselves, on account of  some defect 
or infirmity. 
Love or Friendship is a complacency in another, on account 
of  his accomplishments or services : Hatred, the contrary. 
2.  In  these two  sets of  passion, there is an obvious  dis- 
tinction to be made between the object of  the passion and its 
cause.  The object of  pride and humility is  self:  The  cause 
of  the passion is some excellence in the former  case ; some 
fault, in the latter.  The object of  love and  hatred is some 
other person : The causes, in like  manner, are either excel- 
lencies or faults. 
With regard  to all  these  passions, the  causes  are what 
excite the emotion ;  the object is what the mind  directs its 
view to when the emotion is excited.  Our merit, for instance, 
raises pride;  and it is essential to pride to turn our view on 
ourselves with complacency and satisfaction. 
Now, as the causes  of  these passions  are very numeroua 
and various, though their object be  uniform and simple ; it 
may be a subject of  curiosity to consider,  what that circum- 
stance is, in which all these various causes agree ;  or in other 
words, what is the real efficient cause  of  the  passion.  We 
shall begin with pride and humility. 
3.  In order  to explain  the  causes  of  these passions, we 
must reflect  on certain principles, which, though  they have 
a  mighty influence on every operation,  both  of  the under- 
standing and passions,  are not  commonly much  insisted  on 
by  philosophers.  The first  of  these  is the association  of 
ideas, or that principle, by which we make an easy transitioll 
from one idea to another.  However uncertain  and change- 
able our thoughts may be, they are not entirelj- without rule 
and method in their changes.  They usually pass with regn- 
larity, from one object, to what resembles it, is contiguous to 
it, or produced by it.'  When one idea is present to the imagi-  SECT. 
IJ.  nation, any other, united by these relations, naturally follows it, 
and enters with more facility, by means of that introduction. 
The second property, which I shall observe  in the human 
mind, is a like association of  impressions or emotions.  All 
resembling impressions are connected together ;  and no sooner 
one arises, than the rest naturally  follow.  Grief  and dis- 
appointment give rise to anger, anger to envy, envy to malice, 
and ilialice to grief again.  In  like manner, our temper, when 
elevated with joy, naturally throws itself into love, generosity, 
courage, pride, and other resembling affections. 
In the third place, it is observable  of  these  two  kinds  of 
association,  that they  very  much  assist and  forward each 
other, and that the transition  is more  easily made,  where 
they both conclir in the same object.  Thus, a  mm, who, by 
an injury received  from  another, is very much  discoinposed 
and ruffled in his temper, is apt to find a hundred suhjects of 
hatred,  discontent, impatience,  fear, and  other uneasy pas- 
sions; especially, if he can discover these subjects in or near 
the person, who was the object of  his first emotion.  Those 
principles, which forward the transition of ideas, here concur 
with those which operate on the passions ;  and both, uniting 
in one action, bestow on the mind a double impulse. 
Upon this occasion I may cite a passage  from  an  elegant 
writer,  who  expresses  himself  in the  following  manner : 
'  As the fancy delights in every thing, that is great, strange, 
'  or beautiful, and is still the more pleased the more  it finds 
'  of  these perfections  in the same  object, so it is capable  of 
'  receiving  new  satisfaction  by  the  assistance  of  another 
'  sense.  Thus, any continual sound, as the  inusic  of  birds, 
'  or a fall of  waters, awakens every nloment the mind of  the 
'  beholder,  and  makes  him  more  attentive t,o the several 
'  beauties of  the place, that lie before  him.  Thus,  if  there 
'  arises a fravancy of  smells or perfumes, they heighten the 
'  pleasure of  the imagination, and make even the colours and 
'  verdure of  the landscape  appear  illore  agreeable ;  for  the 
'  ideas  of  both  senses  recommend  each  other,  and  are 
'  pleasanter  together than where they enter the mind  sepa- 
'  rately :  As  the  different colours  of  a  picture, when  they 
'  are well disposed,  set otf  one another, and receive an addi- 
' See  Enquiry  concerning  Human  cintion of Ideas, p. 17. 
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mcT,  '  tional beauty from  the  advantage  of  the situation.'  In  ZU.  these phaenomena, we  may  remark  the association  both  of 
.impressions and ideas : as well as the mutual assistance these 
associations lend to each other. 
4.  It seems to me, that both these species of relations have 
place in producing Pride or Humility, and are the real, efficient 
causes of  the passion. 
With regard to the first relation, that of  ideas, there  can 
be  no question.  Whatever we  are proud  of  must, in  some 
manner, belong to us.  It is always ow  knowledge, our sense, 
beauty,  possessions,  family,  on  which  we  value  ourselves. 
Self, which is the object of  the passion, must still be  related 
to that  quality or  circumstance, which  causes  the  passion. 
There mu& be a connexion between them ;  an easy transition 
of the imagination ;  or a facility of the conception in passing 
from one to the other.  Where this connexion is wanting, no 
object can either excite pride or humility ; and the more you 
weaken the connexion, the more you weaken the passion. 
5.  The only subject of  enquiry is, whether  there be a like 
relation  of  impressions  or  sentiments,  wherever  pride  or 
humility is felt ;  whether the circumstance, which causes the 
passion, previously excites  a  sentiment  sfmilar to  the pas- 
sion ;  and whether there be an easy transfusion  of  the one 
into the other. 
The feeling or sentiment of pride is agreeable ;  of humility, 
painful.  An agreeable sensation is, therefore, related to the 
former;  a painful, to the latter.  And  if we  find, after  ex- 
amination, that every object, which produces pride, produces 
also  a  separate pleasure ; and  every  object,  which  causes 
humility, excites  in  like manner  a separate uneasiness;  we 
must  allow,  in  that case,  that the present theory  is fully 
proved  and ascertained.  The double relation  of  ideas  and 
sentiments will be acknowledged incontestable. 
6.  To  begin  with personal  merit  and demerit, the most 
*obvious  causes of these passions ;  it would be entirely foreign 
to our prebent purpose  to examine  the foundation  of  moral 
distinctions.  It is sufficient to observe, that the foregoing 
theory concerning the origin of the passions may be defended 
on any  hypothesis.  The most  probable  system, which  hag 
been  advanced  to explain  the  difference between  vice  and 
virtue, is, that either from  a primary constitution of  nature, 
or from a sense of  public or private interest, certain charac- 
ters, upon the very view and contemplation, produce  uneasi-  SECT. 
11.  ness ;  and others, in like manner, excite pleasure.  The un- . , 
easiness and  satisfaction, produced  in the spectator, are es- 
sential to vice and virtue.  To  approve of  a  character, is  to 
feel a delight upon its appearance.  To disapprove of it, is to 
be sensible of  an uneasiness.  The pain and pleasure, there: 
fore,  being,  in a  manner, the primary  source  of  blame  or 
praise, must also be the causes of  all their effects ;  and coil- 
sequently, the causes  of  pride  and humility, which  are the 
unavoidable attendants of  that distinction. 
But supposing this  theory  of  morals  should  not  be  re- 
ceived; it is still evident that pain and pleasure, if  not the 
sources of  moral distinctions, are at least inseparable from 
them.  A generous and noble character affords a satisfaction 
even in the survey ;  and when  presented  to us. though only 
in a poem or fable, never fails to charm and delight us.  On 
the  other hand,  cruelty and  treachery displease  from  their 
very nature ;  nor is it possible ever to reconcile  us to these 
qualities,  either  in ourselves or  others.  Virtue, therefore, 
produces always a  pleasure  distinct from the pride or self- 
satisfaction which  attends it : Vice,  an  uneasiness  separate 
from the humility or remorse. 
But a high or low conceit of ourselves arises not from those 
qualities alone  of  the mind,  which,  according to common 
systems  of  ethics, have been  defined parts of  moral duty ; 
but from any other, which have a connexion with pleasure or 
uneasiness.  Nothing flatters our vanity more than the talent 
of  pleasing by our wit,  good-humour, or any other  accom- 
plishment ;  and nothing gives us  a more  sensible mortifica- 
tion, than a disappointment in any attempt of that kind.  No 
one has ever been able to tell precisely, what wit is, and to 
shew why such a system of  thought must be  received under 
that denomination, and such another rejected.  It ie by taste 
alone we can decide concerning it ;  nor are we possessed of  any 
other  standard,  by which we  can  form a  judgment of  this 
nature.  Now  what  is this taste, from which  true and false 
wit  in a manner receive  their being, and without which  no 
thought can  have  a title to either of  these  denominations  P 
It  is plainly nothing but a  sensation of  pleasure  from  true 
wit, and of  disgust from false, without our being able to tell 
the reasons of that satisftrction or uneasiness.  The power of 
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I1  ...  vanity or  mortification, which  arises from one or the other. 
7.  Beauty  of  all  kinds  gives  us  a  peculiar  delight and 
satisfaction ; as  deformity  ~roduces  pain,  upon  whatever 
subject  it may be placed, and whether  surveyed  in an ani- 
mate or inanimate object.  If the beauty or deformity belong 
to our own face, shape, or person, this pleasure or uneasiness 
is  converted into pride  or humility ; as having in this case 
all  the circun~stances  requisite to produce a  perfect  transi- 
tion, according to the present theory. 
It would seem, that the very essence of  beauty consists in 
its power  of  producing  pleasure.  All its effects, therefore, 
must proceed  from  this circumstance :  And  if  beauty is so 
universally the subject of vanity, it is only from its being the 
cause of  pleasure. 
Concerning  all  other  bodily  accomplishments,  we  may 
observe in general, that whatever in ourselves is either useful, 
beautiful, or surprizing, is an  object of pride ;  and the contrary 
of  humility.  These qualities agree in producing  a  separate 
pleasure ;  and agree in nothing else. 
We  are vain of the surprizing adventures which we have nlet 
with, the escapes which we have made, the dangers to which 
we have been exposed ;  as well as of  our surprizing feats  of 
vigour  and  activity.  Hence  the  origin  of  vulgar  lying ; 
where men, without  any interest, and merely out of  vanity, 
heap up a number of  extraordinary events, which are either 
the fictions  of  their brain ;  or,  if  true, have  no  connexion 
with  themselves.  Their  fruitful  invention  supplies  them 
with a variety of  adventures ;  and where that talent is want- 
ing, they appropriate such  as belong  to others, in order  to 
gratify  their  vanity : For  between  that passion,  and the 
sentiment of  pleasure, there is always a close connexion. 
8.  But though pride  and humility  have  the qualities  of 
our  mind  and body, that is, of  self,  for  their  natural and 
more  immediate  causes;  we  find  by experience, that many 
other  objects  produce  these  affections.  We found  vanity 
upon houses, gardens, equipage, and other external objects ; 
as well as ugon personal merit  and  accomplishments.  This 
happens when  external objects acquire any particular rela- 
tion to ourselves, and are  associated or  connected  with  us. 
A beautiful fish  in the ocean, a well-proportioned  animal in 
a forest, and il~deed,  any thing, which neither belongs nor is 
related  to us, has  no  manner  of  influence on  our  vanity : 
whatever  extraordinary qualities  it may be  endowed  with,  SECT. 
and whatever degree of surprize and admiration it may natu- 
rally occasion.  It  must be  someway associated with  us, in 
order to touch our pride.  Its idea must hang, in a manner, 
upon that of  ourselves;  and the transition  from  one to the 
other must be easy and natural. 
Men are vain of the beauty either of their country, or their 
county,  or even  of  their  parish.  Here the idea of  beauty 
plainly  produces  a  pleasure.  This  pleasure  is  related  to 
pride.  The object or cause  of  this  pleasure is, by the sup- 
position, related to self, the object of  pride.  By this double 
relation  of  sentiments and ideas, a transition  is made from 
one to the other. 
Men  are also vain  of  the happy temperature  of  the cli- 
mate,  in which  they  are born ; of  the fertility  of  their 
native soil ;  of  the goodness of  the wines, fruits, or victuals, 
produced  by it; of  the softness  or force of  their language, 
with  other  particulars  of  that kind.  These  objects have 
plainly a reference to the pleasures of  sense, and are origin- 
ally considered as agreeable to the feeling, taste or  hearing. 
How cogld they become causes of  pride,  except  by means of 
that transition above explained P 
There are some, who discover a vanity of an opposite kind, 
and affect to depreciate their own country, in conlparison of 
those,  to  which  they  have  travelled.  These  persons  find, 
when they are at  home, and surrounded with their countrymen, 
that the strong relation  bekween them and their own nation 
is shared with so many, that it  is in a manner  lost to them; 
whereas, that distant relation to a foreign  country, which is 
formed by their having seen it, and lived in it, is augmented 
by their considering  how few have done the same.  For this 
reason, they always admire the beauty, utility, and  rarity of 
what  they met with  abroad, above what  they find  at home. 
Since we can be vain  of  a country, climate or any inani- 
mate object, which bears a relation to us; it is no wonder we 
should  be vain of  the qualities  of  those, who art connected 
with  us  by blood  or  friendship.  Accordingly we find, that 
any qualities which,  when  belonging  to ourselves,  produce 
pride,  produce  also,  in a  less  degree,  the same affection, 
when discovered in persons, related  to us.  The beauty, ad- 
dress, merit, credit, and honours of  their kindred  are care- 
fully displayed by  the proud, and are considerable sources  of 
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SECTe  As me  are proud of  riches in ourselves, we desire, In order  IL  .,  to gratify our vanity, that every one who has any connexion 
with  us,  should  likewise  be  possessed  of  them,  and  are 
ashamed of  such as are mean or poor among our friends and 
relations.  Our  forefathers being  regarded  as  our  nearest 
relations ;  every one naturally affects to be of  n good family, 
and to be  descended  from  a  long  succession of  rich  and 
honourable ancestors. 
Those, who boast  of  the  antiquity of  their  families,  are 
glad when  they can join  this  circumstance,  that their an- 
cestors, for many generations, have  been  uninterrupted pro- 
prietors  of  the same  portion  of  land, and that their family  . 
has never  changed its possessions, or been transplanted into 
any other county or province.  It  is an additional subject of 
vanity, when they can boast, that these possessions have been 
transmitted  through a descent, composed entirely of  males, 
and that the honours and fortune have never passed through 
any female.  Let us endeavour to explain these phaenomena 
from the foregoing theory. 
When  any  one  values  himself  on  the antiquity  of  his 
family, the subjects  of  his vanity are not  merely the extent 
of  time  and  number  of  ancestors  (for in  that respect  all 
mankind are alike),  but these  circumstances, joined  to  the 
riches  and  credit  of  his  ancestors, which  are  supposed to 
reflect  a lustre on  himself, upon  account of  his connexion 
with  them.  Since  therefore  the  passion  depends  on  the 
connexion,  whatever  strengthens the  connexion  must  also 
encrease the passion, and whatever weakens the  connexion must 
diminish the passion.  But it is evident, that, the sameness of 
the possessions must strengthen the relation of  ideas, arising 
from blood  and kindred, and  convey the fancy with  greater 
facility from one generation to another ;  from  the relnotest 
ancestors  to their  posterity, who  are  both their heirs and 
their descendants.  By this facility, the sentiment is trans- 
mitted more entire, and excites a greater degree of pride and 
vanity. 
The case is the same with the transmission of the honours 
and  fortune,  through a  succession  of  males,  without  their 
passing  through  any  female.  It  is  an obvious  quality  of 
human nature, that the imagination naturally turns towhat- 
ever is important and considerable ;  and where two objects are 
presented, a small a.nd a great, it usually leaves the former, 
and  dwells  entirely OII  bhe  latter.  This is  the reason, why 
children  commonly  bear  their  father's  name,  and  are es-  SECT. 
teemed to be of  a nobler  or meaner  birth, according  to his .  I:, 
family.  Atnd  though  the  mother  should  be  possessed  of 
superior qualities to  the father, as &en  happens, the gmeral 
rule  prevails,  notwithstanding the exception,  according to 
the doctrine,  which  shall be  explained  afterwards.  Nay, 
even  when  a  superiority of  any kind  is so  great, or  when 
any  other  reasons  have  such  an  effect,  as  to make  the 
children  rather  represent  the  mother's  family  than  the 
father's,  the general rule still retains an efficacy, sufficient to 
weaken  the relation, and make a kind  of  breach in  the line 
of  ancestors.  The imagination runs not along them with the 
same facility, nor is able to transfer the honour and credit of 
the ancestors to their posterity of the same name and family 
so  readily,  as when  the transition  is  conformable to  the 
general  rule, and passes through the male  line, from father 
to son,  or from brother to brother. 
9. But property, as it gives the fullest power and authority 
over  any object, is the  relation, which  has the greatest in- 
fluence on these passions.l 
Every thing, belonging  to a vain  man, is the best that is 
any  where  to  be  found.  His houses,  equipage, furniture, 
cloaths, horses, hounds, excel all others in his conceit;  and 
it is  easy to observe, that, from the least advantage in any 
of  these he draws  a  new subject  of  pride  and vanity.  His 
wine, if  you will  believe him;  has  a finer flavour than  any 
other ;  his cookery is more exquisite ;  his table more orderly ; 
his servants more  expert: the air,  in which  he lives, more 
healthful ;  the soil,  which  he cultivates,  more  fertile ;  his 
fruits ripen earlier,-and to greater perfection : Such a  thing 
is remarkable for its novelty ;  such another for its antiquity : 
That property is a species  of  rela- 
tion,  which  produces  a connexion be- 
tween the person and the object  is evi- 
dent : The imagination passes naturally 
and easily from  the consideration  of  a 
field to that of  the  person  to whom  it 
belongs.  It  may  only  be  asked,  how 
.his relation is  resolvable  into any of 
those  three, wiz.  causation,  conti.quity, 
and resemblance, which we have affirmed 
to be  the  only  connecting  principles 
among ideas.  To  be the  proprietor of 
any thing is to be the sole  person, who, 
hy the  laws  of  society, has  a ri,h  cr  t to 
dispose of  it, and  to enjoy the benefit 
of  it.  This  right  has  at least a ten- 
dency to procure the person the exercise 
of  it ; and in  fact does commonly pro- 
cure  him  that ad~antage. For  rights 
which had no influence, and never took 
place, would be  110 rights at all.  NOW 
a person who disposes of  an object, and 
reaps benefit from it, both produces, or 
may produce. effects on  it, and is  affect- 
ed by it.  Property  therefore  is a 6pe- 
cies of cnustttion,  It  enables the person 
to produce alterations on the object, and 
it supposes  that his  condition  is im- 
proved and altered by it.  It  is indeed 
the relation the most interesting of any, 
and occurs the most  frequently  to the 
mind.-[This  note  was  added  in  Ed. 
N1 A  DISSERTATION  ON  TIIE  PASSIONS.  A  DISSERTATION  ON  THE  PASSIONS.  163 
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II  ,  once to such a prince or  great man.  All objects, in a word, 
-  which are useful, beautiful, or  surprizing, or  are related  to 
such, may, by means  of  property,  give rise  to this passion. 
These all  agree in  giving  pleasure.  This alone  is common 
to them ;  and therefore mmt be the quality, that produces the 
passion, which  is  their  colnmon  effect.  As every  new  in- 
stance is a new argument, and as the instances are here with- 
out number; it would  seem, that  this  theory is sufficiently 
confirmed by experience. 
Riches imply the power of acquiring whatever is agreeable; 
and as they comprehend  many particular  objects  of  vanity, 
necessarily become one of  the chief  causes of  that passion. 
10.  Our opinions  of  all  kinds  are  strongly  affected  by 
society and  sympathy,  and it is  almost  impossible for  us 
to support any principle or sentiment, against the universal 
consent  of  every  one, with whom we  have any friendship or 
correspondence.  But  of  all our  opinions, those, which we 
form  i11  our  own  favour ;  however lofty or presuming ;  are, 
at bottom, the frailest, and  the  most easily  shaken  by  the 
contradiction and opposition of  others.  Our great concern, 
in this case, makes us Boon  alarmed, and keeps our passious 
upon the watch : Our consciousness  of  partiality still makes 
us dread a mistake :  And  the very difficulty of  judging con- 
cerning an object, which is  never set at a due distance from 
us, nor is seen in a  proper point of  view, makes  us  hearken 
anxiously to the opinions of others, who are better qualified to 
form just opinions conceriling us.  Hence that strong love of 
&me, with which all mankilld are possessed.  It is  in order 
to fix  and  confirm their favourable  opinion  of  themselves, 
not from any original passion, that they seek the applauses of 
others.  And when a man desires to be praised, it is for the 
same reason, that a beauty is pleased with surveying herself 
ill  a  favourable looking-glass, and  seeing the  reflection  of 
her own charms. 
Though  it be  difficult, in all points  of  speculation, to dis- 
tinguish a cause, which encreases an effect, from one, which 
solely produces  it ;  yet in the present case the  pl~aenomena 
see111  pretty strong and  satisfactory  in  confirillation of  the 
foregoing principle. 
We receive s  much grtlatcr satisfaction froin the approba- 
tion of  those whom we ourselves esteem aud approve of, than  sm. 
of  those whom we contemn and despise.  IL  - 
When esteem is obtained after a long  and  intimate  ac- 
paintance, it gratifies our vanity in a peculiar manner. 
The suffrage of those, who are shy and backward in giving 
praise, is attended with an additional relish and enjoyment, 
if we can obtain it in our favour. 
Where a great man is delicate in his choice of  favourites, 
every one courts with greater earnestness  his  countenance 
and protection. 
Praise never gives us much pleasure, unless it concur with 
our  own  opinion, and extol us for those qualities, in which 
we  chiefly excel. 
These ph~nomena  seem to  prove, that the favourable suf- 
frages of  the world  are rega-rded only as authorities, or  as 
confirmations of  our own  opinion,  And  if  the opinions  of 
others have more influence in this subject than in ,any other, 
it is easily accounted for from the nature of  the subject. 
11.  Thus few objects, however related to us, and whatever 
pleasure  they produce, are able to excite a  great degree of 
pride  or  self-satisfaction;  unless  they  be  also  obvious to 
others, and engage the approbation of the spectators.  What 
disposition  of  mind  so  desirable  as the peaceful, resigned, 
contented ;  which readily submits to all the dispensations  of 
providence,  and  preserves  a  constant  serenity  amidst the 
greatest  misfortunes and disappointments ?  Yet this dispo- 
sition, though acknowledged to be a virtue  or excellence, is 
seldom  the  foundation  of  great  vanity  or  self-applause ; 
having  no  brilliancy or exterior lustre, and rather cheering 
the heart, than animating the behaviour  and  conversation. 
The case is the same with many other qualities of  the mind, 
body, or fortune ;  and this circumstance, as well as the double 
relations  above  mentioned, must  be  admitted to be of  con- 
sequence in the production of  these passions. 
A  second  circumstance, which  is of  consequence in  this 
affair, is the constancy and durableness of the object.  What 
is very casual and inconstant, beyond the common course of 
human affairs, gives little joy,  and less  pride.  We are not 
much satisfied with the thing itself;  and are still less apt to 
feel any  new  degree  of  self-satisfaction  upon  its account. 
We foresee and anticipate its change ;  which makes us litt,le 
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I1  constancy appears still greater.  It seems ridiculous to make 
.  ourselves  the object of  a passion, on account of  a quality or 
possession, which is of so much shorter duration, and attends 
us during so small a part of  our existence. 
A  third  circumstance,  not  to be  aglected, is that the 
objects,  in order  to  produce  pride  or  self-value,  mu~t  be 
peculiar  to us,  or at least common to us with a few others. 
The advantages of sun-shine, good weather, a happy climate, 
&c. distinguish us not from any of  our companions, and give 
us no preference or superiority.  The comparison, which  we 
are every moment apt to make, presents no inferewe to our 
advantage ;  and we  still remain, notwithstanding  these en- 
joyments, on a level with all our friends and acquaintance. 
As health  and  sickness vary incessantly to all men,  and 
there is no  one, who  is solely or certainly fixed in either; 
these  accidental blessings  and  calamities are in a  manner 
separated  from  us, and  are not considered  as a foundation 
for vanity or  humiliation.  But  wherever  a  malady of  any 
kind is so rooted in our constitution, that we  no  longer en- 
tertain  any hope  of  recovery, from  that moment it  damps 
our  self-conceit, as is  evident  in  old  men,  whom  nothing 
mortifies more  than  the  consideration  of  their age and in- 
firmities.  They endeavour, as long  as possible,  to conceal 
their blindness  and deafness, their  rheums  and  gouts ;  nor 
do they ever  avow them without reluctance and uneasiness. 
And though young men are not ashamed of  every  head-ach 
or cold which they fall into ;  yet no topic is more  proper  to 
mortify human pride, and make us entertain a  mean opinion 
of  our  nature, than this, that we  are every moment of  our 
lives  subject  to  such infirmities.  This  proves, that bodily 
pain  and  sickness  are in themselves  proper  causes of  hu- 
mility ;  though  the custom  of  estimating every  thing,  by 
comparison,  more  than  by  its intrinsic worth  and  value, 
makes  us overlook  those calamities, which we  find  incident 
to every one, and causes us to form an idea of  our merit and 
character, independent of  them. 
We are ashamed  of  such maladies  as affect  others, and 
are either dangerous or disagreeable to them.  Of  the epi- 
lepsy ;  because it  gives horror to every one  present :  Of  the 
itch; bccause  it is  infectious : Of  the king's  evil;  because 
it  often  goes to  posterity.  Men always consider the senti-  SECT, 
ments of  others in their judgment of  themselves. 
11. 
u 
A  fourth circumstance, which has  an  influence  on  these 
passions,  is  general  rules; b-y  which  we  form  a  notion  of 
different  ranks  of  men, suitably to  the  power  or riches  of 
which they are possessed;  and this notion is not changed by 
any peculiarities  of  health or temper of  the persons, which 
may  deprive them  of  all  enjoyment  in  their  possessions. 
Custom  readily carries  us beyond  the just  bounds  in  our 
passions, as well as in our reasonings. 
It may not be amiss to observe  on this occasion, that the 
influence of  general rules  and maxims on the passions very 
much contributes to facilitate the effects of  all the priilciples 
or  internal  mechanism,  which  we  here  explain.  For  it 
seems evident, that, if  a person full grown, and of  the same 
nature with ourselves, were on a sudden transported into our 
world, he would be much embarrassed with every object, and 
would  not readily determine what degree of  love or hatred, 
of  pride or humility, or of  any other passion  should  be  ex- 
cited by it.  The passions are often varied by very inconsider- 
able principles ; and these  do not always  play with perfect 
regularity,  especially  on  the  first  trial.  But as custom or 
practice has  brought  to light  all these principles, and has 
settled  the just value  of  every  thing : this must  certainly 
contribute to the easy production of  the passions, and guide 
US,  by  means of  general established rules, in the proportions, 
which we ought to  observe in preferring one object to another. 
This remark may, perhaps, serve  to obviate diffi~ult~ies,  that 
arise concerning some causes, which we here  ascribe to par- 
ticnlar passions, and which  may be esteemed  too  refined to 
operate so uiiiversally and certainly, as they are found to do. 
1.  In running  over all the causes, which produce the pas- 
sion  of  pride  or  that of  humility; it would  readily  occur, 
that the  same  circumstance,  if  transferred  from  ourselves 
to another person, would  render  him the object  of  love  or 
h:ltred,  esteem  or  contempt.  The  virtue,  genius,  beauty, 
family, riches, and authority sf others beget favourable senti- 
ments  in  their  behalf;  and  their  vice,  folly,  deformity, 
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--&  on these  passions  of  love and hatred ;  as on the former  of 
pride and humility.  Whatever  gives a separate pleasure or 
pain, and is related to another person or connected with him, 
makes him the object of  our affection or disgust. 
Hence  too injury or  contempt towards  us  is one of  the 
greatest  sources of  our  hatred ;  services or esteem, of  our 
friendship. 
2.  Sometimes  a  relation  to  ourselves  excites  affection 
towards  any person.  But  there  is always here  implied  a 
relation  of  sentiments,  without  which  the  other  relation 
would have no influence.' 
A person,  who  is  related  to us, or conhected with us, by 
blood, by similitude of  fortune, of  adventures,  profession, or 
country, soon becomes an agreeable companion to  us ;  because 
we enter easily and familiarly into his sentiments and concep- 
tions :  Nothing is strange or new  to us : Our  imagination, 
passing  from  self, which  is ever intimately  present  to us, 
runs smoothly along the relation or connexion, and conceives 
with a full sympathy the person, who is nearly related to self. 
He renders  himself  immediately acceptable,  and is  at once 
on  an easy  footing with us :  'No  distance,  no  reserve  has 
place, where  the person  introduced  is  supposed  so  closely 
connected with us. 
Relation  has  here  the  same influence  as custom  or  ac- 
quaintance, in exciting affection ;  and from like causes.  The 
ease and satisfaction, which, in both cases, attend our inter- 
course or commerce, is the source of  the friendship. 
3.  The passions of love and hatred are always followed by, 
or  rather conjoined with, benevolence and anger.  It is this 
conjunction,  which chiefly distinguishes these affections from 
pride  and  humility.  For  pride  and  humility  are  pure 
emotions  in the soul, unattended with  any desire, and not 
immediately  exciting  us  to action.  But  love  and  hatred 
are not  compleat within themselves, nor rest  in that emo- 
tion,  which  they  produce ; but  carry  the  mind  to some- 
thing  farther.  Love  is  always  followed  by  a  desire  of 
happiness to  the person  beloved,  and  an aversion  to his 
misery:  As  hatred  produces  a  desire of  the misery, and 
1  The affection of parents to children  depends  on  the  principles  here  ex- 
seems  founded on  an origiual instinct.  plained. 
The affection  towards  other  relations 
an aversion  to  the happiness  of  the person  hated.  These 
opposite desires seem to be originally and primarily conjoined  111. 
with the passions  of  love and hatred.  It is a constitution 
of  nature, of  which we  can  give no farther explication. 
4.  Compassion frequently  arises, where there is  no  pre- 
ceding esteem or friendship ;  and compassion is an uneasiness 
in the  sufferings  of  another.  It  seems to spring from the 
intimate a~d  strong conception  of  his  sufferings ; and  our 
imagination proceeds by  degrees, from the lively idea  to the 
real feeling of  another's misery. 
Malice  and envy also arise in the mind  without any pre- 
ceding  hatred  or  injury ;  though their tendency is  exactly 
the same with that of  anger  and ill-will.  The comparison 
of  ourselves with others seems to be the source  of  envy and 
malice.  The more unhappy another is, the more  happy do 
we ourselves appear in our own  conception. 
5.  The  similar  tendency of  compassion  to  that of  bene- 
volence, and  of  envy to anger,  forms  a  very  close  relation 
between  these  two  sets of  passions ;  though of  a different 
kind  from  that which  was  insisted  on  above.  It is not a 
resemblance  of  feeling  or sentiment,  but  a  resemblance  of 
tendency or  direction.  Its effect, however, is  the  same,  in 
producing  an  association  of  passions.  Compassion  is 
seldom  or never  felt without  some mixture of  tenderness or 
friendship : and  envy is  naturally  accompanied with  anger 
or ill-will.  To desire  the happiness of  another, from what- 
ever motive, is a good preparative to affection ;  and to delight 
in another's  misery almost unavoidably begets  aversion  to- 
wards him. 
Even  where  interest  is the  source  of  our  concern, it is 
commonly attended with the same consequences.  A partner 
is a natural object of  friendship ;  a rival of  enmity. 
6.  Poverty, meanness,  disappointment, produce  contempt 
and dislike : But when these  misfortunes  are very great, or 
are represented  to us  in very  strong  colours,  they  excite 
c~mpassion,  and  tenderness,  and friendship.  How  is  this 
contradiction to be accounted for?  The poverty and mean- 
ness of  another, in their  common  appearance, gives  us  un- 
easiness, by a species of  irnperfcct  sympathy ; and this  un- 
easiness produces aversion  or dislike, from  the resemblance 
of  sentiment.  But when  we  enter  more  intimately  into 
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SECT.  his  misery, friendship or  goodwill  arises,  from  the similar 
I11  .  . .  tendency of  the inclinations. 
A bankrupt, at first, while the idea of  his misfortunes is 
fresh  and  recent, and while the  comparison  of  his  present 
unhappy  situation  with  his  former  prosperity  operates 
strongly  upon  us,  meets with  compassion  and friendship. 
After these ideas are weakened or obliterated  by time, he is 
in danger of  compassiop and contempt. 
7.  In respect, there  is  a  mixture  of  humility,  with  the 
esteem or affection : In  contempt, a mixture of  pride. 
The  anlorous  passion  is  usually colnponnded of. compla- 
cency in  beauty, a  bodily appetite,  and  friendship or  affec- 
tion.  The close relation of  these sentiments is very obvious, 
as well as their origin from each other, by means of that rela- 
tion.  Were there  no  other phznomenon  to reconcile us to 
the present theory, this alone, methinks, were sufficient. 
1. The  present theory  of  the passions  depends  entirely 
on  the double  relations  of  sentiinents  and  ideas,  and the 
inutual assistance, which these relations lend  to each other. 
It may not, therefore, be  improper  to illustrate  these  prin- 
ciples by  some farther instances. 
2.  The virtues, talents,  accomplishments,  and possessions 
of  others, make  us  love  and  esteem  them : Because  these 
objects excite a pleasing  sensation, which is related to love ; 
and as they have also a relation or connexion with the person, 
this union  of  ideas  forwards the union  of  sentiments, ac- 
cording to the foregoing reasoning. 
But  suppose, that the person, whom  we loye, is also re- 
lated  to us, by blood, country, or  friendship ;  it  is evident, 
that a  species of  pride  must  also be excited by his accom- 
plishments  and  possessions ; there being  the  same double 
relation, which we  have all along  insisted  on.  The  person 
is related  to  us, or  there is an easy transition  of  thought 
from  him to us ;  and sentiments, excited  by  his  advantages 
and virtues, are agreeable, and consequently related to pride. 
Accordingly we  find, that people  are  naturally vain  of  the 
good qualities or high fortune of their friends and countrymen. 
1  [This pal-agraph was added in Edition  R.] 
3.  But it is observable, that, if  we reverse the order of the  8ECT. 
IV.  passions, the  same  effect  does  not follow.  We pass easily .  . , 
from  love and  affection to  pride  and vanity; but not from 
the latter passions to the former, though all the relations be 
the same.  We love not those who are related  to us, on  ac- 
count of  our own merit ;  though they  are naturally vain  on 
account of our merit.  What is the reatson of this difference  P 
The transition of  the imagination to ourselves, from objects 
related  to  us, is always easy;  both  on  account of  the rela- 
tion, which  facilitates  the transition, and because we  there 
pass  from  remoter  objects, to those  which  are contiguous. 
But  in passing  from  ourselves to objects,  related  to us; 
though  the  former  principle  forwards  the  transition  of 
thought,  yet the  latter opposes it; and  consequently there 
is not the same  easy transfusion of  passions from pride to 
love as from love to pride. 
4.  The virtues, services, and fortune of  one man inspire us 
readily with esteem and affection for another related to him. 
The son of our friend is naturally entitled to our friendship : 
The kindred  of  a very great man value themselves, and  are 
valued by others, on account of  thak relation.  The force  of 
the double relation is here fully displayed. 
5.  The following are instances of  another kind, where the 
operation of  these principles  may still be discovered.  Envy 
arises from a superiority in others ;  but it is observable, that 
it  is  not  the great disproportion  between us, which exites 
that passion, but on  the  contrary, our proximity.  A great 
disproportion  cuts off the relation  of  the ideae, and  either 
keeps us from comparing ourselves with what is remote from 
us, or diminishes the effects of the comparison. 
A poet is not apt to envy a philosopher, or a poet of  a dif- 
ferent kind, of  a different nation, or of  a different age.  All 
these differences, if they do not prevent, at least weaken the 
comparison, and consequently the passion. 
This too  is the reason,  why all  objects  appear  great  or 
little, merely by a comparison with those of the same species. 
A mountain neither magnifies nor diminishes  a horse in our 
eyes : But when a FLEMISH  and a WELSH  horse are seen to- 
gether, the one appears greater and the other less, than when 
viewed apart. 
From the same principle we  may  account for that remark 
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SECT.  division, always  choose to call  in  a  foreign enemy at any 
.  hazard, rather than submit to their fellow-citizens.  GUICCI- 
ARDIN applies this remark to the wars in ITALY;  where the 
relations between the different states are, properly speaking, 
nothing but of  naame,  language, and  contiguity.  Yet  even 
these relations, when joined with superiority, by making the 
comparison  more  natural, make  it likewise more  grievous, 
and cause men  to search for  some other  superiority, which 
may be attended with no relation, and by that means, may 
have a less sensible influence on the imagination.  When we 
cannot  break  the association,  we  feel a  stronger  desire  to 
remove the superiority.  This seems to be  the reason,  why 
travellers, though  commonly  lavish  of  their  praise  to the 
CHINESE  and PERSIANS,  take care to depreciate those neigh- 
bouring nations, which niay stand upon a footing of rivalship 
with their native country. 
6.  The fine arts afford us  parallel instances.  Should  an 
author compose a treatise, of  which one part was serious and 
profound,  another  light  snd humorous ; every  one  would 
condemn so strange a mixture, and would blame him for the 
neglect of  all rules of  art and criticism.  Yet we  accuse not 
PRIOR  for joining his Alma and Solomon in the same volume ; 
though  that amiable  poet  has  perfectly  succeeded  in  the 
gaiety of  the one, as well as in the melancholy of  the other. 
Even suppose  the reader  should  peruse  these two  compo- 
sitions without any interval, he would  feel little or no diffi- 
culty in the change of  the passions.  Why? but because he 
considers these performarlces as entirely different, ; and by 
that break in the ideas, breaks the progress of the affections, 
and hinders the one from  influencing  or contradicting the 
other. 
An  heroic  and burlesque  design,  united  in one  picture, 
would be  monstrous ;  though  we  place  two pictures  of  so 
opposite a character in the same chamber, and even close to- 
gether, without any scruple. 
7. It needs be no matter of  wonder, that the easy transi- 
tion of  the imagination  should  have  such an influence  on 
all the passions.  It is  this  very circumstance, which forms 
all the relations and connexions amongst objects.  We know 
no real connexion between one thing and another.  We only 
know, that the idea  of  one thing is associated with that of 
another, and that the imagination  mikes an easy transition 
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between them.  And as the easy transition of ideas, an8 that  SECT. 
IV.  of  sentiments mutually assist each other ;  we  might before-  .-& 
hand expect, that this principle  must  have  a  mighty influ- 
ence on all our internal movements and affections.  And ex- 
perience sufficiently confirms the theory. 
For, not to repeat  all the foregoing  instances : Suppose, 
that I were travelling with a companion through a country, 
to which  we  are both utter strangers ;  it  is evident, that, if 
the prospects be beautiful, the roada agreeable, and the fields 
finely cultivated;  this may serve to put me in good-humour, 
both with myself and fellow-traveller.  But as the country 
has no connexion with myself or friend, it can never  be the 
immediate cause  either  of  self-value or  of  regard  to him: 
And therefore,  if I found not the passion on  some other ob- 
ject, which bears to one of  us a closer relation, my emotions 
are rather to be considered as the overflowings of  an elevated 
or humane disposition, than as an established passion.  But 
supposing the agreeable prospect  before  us  to be  surveyed 
either from his country-seat  or from  mine ;  this  new con- 
nexion  of  ideas gives  a  new direction to the sentiment  of 
pleasure, derived from the prospect, and raises  the emotion 
of regard or vanity, according to  the nature of the connexion. 
There is not here, methinks, much room for doubt or difficulty. 
1. It  seems evident,  that reason,  in  a  strict  sense,  as 
meaning the judgment of  truth and falsehood, can never, of 
itself, be any motive to the will, and can have  no  influence 
but so far as it touches some passion or affection.  Abstract 
relations of  ideas are the object of  curiosity, not of  volition. 
And  matters  of  fact,  where  they are neither good nor  evil, 
where they neither excite desire nor aversion, are totally in- 
different, and whether known or unknown, whether mistaken 
or rightly apprehended, cannot be regwdeil as any motive to 
action. 
2.  What is commonly, in a  popular  sense, called reason, 
and is so much recommended in moral discourses, is nothing 
but a general and a c~lm  passion, which takes a comprehen- 
sive  and a distant view of  its object, and  actuates the will, 
without  exciting  any sensible  emotion.  A man, we  say, is 
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to a character with himself and others. 
3.  The  same  objects,  which  recommend  themselves  to 
reason in this sense of the word, are also the objects of what 
we call passion, when they are brought near to us, and ac- 
quire some other advantages, either of  external situation, or 
congruity to our internal temper;  and by that means excite 
a turbulent and sensible emotion.  Evil, at a  great distance, 
is avoided, we say, from reason :  Evil, near at hand, produces 
aversion, horror, fear, and is the object of passion. 
4.  The  commo3  error  of  metaphysicians  has  lain  in 
ascribing the direction  of  the will  entirely to one of  these 
principles,  and  supposing  the  other to have  no  influence. 
Men  often  act knowingly against  their interest: It is not 
therefore the view of the greatest possible good which always 
influences them.  Men often counteract a violent passion, in 
prosecution of  their distant interests and designs : It is not 
therefore  the present  uneasiness  alone,  which  determines 
them.  In general, we may  observe, that both these  princi- 
ples operate on the will ;  and where  they are contrary, that 
either of  them prevails, according to the general character 
or present disposition of  the person.  What we  call strength 
of  mind implies the prevalence  of  the calm passions above 
the violent; though we  may easily observe,  that there is no 
person so  constantly possessed  of  this virtue,  as never, on 
any occasion, to yield to the solicitation of  violent  affection 
and desire.  From these variations  of  temper  proceeds the 
great difficulty of  deciding with regard to the future actions 
and resolutions  of  men, where  there  is any  contrariety of 
motives and passions. 
SECT.  VI. 
1.  We shall here enumerate some of  those circumstances, 
which render a  passion calm  or violent, which  Leighten  or 
diminish any emotion. 
It is a property in human nature, that any emotion, which 
attends a passion, is easily converted illto it; though in their 
natures they be originally different  from, and even contrary 
to each other.  It  is true, in order to cause a  perfect  union 
amongst passions, and make one produce the other, there is 
always required  a double relation, according to the theory 
above  delivered.  But when  two  passions  are already pro- 
duced by their  separate causes, and are both present in the 
mind, they readily mingle and unite; though they have but 
one relation, and sometimes without any.  The predominant 
passion swallows up the inferior, and converts it into itself. 
The spirits, when  once  excited, easily receive  a  change in 
their  direction;  and  it  is  natural  to imagine,  that this 
change will come  from the prevailing  affection.  The con- 
nesion  is in many oases  closer  between  any two passions 
than between any passion and indifference. 
When a person -is  on&  heartily in love, the little faults 
and caprices  of  his mistress, the jealousies and quarrels, to 
which that commerce is so subject :  however unpleasant they 
be, and  rather connected with  anger  and hatred ; are yet 
found, in many instances, to give additional force to the pre- 
vailing passion.  It is a common artifice of politicians, when 
they would affect any person very much by a matter of  fact, 
of  which  they  intend to  inform  him,  first  to  excite his 
curiosity ;  delay as long as possible the satisfying of  it ;  and 
by that means raise his anxiety and patience  to the utmost, 
before they give him a full insight into the business.  They 
know, that this curiosity will precipitate him into the passion, 
which they purpose  to raise, and will assist the object in its 
influence  on  the mind.  A  soldier advancing  to battle, is 
naturally inspired  with  courage  and  confidence,  when  he 
thinks on his friend's and fellow-soldiers ;  and is struck with 
fear and terror, when he reflects  on the enemy.  Whatever 
new emotion therefore proceeds  from  the former, naturally 
encreases  the  courage ; as the  same  emotion  proceeding 
from the latter, augments the fear.  Hence in martial disci- 
pline,  the uniformity and lustre of  habit,  the regularity of 
figures and  motions, with all the pomp  and majesty of  war, 
encourage ourselves and  our  allies ;  while the  same objects 
in the enemy strike terror  into us, though  agreeable  and 
beautiful in themselves. 
Hope  is,  in itself,  an agreeable  passion,  and allied  to 
friendship and benevolence ;  yet is it able sometimes to blow 
up  anger,  when  that  is the predominant  passion.  Spes 
addita suscitat iras.  VIRG. 
2.  Since  passions,  however  independent,  are  naturally 
transfused into  each other, if they be  both  present  at the 
SECT. 
VI. 
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8ECT.  same time ;  it follows, that when good  or  evil  is placed in 
+  Tk  such a situation as to cause  any particular  emotion, besides 
.its direct passion  of  desire  or  aversion, this latter passion 
must acquire new force and violence. 
3.  This often  happens, when  any object  excites  contrary 
passions.  For it is observable, that an opposition of passions 
commonly causes a new emotion in the spirits, and produces 
more disorder than the concurrence of  any two affections of 
equal force.  This new emotion is easily converted  into the 
predominant passion, and in many instances, is observed to 
encrease  its violence, beyond the pitch, at which  it  would 
have  arrived, had  it met  with  no  opposition.  Hence  we 
naturally desire what is forbid, and often take a pleasure  in 
performing actions, merely because they are unlawful.  The 
notion of  duty, when opposite to the passions, is not  always 
able to overcome them ; and when it fails  of  that effect, is 
apt rather  to encrease and irritate them, by producing  an 
opposition in our motives and principles. 
4.  The same effect  follows, whether  the  opposition  arise 
from internal motives  or external  obstacles.  The passion 
comnionly acquires new force in both  cases.  The efforts, 
which the mind niakes to surmount the obstacle, excite  the 
spirits, and enliven the passion. 
5.  Uncertainty has the same  effect  as  opposition.  The 
agitation of  the thought, the  quick  turns  which  it  ma,kea 
from one view to another, the variety of  passions which suc- 
ceed each other, according to the different views :  All  these 
produce an emotion in the mind ;  and this emotion transfuses 
itself into the predominant passion. 
Security, on the contrary, diminishes the passions.  The 
niind,  when  left to itself,  immediately languishes;  and in 
order to preserve its ardour, must be every moment supported 
by a new  flow  of  passion.  For the same  reason, despair, 
though contrary to security, has a like influence. 
6.  Nothing more powerfully excites any affection  than to 
conceal some part of  its object, by throwing it  into a kind 
of  shade, which at the same  time  that it shows enough to 
prepossess us in favour of  the object, leaves still some work 
for  the  imagination.  Besides  that  obscurity  is  always 
attended with a kind  of  uncertainty ;  the effort, which the 
fancy makes  to  compleat  the idea, rouzes  the  spirits, and 
gives an additional force to the passion. 
7.  As despair and security, though  contrary, produce  the  SECT. 
same effeots ;  so absence is observed to  have contrary effects, ,  ''.  , 
and in different circumstances, either encreases or diminishes 
our  affection.  ROCHEFOUCAULT  has  very  well  remarked, 
that absence destroys weak  passions, but encreases  strong ; 
as the wind extinguishes a candle, but blows up a fire.  Long 
absence naturally weakens our idea, and diminishes the pas- 
sion : But where the affection  is so  strong and  lively as to 
support itself, the uneasiness, arising from absei~ce,  encreases 
the passion, and gives it new force and influence. 
8.  When the soul applies itself to the performance of  any 
action, or the  conception  of  any object, to which  it is not 
accustomed, there is a certain unpliableness in the faculties, 
and a difficulty of  the spirits moving in their new  direction. 
As this difficulty excites the spirits, it is the source of wonder, 
surprize, and of  all the emotions, which arise from  novelty ; 
and is, in itself, agreeable, like  every thing  which  enlivens 
the mind  to a  moderate  degree.  But though  surprize be 
agreeable in itself, yet, as it puts the  ~pirits  in  agitation, it 
not only  augments  our  agreeable  affections,  but  also  our 
painful, according to the foregoing  principle.  Hence  every 
thing that is new, is most affecting,  and gives us either more 
pleasure or pain, than  what, strictly speaking, should naturally 
follow from it.  When it often returns upon us,  the novelty 
wears off ;  the passions subside ;  the hurry of  the spirits is 
over ;  and we survey the object with greater tranquillity. 
9.  The imagination  and affections  have  a  close  union 
together.  The vivacity  of  the former  gives  force  to the 
latter.  Hence the prospect of  any pleasure, with which  we 
are acquainted, affects  us  more  than  any other  pleasure, 
which  we may  own  superior, but  of  whose  nature  we  are 
wholly ignorant.  Of  the one we  can form a particular  and 
determinate idea.  The other we conceive under the general 
notion of  pleasure. 
Any  satisfaction, which  we  lately enjoyed, and of  which 
the memory is fresh  and  recent, operates  on  the will  with 
more violence, than another of  which the traces are decayed 
and almost obliterated. 
A pleasure, which is suitable to the way of  life,  in which 
we are engaged, excites more our  desire  and appetite than 
another, which is foreign to it. 
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8Em.  mind, than eloquence,  by which  objects  are represented  in 
+ Yd  the strongest and most lively colours.  The bare opinion of 
another, especially when enforced with paasion, will cause an 
idea to have an influence upon  us, though  that idea  might 
otherwise have been entirely neglected. 
It is remarkable, that lively passions  commonly attend  a, 
lively imagination.  In this respect, as well as in others, the 
force of  the passion depends as much on the temper  of  the 
person, as on the nature aiid situation of  the object. 
What is distant, either in place or time, has not equal in- 
fluence with what is near and contiguous. 
I  pretend not to have here  exhausted this  subject.  It  is 
aufEcient for my purpose, if I have made  it appear, that,  in 
the production and conduct of  the passions, there is a certain 
regular mechanism, which  is  susceptible of  as accurate a 
disquisition, as the laws of  motion, optics, hydrostatics, or 
any part of  natural philosophy. 
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SECTION  I.-Of  the General Principles  of  Morals. 
DISPUTES  with  men, pertinaciously obstinate in  their prin-  SECT. 
I.  ciples, are, of  all others, the most irksome ;  except, perhaps, 
those with persons, 'entirely disingenuous, who really do not 
believe  the opinions  they defend,  but  engage  in the con- 
troversy,  from  affectation,  from  a  spirit of  opposition,  or 
from a desire of  showing wit and ingenuity, superior to the 
rest of  mankind.  The same blind  adherence  to their oP;n 
arguments is to be expected in both; the same contempt  of 
their antagonists ;  and the same  passionate  vehemenc5,  in 
inforcing sophistry and falsehood.  And an  rcas~ning  is not 
the source, whence either disputant dwives his tenets;  it is 
in vain to expect, that any logic, which  speaks  not  to the 
affections, will ever  engage hiin  to embrace  sounder  prin- 
ciples. 
Those who have denied the  reality of  moral distinctions, 
may be ranked among the disingenuous  disputants ;  nor  is 
it conceivable, that any human creature could ever seriously 
believe, that all characters and actions were alike entitled to 
the affection and regard of  every one.  The difference, which 
nature has placed between one man and another, is so wide, 
and this difference is  still  so  much  farther  widened,  by 
education,  example,  and  habit,  that,  where  the  opposite 
extremes come  at once under our apprehension, there  is no 
scepticism so scrupulous, and scarce any assurance so  deter- 
mined, as absolutely to deny all distindion  between  them. 
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SECT.  Let a man's  insensibility be ever so great, he must  often  be 
.Afl  touched with the images of  RIGHT and WRONG ;  and let 
his prejudices  be  ever  so  obstinate, he  must  observe, that 
others are  susceptible  of  like  impressions.  The  only way, 
therefore,  of  converting  an antagonist  of  this  kind,  is  to 
leave him to himself.  For, finding that no  body keeps  up 
the controversy with him, it is probable  he  will, at last, of 
himself, from mere weariness, come over to the side of  com- 
mon sense and reason. 
There has been a controversy started of  late, much  better 
worth  exam ination,  concerning  the  general  foundation of 
MORALS ;  whether they be derived from REASON, or from 
SENTIMETTT ;  whether we  attain the  knowledge of  them 
by a chain of  argument and induction, or by an imrnedi* 
feeling  and  her  internal sense ; whether,  like  all sound 
judgment of  truth and falsehood, they should be the same to 
every rational intelligent  being ; or  whether, like  the per- 
ception  of  beauty  and  deformity, they be  founded entirely 
on  the  particular  fabric  and  constitution  of  the  human 
species. 
The ancient  philosophers, though  they often  afErm, that 
virtue is nothing but  conformity to reason, yet, in general, 
seem to consider  morals  as deriving  their  existence from 
taste and sentiment.  On  the other hand,  our modern  en- 
quirers, though they also talk much of  the beauty of  virtue, 
and deformity ot' rice, yet have  commonly endeavoured to 
account  for  these  distllictions  by metaphysical  reasonings, 
and by deductions from the most abstract  principles  of  the 
understanding.  Such confusion reigned  in these  subjects, 
that an opposition of  the greatest consequence could prevail 
between one system and another, and even in  the parts  of 
almost each individual system ;  and yet  no  body, till very 
lately, was ever sensible of  it.  The elegant  Lord SHAFTES- 
BURY, who first gave occasion to remark this distinction, and 
who, in general, adhered to the principles of  the ancients, is 
not, himself, entirely free from the same confusion. 
It must be acknowledged, that both sides of  the question 
are susceptible of  specious arguments.  Moral distinctions, 
it may be said, are discernible by pure reason : Else, whence 
the many disputes thdt reign in common  life, as well  as in 
philosophy, with regard to this subject : The long  chain of 
1  [Elegant wcl  sublime : Editions G and K.] 
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proofs often produced on both sides ;  the examples cited, the  SECT. 
authorities appealed to, the analogies employed, the fallacies . I. , 
detected, the inferences drawn, and  the  several  conclusions 
adjusted  to their  proper  principles.  Truth is  disputable ; 
not  taste:  What  exists  in  the  nature  of  things  is  the 
standard of  our judgment ;  what each nian feels within him- 
self  is the standard of  sentiment.  Propositions in geometry 
may be proved, systems in physics may be controverted;  but 
the  harmony of  verse,  the  tenderness  of  passion, the bril- 
liancy  of  wit,  must  give  immediate  pleasure.  No  man 
reasons  concerning  another's  beauty ; but frequently con- 
cerning the justice  or injustice  of  his actions.  In every 
criminal trial the first object  of  the prisoner is  to disprove 
the facts alleged, and deny the actions imputed to him : The 
second to prove, that, even if  these  actions  were  real, they 
might be justified, as innocent and lawful.  It is confessedly 
by deductions of  the understanding, that the first  point  is 
ascertained : How can we suppose that a different  faculty of 
the mind is employed in fixing the other ? 
On  the other  hand, those  who  would  resolve  all  moral 
determinations into sentiment, may endeavour to  show, that 
it is impossible for reason  ever to draw  conclusions of  this 
nature.  To virtue, say they, it belongs to be  amiable, and 
vice odious.  This forms their very nature  or essence.  But 
can  reason  or  argumentation  distribute  these  different 
epithets to any  subjects,  and pronounce  before-hand,  that 
this must  produce  love,  and that hatred?  Or  what  other 
reason  can  we  ever  assign  for  these  affections,  but  the 
original fabric and formation of  the human  mind,  which  is 
naturally adapted to receive them ? 
The end of  all moral speculations is to teach us our duty; 
and, by proper representations of  the deformity of  vice  and 
beauty of  virtue, beget correspondent habits, and engage us 
to avoid the one, and embrace the other.  But is this ever to 
be expected from inferences  and  conclusions of  the under- 
standing, which of themselves have no hold of the dections 
or set in motion the active powers  of  men ?  They  discover 
truths : Rut  where  the tixths which  they discover are in- 
different, and beget no desire or aversion, they can have no 
influence on conduct and behaviour.,  What is houourable, 
what is fair, what is becoming, what is noble, what  is gene- 
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I. - 
embrace and maintain it.  What is intelligible, what is evi- 
dent, what is probable, what is  true, procures  only the cool 
assent  of  the understanding ;  and  gratifying a  speculative 
curiosity, puts an end to our researches. 
Extinguish  all the  warn1 feelings  and  prepossessions in 
favour of  virtue, and all disgust or aversion to vice : Render 
men  totally  indifferent towards  these  distinctions ; and 
morality is no longer a practical study, nor has any tendency 
to regulate our lives and actions. 
These arguments on each side  (and many more  might be 
produced) are so  plausible,  that I am  apt to suspect, they 
may, the one as well as the other, be  solid  and satisfactory, 
and that reason  and  sentiment  concur  in almost  all  moral 
determinations  and  conclusions.  The final  serrteiice, it is 
probable, which pronounces characters  and actions amiable 
or odious, praise-worthy or blameable ;  that which stamps on 
them the mark of  honour or infamy, approbation or censure ; 
that which  renders morality  an active  principle,  and  con- 
stitutes virtue our happiness, and vice our misery : It is pro- 
bable, I say, that this final sentence depends on some internal 
sense or feeling,  which  nature has made  universal in the 
whole species.  For what else can  have  an influence of  this 
nature ?  But in order to pave the way for such a sentiment, 
and give a proper discernment of its object, it is often neces- 
sary, we  find, that much reasoning should precede, that nice 
distinctions  be  made, just  conclusions drawn, distant com- 
parisons formed, complicated relations  examined, and gene- 
ral  facts fixed  and ascertained.  Some  species  of  beaaty, 
especially the natural kinds, on  their first appearance, com- 
mand our affection and approbation ;  and where they fail  of 
this effect, it is impossible for any reasoning to redress their 
influence, or adapt them better to our  taste  and sentiment. 
But ill many orders of  beauty, particularly those of  the finer 
arts, it is requisite  to employ much  reasoning, in order  to 
feel the proper sentiment ;  and a false relish may frequently 
be  corrected  by  argument  and  reflection.  There  are just 
grcunds  to conclude, that moral  beauty partakes  much  of 
this latter species, and demands the assistance of  our  intel- 
lectual faculties, in order to give it  a  suitable  iilfluence  on 
the human nzind. 
But though this question, concerniilg the geceral priilciples 
of  morals, be curious and important,  ib is needless  for us, at 
present, to employ farther care in our researches concerning  SECTb 
it.  For if we can be so happy, in the course of this enquiry, -A4 
as to discover the true  origin  of  morals, it  will then  easily 
appear how  far either  sentiment or  reason  enters  into all 
determinaticns of  this nature.'  In order  to  attain  this 
purpose, we  shall endeavour to follow a very simple method : 
We  shalI  analyse  that  complication  of  mental  qualities, 
which form what, in comnlon life, we  call PERSONAL  MERIT  : 
We shall consider every attribute of the mind, which renders 
a man an object either of  esteem and affection, or of  hatred 
and contempt;  every habit or sentiment or faculty, which, if 
ascribed to any person, implies either  praise  or  blame,  and 
may enter into any panegyric or satire of  his character and 
manners.  The quick  sensibility, which, on this head, is so 
universal  among  mankind,  gives  a  philosopher  sufficient 
assurance,  that he can  never  be  considerably mistaken  in 
framing the  catalogue,  or  incur  any  danger of  misplacing 
the objects of  his contemplation :  He needs  only enter into 
his own breast for a moment, and consider whether or not he 
should desire to have  this or  that quality ascribed  to  him, 
and whether such or such an imputation would proceed from 
a friend or an enemy.  The very nature of  language  guides 
us almost infallibly  in forming a judgment  of  this  nature ; 
and as every tongue  possesses  one set  of  words  which  are 
taken in a good sense, and another in the opposite, the least 
acquaintance with the idiom suffices, without any reasoning, 
to  direct  us  in collecting  and arranging  the estimable  or 
blameable qualities of  men.  The only object of  reasoning is 
to discover the circumstances on both sides, which are corn- 
mon to these qualities ;  to observe that particular in  which 
the  estimable  qualities  agree  on  the one  hand,  and  the 
blameable on the other; and thence to reach the foundation 
of  ethics, and find those universal principles, fkom whicll  all 
See Appendix I. Concerning Moral  call every quality or action of  the mind, 
Sentiment.  virtuous, which  it^  attended with the gene- 
=  [Editions  G to N omit as far as  ml approbation  of  mankind:  and  we 
'  ultimately derived,' and substitute the  shall denominate vicious,  every quality 
following:-Mean  while, it will  scarce  which  is  the  object  of  general  blam  or 
be possible for us, ere this controversy is  censure.  These qualities we  shall  en- 
fully decided, to proceed  in  that accu-  deavour to collect ;  and after examining, 
rate manner; required  in  the  sciences;  on both sides, the several circumstances, 
by  beginning  with  exact  definitions of  in which they agree, 'tis hoped we may, 
virtue  and vice, which  are the  objects  at  last, reach the foundation  of  ethics, 
of  our present  enquiry.  But we  shall  and find those universal principles, from 
do what may justly be esteemed as satis-  which all moral blame  or  approbation 
factory.  We shall consider the matter  is ultimately derived.] 
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SECT.  censure or  approbation  is ultimately derived.  As  this is a 
I  A  question of  fact, not of  abstract science, we  can only expect 
success, by following the experimental method, and deducing 
general  maxims from a comparison of  particular instances. 
The other scientifical method, where a general abstract prin- 
ciple is first established, and is afterwards branched out into 
a variety of  inferences and conclusions, may be more perfect 
in itself, but suits less the imperfection of human nature, and 
is a common source of  illusion and mistake in this as well as 
in other subjects.  Men are now cured  of  their  passion  for 
hypotheses  and  systems  in  natural  philosophy,  and  will 
hearken to no arguments but those which  are derived  fro111 
experience.  It is full time they should attempt a like refor- 
mation in all moral disquisitions ;  and reject every system of 
ethics, however  subtile  or  ingenious, which  is not founded 
on fact and observation. 
We shall begin our enquiry on this head  by the  consi- 
deration of  social virtues, benevolence and justice.  The ex- 
plication of  them will probably give us an opening by which 
others may be accounted for. 
SECTION  II.2-Of  Benevolence. 
PART I. 
IT  may be  esteemed, perhaps, a  superfluous task to  prove, 
that the benevolent or softer affections  are  ESTIMBBLE ; 
and  wherever  they  appear,  engage  the  approbation,  and 
good-will of  mankind.  The  epithets  sociable,  good-natured, 
humane,  mercqul,  grateful, friendly,  generous,  benejcent,  or 
their  equivalents, are known  in all languages, and univer- 
sally  express  the  highest  merit,  which  humon  nature  is 
capable  of  attaining.  Where  these  amiable  qualities  are 
attended with  birth  and  power and eminent  abilities,  and 
display themselves in the good government or useful instruc- 
tion  of  mankind, they seem even to raise the  possessors  of 
them above the rank of  human  nature, and make  them  ap- 
proach  in some  measure  to the divine.  Exalted  capacity, 
undaunted  courage, prosperous  success ;  these may only ex- 
pose a hero or politician to the envy or ill-will of the public : 
1 [This paragraph was added in Edi-  I. which  subsequently appeared as Ap- 
tion 0.1  pendix II.,  Of Self-Love.] 
2  [In Editions G toQ this Section was  [Are VIRTUOUS-engage  theesteem, 
introduced by paragraphs,  forming Part  approbation,  and &c :  Editions  to N.] 
But a,s  soon as the praises are added  of  humane and benefi-  SECT.  -. 
cent ;  when instances are displayed  of  lenity, tenderness, or . y- 
friendship:  envy itself  is  silent,  or joins  the  general voice  PUT I. 
of  approbation and applause.  - 
When  PERICLES,  the  great  ATHENIAN  statesman  and 
general,  was  on  his  death-bed,  his  surrounding  friends, 
deeming him now insensible, began to indulge their  sorrow 
for their expiring patron, by enumerating his great qualities 
and  successes,  his  conquests  and  victories,  the  unusual 
length of  his  administration,  and  his nine  trophies erected 
over the enemies of the republic.  You forget,  cries the dying 
hero, who had heard all,  you  forget  the  most  eminent  of  my 
praises, while you  dwell  so  much  on  those  vulgar  advantages, 
in which fortane had a principal share.  You have not observed, 
that no  citizen has ever yet worne mourning on my  account.l 
In  men of  more ordinary talents and  capacity, the  social 
virtues become,  if  possible, still  more  essentially requisite ; 
there  being  nothing eminent,  in that case,  to compensate 
for  the  want  of  them,  or  preserve  the persqn  from  our 
severest  hatred, as well  as contempt.  A high ambition, an 
elevated  courage, is apt,  says  CICERO,  in  less  perfect  cha- 
raders, to degenerate  into a turbulent  ferocity.  The  more 
social and  softer  virtues  are there chiefly to be  regarded. 
These are always good and amiable.a 
The principal advantage, which JUVENAL  discovers in the 
extensive  capacity of  the human  species is,  that it renders 
our  benevolence  also  more  extensive, and gives  us  larger 
opportunities of  spreading  our  kindly influence than what 
are  indulged  to the inferior  ~reation.~  It must, indeed, be 
confessed,  that by doing good only, can  a  man truly enjoy 
the  advantages of  being  eminent.  His exalted  station, of 
itself, but the more exposes him to danger and tempest.  His 
sole prerogative  is to afford shelter to inferiors, who repose 
themselves under his cover and protection. 
But I forget, that it is not my present business  to recom- 
mend generosity and benevolence, or to paint, in their true 
colours, all the genuine charms of the social virtues.  These, 
indeed, sufficiently engage  every heart, on  the  first  appre- 
hension of  them ;  and it is  difficult to abstain from  some 
sally of  panegyric, as often  as they  occur  in discourse  or 
reasoning.  But our object here being more the speculative, 
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SECT.  than the practical  part of  morals, it will suffice to remark,  .  , (what will  readily, I believe,  be  allowed) that no  qualities 
PUT I-  are more intitled to the  general  good-will  and approbation 
of  mankind than benevolence and humanity, friendship and 
gratitude,  natural  affection  and  public  spirit,  or whatever 
proceeds  from a tender  sympathy with  others, and a  gene- 
rous concern for our kind and species.  These, wherever they 
appear, seem to transfuse themselves, in a manner, into each 
beholder, and to call forth, in  their  own  behalf,  the  same 
favourable and affectionate sentiments, which  they exert on 
all around. 
PART 11.' 
We may  observe, that, in  displaying  the praises  of  any 
humane,  beneficent  man, there  is one  circumstance  which 
never  fails  to be  amply insisted  on, namely, the  happiness 
and satisfaction, derived to society from his intercourse and 
good offices.  To his  parents, we  are apt to say, he endears 
himself  by his pious attachment and duteous care, still more 
than by the connexions of  nature.  His children never  feel 
his authority, but when employed for their advantage.  With 
him,  the ties  of  love  are  consolidated by  beneficence  and 
friendship.  The ties of  friendship approach, in a  fond  ob- 
servance of  each obliging office, to those  of  love  and  incli- 
nation.  His domestics and dependants have  in him  a  sure 
resource ;  and no longer dread the power of  fortune, but so 
far  as  she  exercises it  over  him.  From  him  the hungry 
receive food, the naked cloathing, the ignorant and  slothful 
skill  and industry.  Like  the  sun,  an inferior  minister  of 
providence,  ha  cheers,  invigorates,  and  sustains  the  sur- 
rounding world. 
If confined  to private  life,  the sphere  of  his activity is 
narrower;  but  his  influence is  all  benign  and gentle.  If 
exalted  into a  higher  station, mankind  and  posterity reap 
the fruit of his labours. 
As  these  topics  of  praise  never  fail to be employed, and 
with  success,  where we  would  inspire  esteem for  any one ; 
may  it  not  thence  be  concluded, that  the UTILITY,  re- 
sulting from the social virtues, forms, at least, a part of their 
merit, and is one source of  that approbation and regard so 
universally paid to them P 
When we  recommend even an animal or a plant  as usefttl  SECT. 
and beneficial, we  give  it  an applxdse an6 recommendation 
suited  to its nature.  As,  on  the other hand, reflection on  PART  11. 
the baneful influence of  any of  these inferior  beings  always 
inspires  us  with  the  sentiment  of  aversion.  The  eye  is 
pleased  with  the  prospect  of  corn-fields  and loaded  vine- 
yards; horses  grazing,  and  flocks pasturing:  But flies the 
view of  briars and brambles, affording shelter to wolves  and 
serpents. 
A machine, a piece of  furniture, a vestment,  a  house well 
contrived for use and conveniency, is so  far beautiful, and is 
contemplated  with  pleasure  and  approbation.  An  expe- 
rienced  eye  is  here  sensible  to many  excellencies, which 
escape persons ignorant and uninstructed. 
Can anything stronger be  said in praise  of  a  profession, 
such  as mercliandize  or  macufacture,  than  to  observe the 
advantages  which  it  procures  to  society?  And  is not  a 
monk  and inquisitor  enraged  when  we  treat his order  as 
useless or pernicious to mankind 2 
The historian exults in displaying the benefit arising from 
his labours.  The writer  of  romance alleviates or denies the 
bad consequences ascribed to his manner of  composition. 
In  general, what  praise  is implied  in the  simple  epithet 
usefiLl!  What reproach in the contrary ! 
Your Gods, says CICERO,'  in opposition to the EPLCUREANS, 
cannot justly  claim any worship or adoration, with whatever 
imaginary  perfections  you  may  suppose  them  endowed. 
They are totally useless and unactive.  Even the EGYPTIANS, 
whom you so  much  ridicule,  never  consecrated  any animal 
but on account of  its utility. 
The sceptics as~ert,~  though absurdly, tha4t  the origin of all 
religious worship was derived from  the  utility of  inanimate 
objects, as the sun and moon, to the support and well-being 
of  mankind.  This is also the common  reason  assigned  by 
historians, for the deification  of  eminent  heroes  and legis- 
lator~.~ 
To plant  a  tree, to  cultivate  a  field, to beget  children ; 
meritorious acts, according to the religion of  ZOROASTER. 
Tn  all  deterrninntions  of  morality, this  circumstance  of 
public utility is ever principnlly in view ;  and wherever  dis- 
De Nat. Deor. lib. i.  36. 
DIOD.  SIC.  passim. 
SEXT.  ENP. adversu~  MATH.  lib.  ix. 
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SECT.  putes arise, either in philosophy or common life, concerning 
y.  the bounds  of  duty, the question  cannot, by any means, be 
PA~TII*  decided with greater certainty, than by ascertaining, on any 
side, the true interests of  mankind.  If any false  opinion, 
embraced from appearances, has been found  to prevail ;  as 
soon as farther experience and sounder reasoning have given 
us juster  notions  of  human  affairs ;  we  retract  our  first 
sentiment, and  adjust  anew the boundaries  of  moral  good 
and evil. 
Giving  alms  to  common  beggars  is  naturally  praised ; 
because it seems to carry relief  to the distressed  and indi- 
gent:  But  when  we  observe  the encouragement  thence 
arising to idleness and debauchery, we regard that species of 
charity rather as a weakness than a virtue. 
Tyranl~icide,  or the assassillation  of  usurpers and  oppres- 
sive princes, was highly extolled  in ancient times; because 
it both  freed  mankind  from  many  of  these  monsters, and 
seemed  to keep  the others  in  awe,  whom  the  sword  or 
poinard could not reach.  But history and experience having 
since convinced us, that this practice  encreases the jealousy 
and cruelty of  princes, a TIMOLEON  and a  BRUTUS,  though 
treated with indulgence on account of the prejudices of their 
times,  are  now  considered  as  very  improper  models  for 
imitation. 
Liberality in princes is regarded as a mark of  beneficence : 
But when it occurs, that the homely bread of the honest and 
industrious  is often thereby  converted  into delicious  cates 
for the idle and the prodigal, we  soon  retract our heedless 
praises.  The regrets of a prince, for having lost a day, were 
noble and generous : But had he intended to have  spent it 
in acts  of  generosity to  his  greedy courtiers, it was  better 
lost than misemployed after that manner. 
Luxury, or a refinement on the pleasures and conveniencies 
of  life, had long been supposed  the source of  every comp- 
tion  in  government,  and the  immediate  cause of  faction, 
sedition, civil wars, and the total  loss  of  liberty.  It was, 
therefore, universally regarded as a vice, and was an object of 
declami~tion  to all satyrists, and  severe  moralists.  Those, 
who prove, or attempt to prove, that such refinements rather 
tend to the encrease of  industry, civility, and arts, regulate 
anew our moral as well as political sentiments, and represent, 
as laudable or innocent, what had formerly been regarded aa 
pernicious and blameable. 
Upon the whole, then, it seems undeniable, that  nothing  SECT. 
can  bestow  more  merit on  any human  creature  than the . 
aentiment  of  benevolence  in an eminent  degree;  and  that  PART  11. 
a,  part,  at least,  of  its merit  arises from  its tendency to 
promote  the interests of  our species, and  bestow  happiness 
on human society.  We carry our view into the salutary con- 
sequences of such a character and dispoaition ;  and whatever 
has so benign an influence, and forwards so desirable an end, 
is beheld with complacency and pleasure.  The social virtues 
are never regarded  without their  beneficial tendencies,  nor 
viewed as barren and unfruitful.  The happiness of mankind, 
the order  of  society, the  harmony of  families, the mutual 
support of  friends,  are always  considered  as the  result  of 
their gentle dominion over the breasts of  men. 
How considerable a part of their merit we  ought to ascribe 
to their utility, will better appear from future disquisitions ; 
as well  as the reason,  why this circumstance has  such  a 
command over our esteem and approbati~n.~ 
SECTION  111.-  Of  Justice. 
PART  I. 
THAT  Justice is useful to society, and consequently that part 
of  its merit, at  least, must arise from  that consideration, it 
would be a superfluous undertaking to prove.  That public 
utility is the sole  origin  of  justice,  and that reflections  on 
the beneficial consequences of this virtue are the sole founda- 
tion of  its merit ;  this proposition,  being more  curious  and 
important, will better deserve our examination and enquiry. 
Let us suppose, that nature has bestowed on  the human 
race  such profuse  abundance of  all  external  conveniencies, 
that, without any uncertainty in the event, without any care 
or industry on our part,  every individual finds himself  fully 
provided  with  whatever  his  most  voracious  appetites  can 
want, or luxurious imagination wish or desire.  His natural 
beauty, we shall suppose, surpasses all acquired ornaments : 
The perpetual  clemency of  the seasons  renders  useless all 
cloaths or covering :  The raw herbage  affords him  the most 
delicious fare ;  the clear fountain, tlie richest beverage.  No 
laborious  occupation  required :  No tillage :  No  navigation. 
1 Sect. 36 and 4th.  Of  Justice :  and  Sect. 5th.  Why Utility Pleases. 
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SECT.  Music,  poetry,  and contemplation form  his sole  business : 
,  11,1~  A  Conversation, mirth, and friendship his sole amusement. 
PARTI.  It seems evident,  that, in such a happy  state;  every other 
social  virtue  would  flourish,  and  receive  tenfold  encrease; 
but the cautious, jealous virtue of  justice  would  never  once 
have been dreamed of.  For what  purpose  make a partition 
of  goods, where every one  has already more  than  enough ? 
Why give rise to property, where there cannot possibly be any 
injury? Why call this object mine, when, upon the seizing of 
it  by another, I need  but  stretch out my hand  to possess 
myself  of  what is equally valuable?  Justice, in that case, 
being totally USELESS, would  be  an idle  ceremonial, and 
could never possibly have place in the catalogue of  virtues. 
We see, even in the present necessitous condition of  man- 
kind, that, wherever any benefit is bestowed by nature in an 
unlimited abundance, we leave it  always in common  among 
the whole  human race, and make  no  subdivisions  of  right 
and property.  Water and air, though the most necessary of 
all objects, are not challenged as the property of individuals ; 
nor can any man commit injustice by the most lavish use and 
enjoyment of  these blessings.  In fertile extensive countries, 
with few inhabitants, land is regarded on the  same footing. 
And  no topic is so much insisted  on  by  those, who  defend 
the liberty of  the seas, as the  unexhausted  use  of  them in 
navigation.  Were the advantages, procured  by navigation, 
as inexhaustible, these reasoners  had  never  had any adver- 
saries to refute ;  nor had any claims ever  been  advanced  of 
a separate, exclusive dominion over the ocean. 
It  may happen, in some  countries, at some  periods, that 
there be  established a property in water, none  in land ;  if 
the latter be in greater abundance than can be used  by the 
inhabitants, and the former be found, with difficulty, and in 
very small quantities. 
Again ;  suppose,  that, though  the necessities  of  human 
race continue the same as at present, yet the mind is so en- 
larged, and so replete  with friendship  and generosity, that 
every illan has the utmost tenderness for every man, and feels 
no Inore concern  for  his own  interest  than  for that of  his 
fellows : It seems evident, that the USE of  justice would, in 
this case, be suspended  by  such  an extensive  benevolence, 
GENESIS,  chap. xiii. and xxi. 
nor would the divisions and barriers of  property and oMiga-  SECT. 
tion have ever been thought of.  Why should I bind another, . 
by (z deed or promise, to do me any good office, when I know  PART  1. 
that lie is already prompted, by  the strongest inclination, to 
seek  my  happiness,  and  would,  of  himself,  perform  the 
desired  service ; except  the hurt,  he  thereby  receives,  be 
greater than the benefit  accruing  to me ?  in which case, he 
I~nows,  that,  from  my innate humanity  and  friendship,  I 
sliould be the first to oppose myself to his imprudent gene- 
rosity.  Why raise land-marks between my neighbour's  field 
and mine, when my heart has made no division between our 
interests ;  but shares all his joys  and sorrows with the same 
force  and vivacity  as if  originally  my  own?  Every man, 
upon this supposition, being a second  self to another, would 
trust all his interests to  the discretion of every man ;  without 
jealousy,  without  partition,  without  distinction.  And  the 
whole human race ~vould  form  only one family;  where  all 
would lie in common, and be  used  freely, without regard to 
property;  but cautiously  too,  with  as entire regard  to the 
iiecessities of  each individual,  as if  our own  interests were 
most intimately concerned. 
In  the present disposition  of  the human heart, it would, 
perhaps, be  difficult  to find compleat  instances of such en- 
larged aEections ;  but still we may observe, that the case of 
families approaches towards it ;  and the stronger the mutual 
benevolence  is  among  the  individuals,  the  nearer  it ap- 
proaches;  till  all  distinction  of  property  be,  in  a  great 
measure, lost and confounded among them.  Between mar- 
ried persons, the cement of friendship is by the laws supposed 
so strong as to abolish  all division  of  possessions : and has 
often, in reality, the force  ascribed  to it.  And it is observ- 
able, that, during the ardour of new enthusiasms, when every 
principle  is inflamed  into extravagance, the community  of 
goods has frequently been  attempted : and notliing but ex- 
perience  of  its inconveniencies,  froni  the returning or dis- 
guised selfishiiess of men, could inalie the irnpradent fanatics 
adopt anew the ideas  of  justice  and  of  separate property. 
So true is it, that this virtue  derives  its existence errtirely 
from its necessary use to the intercourse  and social state of 
mankind. 
To make this truth illore evident, let us reverse the fore- 
going sul~positioiis  ;  and carrying every tlring to the opposito 182  CONCERNING  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF MORALS.  OF JUSTICE.  183 
SECT.  extreme,  consider  what  would  be  the  effect of  these  new 
I11  .  ,  a  situations.  Suppose a  soeiety to fall into such want of all 
PART  1.  common necessaries, that the utmost  frugality and industry 
cannot preserve the greater number from perishing, and the 
whole  from  extreme  misery : It  will  readily, I believe,  be 
admitted, that the  strict laws  of  justice  are suspended, in 
such a  pressing  emergence,  and  give place to the stronger 
motives of necessity and self-preservation,  Is it any crime, 
after a shipwreck, to seize whatever means or instrument of 
safety one can lay hold  of, without  regard to former limita- 
tions of property ?  Or if a city besieged were perishing with 
hunger;  can we  imagine,  that men  will  see any means of 
preservation before them, and lose their lives,  from a scru- 
pulous  regard  to what,  in other  situations,  would  be  the 
rules of equity and justice ?  The USE and TENDENCY of 
that virtue is to procure happiness and security, by preserving 
order in society:  But where  the society is ready to perish 
from extreme necessity, 110  greater evil can be dreaded from 
violence and injustice ;  and every man may now provide for 
himself  by  all the means,  which  prudence  can dictate, or 
humanity permit.  The public,  even in less urgent necessi- 
ties, opens granaries, without the consent of  proprietors;  as 
justly  supposing,  that  the  authority  of  n~agistracy  may, 
consistent with equity, extend so far : But were ally number 
of Inen to assemble, without the tye of laws or civil jurisdic- 
tion ;  would an equal partition of bread in a famine, though 
effected by power and even violence, be regarded as criminal 
or injurious ? 
Suppose likewise, that it should be a virtuous man's  fate 
to fall into the society of ruffians, remote from the protection 
of laws and government ;  what  conduct must he embrace  in 
that melancholy situation P  He sees such a desperate mpa- 
ciousness prevail ;  such a disregard to equity, such contempt 
of  order, such  stupid  blindness  to  future  consequences, as 
must  immediately  have the most  tragical  conclusion,  and 
must terminate in destruction to the greater number, and in 
a total dissolution of  society to the rest.  He, mean while, 
can have no other expedient than to arm himself, to whom- 
ever the sword he seizes, or  the buckler,  may belong:  To 
make provision of  all means of  defence and security :  And 
his particular regard to justice  being no  longer of  U S E to 
his own safety or that of others, he must consult the dictates 
of  self-preservation alone, without concern for those who no  SECT. 
longer merit his care and attention.  III. - 
When any man, even in political  society, renders himself,  PART  I. 
by his crimes, obnoxious to the public, he is punished by the 
laws in his goods and person ;  that is, the ordinary rules  of 
justice  are, with  regard  to him, suspended  for  a  moment, 
and it becomes equitable to inflict  on him, for the benefit of 
society, what, otherwise, he could  not suffer without wrong 
or injrxry. 
The rage  and violence of  public  war; what  is it  but  a 
suspension of  justice  among the warring  parties, who  per- 
ceive, that this virtue is now no longer of  any use or advan- 
tage to them?  The laws  of  war,  which  then succeed  to 
those  of  equity  and justice,  are  rules  calculated  for  the 
advantage and utility of  that particular state, in which  men 
are now placed.  And were a civilized nation  engaged  with 
barbarians, who observed no  rules  even of  war ;  the former 
must also suspend  their observance of  them, where they no 
longer  serve to any purpose ;  and must  render every action 
or rencounter  as bloody and  pernicious  as possible to the 
first aggressors. 
Thus, the rules of equity or justice  depend entirely on the 
particular state and condition, in which men are placed, and 
owe  their origin  and  existence  to that UTILITY,  which 
results  to the public  from  their  strict  and regular obser- 
vance.  Reverse,  in  any  considerable  circumstance,  the 
condition  of  men:  Produce  extreme  abundance or extreme 
necessity :  Implant in the human breast perfect moderakion 
and humanity, or perfect rapaciousness and malice : By ren- 
dering justice  totally useless, you  thereby totally destroy its 
essence, and suspend its obligation upon mankind. 
The common situation of  society is a medium  amidst all 
these extremes.  We are naturally partial to ourselves, and 
to our friends;  but are capable  of  learning the advantage 
resulting from a more equitable conduct.  Few  enjoyments 
are given us from the open and liberal hand of  nature ;  but 
by art', labour, and industry, we  can extract them in great 
abundance.  Hence the ideas of  property become  necessary 
in a11  civil society :  Hence justice  derives its usefulness  to 
the public : And  hence  alone  arises  its merit  and  moral 
obligation. 
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SECT  have not escaped even the poets,  in their descriptions of  the 
I11  .-*  felicity, attending the golden  age or the reign of  SATURN. 
PuT1*  . The  seasons, in  that first  period  of  nature, were  so  tem- 
perate, if we  credit these agreeable fictions, that there was 
no necessity for men to provide  themselves with cloaths and 
houses, as a security against the violence of  heat and cold : 
The rivers  flowed  with mine  and milk:  The  oaks  vielded 
.I 
honey ; and  nature  spontaneously produced  her  greatest 
delicacies.  Nor  were  these  the chief  advantages  of  that 
happy age.  Tempests were not alone removed from nature; 
but those more  furious tempests  were  unknown  to human 
breasts, which now  cause such uproar,  and engender  such 
confusion.  Avarice, ambition, cruelty, selfishness, were never 
heard of:  Cordial affection, con~passion,  sympatlly, were tlle 
only movements with  which the mind  was  yet  acquainted. 
Even  the  punctilious  distinction  of  mine  and  thine  was 
banished from among that happy race of nlortals, and carried 
with it the very notion of  property and obligation, justice 
and injustice. 
This poetical fiction of  the goldeqt, age is, in some respects, 
of a piece with the philosop7~ical  fiction of the state of  nature; 
only that the former is represented  as the most  charming 
and  most  peaceable  condition, which  can possibly be  ima- 
gined ;  whereas the latter is painted out as a state of mutual 
war and violence, attended with the most extreme necessity. 
On the first origin of  mankind, we are told, their ignorance 
and  savage nature were  so prevalent, that they could  give 
no mutual trust, but must  each depend upon  himself, and 
his own force or cunning for protection and security.  No 
law was lieard of:  No rule of justice known : No distinction 
of property regarded :  Power was the only measure of right ; 
and a perpetual war of all against all was tlle result of men's 
untamed selfishness and barbarity.' 
This fiction  of  a  state of  nature,  on the contrary, supposes it  certain and 
as a state of  war, was  not first  started  universally acknowledged in thefollow- 
by Mr. HL'BBE.~,  as is  commonly  ima-  ing  passage.'  '&uis  enim  vestrfim, 
gined.  PLATO  endeavours to refute  an  judices,  ignorat,  ita  naturam  rerum 
hypothesis very like it in  the 2nd, 3rd,  tulisse, ut  quodam  tempore  homines, 
and 4th  books  de republica.  CICERO,  nondum  neque  nnturali,  neque  civili 
[Editions G to N add :  Which is the  OVID or PLAUTUS  or PETRONIUS  a nee-- 
only  authority I  shall  cite  for these  sitry warrant for every moral truth ; or 
reasonings:  not  imitating  in  this  tlie  the example  of  Mr.  WOOLASTON,  who 
example of  PUFFENDORF,  nor ev~li  tlli~t  has  conxtnnt  recourse to HEBREW  and 
of  GROTIUS,  who  think  it  rcrsc  i'run~  ARAI~IC  authors  for the same purpose.1 
Whether  such  a  condition  of  human nature  could  ever  SECT. 
exist, or if  it did, could  continue  so  long as to merit the .  'IT1- 
appellation  of  a  state,  may justly  be  doubted.  Men  are  PABTI. 
necessarily born in a family-society, at least ;  and are trained 
up by their parents to some rule of  conduct  and behaviour. 
But this must be  admitted, that, if  such a  state of  mutual 
war and violence  was  ever real, the suspension of  all laws 
of  justice,  from  their absolute inutility, is a  necessary and 
infallible consequence. 
The Inore we vary our views of  human life, and the newer 
and more unusual the lights  are, in which we survey it, the 
more shall we be convinced, that the origin here assigned for 
the virtue of justice is real and satisfactory. 
Were  theie  a  species  of  creatures,  intermingled  with 
men, which, though rational, were possessed of such inferior 
strength, both  of  body and mind, that they were  incapable 
of  all resistance,  and could never, upon the highest provoca- 
tion, make us feel the effects of their resentment ;  the neces- 
sary conseq~lence,  I think, is, that we  should be  bound, by 
the laws  of  humanity, to give gentle usage  to these crea- 
tures,  but  should  not,  properly  speaking,  lie  under  any 
restraint  of  justice  with  regard to them,  nor  could  they 
possess  any right  or property, exclusive  of  such arbitrary 
lords.  Our intercourse with them could not be called societ-y, 
which supposes a degree of equality; but absolute command 
on the one side, and servile obedience on the other.  What- 
ever  we  covet, they must  instantly resign :  Our  permission 
is the  only tenure,  by which  they  hold  their possessions : 
Our compassion and kindness the only check, by which they 
curb our lawless will : And as no inconvenience  ever results 
from the exercise of a power, so firrnly established in nature, 
the restraints of  justice  and  being totally useless, 
would never have place in so unequal a confederacy. 
jure  descripto,  fusi  per  agros, ac  dis- 
persi  vagarentur  tantumque  haberent 
quantum  manu  ac  viribus, per  cadem 
ac vulnera,  aut  eripere,  aut  retinere 
potuissent 7  Qui igitur primi virtute et 
consilio  przstanti  extiterunt,  ii  peer- 
specto genere humanae docilitatis atque 
ingenii, dissipates, unum  in locum con- 
gregarunt,  eosque  ex  feritate  illa  ad 
justitiam  ac mansuetudinem  tranedux- 
erunt.  Tum res, ad communem  utili- 
tatem; quas  publicas  appellnmus,  tnm 
conrenticula hominum, qua?  postea civi- 
tates  nominatae  sunt.  tum  domicilia 
conjuncta, quav  urbes dicamus, invento 
et divino et huninno jure, menibus sep- 
serunt.  Atyue inter hanc vitam,  per- 
politam humanitate, et iU8.m immanem, 
nihil tam interest quam JU  S atque  VIS. 
Horum utro uti nolimus, altero est uten- 
dum.  Vim  volumus  extingui?  Jus 
valeat necesse est, id est, judicia, quibus 
omne  jus  continetur.  Judicia  displi- 
cent,  nut nulla sunt?  Vis  dominetur 
necesse est.  Ha  vident omneo.'  Pro 
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SECT.  This  is  plainly  the  situation  of  men,  with  regard  to  .  'I:.  ,  animals ;  and how far these  may be  said to possess reason, 
PUT I.  1  leave it to others to determine.  The peat superiority of 
civilized EUROPEANS  above barbarous INDIANS,  tempted us 
to imagine  ourselves on  the  same  footing  with  regard to 
them, and made us throw  off  all restraints  of  justice,  and 
even  of  humanity,  in  our  treatment  of  them.  In many 
nations, the female sex are reduced  to like slavery, and are 
rendered  incapable  of  all property,  in opposition  to their 
lordly  masters.  But though the males, when  united, have, 
in  all countries,  bodily  force  sufficient  to  maintain  this 
severe tyranny ;  yet  such  are the insinuation, address, and 
cliarms of  their fair companions, that women are commonly 
abie to break the confederacy, and share with the other  sex 
in all the rights and privileges of society. 
Were the human species so framed by nature as that each 
individual  possessed  within himself  every faculty, requisite 
both for his own preservation and for the propagation of  his 
kind :  Were all society and intercourse cut off between man 
and man, by the primary intention of  the supreme Creator : 
It seems evident, that so solitary a being would be as much 
incapable of  justice, as of  social discourse aad conversation. 
Where mutual regards  and forbearance  serve to no manner 
of  purpose, they would  never direct the conduct of  any rea- 
sonable man.  The headlong  course of  the passions  would 
be  checked by no  reflection on future consequences.  And 
as each man is here  supposed to love himself  alone, and to 
depend only on himself  and his own  activity for safety and 
happiness,  he  would,  on  every  occasion,  to the utmost of 
his power, challenge the preference abore every other being, 
to none of  which he is bound by any ties, either of  nature or 
of interest. 
' But surpose the conjunction of the sexes to be established 
in nature, a family immediat,ely arises ;  and particular rules 
being  found requisite  for  its  subsistence, these are imme- 
diately embraced ;  though without  comprehending the rest 
of mankind within their prescriptions.  Suppose, that several 
families  unite  together  into one  uociety,  which  is  totally 
disjoined from  all others,  the  rules,  which  preserve  peace 
and order, enlarge theniselves to the utmost  extent of  that 
society ;  but becoming then entirely useless, lose their force 
when  carried  one  step facther.  But  again  suppose,  that 
several distinct  societies maintain a kind of  intercourse for  SECT. 
mutual convenience and advantage, the boundaries of justice  , 'lyl.  + 
still  grow  larger, in proportion  to  the  largeness  of  men's  PABTI. 
views, and the force of  their mutual  connexions.  History, 
experience,  reason  sufficiently instruct  us  in this  natural 
progress of human sentiments, and  in the gradual enlarge- 
ment of  our regards to justice,  in proportion as we become 
acquainted with the extensive utilitv of that virtue. 
PART 11. 
If  we  examine  the particular  laws,  by  which justice is 
directed,  and  property  determined ;  we  shall  still be  pre- 
sented with the same  conclusion.  The good of  mankind  is 
the only object  of  all these laws and regulations.  Not  only 
it is requisite,  for  the peace  and interest  of  society, that 
men's possessions should be separated ;  but the rules, which 
we follow, in making the separation, are such as can best be 
contrived to serve farther the interests of society. 
We shall suppose, that a creature, possessed of  reason, but 
unacquainted with  human  nature,  deliberates with himself 
what  RULES of  justice  or property  would  best  promote 
public interest, and establish peace and security among man- 
kind:  His most  obvious  thought would  be,  to assign  the 
largest possessions to the  most  extensive  virtue,  and give 
every one the power of doing good, proportioned to his incli- 
nation.  In a  perfect  theocracy,  where  a  being,  infinitely 
intelligent, governs by  particular volitions,  this rule would 
certainly have place, and might serve to the wisest purposes: 
But were mankind to execute  such  a  law;  so  great is the 
uncertainty of  merit,  both  from  its natural obscurity,  and 
from the self-conceit of  each individual, that no determinate 
rule  of  conduct would  ever  result  from  it ;  and  the  total 
dissolutiozl of  society must  be  the immediate consequence. 
Fanatics may suppose, that dominion is  founded on grace, and 
that saints alone  inherit  the  earth; but the civil magistrate 
very justly puts these  sublime theorists on the same footing 
with common robbers, and teaches them by  the severest dis- 
cipline,  that  a  rule,  mhich,  in speculation,  may  seem the 
most advantageous to society, may yet be found, in practice, 
totally pernicious and destructive. 
That there were religious fanatics of this kind in ENGLAND, 188  CONCERNING  THE  PRINCII'LES  OF MORALS.  OF JUSTICE.  180 
SECTe  during the civil  wars,  we  learn  from history ;  though it is 
.?:-,  probable, that the obvious tendency of these principles excited 
P*~~  11*  such horror in mankind, as soon  obliged  the dangerous en- 
thusiasts to renounce, or at least conceal their tenets.  Per- 
haps,  the  levellers,  who  claimed  an  equal  distribution  of 
property, were a  kind of political  fanatics, which arose from 
the religious species, and more  openly avowed their preten- 
sions ;  as  carrying  a  more  plausible  appearance,  of  being 
practicable in themselves, as well as useful to human society. 
It must, indeed, be  confessed, that nature is so liberal to 
mankind, that, were all her presents equally divided among 
the species, and improved  by art and industry, every indivi- 
dual would  enjoy  all  the necessaries,  and even most of the 
comforts of  life;  nor mould  ever  be  liable to any ills, but 
such as might accidentally  arise from  the sickly frame and 
constitution of  his  body.  It  must also  be confessed, that, 
wherever we  depart from  this  equality,  we  rob the poor of 
more  satisfaction  than we  add  to the rich,  and that the 
slight gratification of  a  frivolous vanity, in one individual, 
frequently costs more than bread to many families, and even 
provinces.  It may appear withal,  that the rule of  equality, 
as it would be highly useful, is not altogether impracticable ; 
but  has taken  place,  at least  in  an imperfect  degree,  in 
some republics ;  particularly that of  SPARTA;  where it was 
attended, it is said, with the most  beneficial consequences. 
Not  to mention,  that  the  AGRARIAN  laws,  SO  frequently 
claimed in ROME,  and carried into execution in many GREEK 
cities,  proceeded,  all  of  them,  froin  a  general  idea of  the 
utility of this principle. 
But historians,  and even  common  sense,  may inform us, 
that,  however  specious  these ideas  of perfect  equality nlay 
seein, they  are  really,  at bottom,  impractica'bla;  and were 
they not so, would be extremely pernicious to human society. 
Render possessions ever  so equal, men's  different degrees of 
art, care, and industry will  immediately break that equality. 
Or if you check these virtues, you reduce society to the most 
extreme  indigence ; and  instead  of   reve en tin^  want  and 
beggary in a  few,  render  it unavoidable to the whole com- 
munity.  The  most  rigorous  inquisition too is requisite  to 
watch every inequality on its first appearance ;  and the most 
severe jurisdictica, to punish  and redress it.  But besides, 
that so lnucll nuihority must  soon  degenerate into tyranny, 
and be exerted with great partialities ;  who can possibly be  SECT. 
possessed of  it, in such  a  situation  as is here  supposed ? .  It'. 
Perfect equality of  possessions, destroying all subordination,  PART  11. 
weakens  extremely  the authority of  magistracy,  and must 
reduce all power nearly to a level, as well as property. 
We may  conclude,  therefore, that, in order  to establish 
laws for the regulation  of  property, we  must be  acquainted 
with the nature and situation of  man ;  must reject  appear- 
ances, which may be false, though specious ;  and must search 
for  those  rules,  which  are, on  the whole,  most usejbl  and 
beneJicia1.  Vulgar sense and slight experience  are sufficient 
for this  purpose;  where  men  give  not way  to too  selfish 
avidity, or too extensive enthusiasm. 
Who sees not, for instance, that whatever  is produced  or 
improved  by a  man's  art or  industry ought, for ever, to be 
secured to him, in order to give encouragement to  such useful 
habits and accomplisl~ments  ?  That the property ought also 
to descend to children and relations, for the same usef~il  pur- 
pose?  That it may  be  alienated  by  consent, in order to 
beget  that commerce  and intercourse, which is so beneficial 
t9 human society?  And  that  all  contracts  and  promises 
ought  carefully to be  fulfilled,  in order  to secure  mutual 
trust and confidence, by which  the general interest of  man- 
kind is so much promoted? 
Examine the writers on the laws of  nature ;  and you will 
always find, that, whatever principles they set out with, they 
are sure to terminate here at last, and to assign, as the ulti- 
mate reason  for  every rule  which  they establish,  the con- 
venience  and  necessities  of  mankind.  A  concession  thus 
extorted, in opposition to systems, has more authority, than 
if  it had been made in prosecution of  them. 
What other  reason, indeed, could writers  ever  give, why 
this must be -mine and that yours ;  since uninstructed nature, 
surely, never made any such distinction ?  The objects, which 
receive those appellations, are, of  themselves, foreign to us ; 
they are totally disjoined and separated from us ;  and nothing 
but the general interests of  society can form the connexion. 
Sometimes, the interests of  society may require  a  rule  of 
justice in a particulal- case ; but may not determine any par- 
ticular rule, among several, which  are all equally beneficial. 
In  that case, the slightest analogies are laid hold of, in order 
to prevent  that indifference and ambiguity, which would be 190  CONCERNING  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  MORALS.  OF JUSTICE.  191 
SECT.  the source of  perpetual dissention.  Thus possession alone, 
I11  . , ,  and  first  possession, is supposed to convey property, where 
PART  11-  no body else has any preceding claim and pretension.  Many 
of  the reasonings  of  lawyers  are of  this analogical nature, 
and depend on very slight connexions of  the imagination. 
Does any one scruple, in extraordinaay cases, to violate all 
regard  to the private  property of  individuals,  and sacrifice 
to public interest a  distinction, which  had  been  established 
for the sake  of  that interest?  The safety of  the people  is 
the supreme law : All other  particular  laws are subordinate 
to it, and dependant on it : And if, in the common  course of 
things, they  be  followed  and regarded;  it is only  because 
the  public  safety  and interest  commonly  demand  so  equal 
and impartial an administration. 
Sometimes both  utility  and  analogy  fail,  and leave  the 
laws of  justice  in total uncertainty.  Thus, it  is highly re- 
quisite, that prescription  or  long possession should convey 
property;  but  what  number  of  days  or  months  or  years 
should  be  sufficient  for  that purpose,  it is impossible  for 
reason alone to determine.  Civil laws here  supply the place 
of  the natural code,  and assign  different terms for prescrip- 
tion,  according to the  different  utilities,  proposed by  the 
legislator.  Bills  of  exchange  and  promissory notes, by the 
laws  of  most  countries,  prescribe  sooner  than bonds,  and 
mortgages, and contracts of  a more formal nature. 
In  general, we  may observe, that all questions of  property 
are  subordinate to authority  of  civil  laws,  which  extend, 
restrain, modify, and alter the  rules  of  natural justice,  ac- 
cording  to  the particular  convenience  of  each  community. 
The laws  have, or ought  to have, a  constant reference  to 
the  constitution  of  government, the manners, the  climate, 
the religion, the  commerce,  the  situation  of  each  society. 
A late author l of  genius, as well as learning, has prosecuted 
this  subject at large, and has  established, from these prin- 
ciples, a  system  of  political knowledge, which  abounds  in 
ingenious  and  brilliant  thoughts,  and  is  aot wanting  in 
soIidity.' 
1 [Editions G and K read : Of  great  This  illustrious  writer,  however,  seh 
genius as well as extensive  learning,-  out with a different theory, and supposes 
the best system of  political  knowledge,  all right to be founded on certain ~p- 
that,  perhaps, has ever  yet  been  com-  ports  or relations;  which  is a  system, 
municated to the world.]  that, in ~qy  opinion, never will he recon- 
2  The  author  of  L'Xsprit  des  hh.  ciled  with  true  philosophy.  Father 
What is a man's  property ?  Any thing, which it is lawful  SECT. 
111.  for him, and for him alone, to use.  Hut  what  rule  have  we,  . 
bg whicl~  we  call. distinguish  these  objects ?  Here we  must  PART  11. 
have  recourse  to  statutes,  customs,  precedents,  analogies, 
and a hundred other circumstances;  some of  which are con- 
stant and inflexible, some  variable and arbitrary.  But  the 
ultimate  point, in which  they all professedly terminate,  is, 
the interest  and happiness  of  human  society.  Where this 
enters  not  into  consideration,  nothing  can  appear  more 
whimsical,  unnatural,  and  even  superstitious,  than all  or 
most of  the laws of  justice and of  property. 
Those, who  ridicule  vulgar  superstitions, and  expose  the 
folly of  particular  regards to meats, days,  places,  postures, 
apparel,  have  an  easy  task;  while  they  consider  all  the 
qualities and relations  of  the objects, and discover no  ade- 
quate  cause  for  that affection or  antipathy,  veneration  or 
horror, which have so mighty an influence over  a  consider- 
able part of  mankind.  A SYRIAN  would have starved rather 
than taste pigeon ; an EGYPTIAN  would  not have approached 
bacon:  But  if  these  species  of  food  be  examined  by  the 
senses of  sight, smell, or taste, or scrutinized by the sciences 
MALEBRANCHE,  as far as I can  learn,  terests  of  society,  it  loses  all its  au- 
was the first that started  this abstract  thority, and men judge  by the ideas of 
theory of  morals, which was afterwarJs  natural  justice, which are conformable to 
adopted  by'  CUDW~RTH,  CLARKE,  and  those  interests.  Sometimes  also civil 
others ; and as it  excludes  all  senti-  laws, for useful purposes, require a cere- 
ment, and pretends to found every thing  mony  or form to any deed ; and where 
on reason, it has  not wanted  followers  that is wanting, their decrees  run con- 
in this philosophic age.  See Section 1.  trary to the usual tenour of justice; but 
and  Appendix I. With regard to justice,  one whotakesadvantageof such chicanes, 
the virtue here treated of, the inference  is not commonly regarded as an honest 
against this theory seems short and con-  man.  Thus,  the  interests  of  society 
clusive.  Property is allowed to be  de-  require, that contracts be fulfilled ;  and 
pendent  on  civil laws ; civil  laws are  there  is  not  a  more  material  article 
allowed  to  have no  other  object,  but  either  of  natural  or civil justice : Bur, 
the interest  of  society: This therefore  the  omission  of  a  trifling  circum- 
must be allowed  to be the sole founda-  stance uill often, by  law,  invalidate a 
tion  of  property and justice.  Not  to  contract,  in ,for0  humano, but  not  in 
mention,  that our obligation  itself  to  ,for0  conscientiq  as  divines  express 
obey  the  magistrate  and his  laws  is  themselves.  In these cases, the magis- 
founded on nothing  but the interests of  trate is supposed  only to withdraw his 
society.  power  of  enforcing  the  right,  not  to 
If the idea8 of justice, sometimes, do  have altered the right.  Where his in 
not follow the dispositions of  civil law :  tention extends to the right, and is con- 
we shall find, that these  cases,  instead  formable to the  interests of  society;  it 
of  objections, are confirmations of  the  never  fails  to  alter the right; a clew 
theory delivered above.  Where a civil  proof  of  the origin  of  justice  and  of 
law is s9 perverse as to cross all the in-  property, as assigned above. 
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SECT.  of  chymistq, medicine,  or  physics;  no  difference  is  ever 
111  . ,  found  between  them  and  any other  species,  nor  can  thak 
PART  11.  precise circumstance be pitched  on, which may afford a just 
foundation  for the religious  passion.  A fowl  on Thursday 
is lawful food ;  on Friday abominable : Eggs,  in this house, 
and in  this  diocese, are permitted during Lent; a hundred 
paces farther, to eat them is a damnable sin.  This earth or 
building,  yesterday  was  profane ;  to-day,  by the muttering 
of  certain words, it has become  holy  and sacred.  Such  re- 
flections  as  these, in the  mouth of  a  philosopher, one may 
safely say, are too  obvious to hare  any influence ;  because 
they must  always, to every man, occur  at first  sight; and 
where  they  prevail  not,  of  themselves, they are surely ob- 
structed  by education, prejudice,  and passion, not  by  igno- 
rance or mistake. 
It may appear to a careless view, or rather a too abstracted 
reflection, that there enters a like  superstition into all  the 
sentiments of  justice ;  and that, if  a man  expose  its object, 
or what we call property, to the same  scrutiny of  sense and 
science, he will not, by the most  accurate enquiry, find  any 
foundation for the difference made by moral  sentiment.  I 
may lawfully nourish myself  from this tree ;  but the fruit of 
another of  the  same species, ten paces off,  it is criminal for 
me to touch.  Had I worne this apparel an hour ago, I had 
merited  the  severest punishment ;  but a man, by pronounc- 
ing a few magical  syllables, has now rendered it fit for my 
use and service.  Were this house  placed in the neighbour- 
ing territory, it had been immoral for me to dwell in it ;  but 
being built  on  this  side  of  the river,  it is subject to a dif- 
ferent inunicipal law, and,  by its becoming mine, I incur no 
blame or censure.  The  same  species  of  reasoning, it  may 
be  thought,  which  so  successfully exposes  superstition,  is 
also applicable to justice ;  nor is it possible, in the one case 
more than in the other, to point out, in the object, that pre- 
cise quality or circumstance, which is the foundation  of  the 
sentiment. 
But there is this material difference between superstitiort and 
justice,  that the former is frivolous, useless, and burdensome ; 
the latter is absolutely requisite to the well-being of mankind 
and existelice of  society. When we abstract from this circum- 
stance (for it is too apparent ever to be overlooked) it must be  SECT. 
confessed, that all regards to right and property, seem entirely  -':Is  , 
without foundation, as much as the grossest and most vulgar  PART  11. 
superstition.  Were  the  interests  of  society  nowise  con- 
cerned,  it  is  as  unintelligible,  why  another's  articulating 
certain  sounds implying consent, should  change the nature 
of  my actions with regard to a  particular object, as why the 
reciting of  a liturgy by a  priest, in a certain habit and pos- 
ture, should dedicate a heap of  brick and timber, and render 
it, thenceforth and for ever,  sacred.l 
1 It is evident, that the will  or con- 
sent alone never transfers property, nor 
causes the obligation  of  a  promise (for 
the  same  reasoning  extends to  both) 
but the will must be expressed by words 
or signs, in order to impose a tye  upon 
any man.  The  expression being  once 
brought  in as subservient to the will, 
soon becomes the principal part of  the 
promise ; nor will a man be lese  hound 
by his  word, though he  secretly give a 
different direction to his intention, and 
with-hold the assent of  his mind.  But 
though  the  expression  makes, on most 
ocrasions, the whole of the promise, yet 
it does  not  always so; and  one  who 
should  make  use of  any expression, of 
which  he  knows not the meaning, and 
which he uses without any sense of  the 
consequences,  would  not  certainly  bo 
bound by it.  Nay, though he kuow its 
meaning, yet if he use it  in jest only, and 
with such signs as evidently show, that 
he has no serious intention  of  binding 
himself,  he  would  not  lie  under  any 
obligation  of  performance;  but  it  is 
necessary, that the words  be  a  perfect 
expression of  the will, without any con- 
trary signs.  Nay,  even  this we  must 
not carry so far as to imagine, that one, 
whom, by our quickness of  understand- 
ing, we  conjecture, from  certain  signs, 
to have an intention of  deceiving  us, is 
not bound  by his  expression  or verbal 
promise, if  we  accept  of  it; but must 
limit  this  conclusion  to  those  cases 
where the signs are of a different nature 
from  those  of  deceit.  All these con- 
tradictions are easily accounted  for,  if 
justice arise entirely from its usefulness 
to society; but will never be  explained 
on any other hypothesis. 
It  is remarkable, that the moral cleci- 
sions of  the Jesuits and other relaxed 
casuists, were commonly formed in prc- 
secution  of  some  such  subtilties  of 
reasoning as are here pointed  out, and 
proceed  as  much  from  the  habit  cf 
scholastic  refinement  as from any cor- 
ruption  of  the heart, if  we may follow 
the authority of Mons. BAYLE. See his 
Dictionary,  article  LOYOLA.  And why 
has the indignation of  mankind risen so 
high against these casuists ;  but because 
every one perceived, that human society 
could  not  subsist were  such  practices 
authorized, and  that  morals must always 
be  handled  with  a  view  to  public in- 
terest,  more  than  philosophical  regu- 
larity?  If the  secret  direction  of  the 
intention,  said  every  man  of  sense, 
could  invalidate a  contract ; where  is 
our security ?  And yet a metaphysical 
schoolman  might think, that where  an 
intention was suppoeed to be  requisite, 
if  that intention  really had  not  place, 
no consequence ought to follow, and no 
obligation be imposed.  The casuistical 
subtilties may not be  greater  than the 
subtilties of  lawyers, hinted  at above ; 
b~~t  as the former  are p(naicious,  and 
the latter iranocent  and even  necessary, 
this is the reason  of  the very different. 
reception  they  meet  with  from  the 
world. 
It is  a  doctrine  of  the church  of 
ROME,  that the  priest, by a  secret  di- 
rection  of  his intention, can  invalidate 
any  sacrament.  This  position  is  de- 
rived from a strict and regular,prosecu- 
tion  of  the obvious  truth,  that emvty 
words  alone,  without  any  meaning or 
intention  in  the speaker, call  never be 
attended with  any effect.  If the same 
conclusion  be  not  admitted  in reason- 
ings concerning  civil  contracts,  where 
1  [By  its becoming mine : added in Edition Q.]  2  [This paragraph was added  in Edition 0.1 194  CONCERNING  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  MORALS.  OF  JUSTICE,  195 
SECT.  These reflections are far from weakening the obligations of  .  justice,  or diminishing  any thing  from  the most sacred at- 
PmII* tention to property.  On the contrary, such sentiments must 
acquire new force  from the present  reasoning.  For  what 
stronger foundation can be desired or conceived for any duty, 
than to observe, that human society, or  even  human  nature 
could not subsist, without the establishment of  it; and will 
still arrive at greater degrees  of  happiness  and perfection, 
the more inviolable the regard is, which is paid to that duty ? 
The dilemma  seems  obvious:  As justice  evidently tends 
to promote  public  utility  and  to ,support  civil society, the 
sentiment of  justice is either derived from  our  reflecting  on 
that tendency, or like hunger,  thirst,  and  other  appetites, 
resentment, love  of  life, attachment to offspring, and  other 
passions, arises from a simple original instinct in the human 
breast, which  nature  has implanted  for like  salutary pur- 
poses.  If the latter be the case, it follows, th~t  property, 
which  is  the object  of  justice,  is  also  distinguished  by  a, 
simple, original instinct, and is not ascertained by any  argu- 
ment  or  reflection.  But who  is there that ever  heard  of 
such  an instinct?  Or  is  this a subject, in which  new dis- 
coveries can be made?  We may as well attempt to discover, 
in the body, new senses, which  had  before  escaped the ob- 
servation of  all  mankind. 
But  farther,  though it  seems a  very simple proposition 
to say, that nature, by an instinctive sentiment, distinguishes 
property, yet in reality we shall find, that there are required 
for  that purpose  ten thousand different instincts, and these 
employed about objects of  the greatest intricacy and nicest 
discernment.  For when a definition of  property  is required, 
that relation  is found  to resolve itself into any possession 
acquired  by occupation, by industry, by prescription, by  in- 
the Air  is allowed to  be  of so  much  dogmatical  any  superstition  may  ap- 
less consequence than the eternal salva-  pear, it never can  convey any thorough 
tion of  thousands,  it proceeds  entirely  persuasion of  the reality of  its objects, 
from men's sense of  the danger and in-  or put them, in any degree, on a balance 
convenience of  the doctrine in  the for-  with  the  common  incidents  of  life, 
mer case : And we may thence observe,  which we learn from  daily observation 
that  however  positive,  arrogant,  and  and experimental reasoning, 
1 wition  G  omits  all between  this  from a simple, original instinct in  t.he 
point and the concluding paragraph of  human  breast, without any reflection, 
the section.]  even  on  those  obvious  interests  of 
2  [Edition  N omits  the  preceding  society,  which  absolutely require  that 
sentence, and  reads : If  justice  arose  virtue, it follows, &c.] 
heritance,  by  contract, &c.  Can  we  think, that nature, by  SECT. 
an  original  instinct,  instructs  us  in all these  methods  of -  a 
acquisition ?  PART  IT. 
These words too, inheritance and contract, stand for ideas 
infinitely complicated ;  and to define them exactly, a hundred 
volumes of  laws, and a thonsand volumes of  commentators, 
have not been found sufficient.  Does nature, whose instincts 
in men are all sifiiple, embrace such complicated and artificial 
objects, and create a rational creature, without trusting any 
thing to the operatioil of his reason? 
But even though all this were  admitted, it  would  not be 
satisfactory,  Positive laws  can certainly transfer property. 
Is it by  another  original  instinct,  that we  recognize  the 
authority of  kings and senates, and mark all the boundaries 
of  their jurisdiction ?  Judges too, even  though their  sen- 
tence be erroneous and illegal, must be allowed, for the sake 
of peace and order, to have decisive authority, and ultimately 
to determine  property.  Have  we  original,  innate ideas  of 
prsetors and chancellors and juries?  Who sees not, that a11 
these institutions arise merely from the necessities of  human 
society ? 
All birds of  tlhe same species, in every age  and country, 
build their nests alike :  In this we see the force of  instinct. 
Men, in different times and places, frame their houses diffe- 
rently : Here we  perceive the iduence  of reason and custom. 
A like inference  may be  drawn from comparing the instinct 
of  generation and the institution of property. 
How great soever  the variety of  municipal laws, it must 
be confessed, that their chief  out-lines  pretty regularly con- 
cur ;  because  the purposes,  to  which  they tend,  are every 
where  exactly  similar.  In like  manner, all houses have a 
roof  and walls, windows and chimneys;  though diversified 
in their  shape, figure, and materials.  The purposes of  the 
latter, directed to the conveniencies of  human life, discover 
not  more  plainly  their origin  from  reason  and  reflection, 
than do those of the former, which point all to a like end. 
I need not mention the variations, which  all the rules of 
property receive from the finer turns and connexions of  the 
imagination, and from the subtilties and abstractions of law- 
topics and reasonings.  There is no possibility of  reconciling 
this observation to the notion of  original instincts. 
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SECT.  which I insist, is the influence  of  education and  acquhil 
-If1-  +  habits, by which  we  are so accustomed  to blame injustice, 
PUT 11.  .that we  are not, in every instance, conscious of  any imme- 
diate reflection  on  the pernicious  consequences of  it.  The 
views  the most familiar to us are apt, for that very reason, 
to escape us; and what we  have  very frequently performed 
from  certain  nlotives,  we  are  apt  likewise  to  continue 
mechanically,  without  recalling,  on every occasion, the re- 
flections,  which first  determined us.  The convenience,  or 
rather necessity, which  leads to justice, is so universal, and 
every where points so much to the same rules, that the habit 
takes  place  in all  societies;  and it  is  not  without  some 
scrutiny, that we are able to ascertain its true origin.  The 
matter, however, is not so obscure, but that, even in common 
life,  we  have,  every moment,  recourse  to the principle  of 
public  utility,  and ask,  What must  become  of  tl~e  world, if 
such practices prevail  ?  How  could  society subsist  under  such 
diswders ?  Were the distinction or separation of  possessions 
entirely useless,  can any one  conceive, that it ever should 
have obtained in society? 
Thus we  seem, upon the whole, to have  attained a know- 
ledge of the force of  that principle here insisted on, and can 
determine what degree of  esteem or moral approbation may 
result from  reflections on public  interest  and utility.  The 
necessity of  justice  to the support of  society is  the SOLE 
foundation of  that virtue ;  and since no moral excellence is 
more  highly esteemed,  we  may conclude, that this circum- 
stance  of  usefulness  has,  in general, the strongest  energy, 
and most  entire  command  over  our  sentiments.  It  must, 
therefore, be the source of  a  considerable part of  the merit 
ascribed  to humanity, benevolence, friendship, public spirit, 
and other  social virtues of  that stamp; as it is the SOLE 
source  of  the moral  approbation  paid  to  fidelity,  justice, 
veracity,  integrity,  and  those  other estimable  and  useful 
qualities and principles.  It is entirely agreeable to the rules 
of  philosophy,  and  even  of  common  reason;  where  any 
principle has been  found to have a great force and energy 
in one instance, to ascribe to it  a  like energy in all similar 
instances.  This  indeed is NEWTON'S  chief  rule of  philo- 
~ophizing.~ 
1  [This  sentence is printed as a note  it the stcolzd rule.] 
in Blit~ons  G to P; and they also  call  Principia, lib. iii. 
SECTION  1V.-Of  Political Society. 
HAD  every man sufficient sagacity to perceive, at all times,  SECT-  IV. 
the strong interest, which  binds  him  to the observance  of .-, 
justice and equity, and strength of mind sufficient to persevere 
in a steady adherence to a general and a distant interest, in 
opposition to the allurements of  present pleasure and advan- 
tage; there had never, in that case, been any such thing as 
government or political society, but each man, following  his 
natural liberty, had lived in entire peace  and harmony with 
all others.  What need of  positive law where natural justice 
is, of  itself, a sufficient restraint P  Why create magistrates, 
where there never  arises  any disorder  or iniquity?  Why 
abridge  our  native freedom,  when,  in every  instance,  the 
utmost  exertion  of  it is found innocent and beneficial P  It 
is evident, that, if  government mere totally useless, it never 
could have place, and that the SOLE foundation of the duty 
of  ALLEGIANCE  is  the advantage, which  it  procures  to 
society, by preserving peace and order among mankind. 
When a  number  of  political  societies  are erected,  and 
maintain a great intercourse together, a new set of  rules are 
immediately discovered to be useful in that particular  situa- 
tion ; and accordingly take place under  the title  of  LAWS 
of  NATIONS.  Of  this  kind  are,  the sacredness  of  the 
person  of  ambassadors,  abstaining  from  poisoned  arms, 
quarter in war, with others of  that kind, which  are plainly 
calculated for the advantage of  states and kingdoms, in  their 
intercourse with each other. 
The rules of  justice,  such  as prevail  among individuals, 
are not  entirely suspended  among  political  societies.  All 
princes pretend a regard to the rights of  other princes ;  and 
some, no doubt, without  hypocrisy.  Alliances  and treaties 
are every day made between independent states, which would 
only be so much waste of  parchment, if they were not found, 
by experience, to have  some  influence  and  authority.  But 
here  is  the difference  between  kingdoms  and individuals. 
Human  nature cannot, by any means, subsist, without  the 
association of  individuals ;  and that association  never could 
have place, were no regard  paid  to the laws  of  equity and 
justice.  Disorder, confusion, the war  of  all againct all, are 
the necessary  consequences  of  such  a  licentious  conduct. 198  CONCERNING  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  MORALS,  OF  POLITICAL  SOCIETY.  109 
SECT.  But nations can subsist without intercourse.  They may even 
IV  .  ,  subsist, in some degree,  under a general war.  The  obser- 
vance of  justice,  though useful among them, is not guarded 
by so strong a necessity as among individuals ;  and the moral 
obligation holds proportion with the usefiLlness.  All politicians 
will allow, and most philosophers, that REASONS of STATE 
may, in particular emergencies,  dispense  with the rules  of 
justice,  and invalidate any treaty or alliance, where the strict 
observance  of  it  would  be  prejudicial,  in  a  considerable 
degree, to either  of  the contracting parties.  But nothing 
less  than the most  extreme necessity,  it is confessed,  can 
justify individuals in a breach of  promise, or an invasion  of 
the properties of  others. 
In a  confederated  commonwealth,  such  as the ACHBAN 
republic of  old, or the Sw~sa  Cantons and United  Provinces 
in modern times ;  as the league has here a peculiar  utility, 
the  conditions  of  union  have  a  peculiar  sacredness  and 
authority, and a violation of  them would  be regarded  as no 
less, or even  as more  criminal, than  any private  injury or 
injustice. 
The long and helpless  infancy of  man requires  the oom- 
bination of  parents for the subsistence of  their young ;  and 
that combination  requires  the  virtue  of  CHASTITY  or 
fidelity to the marriage bed.  Without such a utility, it will 
readily be owned, that such a virtue would never  have  been 
thought of.' 
An infidelitx of  this nature is much  more  pernicious  in 
women than in men.  Hence the laws  of  chastity are much 
stricter over the one sex than over the other. 
These rules  have  all a reference  to generation ;  and yet 
women past child-bearing  are no  more  supposed to be  ex- 
eillpted from them than those in the flower  of  their youth 
1  The  only  solution,  which  PLATO 
gives to all  the  objections, that  might 
be  raised  againet  the  community  of 
women,  estab:isk.ed  in  his  imaginary 
commonwealth,  is Kdthhra~a  yhp 6h  70670 
KS)  hiyrrar  ~al  ,irhi[~rar,  8rr  rb pJv 
&+E'hipav  ~aAdv.  1  b 6; flhafl~pbv  aiaXpdv. 
Scite enim istud & dicitur cj dicetur, ICE 
pod  utile sit ?wnez:ttrm esse, quod autm 
inutile sit tu~r  esse.  De Rep. lib. 5. p. 
457,  ex  edit.  Ser.  And  this  maxim 
will  admit  of no  doubt, where  public 
utility is concerned ;  which  is PLATO'S 
meaning.  And  indeed  to what  other 
purpose do all the ideas of chastity and 
modesty  serve?  Nisi  utile  cst  quod 
facimus,  .frustra est glom'n, says PHB- 
DRUS,  8, 17,12.  K~Y  76~  flAaB~p6v 
ottiiv. says PLUTARC~  de  vitioso  pudore, 
520,  F.  Nihil  eorum  quse  damnosa 
sunt, pulchrum est.  The same was the 
opinion of the Stoics. cliaarv o8v oi %TWKO~ 
hyaebv  ~i'var  &$;hrcav  4  oi'x  krppv 
&q~~cias,  &$~hcravp~vh~yovrcs  rhv  hptrhv 
~al  rbv  awov6alav ~pGtc~j.  SEXT.  'EMP. 
lib. 3. cap. 20. 
and  beauty.  General rules are often extended  beyond  the  SECT. 
principle, whence they first arise ;  and this in all matters of .z, 
taste  and sentiment.  It  is it vulgar  story at PARIS,  that, 
during the rage  of  the MISSISSIPPI,  a hump-backed  fellow 
went  every day  into the  RUE  DE  QUINCEHPOIX,  where  the 
stock-jobbers  met  in great crowds,  and was  well  paid  for 
allowing them to make use of  his hump as a desk.,  in order 
to sign their contracts upon  it.  Would  the foktune, which 
he raised  by this expedient,  make him a handsome  fellow ; 
though  it  be  confessed,  that  personal  beauty  ariaes  very 
much from ideas of  utility ?  The imagination is influenced 
by associations of  ideas;  which,  though they arise  at first  - 
from the judgment, are not easily altered by every particular 
exception  that occurs  to  us.  To  which we  may  add, in 
the present  case  of  chastity,  that the example  of  the old 
would be  pernicious  to  the young ; and that women, con- 
tinually foreseeing that a certain time would bring them the 
liberty of  indulgence, would naturally advance  that period, 
and think more lightly of  this  whole  duty, so  requisite  to 
society. 
Those  who  live  in the same  family  have  such frequent 
opportunities of  licence of this kind, that nothing could pre- 
serve purity of  manners, were marriage  allowed, among  the 
nearest relations,  or  any intercourse  of  love  between  them 
ratified  by  law  and  custom.  INCEST,  therefore,  being 
pernicious  in a superior degree, has also a superior turpitude 
and moral deformity annexed to it. 
What  is the reason,  why,  by  the  ATHENIAN  laws,  one 
might  marry  a  half-sister by  the father,  but  not  by  the 
mother?  Plainly this : The  manners  of  the ATHENIANS 
were so reserved, that a man was never permitted to approach 
the  women's  apa~tment,  even  in the  same family,  unless 
where he visited his own mother,  His step-mother and her 
children were as much  shut up  from him  as the women  of 
any  other  family,  and  there  was  as little  danger  of  any 
criminal correspondence between them.  Uncles and nieces, 
for a like reason, might marry at ATHENS  ;  but neither these, 
nor half-brothers and sisters, could contract that alliance at 
ROME,  where  the intercourse  was  more  open  between  the 
sexes.  Public utility is the cause of  all these variations. 
To repeat, to a man's  prejudice, any thing that escaped 
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'77-  private letters, is highly blamed.  The free and social inter- 
?-- course of  minds must be  extremely checked, where  no such 
rules of  fidelity are established. 
Even  in repeating  stories, whence  we  can  foresee  no  ill 
consequences to result, the giving of  one's  author is regarded 
as a  piece  of  indiscretion,  if  not  of  immorality.  These 
stories, in passing from hand to hand, and receiving  all the 
usual variations, frequently come about to the persons  con- 
cerned, and produce animosities and quarrels among people, 
whose intentions are the most innocent and inoffensive. 
To pry into secrets, to open  or even  read  the  letters  of 
others,  to play  the  spy upon  their  words  and  looks  and 
actions ;  what habits more  inconvenient in society ?  What 
habits, of  consequence, more blameable ? 
This principle is also the foundation of  most of  the law:, 
of  good manners ;  a  kind of  lesser  morality, calculated for 
the ease  of  company and conversation.  Too  much  or too 
little ceremony are both blamed, and every thing, which pro- 
motes  ease,  without  an indecent familiarity,  is useful  and 
laudable. 
Constancy  in friendships, attachments,  and familiarities, 
is commendable, and is requisite to  support trust  and good 
correspondence in society.  But in places of  general, though 
casual concourse, where the pursuit of  health  and pleasure 
brings people promiscuously together, public conveniency hacl 
dispensed with this maxim ;  and custom  there promotes  an 
unreserved  conversation  for  the  time,  by  indulging  the 
privilege of  dropping afterwards every indifferent acquaint- 
ance, without breach of  civility or good manners. 
Even in societies, which are established  on  principles  the 
most immoral, and the  most destructive  to the interests of 
the general society, there are required certain rules, which a 
species of  false honour, as well  as private  interest, engages 
the members to observe.  Robbers and pirates, it has often 
been  remarked,  could  not  maintain  their  pernicious  con- 
federacy,  did  they not  establish a  new  distributive justice 
among themselves,  and recal  those  laws  of  equity, which 
they have violated with the rest of  mankind. 
I hate a  chinking  companion, says  the GREEK  proverb, 
who never forgets.  The follies  of  the last debauch  should 
be buried in eternal oblivion, in  order to  give  full  scope to 
the follies of  the next'. 
Among  nations,  where  an iininoral  gallantry,  if  covered  SECT* 
IV.  with a thin veil of mystery, is, in some degree, authorised by  .-* 
custom, there immediately arise a set of  rules, calculated for 
the conveniency of  that attachment.  The  famous court or 
parliament of  love in PROVENCE  formerly decided all difficult 
cases of  this nature. 
In  societies for play, there are laws required  for the con- 
duct of the game ;  and these laws are different in each game. 
The foundation, I own,  of  such societies is frivolous ;  and 
the laws  are,  in a  great measure,  though not  altogether, 
capricious and arbitrary.  So f'ar is there a material difference 
between them and the rules  of  justice, fidelity, and loyalty. 
The general societies of  men are absolutely requisite for the 
subsistence  of  the species ; and  the  public  conveniency, 
which regulates morals, is inviolably established in the nature 
of  man,  and of  the world,  in which  he lives.  The com- 
parison, therefore, in these  respects, is very imperfect.  We 
may only learn from it the necessity of  rules,  wherever  men 
have any intercourse with each other. 
They cannot  even  pass  each  other  on  the road  without 
rules.  Waggoners, coachmen, and postilions have principles, 
by which they give the way ;  and these  are  chiefly founded 
on mutual eage and convenience.  Sometimes also thev are 
arbitrary, at least dependent on a kind of capricious anilogy, 
like Inany of  the reasonings of  lawyers.' 
To carry the matter farther, we may observe, that it is im- 
possible for men so  much as to murder  each  other without 
statutes, and maxims, and an  idea  of  justice  and  honour. 
War has its laws as well  as peace;  and  even  that sportive 
kind  of  war,  carried  on  among wrestlers,  boxers,  cudgel- 
players, gladiators, is regulated by fixed principles.  Common 
interest and utility beget  infallibly a standard of  right and 
wrong among the parties concerned. 
That the lighter machine  yield to  the great city, and of  the preference of 
tlle  heavier,  and, in  machines  of  the  the future to the past.  From like rea- 
silme kind, that the empty  yield to  the  sons,  among foot-walkers,  the  right- 
loaded: this  rule  is  founded  on  con-  hand  int,itles a  man  to the wall,  and 
venience.  That those who are going to  prevents jostli~g,  which peaceable peo- 
the capital  take  place  of  those  who  ple  find  very  disagreeable  and  incon- 
are comlng  from  it; this  see~ns  to  be  venient. 
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SECT.  V.-  Why  Utility pleasea. 
PART  I. 
IT  seems so natural a thought to ascribe to their utility the  v. -  praise, which we bestow on the social virtues, that one would 
Pmr'.  expect  to meet  with  this  principle  every  where  in moral 
writers, as the chief foundation of their reasoning and enquiry. 
In common  life, we  ,nay  observe,  that the circumstance of 
utility is always appealed to; nor is it supposed, that a greater 
eulogy can be given to any man, tlian to display his usefulness 
to the public,  and enumerate  the  services,  which  he has 
performed to mankind and society.  What praise, even of  an 
inanimate form,  if the regularity and elegance of  its parts 
destroy not its fitness for any useful purpose !  And how satis- 
factory an apology for any disproportion or seeming deformity, 
if  we can show the necessity of  that particlllar construction 
for the use intended !  A ship appears more beautiful to an 
artist, or one moderately skilled 6l-navigation, where its prow 
is wide and swelling beyond  its poop, than if it were framed 
with aprecise geometrical reg~larit~y,  in contradiction to all  the 
laws of  mechanics.  A  building, whose  doors  and windows 
were exact squares, would hurt the eye by that very propor- 
tion ;  as ill adapted to the figure of  a  human creature, for 
whose  service the fabric was intended.  What wonder then, 
that a man, whose habits a,nd conduct are hurtful to society, 
and dangerous or pernicious to every one who has an inter- 
course with him,  should,  on that account,  be  an object of 
disapprobation,  ind communicate  to  every  spectator  the 
strongest sentiment  of  disgust and hahed  .l 
1 We ought not  to imagine, because 
an inanimate  object  may be  useful as 
well as a man, that therefore  it ought 
also, according to this system, to m6rit 
the appellation of  virtztous.  The senti- 
ments, excited by utility, are, in the two 
cases.  very  different;  and  the  one  is 
mixed with  affection, esteem,  approba- 
tion,  &c.  and  not  the other.  In like 
manner, an inanimate  object may have 
good  colour  and  proportion^ as well as. 
a human figure.  B.lt can  we  ever be 
in love with the former?  There are a 
numgrous  set  of  passions  and  senti- 
ments, of which thinking rational beings 
are,  by  theoriginalconstitution of nature, 
the only  proper  objects:  Arid  though 
the very same  qualities be  transferred 
to an insensible, inanimate  being, they 
will  not  excite  the  same  sentiments. 
The beneficial  qualities  of  herbs and 
minerals are, indeed, sometimes called 
their virtues ; but this is an effect of  the 
caprice of  language, which ought not to 
be regarcled  in reasoning.  For though 
there be a species of  approbation attend- 
ing even  inanimate objects when  bene- 
ficial, yet  this sentiment is  so weak, and so 
different from that which  is directed to 
beneficent  magistrates  or  statesmen, 
that they ought not to be ranked under 
the snme class or appellation. 
A very small variation of  the object, 
even whore the same qualities  are pre- 
But perhaps the difficulty of accounting for these effects of  SECT. 
usefulness,  or  its contrary, has kept philosophers  from  ad-  +  vv 
mitting them into their systems of  ethics, and has induced  PART  I 
them rather to employ any other principle,  in explaining the 
origin of  moral good and evil.  But it is no just reason for 
rejecting  any principle,  confirmed  by  experience,  that we 
cannot give a satisfactory account of  its origin, nor are able 
to resolve it into  _other more general principles.  And if we 
would employ a little thought on the present subject, we need 
be at no loss to account for the influence of  utility,  and to 
deduce it from  principles,  the most  known  and  avowed in 
human nature. 
From the apparent usefulness of  the social virtues, it has 
readily been  inferred  by  sceptics, both ancient and modern, 
that all nioral distinctions arise from education, and were, at 
first, invented, and afterwards encouraged, by the art of poli- 
ticians, in order  to render  men  tractable, and subdue their 
natural ferocity and selfishness, which incapacitated tdhem  for 
society.  This principle,  indeed,  of  precept  and education, 
must so far be owned  to have  a  powerful  influence, that it 
may frequently encrease  or diminish,  beyond  their natural. 
standard, the sentiments of  approbation or dislike;  and may 
even,  in  particular  instances,  create,  without  any  natural 
principle, a new sentiment of  this kind ;  as is evident in all 
superstitious practices and observances : But that all moral 
affection or dislike arises from this origin, will never surely 
be allowed by any judicious enquirer.  Hacl  nature made  no 
such distinction, founded on the original constitution of  the 
mind, the words, honourable  and shameful, lovely  and odiozrs, 
noble  and despicable, had  never  had place in any language; 
nor could  politicians,  had they invented  these terms,  ever 
have  been  able  to render theill  intelligible,  or make them 
convey any idea to the audience.  So that nothing can be 
more  superficial tlian  this paradox  of  the sceptics;  and it 
were well, if, in the abstruser studies of logic and iiietaphysics, 
we could  as easily obviate the cavils of  that sect, as in the 
practical  and  more  intelligible  sciences  of  politics  and 
niorals. 
The social virtnes  must,  therefore,  be  allowed  to have  a 
scrred, will destroy n sentimel~t. Thus,  where  nature  is  not  extremely  per- 
tho  snme  beauty, triinsferred to  n dif-  verted. 
fe~nt  sex, excites no  amorous  passion, 204  CONCERNING  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF 11ORA.LS.  WHY  UTILITY  PLEASES.  !mi 
SECT*  natural beauty and amiableness, which,  at first,  antecedent 
V. 
.-#  to  all precept or education, recommends them to the esteem 
PmTL  of uninstructed mankind, and engages their affections.  And 
as  the  public  utility of  these  virtues  is the chief  circum- 
stance, whence they derive their merit, it follows,  that the 
end, which  they have  a  tendency to promote,  must be some 
way agreeable to us, and take hdd  ofsome natural affection. 
It must please, either from considerations of  self-interest, or 
from more generous motives and regards. 
It has often been asserted, that, as every man has a strong 
connexion with society, and perceives the impossibility of his 
solitary subsistence, he becomes, on that account, ftctvournble 
to all those habits or principles,  which promote order in so- 
ciety, and insure to him the quiet possession of  so inestimable 
a  blessing.  As much  as we  value  our own  ha'ppiness and 
welfare, as much must we  applaud tbe practice of justice and 
humanity, by which alone the social confederacy can be main- 
tained, and every man reap the fruits of  mutual protection 
and assistance. 
This deduction  of  morals  from  self-love, or  a  regard to 
private interest, is an obvious thought,  and has not arisen 
wholly from the wanton  sallies and sportive assaults of  the 
sceptics.  To mention no othe~s,  POLYBIUS,  one of the gravest 
and most judicious, as well as most moral writers of  antiquity, 
has assigned this selfish origin to all our sentiments of virtue.l 
But though the solid, prsctical sense of that author, and his 
aversion to all rain subtilties, render  his  authority on  the 
present subject very considerable ;  yet is not this an affair to 
'  be decided by authority, and the voice of  nature and experi- 
ence seems plainly to oppose the selfish theory. 
We  frequently bestow praise on virtuous actions, performed 
in very distant ages and remote countries ;  where the utmost 
subtilty of imagination would not discover any appearance of 
self-interest, or find any connexion of  our present  happiness 
and security with events so widely separated from us. 
A generous, a brave, a noble deed, performed by an adver- 
1  Undutifulness  to parents is disap- 
proved of  by mankind, ~poa~wpCvovs  7b 
p.r6~~ov,  KaI  ~v~ho~r$o~hvous,  871  7b 
?rapa?rh~~rou  CK~UTOLS  ab~3v  avy~vp+Tcr. 
Ingratitude  for  a  like reason  (though 
he seems there to mix a more  generous 
regard) ~vvayava~~o~vras  piu r$  nhas, 
Civ~dpov~~as  6'  h' ~6~03s  rb  ?rtaprAI]u~ov. 
&v  inroylyvcral  71s Zvvoia rap'  Z~darrp 
703  ~aOij~ov~os  Gvvdp~ws  ual  Ocdpras. 
Lib. vi. cap. 6.  Perhaps the historian 
only meant, that ow  sympathy and hu- 
manity was more enlivened, by our con- 
sidering the similarity of  our case with 
that of the person suffering ;  which is a 
just sentiment. 
sary, commands our approbation ; while  in its consequences  SEm 
it may be acknowledged prejudicial to our partict~lar  interest. .$ 
Where private advantage co~icurs  with general affection for  PABTL 
virtue,  we  readily perceive  and avow  the mixture of  these 
distinct sentiments, which  have a very different feeling  and 
influence on the mind.  We  praise, perhaps, with more alacrity, 
where  the generous, humane action contributes to our par- 
ticular interest:  But the topics of  praise, which we insist on, 
are very wide of this circumstance.  And we may attempt to 
bring over others to our sentiments, without endeavouring to 
convince them, that they reap any advantage from the actions 
which we recommend to their approbation and applause. 
Frame the model of  a  praise-worthy character, consisting 
of  all the most  amiable  moral virtues:  Give  instances,  in 
which these  display tliemselves  after an eminent and extra- 
ordinary manner : You readily engage the esteem and appro- 
bation of all your audience, who never so much as enquire in 
what age and country the person lived, who possessed these 
noble qualities :  A circumstance, however, of  all others,  the 
most material to self-love, or a concern for our own individual 
happiness. 
Once  on  a  time, a statesman, in the shock and contest of 
parties, prevailed so far as to procure, by his eloquence, the 
banishment of an able adversary ;  whom he secretly followed, 
offering him  money  for  his  support  during his exile,  and 
soothing him with topics of  consolation  in his misfortunes. 
Alas! cries the banished  statesman, with what regret must J 
leave my  friends  in  this city, where even enemies are so generous! 
Virtue, though in an enemy, here pleased him : And we also 
give it the just tribute of  praise and approbation ;  nor $0 we 
retract these sentiments, when we hear, that the action passed 
at  ATHENS,  about two thousand years  ago, and that the per- 
sons' names were ESCHINES  and DEMOSTHENES. 
What  is that to me ?  There are few occasions, when this 
question is not pertinent : And had it that universal, infallible 
influence supposed, it would turn illto ridicule every compo- 
sition,  and  almost  every  conversation,  which  contain  any 
praise or censure of men and manners. 
It  is but  a weak  subterfuge, when  pressed by these facts 
and arguments,  to say,  that we  transport  ourselves, by the 
force  of  imagination,  into distant ages and countries,  and 
consider the advantage, which we  should  have  reaped  from 206  CONCEItNING  THE  PrLINClPLES  OF  MOItALS.  WHY  UTILITX  PLEASES.  207 
SECT.  these characters, had we been contemporaries,  apd had  any 
V 
.'&  commerce with the persoas.  It is not  conceivable, how  a 
PARTJ-  .real sentiinent  or passion  can ever arise from a known im- 
ayinn~y  interest ;  especially when our real interest is still kept 
in view, and is often acknowledged to be entirely distinct from 
the imaginary,  and even sometimes opposite to it. 
A man, brought to the brink of  a  precipice, cannot look 
down  without ' trembling ; and the sentiment of  imaginary 
danger actuates him, in opposition to the opinion and belief 
of  real  safety.  But the imagination is here assisted by the 
presence of  a striking object;  and yet, prevails not, except it 
be also aided by novelty, and the unusual  appearance of  the 
object.  Custom soon reconciles us to heights and precipices, 
and wears off  these false and delusive terrors.  The reverse 
is observable in the estimates, which we  form of  characters 
and manners;  and  the more we  habituate  ourselves to an 
accurate scrutiny of  morals, the more delicate feeling do we 
acquire  of  the most  minute  distinctions between  vice  and 
virtue.  Such frequent occasion, indeed, have we, in common 
life, to pronounce all kinds of  moral determinations, that no 
object of  this kind can be new or unusual to us ;  nor could any 
false views or prepossessions maintain their ground  against 
an experience, so coinmon and familiar.  Experienc~  being 
chiefly what forms the association of  ideas, it is impos~ible, 
that any association  could  establish  and  support  itself,  in 
direct opposition to that principle. 
Usefulness is agreeable, and engages our approbation.  This 
is a matter of  fact, confirmed by daily observation.  But, use- 
ful ?  For what?  For some body's  interest, surely.  Whose 
interest  then?  Not  our own  only : For our  approbation 
frequently extends farther.  It must, therefore, be the interest 
of  those, who are  served by the character or action approved 
of;  and these we  may  conclude,  however  remote,  are not 
totally indifferent  to us.  By opening up this principle, we 
shall discover one great source of  moral distinctions. 
PART  11. 
Self-love is a principle in human nature of  such  extensive 
energy, and the interest of  each individual  is,  in general, so 
closely connected with that of the community, that those phi- 
losophers were  excusable, who fancied, that  all our concern 
for the public might be resolved  into a concern  for our  own  SECTe 
v.  happiness  and preservation.  They  saw every  moment, in- -- 
stances of approbation  or blame, satisfaction  or  displeasure  PART  11. 
towards characters and actions ;  they,denominated the objects 
of  these sentiments, virtues, or vices ;  they observed, that the 
former  had a tendency  to  encrease  the happiness, and the 
latter the misery of  mankind ;  they asked, whether it were 
possible that we could have any general concern for  society, 
or any disinterested  resentment  of  the welfare or  injury of 
others ;  they found it simpler to consider all these sentiments 
as modifications of  self-love ;  and they discovered a pretence, 
at least,  for this unity of  principle, in that close union of 
interest, which is so observable between the public and each 
individual. 
But notwithstanding this frequent confusion of  interests, 
it is  easy  to attain  what  natural  philosophers,  after lord 
BACON,  have affected to call the experimentm crucis, or that 
experiment, which points out the right way in any doubt  or 
ambiguity.  We have  found  instances,  in  which  private 
interest was separate from public ;  in which it was even con- 
trary :  And yet we observed the moral sentiment to continue, 
notwithstanding this disjunction of interests.  And wherever 
these distinct interests sensibly concurred, we  always found 
a sensible  encrease  of  the  sentiment,  and  a  more  war111 
affection to virtue, and detestation  of  vice, or what  we  pro- 
perly  call,  gratitude  and  revenge.  Compelled by  these  in- 
stances, we  must  renounce  the theory, which  accounts  for 
every  moral  sentiment by  the principle  of  self-love.  We 
must  adopt  a  more  public  affection, and allow,  that  the 
interests of  society are not, even on their  own  account, en- 
tirely indifferent to us.  Usefulness is only a tendency to a 
certain  end; and  it is a  contradiction  in  terns, that any 
thing pleases as  means to an  end, where  the end  itself  no 
wise  affects us.  If  usefulness,  therefore,  be  a  source  of 
moral sentiment, and if this usefulness be  not  always con- 
sidered with a reference to  self; it follows, that every thing, 
which contributes to the happiness  of  society, recommends 
itself  directly to our approbation and good-will.  Here  is s 
principle,  which  accounts, in great  part, for  the  origin  of 
morality :  And what need we  seek for  abstruse and remote 
systems, when there occurs one so obvious and natural P 
' It is needless to push our researches  or  a  fellow-feeling with  others.  It  8 
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SECT.  Have we any difficulty to comprehend the force of humanity  v  . ;  +  and benevolence?  Or to conceive, that the  very aspect  of 
PART  11-  happiness, joy,  prosperity,  gives pleasure ;  that of  pain, suf- 
fering,  sorrow,  communicates  uneasiness ?  The  human 
countenance, says HORACE,'  borrows smiles or tears from the 
human  countenance.  Reduce a person  to solitude,  and he 
loses all enjoyment, except either of  the sensual or specula- 
tive kind ;  and that because the movements of  his heart are 
not forwarded by  correspondent  movements  in his  fellow- 
creatures.  The  signs  of  sorrow  and  mourning,  though 
arbitrary, affect us with melancholy ;  but the natural symp- 
toms, tears and cries and groans, never fail to infuse compas- 
sion and uneasiness.  And if the effects of  misery touch us..in 
so lively a manner ;  can we  be supposed altogether insensible 
or  indifferent towards  its  causes ; when  a  malicious  or 
treacherous character and behaviour are presented to us ? 
We enter, I shall suppose, into a convenient, warm, well- 
contrived apartment :  We necessarily receive a pleasure from 
its very  survey;  because it presents us  with  the pleasing 
ideas of  ease,  satisfaction,  and  enjoyment.  The  hospit- 
able,  good-humoured,  humane  landlord  appears.  This 
circumstance surely must embellish the whole : nor  can we 
easily  forbear  reflecting, with  pleasure, on  the satisfaction 
which results to every one  from  his intercourse  and good- 
offices. 
His whole  family, by the freedom,  ease,  confidence,  a.nd 
calm enjoyment, diffused over their countenances, sufficiently 
express their happiness.  I have a pleasing  sympathy in the 
prospect of  so much joy,  and can  never  coilsider the  source 
of  it, without the most agreeable emotions 
He tells me, that an oppressive  and powerful  neighbow 
had attempted to dispossess him of  llis inheritance, and had 
long disturbed all his innocent and social pleasures.  1  feel 
a principle in human nature.  We must 
stop somewhere  in  our  examination of 
causes ;  and there are, in every science, 
some general  principles, beyond which 
we  cannot  hope  to find  any principle 
more  general.  No  man  is absolutely 
indifferent to the happiness and misery 
of  others.  The  first  has  a  natural 
tendency to  give pleasure ; the second, 
pain.  This every one may find in him- 
rtelf.  It  is not  probable,  that  these 
princioles  can  be  resolved  into  yrin - 
ciples more simple and universal, what- 
ever  attempts  may have- been  made to 
that purpose.  But if  it mere  possible, 
it belongs  not to  the present  subject; 
and we  may here safely consider these 
principles  as original : Happy,  if  we 
can render all the  consequences suffici- 
ently plain and perspicuous ! 
Uti ridantibus arrident,  ita flenti- 
bus aclflent 
Hnmani rultus.  HOR.  A. P. 101. 
ail immediate indignation arise in me against such violence  SECT. 
and injury.  V.  -' 
But it is no wonder, he adds, that a private  wrong should  PA~TII- 
proceed from a man, who had enslaved provinces, depopulated 
cities, and made the field and  scaffold stream  with human 
blood.  I am struck with horror at the prospect of  so much 
misery, and am actuated by the strongest  antipathy against 
its author. 
In general, it is  certain, that, wherever  we  go, whatever 
we  reflect on  or  converse  about, every thing still presents 
us with the view of  human happiness or misery, and excites 
in our breast a  sympathetic  movement  of  pleasure  or un- 
easiness.  In our serious occupations, in our careless amuse- 
ments, this principle still exerts its active energy. 
A man, who enters the theatre, is immediately struck with 
the view of  so great a multitude, participating of  one com- 
mon amusement ;  and experiences, from their very aspect, a 
superior sensibility or disposition of being affected with every 
sentiment, which he shares with his fellow-creatures. 
He observes the actors to be animated by the appearance 
of  a  full audience, and raised  to a  degree  of  enthusiasm, 
which they cannot command in any solitary or calm moment. 
Every movement of  the theatre, by a skilful poet, is com- 
municated, as it were by magic, to the spectators ;  who weep, 
tremble,  resent,  rejoice,  and  are  enflamed  with  all  the 
variety of  passions, which actuate the several personages  of 
the drama. 
Where any event  crosses  our wishes, and interrupts the 
happiness  of  the  favourite  characters,  we  feel  a  sensible 
anxiety and  concern.  But  where their  suffering8 proceed 
from  the treachery,  cruelty, or tyranny  of  an enemy,  our 
breasts are affected with the liveliest resentment against the 
autlior of  these calamities. 
It is here esteemed contrary to the rules  of  art  to repre- 
sent any thing cool  and indifferent.  A distant friend, or a 
confident, who has no immediate interest in the catastrophe, 
ought, if  possible, to be  avoided by the poet;  as communi- 
cating a like indifference to the audience, and checking the 
progress of  the passions. 
Few species of poetry are more entertaining than paatorat; 
and every one is sensible, that the chief source of  its pleasure 
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SECT*  which it represents in its personages, and  of  which it corn- 
V. 
.,&  municates a like sentiment to the reader.  SANNAZARIUS,  who 
P*~T  transferred the scene to the sea-shore, though he presented 
the most magnificent object in nature, is confessed to have 
erred  in his choice.  The idea  of  toil, labour, and danger, 
suffered by  the  fishermen,  is painful;  by  an unavoidable 
sympathy, which attends every conception of  human  happi- 
ness or misery. 
When I was  twenty, says a FRENCH  poet,  OVID was  my 
favourite : Now  I am  forty, I declare  for  HORACE.  We 
enter,  to  be  sure,  more  readily  into  sentiments,  which 
resemble those we feel every day : But no passion, when well 
represented, can be entirely indifferent to us ;  because there 
is none,  of  which  every man 1las not, within  him, at least 
the seeds and first principles.  It is the business  of  poetry 
to bring every  affection near  to us  by  lively imagery  and 
representation, and make  it look  like truth and reality:  A 
certain proof, that, wherever that reality is found, our minds 
are disposed to be strongly affected by it. 
Any recent  event or piece  of  news, by which  the fate of 
states, provinces, or many individuals is affected, is extremely 
interesting even to those whose welfare  is not  immediately 
engaged.  Such  intelligence  is  propagated  with  celerity, 
heard  with avidity,  and enquired  into with  attention and 
concern.  The interest of  society appears, on this occasion, 
to be, in some degree, the interest of  each individual.  The 
imagination  is sure to be  affected ; though  the  passions 
excited  may not always be so  strong and steady as to have 
great influence on the conduct and behaviour. 
The perusal of  a history seems a calm entertainment ;  but 
would be  no entertainment at all, did  not  our  hearits beat 
with correspondent movements to those which are described 
by the historian. 
THUCYDIDES  and GUICCIARDIN  support with difficulty our 
attention ;  while the former describes the trivial rencounters 
of  the small  cities  of  GREECE,  and the latter the harmless 
wars  of  PISA. The few persons  interested, and the small 
interest fill not the imagination, and engage not the affec- 
tions.  The deep distress of  tho numerous ATHENIAN  army 
before  SYRACUSE  ; the  danger,  which  so nearly threatens 
VENICE  ;  these  oxcite  compassion ;  these  move  terror  and 
anxiety. 
The indifferent, uninteresting stile of  SUETONIUS,  equally  SECT. 
v. 
with the masterly pencil of  TACITUS,  may convince us of the  L-~-& 
cruel depravity of  NERO  or TIBEBIUS  :  But what a difference  P~~T  11* 
of sentiment ! While the former coldly relates the facts ;  and 
tlle latter  sets  before  our  eyes the venerable  figures  of  a 
SORANUS  and a  THRASEA,  intrepid in their  fate,  and only 
moved by the melting sorrows of  their friends and kindred. 
What sympathy then touches every human  heart !  What 
indignation  against the tyrant, whose causeless fear or  un- 
provoked malice gave rise to such detestable barbarity ! 
If we bring these subjects nearer :  If we  remove  all  SUS- 
picion  of  fiction  and  deceit:  What  powerful  concern  is 
excited, and  how much  superior, in many instances, to the 
narrow  attachments  of  self-love  and  private  interest ! 
Popular sedition, party zeal, a devoted obedience to  factious 
leaders ;  these  are  some  of  the  most  visible,  though  less 
laudable effects of  this social sympathy in human nature. 
The frivolousness of the subject too, we may observe, is not 
able to detach  us  entirely  from  what  carries  an image of 
human sentiment and affection. 
When a  person  stutters,  and pronounces  with difficulty, 
~vt:  even sympathize with  this trivial uneasiness,  and suffer 
for him.  And it is a rule in criticism, that every combination 
of  syllables or letters, which gives pain to the organs of speech 
in the recital, appears also, from a species of  sympathy, harsh 
and disagreeable to the ear.  Nay, when we run over a book 
with our eye, we are sensible of  such unharmonious composi- 
tion ;  because we  still imagine, that a person recites it to us, 
and suffers from the pronunciation of  these jarring  sounds. 
So delicate is our sympathy ! 
Easy and unconstrained postures  and motions  are always 
beautiful :  An air of health and vigour is agreeable : Cloaths 
which warm, without burdening the body ;  which cover, with- 
out imprisoning the limbs, are well-fashioned.  In  every judg- 
ment of beauty, the feelings of the person affected enter into 
consideration,  and  colnmunicate  to  the  spectator  similar 
touches of  pain or pleasure.'  What wonder, then, if we can 
pronounce no judgment concerning the character and conduct 
'  Decentior  equus  cujus  astricta  paratior.  Nunquam  enim  species ab 
sunt ilia; sed idem  velocior.  Pulcher  %tilitate  dividitur.  Sed  hy quidem 
aspectu  sit  athleta, cujus  lacertos ex-  discernare modici judicii  est.  QUIN- 
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SECT.  --  of  men, without considering the tendencies of  their actions, 
&  and the happiness or luisej  which  thence arises to society? 
PART  11.  .What association of  ideas would ever operate, were that prin- 
ciple here totally unactive.' 
If any man from a cold insensibility, or narrow selfishness 
of temper, is unaffected with the images of human happiness 
or misery, he must be equally indifferent to the images of vice 
and virtue : As, on the other hand, it is always found, that a 
warm concern for the interests of our species is attended with 
a delicate feeling of  all moral distinctions;  a strong resent- 
ment of  injury  done to men;  a lively  approbation of  their 
welfare.  In this particular, though great superiority is ob- 
servable of  one man above another ;  yet none are so entirely 
indifferent to the interest of  their fellow-creatures, as to per- 
ceive no distinctions of  moral  good and evil, in consequence 
of  the different tendencies of  actions and principles.  How, 
indeed, can we  suppose it  possible  in any one, who wears  a 
human heart, that if  there be subjected  to his  censure, one 
character or system of  conduct, which  is beneficial, and an- 
other, which  is pernicious, to his  species or community, he 
will not so much as give a cool  preference to the former, or 
ascribe to it  the smallest merit or regard ?  Let us suppose 
such  a person ever  so  selfish; let private  interest have in- 
grossed ever so much his attention ;  ~et  in instances, where 
that is not concerned, he niust unavoidably feel some propen- 
sity to the good of  mankind, and make it an obiect of choice, 
if every thing else be equal.  Would any man, who is walking 
along, tread as willingly on  another's  gouty toes, whom  he 
has no  quarrel with,  as on  the hard flint and pavement? 
There is here surely a difference in the case.  We surely take 
In proportion  to the station which 
a man possesses, according  to the rela- 
tion~  in which he is placed ;  we  always 
expect from him a greater or less degree 
of  good, and when  disappointed, blame 
his  inutility; and  much  more  do  we 
blame him, if any ill or prejudice  arise 
from his conduct and behaviour.  When 
the  interests  of  one  country  interfere 
with  those  of  another, we  estimate the 
merits  of  a  statesman by the good  or 
ill,  which  results  to  his  own  country 
&om  his  measures  and conncils,  with- 
out  regard to the  prejudice which  he 
brings on his enemies and rivals.  His 
fellow-citizens  are  the  objects,  which 
lie nearest the eye, while we determine 
his  character.  And  as  nature  has 
implanted  in  every  one  a  superior 
affection to his own  country,*we never 
expect  any regard  to distant nations, 
where  a  competition  arises.  Not  to 
mention, that, while every man consults 
the good of  his own community, we are 
sensible,  that  the  general  interest  of 
mankind  is  better promoted,  than  by 
loose  indeterminate views  to the good 
of a species, whence no beneficial action 
could  ever  result, for  want of  a duly 
limited  object,  on  which  they  could 
exert themselves. 
into consideration  the happinew  and  misery  of  others,  in  SECT. 
weighing the several motives of  action,  and incline  to the ,;- 
former, where  no  private  regards  draw us  to seek our own  PARTIL 
promotion or advantage by the injury of  our fellow-creatures. 
And  if  the principles  of  humanity  are capable,  in many 
instances, of influencing our actions, they must, at all times, 
have some authority over our sentiments, and give us a general 
approbation of what is useful to society, and blame of what is 
dangerous or  pernicious.  The degrees of  these  sentiments 
may be the subject of  controversy;  but the reality of  their 
existence, one should think, must be admitted, in every theory 
or system. 
A creature, absolutely malicious  and spitefill, were  there 
any such in  nature, must  be  worse than indifferent  to the 
images of  vice  and virtue.  All his sentiments must be in- 
verted, and directly opposite to those, which  prevail  in the 
human  species.  Whatever contributes to the good of  man- 
kind, as it crosses the constant bent of his wishes and desires, 
must  produce  uneasiness  and disapprobation;  and  on the 
contrary, whatever  is the source of  disorder  and misery in 
society, must, for the same reason, be regarded with pleasure 
and complacency.  TIMON,  who,  probably from his affected 
spleen, more  than any inveterate  malice, was  denominated 
the man-hater,  embraced ALCIBIADES,  with great  fondness. 
Go on my  boy !  cried he, acquire the confidence of  the people : 
You  will one day, I foresee,  be  the cause of  great calamities to 
them :  Could we admit the two principles of the MANICHEANS, 
it is an infallible consequence, that their sentiments of human 
actions, as well as of  every thing else, must be totally oppo- 
site, and that every instance of justice and humanity, from its 
necessary tendency, must  please the one deity and displease 
the other.  All mankind so far resemble the good principle, 
that, where interest or revenge or envy perverts not our dispo- 
sition, we are always inclined, from our natural philanthropy, 
to give the preference  to the happiness of  society, and con- 
sequently to virtue, above its opposite.  Absolute, unprovoked, 
disinterested  malice has never, perhaps, place in any human 
breast;  or if it had, must there pervert all the sentiments of 
morals, as well as the feelings of  humanity.  If the cruelty 
of  NERO  be  allowed entirely voluntary,  and not rather the 
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.-d  effect of  constant  fear  and resentment;  it is evident,  that 
P~"11.  TIGELLINUS,  preferably  to SENECA  or  BURRHUS,  must have 
possessed his steady and uniform approbation. 
A statesman or patriot, who serves our own country, in our 
own time, has always a inore passionate regard paid to him, 
than onewhose beneficial influence operated on distant ages or 
remote nations ;  where the good, resulting from his generous 
humanity, being less connected with us, seems more obscure, 
and affects us with a less lively sympathy.  We  may own the 
merit to be equally great, though our sentiments are not raised 
to an equal height, in both cases.  The  judgment here corrects 
the inequalities of our internal emotions and perceptions;  in 
like  manner,  as it preserves us  from  error,  in the several 
variations of  images, presented to our external senses.  The 
same object, at a double distance, really throws on the eye a 
picture of  but half the bulk; yet we imagine that it appears 
of  the same size in both situations ;  because we know, that, 
on our approach to it, its image would expand on the eye, and 
that the difference consists not in the object itself, but in our 
position with regard to it.  And, indeed, without such a correc- 
tion of appearances, both in internal and external sentiment, 
men collld never think or talk steadily on any subject ;  while 
their fluctuating situations produce a continual variation on 
objects,  and  throw  them  into  such different  and contrary 
lights and positions.' 
The more we converse with mankind, and the greater social 
intercourse we maintain, the more  shall we  be  faiuiliarized 
to these general preferences and distinctions, without which 
our conversation and discourse could scarcely be rendered in- 
telligible to each other.  Every man's interest is peculiar tot 
himself, aid the aversions and desires, which result Goln it, 
For  a  like reason,  the tendencies 
of  actions and characters, not their real 
accidental  consequences, are  alone  re- 
garded in our determinations or general 
j udgments ; though in our real feeling 
or  sentiment,  wo  cannot  help  paying 
greater  regard  to  one  whose  station, 
joined  to virtue, renders him really use- 
ful to society, than to  one, who  exerts 
the  social  virtues  only  in good  inten- 
tions and benerolent  affections.  Scpa- 
rating  the character  from the fortune, 
by  an  easy  and  necessary  effort  of 
thought,  we  pronounce  these  persons 
alike, and give them  the  same general 
praise.  The judgment  corrects  or  en- 
deavours to correct the appearance :  But 
is not able entirely to prevail over senti- 
ment. 
Why is this  peach-tree  said to  bo 
better than that other ;  but because it 
produces  more  or better  fruit?  And 
would not the same  praise  be given it, 
though snails or vermin  had destroyecl 
the peaches, before they came to full ma- 
turity ?  In morals too, is not  the  tree 
&known  by  the fruit?  And cannot  we 
easily  distinguish between  nature and 
accident, in the one case as  well as  in the 
other ? 
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cannot be supposed to affect  others in a like degree.  General  SECT. 
language, therefore,  being  formed for  general use, must  be . 
moulded on some more general views, and must ax  t,he epi-  PART  11. 
thets of  praise or blame, in conformity to sentiments, which 
arise fkom  the general interests of  the community.  And  if 
these  sentiments, in most  men,  be  not  so strong as those, 
which have  a  reference to private good ;  yet still they must 
make some distinction, even in persons the most depraved and 
selfish; and must attach the notion of  good  to a-beneficent 
conduct,  and of  evil to the contrary.  Sympathy, we  shall 
allow, is much  fainter than our  concern  for  ourselves,  and 
sympathy with persons  remote from us,  much  fain&  than 
that with  persons  near  and contiguous;  but for  this very 
reascn, it is necessary for us, in our calm judgments and dis- 
course concerning the characters of men, to  neglect all these 
differences, and render our sentiments more public and social. 
Besides, that we  ourselves often change our situation in this  - 
particular,  we  every  day meet  with persons, who  are in a 
situation different from us, and who could never converse with 
us, were we to remain  constantly in that position  and point 
of view, which  is peculiar  to ourselves.  The intercourse of 
sentiments, therefore, in society and conversation, makes us 
form  some  general  unalterable  standard, by which we  may 
approve or disapprove of characters and manners.  And .tihough 
the heart takes not part with those general notions, nor re&- 
lates all its love and hatred, by the universal, abstract differ- 
ences of vice and virtue, without regard to self, or the persons 
with whom we are more intimately connected ;  yet have these 
moral differences a considerable influence, and being sufficient, 
at least, for discourse, serve all our purposes in company, in 
the pulpit, on the theatre, and in the schoo1s.l 
Thus, in whatever  light we  take this  subject,  the merit, 
ascribed to the social virtues, appears still uniform, and arises 
chiefly from that regard,  which  the natural  sentiment of 
benevolence engages us to pay to the interests of  mankind 
andsociety.  If we consider the principles of the human make, 
It  is wisely ordained by nature, that  sentiments  of  love  and  approbation 
private  connexions  should  commonly  than a  great benefit  d9ne to a distant 
prevail  over  universal views  and  con-  commonwealth :  But still we know here, 
siderations ;  otherwise our affections  and  as in  all  the  senses,  to correct  these 
actions  would  be  dissipated  and lost,  inequalities  by reflection, and retain  a 
for  want  of  a  proper  limited  object.  general  standard  of  rice  and  virtue, 
Thus a small benefit done  to ourselves,  founded chiefly on general usefulness 
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SECT.  such  as they appear to daily experience and observation, we  v  .  must, b yriori, conclude it impossible for such a creature as 
p*mII*  man  to be  totally indifferent  to tlie well or ill-being of  his 
fellow-creatures, and not readily, of  himself,  to pronounce, 
where nothing gives him any particular byass, that what pro- 
motes their happiness is good, what tends to their misery is 
evil, without any farther regard or consideration.  Here then 
are the faint rudiments, at least, or out-lines, of a general dis- 
tinction between actions ;  and in propcrtion as the humanity 
of  the person  is supposed to encrease, his  connexion with 
those who are injured or benefited, and his lively conception 
of their misery or happiness ; his consequent censure or appro- 
bation acquires proportionable vigour.  There is no necessity, 
that a generous action, barely mentioned in an old history or 
remote  gazette, should  communicate  any strong feelings of 
applause and admiration.  Virtue, placed at such a distance, 
is liked a fixed  star, which, though to the eye of  reasen,  it 
may appear  as luminous  as the  sun  in his meridian, is so 
infinitely removed, as to affect the senses, neither with light 
nor heat.  Bring this virtue nearer, by our acquaintance or 
connexion with the persons, or even by an eloquent recital of 
the case ;  our hearts are immediately caught, our sympathy 
enlivened,  and our cool approbation converted into the  warmest 
sentiments of  friendship and regard.  These seem necessary 
and infallible consequences  of the general principles of human 
nature, as discovered in common life and practice. 
Again ;  reverse these views and reasonings : Consider the 
matter b posteriori ;  and weighing the consequences, enquire 
if  the nierit  of  social  virtue  be not,  in a  great measure, 
derived from the feelings of  humanity, with which it affects 
the spectators.  It appears to be matter of fact, that the cir- 
cumstance of  utility, in all subjects, is a source of praise and 
approbation :  That it is constantly appealed to in all moral 
decisions concerning the merit and demerit of  actions : That 
it  is the sole  source  of  that high  regard  paid  to justicc, 
fidelity, honour, allegiance, and chastity : That it is insepa- 
rable from a!l  the other social virtues, humanity, generosity, 
charity, affa13ility, lenity, mercy, and moderation : And, in a 
word, that it  is a  foundation of  the chief  part  of  morals, 
which has a reference to mankind and  our  fellow-creatures. 
It appears also, that, in our  general  approbation  of  cha- 
racters and manners, the uscfr~l  tlenc7eney of  the social virtues 
moves us not by any regards to self-interest, but has an in-  SECT. 
fluence much more universal and extensive.  It appears, that . . 
a tendency to public  good, and to the  promoting  of  peace,  PBT 11- 
harmony,  and order  in societj,  does  always,  by  affecting 
the  benevolent  principles  of  our  frame, engage  us on  the 
side of  the social virtues.  And it app=ars, as an additional 
confirmation, that these principles of humanity and sympathy 
enter so deeply into all our sentiments,  and ha;ve so powerful 
an influence, as may  enable them to excite the strongest 
censure  and applause.  The present  theory  is  the simple 
result of  all these inferences, each of  which  seems founded 
on uniform experience and observation. 
Were it doubtful, whether there were  any such principle 
in our nature as humanity or a concern for others, yet  when 
we  see, in numberless  instances,  that whatever  has a ten- 
dency  to  promote  the  interests  of  society,  is  so  highly 
approved of, we  ought thence to learn the force of  the bene- 
volent principle ;  since it is impossible for any thing to please 
as means to an end, where the end is totally indifferent.  On 
the other hand, were it  doubtful,  whether there were,  im- 
planted in our nature, any general principle of  moral blame 
and approbation, yet when we see, in numberless  instances, 
the influence of humanity, we  ought thence to conclude, that 
it is impossible,  but that every thing, which promotes  the 
interest  of  society,  must  communicate  pleasure, and what 
is pernicious  give  uneasiness.  But  when  theae  different 
reflections and observations concur in establishing the same 
conclusion, must  they not  bestow  an undisputed  evidence 
upon it  ? 
It is however hoped, that the progress  of  this  argument 
will bring a farther confirmation  of  the present  theory, by 
showing the rise of  other sentiments of  esteem  and regard 
from the same or like principles. 
SECTION  V1.-Of  Qualities Useful to  Ourselves. 
PART  1.' 
IT  seems evident, that where a quality or habit is subjected 
t,o our examination, if  it appear, in  any respect, prejudicial 
to the person possessed  of  it, or  such as incapacitates  him 
' [In  Editions G  to N this  Section  Part I.,  which subsequently appeared as 
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SECT.  for  business  and action, it is instantly blamed, and ranked 
VI  .  ,  among his faults and imperfections.  Indolence,  negligence, 
PART  1.  . want;  of  order  and  method, obstinacy, fickleness, rashness, 
credulity; these qualities were  never  esteemed by any one 
indifferent  to a  &ara,cter ;  much  less,  extolled  as accom- 
plishments or virtues.  The prejudice, resulting from them, 
immediately strikes our eye, and  gives  us the sentiment of 
pain and disapprobation. 
No quality, it is allowed, is absolutely either blameable  or 
praise-worthy.  It is  all  according  to its degree.  A due 
medium,  say  the  PERIPATETICS,  is  the  characteristic  of 
virtue.  But  this medium is  chiefly determined  by  utility. 
A proper celerity, for  instance, and dispatch  in business, is 
commendable.  When defective, no progress is ever made in 
the execution of any purpose : When  excessive, it  engages 
us in precipitate and ill-concerted measures and enterprises : 
By  such reasonings,  we  fix  the proper  and  commendable 
mediocrity  in all moral and prudential disquisitions ;  and 
never  lose view  of  the advantages, which  result  from any 
character or habit. 
Now as these advantages are enjoyed by the person  pos- 
sessed of  the character, it can never be self-lowe which renders 
the prospect  of  them  agreeable to us, the spectators, and 
prompts our esteem and approbation.  No force of  imagina- 
tion can convert us into another person, and make  us fancy, 
that we,  being that person, reap benefit  from those valuable 
qualities, which belong to him.  Or if it did, no  celerity  of 
imagination  could  immediately  transport  us  back,  into 
ourselves, and make us love  and esteem the person, as dif- 
ferent from us.  Views and sentiments, so opposite to known 
truth, and to each other, could never have place, at the same 
time, in the same person.  A11  suspicion, therefore, of selfish 
regards,  is  here  totally  excluded.  It is a  quite  different 
principle, which actuates our bosom,  and interests us in the 
felicity  of  the person  whom  we  contemplate.  Where his 
natural talents and acquired abilities give us the prospect  of 
elevation, advancement, a figure in life, prosperous  success, 
a steady eommand over fortune, and the execution  of  great 
or  advantageous  undertakings ; we  are  struck  with  such 
agreeable images, and feel a complacency and regard  imme- 
diakely  arise  towards  him.  The  ideas  of  happiness,  joy, 
triumph, prosperity, are connected with every  circumstance 
of his chqracter, and diffuse over our minds a pleasing senti-  SECT. 
ment of  sympathy and humanity.'  -  VI. 
Let us suppose a person originally framed so as to have no  PART  1. 
manner of  concern for his fellow-creatures, but to regard the 
happiness  and  misery  of  all  sensible beings  with  greater 
indifference than even  two  contiguous shades  of  the same 
colour.  Let  us  suppose, if  the prosperity  of  nations  were 
laid on the one hand, and their ruin  on  the  other, and he 
were desired to choose ;  that he would stand, like the school- 
man's  ass,  irresolute  and  undetermined,  between  equal 
motives ;  or rather, like  the same ass between two pieces  of 
wood  or marble,  without  any inclination  or propensity  to 
either  side.  The consequence, I believe, must  be  allowed 
just, that such a person, being absolutely unconcerned, either 
for the public good of  a community or the private  utility of 
others, would  look  on  every quality, however pernicious, or 
however  beneficial, to society, or  to its possessor, with  the 
same indifference as on the most colnmon and uninteresting 
object. 
But if, instead of  this fancied monster, we  suppose a man, 
to form a judgment or determination in the case, there  is to 
him a plain foundation of  preference, where every thing else 
is equal;  and however cool  his choice  may be,  if  his  heart 
be selfish, or if  the persons interested be  remote  from him; 
there must still be a choice or  distinction between what  ig 
useful, and what is pernicious.  Now this distinction is the 
same  in all  its  parts,  with  the  moral  distinction,  whose 
foundation has been so often, and so much in vain, enquired 
afier.  The same endownlents of  the mind, in every circum- 
stance, are agreeable to the sentiment of  morals and to that 
of  humanity ;  the same temper is susceptible of high degrees 
1  One  may venture  to affirm,  that 
there  is no  human creature, to whom 
the  appearance  of  happiness  (where 
envy or revenge has no place) does  not 
give  pleasure,  that of  misery,  uneasi- 
ness.  Fhis seems  inseparable from our 
make  and constitution.  But they  are 
only the more  generous minds, that are 
thence  prompted  t.o seek zealously the 
good of  others, and  to have a  real pas- 
sion  for their  welfare.  With  men  of 
narrow  and  ungenerous  spirits,  this 
sympathy  goes not  beyond  a  slight 
feeling of the imagination, which serves 
ollly  to excite  sentimenk  of  compla- 
cency or censure, and makes  them  np- 
ply tothe object either honourable or dis. 
honourable appellations. Agripingmiser, 
for instance, praises extremely  industry 
and frugality even  in  others, and sets 
them, in his  estimation,  above  all  the 
other virtues.  He knows the good that 
results from them, and feels that  species 
of  happiness  with  a  more  lively sym- 
pathy, than any other you  could  repre- 
sent to him ;  though perhaps  he would 
not  part with  a  shilling to make the 
fortune  of  the industrious man,  whom 
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SECT-  of  the one sentiment and of  the other ;  and the same altera- 
q5  tion in the objects, by their nearer approach orsby connexions, 
P*~T  I* . enlivens the one and the  other.  By all the rules of  philo- 
sophy, therefore, we  must  conclude,  that these  sentiments 
.are originally the same ;  since, in each  particular, even the 
most minute, they are governed by the same  laws, and are 
moved by the same objects. 
Why ,do philosophers infer, with  the  greatest  certainty, 
that the moon is kept in its orbit by the same force of gravity, 
that makes bodies  fall near  the surface of  the earth, but 
because  these effects  are, upon  computation,  found  similar 
and equal?  And must  not this argument bring as  strong 
conviction, in moral as in natural disquisitions ? 
To prove, by any long detail, that all the qualities, useful 
to the possessor, are approved of, and the contrary censured, 
would be superfluous.  The least reflection on what is every 
day  experienced  in life,  will be  sufficient.  We shall only 
inention a few instances, in order to remove, if  possible,  all 
doubt and hesitation. 
The quality, the most necessary for the execution  of  any 
useful enterprise, is DISCRETION ;  by  which  we  carry on 
a safe intercourse with others, give due attention to our own 
and  to their  character,  weigh  each  circumstance  of  the 
business  which  we  undertake,  and  employ the surest  and 
safest means for the attainment of  any end or purpose.  To 
a CROMWELL,  perhaps  or a DE RETZ,  discretion  may appear 
an  alderman-like  virtue, as Dr.  SWIFT  calls it ;  and being 
incompatible with those vast designs, to which their courage 
and ambition prompted them, it might really, in them, be  a 
fault or imperfection.  But in the conduct  of  ordinary life, 
no virtue is more requisite,  not only to obtain success, but to 
avoid the most fatal miscarriages and disappointments.  The 
greatest parts without it, as observed by an  elegant  writer, 
may be fatal to their owner;  as POLYPHEMUS,  deprived  of 
his eye, was only the more exposed, on account of  his enor- 
mous strength and stature. 
The best character,  indeed, were it not rather too perfect 
for human nature, is that which is not swayed  by temper  of 
any kind ;  but  alternately employs  enterprise and  caution, 
as each is useful to the particular purpose  intended.  Such 
is the excellence which ST. EVREMOND  ascribes to mareschal 
TURENNE,  who displayed  every campaign, as he  grew older, 
more temerity in his military enterprises ;  and being now,  SECT. 
from long experience, perfectly acquainted with every incident .  a 
in war, he advanced with greater firmness and security, in a  PARTI. 
road so well known  to him.  Fabius, says  MACHIAVEL,  was 
cautious ;  Scipio enterprising : And both succeeded, because 
the situation of  the ROMAN  affairs, during the command of 
each, was peculiarly adapted to his  genius ;  but both would 
have failed, had these situations been reversed.  He is happy, 
whose circumstances suit his temper ;  but he is more excel- 
lent, who can suit his temper to any circumstances. 
What need is there to display the praises of INDUSTRY, 
and to extol its advantages, in the acquisition of  power and 
riches, or in raising what we call a fortune in the world?  The 
tortoise, according  to the fable, by his perseverance, gained 
the race of  the hare, though possessed of  much superior swift- 
ness.  A man's time, when well husbanded, is like a cultivated 
field, of which a few acres produce more of  what is useful to 
life, than extensive provinces, even of  the richest soil, when 
over-run with weeds and brambles. 
But all prospect of success in life, or even of  tolerable sub- 
sistence, must fail, where a reasonable FRUGALITY is want- 
ing.  The heap, instead of  encreasing, diminishes daily, and 
leaves  its possessor  so  much more unhappy, as, not having 
been able to confine his expences to a large revenue, he will 
still less be able to live contentedly on a small one.  The souls 
of men, according to PLATO  l,  inflamed with impure appetites, 
and losing the body, which alone afforded means of  satisfac- 
tion, hover about the  earth, and haunt the places where their 
bodies are deposited;  possessed with a  longing desire to re- 
cover the lost organs of sensation.  So may we see worthless 
prodigals, having consumed their fortune in wild debauches, 
thrusting themselves into every plentiful table, and every party 
of  pleasure, hated even by the vicious, and despised even by 
fools. 
The one extreme of  frugality is avarice, which,  as it both 
deprives a man of all use of  his riches, and checks hospitality 
and every social enjoyment,  is justly  censured  on a  double 
account.  Prodigality,  the other extreme, is coinmonly more 
hurtful  to  a  man  himself;  and each of  these  extremes is 
blamed above the other, according to the temper of  the person 
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SECT.  who censures, and according to his greater or less sensibility 
VI.  ,  to pleasure, either social or sensual. 
PaT  I.  .  QUALITIES  often derive their merit  from complicated sources. 
Honesty, jidelity,  t~uth,  are praised  for their immediate ten- 
dency to promote  the interests of  society ;  but  after those 
virtues  are once established  upon  this foundation, they are 
zlso considered as advantageous to the person himself, and as 
the source of that trust and confidence, which can alone give 
n man any consideration in life.  One becomes contemptible, 
no less than odious, when he forgets the duty, which, in this 
particular, he owes to hiinself as well as to society. 
Perhaps, this consideration is one chief source of  the high 
blame, which  is thrown  on  any instance of  failure  among 
women in point of  chastity.  The greatest regard, which can 
be acquired by that sex, is derived from their fidelity;  and 
a woman becomes cheap and vulgar,  loses her rank, and is 
exposed to every insult, who is deficient  in this particular. 
The smallest failure is here sufficient to blast her character. 
A female has so many opportunities of secretly indulging these 
appetites, that nothing can give us security but her absolute 
modesty  and reserve ;  and where a breach is once made, it 
can scarcely ever  be  fully repaired.  If a  man behave with 
cowardice on one occasion, a contrary conduct reinstates him 
in his character.  But by what action can a woman, whose 
behaviour  has once been  dissolute, be able to assure us, that 
she has formed  better  resolutions,  and  has  self-command 
enough to carry them into execution? 
All men,  it is allowed, are equally desirous of  happiness; 
but few are successful in the pursuit : One considerable cause 
is the want of  STRENGTH of  MIND, which might enable 
them to resist the temptation of present ease or pleasure, and 
carry them forward in the search of  more distant profit  and 
enjoyment.  Our  affections, on  a  general prospect of  their 
objects, form certain rules of  conduct, and certain measures 
of  preference  of  one  above  another:  And  these decisions, 
though really the result of  our calm passions and propensities, 
(for what else can pronounce any object eligible or the con- 
trary?) are yet said, by a natural abuse of terms,  to be the 
determinations of pure reason and reflection.  But when some 
of these objects approach nearer to us, or acquire the advan- 
tages of favourable lights and positions, which catch the  heart  SECT. 
VI.  or imagination ;  our  general  resolutions are frequently con-  ,d 
founded, a small enjoyment preferred, and lasting shame and  PAR*  1. 
sorrow entailed upoil us.  And  however poets may employ 
their wit and eloquence, in celebrating present pleasure, and 
rejecting all distant views to fame, health, or fortune; it is 
obvious,  that this practice is the source of  dl  dissoluteness 
and disorder, repentance and misery.  A man of  a strong and 
determined temper adheres tenaciously to his general resolu- 
tions, and is neither seduced by the allurements of  pleasure, 
nor terrified by the menaces of  pain; but keeps still in view 
those  distant  pursuits,  by  which  he,  at once, ensures  his 
happiness and his honour. 
Self-satisfaction, at least in some degree, is an advantage, 
which equally attends the FOOL and the WISE MAN : But 
it is the only one ;  nor is there any other circumstance in the 
conduct of life, where they are upon an equal footing.  Busi- 
ness, books, conversation ;  for all of  these,  a  fool  is totally 
incal~acit~ated,  and except condemned  by his station to the 
coarsest  drudgery, remains a useless burthen upon the earth. 
Accordingly,  it is found, that men are extremely jealous of 
their character  in this particular;  and many instances are 
seen of  profligacy and treachery, the most avowed and unre- 
served ;  none of bearing patiently the imputation of ignorance 
and stupidity.  DICAEARCHUS,  the MACEDONIAN  general, who, 
as POLYBIUS  tells us l, openly erected  one altar to impiety, 
another to injustice, in order to bid defiance to mankind ;  even 
he, I am well assured, would  have started at the epithet of 
fool,  and have meditated revenge for so injurious an appella- 
tion.  Except  the a.ffection of  parents,  the strongest  and 
most indissoluble bond in nature, no connexion has strength 
sufficient to support the disgust arising from this character. 
Love itself, which can subsist under treachery, ingratitude, 
malice, and infidelity, is immediately extinguished by it, when 
perceived and acknowledged ;  nor are deformity and old age 
more fatal to the dominion of that passion.  So dreadful are 
the ideas of an  utter incapacity for any purpose or undertaking, 
and of  continued error and misconduct in life ! 
When it is asked, whether a quick or a slow apprehension 
be most valuable?  Whether one, that, at  first view, penetrates 
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SECT.  far into a subject, but can perform nothing upon study; or a, 
VI  .  ,  contrary character, which must work out every thing by dint 
PART  1. . of  application 2  Whether a clear head or a copious invention? 
Whether a profound  genius or a sure judgment?  In  short, 
what  character,  or peculiar  turn of  understanding  is more 
excellent than another?  It  is evident, that we can answesO 
none of  these questions, without considering which of  those 
qualities capacitates a rnan best for the  world, and carries hini 
farthest in any undertaking. 
If refined sense and exalted sense be not so useful  as com- 
mon sense, their rarity, their novelty, and  the nobleness  of 
their objects make some compensation, and render them the 
admiration of  mankind : As  gold,  though  less  serviceable 
than iron, acquires, from its scarcity, a value, which is much 
superior. 
The defects  of  judgment  can be  supplied  by  no  art or 
invention;  but those  of  MEMORY  frequently  may,  both 
in business and in study,  by  method  and industry, and by 
diligence  in committing  every  thing to writing;  and we 
scarcely  ever  hear  a short  memory  given  as a reason for a 
man's  failure  in any undertaking.  But in ancient  times, 
when  no  man  could  make  a  figure without  the talent of 
speaking,  and when  the audience were too delicate to bear 
such crude, undigested harangues as our extemporary orators 
offer to public assemblies ;  the faculty of  memory  was  then 
of  the utmost consequence, and was accordingly much more 
valued than at present.  Scarce any great genius is mentioned 
in  antiquity,  who  is  not  celebrated  for this talent; and 
CIOERO  enumerates it among  the other sublime  qualities oi 
CBSAR  himself. 
Particular  customs  and manners  alter the usefulness  of 
qualities : They also alter their merit.  Particular situations 
and accidents have, in some degree, the same influence.  He 
will always  be  more  esteemed,  who  possesses those talents 
and accomplishments, which suit  his station and profession, 
than he whom fortune  has misplaced  in the part which she 
has assigned him.  The private or selfish virtues are, in this 
respct,  more  arbitrary than  the  public  and  social.  In 
other respects,  they  are, perhaps, less  liable  to doubt  and 
controversy. 
Fuit  in  illo ingecium,  ratio, memoria, literae, cura,  cogitatio, diligentia, &c. 
PHILIP.  2. 45. 
OF QUALITIES  USEFUL  TO  OURSELVES,  225 
In  this kingdom,  such continued ostentation, of late years,  SECT. 
VI.  has prevailed aillong men in active life with regard  to public  __, 
q'irit,  and among those in speculative with  regard to benevo-  PAPTI- 
lence ;  and so  many  false pretensions to each have been, no 
doubt, detected, that men of  the world are apt,, without any 
bad intention, to discover a sullen incredulity on the head of 
those moral endowments, and  even  sometimes absolutely to 
deny their  existence  and  reality.  In like  manner,  I find, 
that., of  old, the perpetual cant of  the Stoics and Cynics con- 
cerning  virtue,  their magnificent  professions  and  slender 
performances, bred a disgust in mankind ;  and LUCIAN,  who, 
though licentious with regard  to pleasure,  is yet,  in  other 
respects,  a  very  moral  writer,  cannot,  sometimes,  talk of 
virtue,  so  much  boasted,  without  betraying  symptoms  of 
spleen and irony.'  But surely this peevish delicacy, whence- 
ever it arises, can never be carried so far as to make us deny 
the existence of  every species of  merit, and all distinction of 
manners and  behaviour.  Besides  discretion,  caution,  enter- 
prise,  industry,  assiduity,  f~ugugality,  economy,  good-sense, 
prudence,  discernment ; besides  these  endowments,  I  say, 
whose very names force  an avowal  of  their merit, there are 
many others, to which the most  determined scepticism can- 
not, for a moment, refuse the tribute of  praise and approba- 
tion.  Temperance, sobriety,  patience,  constancy, p,erseverance, 
forethought, considerateness, secrecy, order, ilzsinuatzon, address, 
presence of  mind, quickness of  conception, facility of  expression ; 
these, and a thousand more of  the same  kind,  no inan will 
ever deny to be excellencies and perfections.  As their merit 
consists in their hndency to serve  the  person,  possessed of 
them, without  any  magnificent  claim  to  public  and social 
desert,  we  are the less  jealous  of  their  pretensions,  and 
readily admit them into the  catalogue of  laudable qualities. 
We are not sensible, that, by this concession, ae  have paved 
the way for all the other moral excellencies, and cannot con- 
fidently hesitate  any  longer,  with  regard  to disinterested 
benevolence,  patriotism,  and humanity. 
It seems, indeed, certain, that firs$ appearances are here, as 
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SECT.  speculative  way,  to resolve  into self-love  the merit, which 
VI  .'.  we ascribe to the selfish virtues  above-mentioned,  than that 
PaT  I*  even of  the social virtues, justice and beneficence.  For this 
latter  purpose,  we  need  but  say,  that  whatever  conduct 
promotes the good of  the community is loved,  praised,  and 
esteemed by the community, on account of  that utility and 
interest,  of  which  every  one  partakes:  And  though  this 
affection  and  regard  be, in reality, gratitude, not self-love, 
yet  a  distinction,  even  of  this  obvious  nature,  may  not 
readily  be made by superficial reasoners;  and there is room, 
at least, to support the cavil and dispute for a moment,  But 
as qualities, which tend only to the utility of their possessor, 
without  any reference  to  us,  or to the community, are yet 
esteemed  and valued; by  what  theory  or  system  can  we 
account for this sentiment f'rom self-love, or  deduce it from 
that favourite  origin?  There  seems  here  a  necessity  for 
confessing that the happiness and  misery of  others  are not 
spectacles entirely indifferent to us ;  but that the view of  the 
former, whether in its causes or effects, like sun-shine or the 
prospect of  well-cultivated  plains,  (to carry  our pretensions 
no higher) communicates a secret joy  and satisfaction; the 
appearance  of  the latter,  like a lowering cloud  or  barren 
landskip,  throws  a  melancholy  damp over the imagination. 
And this concession  being once made, the difficulty is over; 
and a natural unforced  interpretation of  the ph~nomena  of 
human life will afterwards,  we  may  hope, pr.evai.1 among all 
speculative enquirers. 
PART 11.' 
It may not be improper, in this  place,  to examine the in- 
fluence of  bodily endowments,  and of  the good8  of  fortune, 
over our sentiments of regard and esteem,  and to consider 
whether  these  ph&nomena  fortify  or  weaken  the  present 
theory.  'It  will  naturally  be  expected,  that the beauty  of 
the body, as is  supposed  by  all  ancient  moralists,  will  be 
similar,  in some  respects,  to  that of  the mind ;  and that 
every  kind  of  esteem,  which  is paid  to a man,  will have 
something similar  in its origin,  whether it  arise from  his 
mental endowments,  or  from  the situation of his exterior 
circun~stances. 
It is evident,  that one considerable source of  beauty in all 
1  [Part  3 inEtlitions  to N.]  Edition  N, which,  however,  stops  at 
9  ['rh~s  sentence  was  added  in  'origin.'] 
animals is the advantage, which they reap from the particular  SECT. 
structure of  their limbs and  members,  suitably to the par- .  :Is 
ticular manner of  life, to which they are by nature destihed.  PART 
The just proportions of  a horse, described by XENOPHON  and 
VIRGIL,  are the same,  that are received  at this day by our 
modern jockeys;  because  the  foundation  of  them  is  the 
same, namely, experience of  what is detrimental or useful in 
the animal. 
Broad shoulders, a lank belly,  firm joints,  taper legs ;  all 
these are beautiful in our  species, because signs of  force and 
vigour.  Ideas of  utility  and  its contrary,-though they do 
not eniirely  determine  what is handsome  or deformed, are 
evidently the source  of  a  considerable  part of  approbation 
or dislike. 
In  ancient times, bodily  strength and dexterity, being  of 
greater  use and  importance  in war,  was  also  much  more 
esteemed  and valued,  than  at present.  Not  to insist  on 
HOMER  and  the  poets,  we  may  observe,  that historians 
scruple not  to mention force  of  body among the other ac- 
com~lishments  even of  EPAMINONDAS,  wlionl  they  acknow- 
ledge to be the greatest hero, statesman, and  general  of  all 
the GREEKS.' A like praise is given to POMPEY,  one of  the 
greatest of  the  ROMANS.^  This instance  is siinilar to what 
we observed above, with regard to memory. 
What derision  and  contempt,  with  both sexes,  attend 
impotence ;  while  the unhappy object is regarded  as one de- 
prived of  so capital a pleasure in life, and at  the same time, 
as disabled  from  communicating it to  others.  Barrenness 
in women, being also a species of inutility, is a reproach, but 
not in the same degree : Of  which the reason is very obvious, 
according to the  the or^.^ 
DIODORUS  SICULUS,  lib. 15, 88.  I' 
may not be improper to give the charac- 
ter of  EPA~~IN~NDAS,  as drawn  by the 
historian, in order to show the ideas of 
perfect merit, which prevailed in those 
ages.  In other illustrious men, says he, 
you  will  observe, that  each possessed 
some  one  shining quality,  which  was 
the foundation of his fame : In EPAMI- 
NONDAS  all the virtues are found united ; 
force cif body, eloquence of  expression, 
vigour  of  mind,  contempt  of  riches, 
gentleness of  disposition,  and  what  is 
chiefly to be  regad&,  courage and con- 
dllct in war. 
Cum alaeribus, aaltu; cum velocibus, 
cursu; cum valid6 recte cc~tabat. SAL- 
LUST apud VEQET.-De  Re Mil. 19. 
[Edition G adds in a note ;  To  the 
same Purpose, we may obsewe  a Plw- 
nomenon,  which  might  appear  snnle- 
what trivial and ludicrous; if any Thing 
could be trivial, which fortify'd Conclu- 
sions of such Importance ;  or ludicrous, 
which was  employ'd  in a philosophical 
Reasoning.  'Tis a general Remark, that 
those  we call  good Wmen's Men, who 
have  either  signaliz'd  themselves  by 
their amorous Exploits, or whose Make 
of  Body  or  other  symptoms  promiso 
ally extraordinar  Vigour of  that kind, 
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SECT.  There is no rule in painting or statuary inore indispensible  .  V'.  .  than that of  balancing  the figures,  and placing  them  with 
PABT  11.  the  greatest  exactness  on  their proper  center  of  gravity. 
A figure, which is not justly  balanced,  is  ugly ;  because it 
conveys the disagreeable ideas .of  fall, harm, and pain'. 
A disposition  or  turn of  mind, which qualifies a man  to 
rise  in the world,  and  advance  his fortune,  is entitled  to 
esteem and regard, as has already been  explained.  It may, 
therefore, naturally be supposed, that the actual  possession 
of  riches and  authority will  have  a  considerable influence 
over these sentiments. 
Let us  examine  any hypothesis, by which we can account 
for the regard  paid to the rich and powerful :  We shall find 
none  satisfactory,  but that which derives it from  the enjoy- 
ment  communicated  to  the  spectator  by  the  imagei  bf 
prosperity, happiness, ease, plenty, authority, and the gratifi- 
cation of every appetite.  Self-love, for instance, which some 
affect so much to consider as the source  of  every sentiment, 
is plainly  insufficient for this purpose.  Where no good-will 
or friendship  appears,  it  is  difficult to conceive on  what  -  - 
we  mn  found  our  hope  of  advantage  from  the riches  of 
others ;  though we  naturally respect the rich,  even  before 
they discover  any  such favourable disposition towards us. 
We are affected with the same sentiments, when we lie so 
much out of  the sphere  of  their  activity,  that they cannot 
even be  supposed-to  possess  the power  of  serving us.  A 
prisoner  of  war,  in  all  civilised  nations, is treated  with  a 
regard suited to his condition ;  and riches, it is evident,  go 
far towards fixing the condition of  any person.  If birth and 
naturally engage the Affections  even of 
those  whose  Virtue  or  Situation  pre- 
vents anyDesign of ever giving Employ- 
ment to those Talents.  The Imagina- 
tion is  plens'd  with  these  Conccptions, 
and entering with  Satisfaction into the 
Ideas  of  so  favourite  an  Enjoyment, 
feels a Complacency and Good-will  to- 
wards  the  Person.  A  like  Principle 
operating more ertensively, is the gene- 
ral Source of  more  Affiction  and Ap- 
probation.] 
All  men  are equally liable to pain 
and  disease  and sickness ; and  may 
again recover health and ease. These cir- 
cumstances, as they make no distinction 
between one man  and another, are no 
source of  pride  or humility, regard or 
contempt.  But  con~paring our  own 
species  to superior  ones,  it is a very 
mortifying consideration, that we should 
all be so liable to diseases and infirmi- 
ties ; and divines  accordingly  employ 
this topic, in order to depress  self-con- 
ceit  and  vanity.  They  would  haro 
more  success, if  the  common  bent  of 
our  thoughts  were  not  perpetually 
turned  to  compare  ourselves  with 
others.  The! infirmities of  old  age are 
mortifying ;  because a comparison with 
the young may take place.  The king's 
evil is industriously concealed, because 
it  affects  others, and  is  often  trans- 
mitted to posterity.  The case is nearly 
the same with such  diseases as convey 
any nauseous or frightful images ; the 
epilepsy,  for  instance,  ulcers,  mres, 
scabs, etc. 
quality enter for a share, this still affords us an argument to 
8:.  our present purpose.  For what is it we  call a man of  birth,  -==# 
but one who is descended from a long succession of  rich and  PmT 'I* 
powerful  ancestors,  and  who  acquires  our  esteem by  his 
connexion with persons  whom we  esteem P  His ancestors, 
therefore, though dead, are respected, in  some  measure,  on 
account of  their riches ;  and consequently, without any kind 
of  expectation. 
But not to go so far as  prisoners of  war  or  the dead,  to 
find instances  of this disinterested regard of riches ;  we may 
only observe, with a little attention, those phznomena, which 
occur  in  common  life  and  conversation.  A  man,  who  is 
himself,  we  shall snppose, of  a  competent  fortune,  and of 
no profession, being  introduced  to a company of  strangers, 
naturally treats them with different degrees of respect, as he 
is informed  of  their  different  fortunes  and  conditions ; 
though it is impossible that he can so suddenly propose, and 
perhaps he  would  not  accept  of,  any pecuniary  advantage 
from them.  A traveller  is  always  admitted  into company, 
and meets  with  civility,  in  proportion  as  his  train and 
equipage speak him-a man of great or moderate fortune.  In 
short, the different ranks of  men  are,  in a  great  measure, 
regulated by riches ;  and that with  regard  to  superiors  as 
well as inferiors, strangers as well as acquaintance. 
What remains, therefore, but  to conclude, that, as riches 
are desired for ourselves only as the ineans of  gratifying our 
appetites,  either  at  present  or in  some imaginary  future 
period; they beget esteem in others merely from their having 
that influence.  This indeed is their very nature or essence : 
They have  a  direct  reference  to the commodities, conve- 
niencies, and pleasures of  life : The bill of  a  banker, who  is 
broke, or gold in a desart island, would otherwise  be  full as 
valuable.  When we approach a  man,  who  is, as we  say, at 
his ease, we  are presented with the pleasing ideas of plenty, 
satisfaction,  cleanliness, warmth; a  chearful house, elegant 
furniture, ready service, and whatever  is desirable  in meat, 
drink,  or  apparel.  On  the  contrary,  when  a  poor  man 
appears,  the  disagreeable  images  of  want,  penury,  hard 
labour,  dirty furniture,  coarse  or  ragged cloaths, nauseous 
meat and  distasteful  liquor,  immediately  strike  our  fancy. 
What else do we mean by saying that one is rich, the other 
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SECT.  of  those  different  situations  in  life;  it is easily seen what  . "  .  additional light and evidence this throws  on our preceding 
P~T  n* theory, with regard to all moral distinctions.' 
A  man,  who  has  cured  himself  of  all ridiculous  pre- 
possessions, and is fully,  sincerely,  and steadily convinced, 
from experience  as well as philosophy, that the difference of 
fortune makes less difference in happiness  than is vulgarly 
imagined ;  such a one does not measure out degrees of esteem 
according  to the  rentrolls of  his acquaintance.  He may, 
indeed, externally pay a superior deference to the great lord 
above  the vassal ;  because  riches  are the most  convenient, 
being the most fixed and determinate, source of  distinction : 
But  his  internal  sentiments  are  more  regulated  by  the 
pe~sonal  characters of  men,  than by  the  accidental  and 
capricious favours of  fortune. 
In most countries of  EUROPE,  family,  that is,  hereditary 
riches, marked with titles and symbols from the sovereign, is 
the chief  source of  distinction.  In ENGLAND,  more regard 
is paid to present  opulence and plenty.  Each practice has 
its advantages and disadvantages.  Where birth is respected, 
unactive, spiritless minds remain in haughty indolence, and 
dream  of  nothing  but  pedigrees  and  genealogies : The 
generous and ambitious seek honour  and authority and re- 
putation and favour.  Where riches are the chief idol,  cor- 
ruption, venality, rapine  prevail : Arts,  manufactures,  com- 
merce,  agriculture  flourish.  The  former prejudice,  being 
favourable to military virtue, is  more  suited  to monarchies. 
The latter,  being  the chief  spur to industry, agrees better 
with a republican government.  And we accordingly find, that 
each of  these forms of  government, by varying the utility of 
those customs, has commonly a proportionable  effect on tbe 
sentiments of  mankind. 
1 There  is something extraordinary, 
and  seemingly  unaccountable  in  the 
operation  of  our  passions,  when  we 
consider  the  fortune and  situation  of 
others.  Very often another's advance- 
ment  and  prosperity  produces  envy, 
which has a strong mixture of  hatred, 
and arises chiefly from the comparison 
of ourselves with  the person.  At the 
very same time, or at least in very short 
intervals,  we  may  feel  the  passion  of 
respect, which  is a  species of  affection 
or good-will, with a mixture of humility. 
On  the other  hand, the misfortunes of 
our fellows often cause  pity, which has 
in  it. a  strong  mixture  of  good-will. 
This sentiment of  pity is nearly allied 
to contempt, which is a species of  dis- 
like, with a mixture  of  pride.  I only 
point out these phenomena, as a subject 
of  speculation  to  such  as  are  curious 
with  regard  to  moral  enquiries.  It is 
sufficient for the present purpose to ob- 
serve in general, that power and riches 
commonly cause  respect,  poverty  and 
meanness  contempt, though particular 
views  and  incidents  may  sometimes 
raise the passionu of envy and of pity. 
OF  QUALITIES IMMEDIATELY AGREEABLE TO  OURSELVES, 
SECT.  VI1.-Of  Qualities  immediately agreeable  to 
Ozcrselves. 
WHOEVER  hm  passed  an  evening  with  serious  melancholy  SECT. 
people, and has observed how suddenly the conversation was  ma 
v 
animated,  and  what  sprightliness  diffused  itself  over  the 
countenance, discourse, and behaviour  of  every one, on the 
accession of  a good-humoured, lively companion ;  such a one 
will easily allow, that CHEARFULNESS carries great merit 
with it, and naturally conciliates the good-will of  mankind. 
No  quality, indeed, more  readily communicates itself  to all 
around ;  because  no  one has a greater propensity to display 
itself, in jovial talk and pleasant entertainment.  The flame 
spreads through the whole circle;  and the most  sullen  and 
morose are often  caught by it.  That the melancholy hate 
the merry, even  though HORACE  says it, I have  some  diffi- 
culty to allow ;  because I have always observed, that, where 
the  jollity  is  moderate  and decent,  serious people  are so 
much  the more delighted, as it  dissipates  the gloom, with 
which  they are commonly  oppressed;  and gives them  an 
unusual enjoyment. 
From this influence of  chearfulness, both to comlnunicate 
itself,  and to  engage  approbation,  we  may  perceive,  that 
there is another set of  mental qualities, which, without any 
utility or  any tendeney to farther good, either of  the com- 
munity or of  the possessor, diffuse a satisfaction on the be- 
holders, and procure  friendship  and  regard.  Their  imme- 
diate sensation, to the person possessed  of  them, is  agree- 
able: Others  enter  into the same humour,  and catch  the 
sentiment, by a contagion  or  natural sympathy :  And as we 
ca-nnot forbear  loving  whatever  pleases,  a  kindly  emotion 
arises towards the person, who communicates so much satis- 
faction.  He is  a  more  animating spectacle:  His presence 
diffuses  over  us  more  serene  complacency and enjoyment: 
Our imagination, entering into his feelings and disposition, 
is affected in a more agreeable manner, than if a melancholy, 
dejected, sullen, anxious temper were presented to us.  Hence 
the affection and approbation, which attend the former:  The 
aversion and disgust, with which we regard the latter.' 
1  There  is no man, who, on  particu-  the  di~agreeable  passions, fear,  anger, 
lar  occasions, is not  affected with  all  dejection,  grief,  melancholy,  anxiety, 232  CONCERNING  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF AfORALS. 
SECT.  Few men would envy the character, which C~ESAB  gives of 
VII.  .-  CASSIUB. 
He loves no play, 
As thou do'st,  ANTHONY  : He hears no muslc: 
Seldom he smiles ;  and smiles in such a sort, 
As if he mock'd himself, and scorn'd his spirit 
That could be mov'd to smile at any thing. 
Not only such men, as C~AR  adds, are commonly dangerous, 
but also, having little enjoyment within themselves, they can 
never  become  agreeable  to others,  or contribute to social 
entertainment.  In all polite  nations and ages, a relish  for 
pleasure,  if  accompanied  with temperance and  decency,  is 
esteemed a  considerable merit,  even  in the greatest men; 
and becomes still more  requisite in  those  of  inferior rank 
sad character.  It  is an agreeable  representation, which  e 
FRENCH  writer gives of the situation of his own mind in this 
particular,  Virtue I  love,  says he, without austerity :  Pleaszcre, 
withozct e$emhcy  :  And life,  without fearing its end.' 
Who is not struck with  any signal instance of  GREAT- 
NESS of  MIND or Dignity of  Character ;  with elevation of 
sentiment, disdain of  slavery, and with that noble pride and 
spirit,  which  arises  from  conscious virtue P  The  sublime, 
says LONGINUS,  is often  nothing but the echo  or image of 
magnanimity;  and where  this quality appears  in any one, 
even though a syllable be not uttered, it excites our applause 
and admiration;  as may be  observed of  the famous silence 
of AJAX  in the ODYSSEY,  which expresses more noble disdain 
and resolute indignation, than any language can con~ey.~ 
Were I  ALEXANDER,  said PARYENIO,  I  would accept of  these 
ofm  made by  DARIUS. So would I too,  replied ALEXANDER, 
were I  PARMENIO.  This saying is admirable, says LONGINUS, 
from a like prixciple.3 
Go !  cries the same hero to his soldiers, when they refused 
to  follow  him to the INDIES,  go  tell  your  countrymen, that 
you  left  ALEXANDER  compleating  the  conquest  of  the  world. 
'ALEXANDER,'  said  the  Prince  of  COND~,  who  always 
4c.  But  these,  so  far  as  they  are 
natural, and universal, make no  differ- 
ence between one man and another, and 
can  never be the object of  blame.  It 
is  only  when  the  disposition  gives  n 
propensity to any of  these  disagreeable 
passions, that  they  disfigure  the  cha- 
racter,  and  by  giving  uneasiness, con- 
vey the sentiment of  disapprobation to 
the spectator. 
'  J'aime la vertu, sans rudesse ; 
J'aime le plaisir, sans molesse ; 
J'aime  la vie, & n'en crains point 
la fin!  St. Evmxom. 
Cap.  9. 
Idem. 
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admired  this passage, '  abandoned by  h~s  soldiers,  among  SECT.  VU 
'  Barbarians, not yet fully  subdued, felt in himself  such a  --# 
'  dignity and right of  empire, that he could  not believe it 
'  possible, that any one would refuse to obey him.  Whether 
'  in EUROPE  or in ASIA, among GREEKS  or PERSIANS,  all was 
'  indifferent to him :  Wherever he found men, he fancied he 
'  should find subjects.' 
The  'confident  of  MEDEA  in  the  tragedy  recommends 
caution and submiesion ;  and enumerating all the distresses 
of  that unfortunate heroine,  asks her, what she has to  sup- 
port  her  against  her  numerous  and  implacable  enemies. 
Myself,  replies she; Myself,  I  say, and it is enough.  BOILEAU 
justly  recommends  this  passage  as  an  instance  of  true 
sublime.2 
When PHOCION,  the modest, the gentle PHOCION,  was  led 
to execution, he turned  to one  of  his  fellow-sufferers, who 
was lamenting his own hard fate.  Is it not  glory enough for 
you,  says he, that you die with PHOCION  ? 
Place in opposition the picture, which  TACITUS  draws of 
VITELLIUS,  fallen  from  empire,  prolonging  his  ignominy 
from a wretched love of  life, delivered over  to the mei.ciless 
rabble ;  tossed, buffeted, and kicked  about ;  constrained,  by 
their holding a  poinard  under  his chin, to raise his head, 
and expose himself  to every  contumely.  What abject in- 
famy !  What low  humiliation !  Yet  even  here,  says the 
histbrian,  he  discovered  some  symptoms  of  a  miid  not 
wholly  degenerate.  To  a  tribune,  who  insulted  him,  he 
replied, I  am still your emperor.' 
We never excuse  the absolute want  of  spirit and dignity 
of  character, or a proper  sense  of  what is due to one's  self, 
in society  and the common intercourse  of  life.  This vice 
constitutks what we properly call meanness; when a man can 
submit to the basest slavery, in order to gain his ends; fawn 
upon those who abuse him; and degradePhimself by intima- 
cies and familiarities with  undeserving inferiors.  A certain 
degree of  generous  pride or self-value  is so requisite, that 
['  Confidant '  in several Editions.]  diam abstulerat.  To enter thoroughly 
Reflexion 10 sur Longin.  into  this method of  thinking, we  must 
PLUTARCH  in Paoc. 36.  make allowance for the ancient maxims, 
Tacit. hist. lib. iii. 84.  The author  that  no  one  ought  to prolong his life 
entering  upon  the  narration,  says,  after it became dishonoura5le ;  but,  as 
Laniata veste, f~dum  spectnculum duce-  he had  always a right to dispose of  it, 
batur, multis  increpantibzcs, null0 ids-  it then became a duty to part with it. 
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the absence  of  it in  the mind  displeases,  after the same 
VII.  manner  as  the want  of  a  nose,  eye,  or  any  of  the most 
-.  material features of  the face or members of the body.' 
The utility of  COURAGE, both to  the public and to the 
person  possessed  of  it, is an obvious foundation of  merit: 
But to any  one who  duly  considers  of  the matter, it will 
appear,  that this  quality  has  a  peculias  lustre,  which  it 
derives  wholly  from  itself,  and from that noble  elevation 
inseparable  from  it.  Its figure, drawn  by  painters  and by 
poets, displays, in each  feature, a sublimity and daring con- 
fidence; which  catches the eye, engages the affections, and 
diffuses, by  sympathy,  a  like  sublimity  of  sentiment over 
every spectator. 
Under what shining colours does DENOSTHENES  represent 
PHILIP  ;  where the orator apologiqes for his own administra- 
tion,  and justifies  that pertinacious  love  of  liberty,  with 
which he had  inspired  the ATHENIANS. '  I beheld PHILIP,' 
says he, '  he with whom was  your  contest, resolutely, while 
'  in  pursuit  of  empire  and  dominion,  exposing  himself  to 
'  every wound;  his  eye  goared, his neck  wrested, his  arm, 
'  his thigh pierced, whatever part of  his body fortune should 
'  seize on, that cheerfully relinquishing ;  provided that, with 
'  what remained, he might live in honour and renown.  And 
'  shall it be said, that he, born  in PELLA,  a place heretofore 
'  mean  and  ignoble,  should  be  inspired  with  so  high  an 
'  ambition and thirst of  fame :  While you, ATHENIANS,  &c.' 
These  praises  excite  the most  lively  adairation;  but the 
views presented by the orator, carry us  not, we  see, beyond 
the hero  himself, nor  ever regard the future advantageous 
consequences of his valour. 
The martial temper of  the ROMANS,  inflamed by continual 
wars, had raised  their  esteem  of  courage  so high,  that, in 
their langl~age,  it  was  called  virtue, by  way  of  excellence 
and of  distinction from all other moral qualities.  T7~e  SUEVI, 
The absence of a virtue  may often 
be a vice ;  and that of the highest kind; 
as in the instance of ingratitude, as well 
as meanness.  Where  we expect a beauty, 
the disappointment gives an uueasy sen- 
sation,  and produces  a real deformity. 
An abjectness of  character, likewise, is 
disgustful and contemptible in another 
view.  Where a  man  has  no  sense  of 
value  in himself, we  aye  not likely  to 
have any higher  esteem of  him.  And 
if the  same  person,  who  crouches  to 
his superiors, is insolent to his inferiors 
(as  often  happens), this contrariety of 
behaviour,  instead  of  correcting  the 
former  vice,  aggravahs  it  extremely 
by  the  addition  of  a  vice  still more 
odious.  See sect. 8.  Of  Qualities im- 
mediately agreeable to Othe~s. 
Pro  corona, 247. 
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in the opinion of  TACITUS,'  dressed  their hair with a laudable  SECT* 
VIL  intent:  Not for  the pwrpose  of  loving  or  being  loved:  They  .-+ 
adorned  thenzselves  only  for  their  enemies,  and  in  order  to 
appear more  terrible.  A sentiment of  the historian,  which 
would sound a little oddly in other nations and other ages. 
The SCYTHIANS,  according to HERO DO TUB,^ after scalping 
their enemies, dressed the skin like leather, and used it as a 
towel ;  and whoever had the most  of  those towels was  most 
esteemed  among them.  So much  had  martial bravery,  in 
that nation, as well  as in many others, destroyed  the senti- 
ments of  humanity:  a virtue  surely nluch  more useful  and 
engaging. 
It  is  indeed  observable,  that,  among  all  uncultivated 
nations,  who have  not,  as yet,  had full  experience  of  the 
advantages  attending beneficence,  justice,  and  the  social 
virtues,  courage  is  the  predominant  excellence;  what  is 
most  celebrated  by  poets,  recommended  by  parents  and 
instructors,  and  admired  by  the public  in  general.  The 
ethics of  HOMER  are, in this particular, very different from 
those of  FENELON,  his elegant  imitator;  and such as were 
well  suited  to  an  age,  when  one  hero,  as  remarked  by 
THU~YDIDES;~  could ask another, without offence, whether he 
were a robber or not.  Such also, very lately, was the system 
of  ethics,  which  prevailed  in  many  barbarous  parts  of 
IRELAND  ; if  we  may  credit  SPENCER,  in  his  judicious 
account of  the state of  that kingdom.' 
Of  the same class  of  virtues with  courage  is that undis- 
turbed  philosophical  TRANQUILLITY,  superior  to pain, 
sorrow, anxiety, and each assault of  adverse fortune.  Con- 
scious  of  his  own  virtue,  say  the  philosophers,  the sage 
elevates  himself  above every  accident of  life;  and securely 
placed  in the  temple  of  wisdom,  looks  down  on  inferior 
mortals,  engaged in pursuit  of  honours,  riches, reputation, 
and  every  frivolous  enjoyment.  These  pretensions,  no 
doubt,  when  stretched  to  the  utmost,  are,  by  far,  too 
magnificent  for  human  nature.  They  carry,  however,  a 
De moribus Germ. 38.  ing  a  while  up  and  down  idly  the 
Lib. iv. 64.  Lib. i. 5.  country,  taking  only meat,  he at last 
It  is a common use, says he, amongst  falleth  into  some  bad  occasion,  that 
their  gentlemen's sons, that, as soon as  shall  be  offered;  which  being  once 
they are able to use their weapons, they  made known, he is thenceforth counted 
strait @her  to themselves three or four  a  man  of  worth,  in  whom  there  is 
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SECT-  grandeur with them, which seizes the spectator, and strikes 
VII  -&  him with admiration.  And the nearer we  can approach  in 
practice, to this sublime tranquillity and indifference (for we 
must  distinguish it from  a  stupid  insensibility) the  more 
secure  enjoyment  shall we  attain within ourselves, and the 
more grea,tness of mind shall we discover to the world.  The 
philosophical tranquillity may, indeed, be considered only as 
a branch of  magnanimity. 
Who admires not  SOCRATES;  his perpetual  serenity  and 
contentment,  amidst  the  greatest  poverty  and  domestic 
vexations; his  resolute  contempt  of  riches,  and his  mag- 
nanimous  care  of  preserving  liberty,  while  he  refused  all 
assistance from his friends and disciples, and avoided even 
the dependence  of  an obligation?  EPICTETUS  had  not  so 
much  as a  door to his little house or hovel;  and therefore, 
soon  lost  his iron lamp, the only  furniture  which  he had 
worth taking.  But resolving  to disappoint all robbers  for 
the future, he supplied  its place with  an earthen lamp, of 
which he very peaceably kept possession ever after. 
Among the ancients, the heroes in philosophy, as well  as 
those in war  and patriotism, have  a  grandeur and force  of 
sentiment, which astonishes our narrow souls, and is rashly 
rejected  as extravagant  and  supernatural.  They,  in their 
turn, I allow, would  have had equal reason  to consider  as 
romantic and incredible, the degree of  humanity, clemency, 
order, tranquillity, and other social virtues, to which, in the 
administration  of  government, we  have  attained in modern 
times,  had  any  one  been  then  able to  have  made  a  fair 
representation  of  them.  Such is  the compensation, which 
nature, or rather education, has made  in the distribution of 
excellencies and virtues, in those different ages. 
The merit  of  BENEVOLENCE, arising from  its utility, 
and its ter,dency to promote the good of  mankind, has been 
already  explained,  and  is,  no  doubt,  the  source of  a  con- 
siderable part of  that esteem, which is so universally paid to 
it.  But it will also be  allowed, that the very softness and 
tenderness  of  the  sentiment, its  engaging endearments, its 
fond expressions, its delicate attentions, and all that flow of 
mutual confidence and regard,  which  enters  into  a  warm 
attachment of love and friendship : It will be allowed, I say, 
that  these  feelings,  being  delightful  in  themselves,  are 
necessarily ~ommunica~ted  to the spectators, and melt them 
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into  the same  fondness  and delicacy.  The  tear  naturally  SECT. 
VII.  starts in our eye  on the apprehension  of  a warm sentiment . , 
of this nature : Our breast heaves, our heart is agitated, and 
every humane tender principle of  our frame is set in motion, 
and gives us the purest and most satisfactory enjoyment. 
When  poets  form  descriptions  of  ELYSIAN  fields, where 
the blessed  inhabitants  stand  in  no  need  of  each  other's 
assistance, they yet  represent  them  as  maintaining  a  con- 
stant intercourse of love and friendship, and sooth our fancy 
with the pleasing  image of these  soft and gentle  passions. 
The  idea  of  tender  tranquillity in  a  pastoral  ARCADIA  is 
agreeable from a like principle, as has been observed above.' 
Who would live amidst perpetual wrangling, and scolding, 
and mutual reproaches?  The roughness  and harshness  of 
these  emotions disturb  and  displease  us :  We  suffer by 
contagion  and  sympathy;  nor  can  we  remain  indifferent 
spectators,  even  though  certain,  that no  pernicious  conse- 
quences would ever follow from such angry passions. 
As a certain proof, that the whole merit of  benevolence is 
not derived from its usefulness, we  may observe, that, in  a 
kind way of  blame, we  say,  a person is  too  good;  when  he 
exceeds  his  part  in  society,  and  carries  his attention  for 
others beyond  the proper  bounds.  In like manner, we  say 
a man is too  high-spirited, too  intrepid, too  indzzerent  about 
fortune : Reproaches, which  really,  at bottom,  imply more 
esteem than many  panegyrics.  Being  accustomed  to  rate 
the merit  and demerit of  characters  chiefly by their  useful 
or  pernicious  tendencies,  we  cannot  forbear applying  the 
epithet of  blame, when we  discover a sentiment, which rises 
to a  degree, that is hurtful:  But it may  happen,  at the 
same time, that its noble  elevation, or  its engaging tender- 
ness so seizes the heart, as rather to encrease our friendship 
and concern for the per~on.~ 
The  amours  and- attachments  of  HARRY  the  IVth  of 
FRANCE,  during the civil wars of  the league, frequently hurt 
his interest and his cause ;  but  all the young, at least, and 
amorous, who can sympathize with  the tender passions, will 
allow, that  this-very weakness (for  they will  readily call it 
'  Sect.  v.  Part  2.  Why  Utility  dissolute mirth, without a proper cause 
pleases.  or subject, is a sure symptom  and cha- 
*  Cheerfulness could  scarce admit of  racteristic, of  folly, and on that account 
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SECT.  such) chiefly endears  that hero, and  interests  them in  hia 
VII  .  fortunes. 
The excessive bravery and resolute inflexibility of CHARLES 
the XIIth ruined  his  own  country,  and  infested  all  his 
neighbours ;  but have such splendour and greatness in their 
appearance, as strikes us with admira.tion ;  and they might, 
in some degree, be even approved of, if thej- betray not some- 
times too evident symptoms of madness and disorder. 
The ATHENIANS  preiended  to the first invention Lf agri- 
culture and of laws ;  and always valued themselves extremely 
on the benefit thereby procured  to the whole  race of  man- 
kind.  They also boasted, and with reason, of  their warlike 
enterprizes ; particularly against those  innumerable fleets 
and armies of  PERSIANS,  which  invaded  GREECE  during the 
reigns  of  DARIUS  and XERXES.  But though there be  no 
comparison, in point  of  utility, between  these  peaceful and 
military honours ;  yet  we  find, that  the  orators, who  have 
writ  such  elaborate  panegyrics  on  that famous  city, have 
chiefly triumphed  in displaying  the warlike  atchievements. 
LYSIAS,  THUCYDIDEB,  I'LATO,  and ISOCRATES  discover, all  of 
them, the same  partiality ; which,  though  condemned  by 
calm  reason and  reflection, appears  so natural in the mind 
of man. 
It is observable, that the great charm of poetry consists in 
lively pictures of the  sublime passions, magnanimity, courage, 
disdain of fortune ;  or those of the tender affections, love and 
friendship ;  which warm the heart, and diffuse over it similar 
sentiments and emotions.  And though all kinds of passion, 
even  the most  disagreeable,  such  as  grief  and  anger,  are 
observed, when excited by poetry, to convey a  satisfaction, 
from a mechanism of nature, not easy to be explained : Yet 
those more elevated  or  softer affections have a peculiar in- 
fluence, and please  from  more  than one cause or principle. 
Not to mention, that they alone  interest us in the fortune 
of  the persons represented, or communicate  any esteem and 
affection for their character. 
And can it  possibly be  doubted, that this talent itself  of 
poets, to move the passions, this PATHETIC and SUBLIME 
of  sentiment,  is a  very considerable  merit ;  and  being en- 
hanced by its extreme rarity, may exalt the person possessed 
of it, above  every character of  the age  in which  he lives ? 
The  prudence, address, steadiness, and  benign  government 
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of  AUGUSTUS,  adorned with  all the splendour  of  his  noble  SECT. 
birth and  imperid crown, render him  but an unequal com-  -'!Ie 
petitor  for  fame  with  VIRGIL,  who  lays  nothing  into the 
opposite scale but the divine bet~uties  of  his poetical genius. 
The very sensibility to these  beauties, or  a  DELICACY 
of  taste, is  itself  a beauty in  any character ;  as  conveying 
the  purest,  the  most  durable,  and  most  innocent  of  all 
enjoyments. 
These are some  instances of  the several  species of  merit, 
that are valued for the immediate pleasure, which they com- 
municate to the person possessed of them.  No views of  utility 
or of future beneficial consequences enter into this sentiment 
of  approbation;  yet  is it of  a  kind  similar  to that other 
sentiment, which  arises  from views  of  a  public  or  private 
utility.  The same  social  sympathy,  we  may  observe,  or 
fellow-feeling with human happiness or misery, gives rise to 
both ;  and this  analogy,  in  all  the parts  of  the present 
theory, may justly be regarded as zl confirmation of it. 
SE~T.  V1II.-Of  Qualitied immediately agreeabb to Others.' 
As the  mutual  ~hocks,  in  society,  and  the opposition& of 
interest and self-love have constrained  mankind to establish 
€he  laws of  justice ;  in order  to  preserve  the advantages of 
mutual  assistance  and  protection:  In like  manner,  the 
eternal  contrarieties, in  company, of  meh's  pride  aud  self- 
conceit, have introduced  the rules of  GOOD-MANNERS or 
POLITENESS;  in order  to facilitate the  intercourse  of 
minds,  and  an  undisturbed  commerce  and  conversation. 
Among well-bred people, a mutual deference is affected :  Con- 
tempt of  others disguised : Authority concealed :  Attention 
given to each in his turn :  And an easy stream of  conversation 
maintained, without vehemence, without interruption, with- 
out eagerness for victory, and without any airs of superiority. 
These  attentions and regards  are immediately  agreeuble to 
others, abstracted from any consideration of utility or bene- 
ficial tendencies : They conciliate affection, promote esteem, 
1 It is the  nature, and, indeed, the  pleasure,  bepause  they  are  useful  KO 
definition of virtue, that it, is a quality  society, or  useful  or  agreeable  to  the 
Qf the  mind  agreeable to or approved of  person himself ; others produce it more 
by  evey one, who  considers w contem-  immediately : Which  is  the  case  with 
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SECT.  and extremely enhance the merit of the  person, who regulates  .=.  his behaviour by them. 
Many of  the forms  of  breeding  are arbitrary and casual : 
But the thing expressed by them is still the same.  A SPAN- 
rnm goes  out of  his own  house before  his guest, to signify 
that he leaves  him  master of  all.  I11  other countries, the 
landlord walks out last, as a common mark of  deference and 
regard. 
But, in order  to render  a  man perfect  good company, he 
must have WIT and INGENUITY as well as good-manners. 
What wit  is, it  may not  be  easy to define;  but it is easy 
surely to determine, that it is a quality immediately agreeable 
to others,  and communicating,  on  its first  appearance,  a 
lively joy  and satisfaction to every one who has any compre- 
hension of it.  The most profound metaphysics, indeed, might 
be employed, in explaining the various kinds and species of 
wit; and many classes of it, which are now received on the sole 
testimony of taste and sentiment, might, perhaps, be resolved 
into more general principles.  But this is sufficient for our 
present  purpose,  that  it does  affect  taste and  sentiment, 
and bestowing an immediate  enjoyment, is a  sure source of 
approbation and affection. 
In  countries, where  men  pass  most  of  their time in con- 
versation,  and  visits,  and assemblies, these  companionable 
qualities, so  to  speak, are of  high  estimation,  and form  a 
chief part of  personal  merit.  In countries, where  men live 
a more domestic life, and  either  are  employed  in business, 
or amuse themselves  in a  narrower  circle  of  acquaintance, 
the more solid qualities are chiefly regarded.  Thus, I have 
often observed, that, among the FRENCH,'  the first questions, 
with regard to a stranger, are, Is he polite ?  Has he wit ?  In 
ourr  own  country, the chief  praise  bestowed, is always that 
of  a good-~ratured,  sensible fellow. 
In conversation, the lively spirit of  dialogue is agreeable, 
even to those who  desire  not  to have  any share in the dis- 
course : Hence the teller of  long stories, or the pompous de- 
claimer,  is very little  approved  of.  But most  men  desire 
likewise their turn in the conversation,  and  regard, with a 
very evil eye, that loquacity, which  deprives them of  a right 
they are naturally so jealous  of. 
There  is  a  sort  of  harmless  liars, frequently  to be  met 
with in company, who deal much  in the marvellous.  Their 
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usual intention  is to please  and  entertain ; but as men are  SECT. 
nlost  delighted with what  they conceive  to  be  truth, these  'fl'*  , 
people  mistake extremely the means  of  pleasing, and incur 
universal  blanze.  Some  indulgence,  however,  to  lying  or 
fictioiz  is  given  in humorous  stories ;  because  it is  there 
really  agreeable and entertaining;  and truth is not of  any 
importance. 
Eloquence,  genius  of  all  kinds,  even  good  sense,  and 
sound reasoning, when it  rises to an eminent degree, and is 
employed upon subjects of  any considerable dignity and nice 
discernment ;  all these endowments seem immediately agree- 
able, and have a merit distinct from their usefulness.  Rarity, 
likewise, which so much enhances  the price of  every thing, 
must set an additional value  on  these  noble  talents of  the 
human mind. 
Modesty  nzay  be  understood  in  different  senses,  even 
n,bstracted from chastity, which has been already treated of. 
It sometimes  means that tenderness  and nicety of  honour, 
that apprehension of blame, that dread of intrusion or injury 
towards others, that PUDOR,  which is the proper guardian of 
every kind  of  virtue,  and  a  sure  preservative  against vice 
and corruption.  But its most  usual  meaning is when it is 
opposed  to impudence and  arrogance, and  expresses a diffi- 
dence of  our own judgment, and a due attention and regard 
for others.  In  young men chiefly, this quality is a sure sign 
of  good sense ;  and is also the certain means of augmenting 
that endowment, by preserving their ears open to  instruction, 
and making them still grasp aRsr new attainments.  But it 
has a farther charm to every spectator ;  by flattering every 
man's  vanity,  and presenting  the appearance  of  a  docile 
pupil, who receives, with proper attention and respect, every 
word they utter. 
Men have, in general, a much  greater propensity to over- 
value  than  under-value  themselves ; notwithstanding  the 
opinion of  ARISTOTLE.~  This makes us more  jealous of  the 
excess on the former side, and  causes  us to regard, with a 
peculiar  indulgence, all tendency to modesty and  self-diffi- 
dence;  as  esteeming  the  danger  less  of  falling  into  any 
vicious  extreme  of  that nature.  It is thus,  in countries, 
where men's  bodies are apt to exceed in corpulency, personal 
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SECT.  beauty is placed  in a  much  greater  degree  of  slenderness, 
-  than  in  countries,  where  that  is the  most  usual  defect. 
Being so  often  struck with instances  of  one species of  de- 
formity, men think they can  never keep at too  great a  dis- 
tance  from  it, and wish  always  to have  a  leaning to the 
opposite  side.  In like manner,  were  the  door  opened  to 
self-praise,  and were MONTAIGNE'S  maxim observed, that one 
should  say  as frankly, I  have  sense, I  have  learning, I  have 
courage, beauty, or  wit ;  as it is sure we often think so ;  were 
this the case, I say, every one  is sensible, that such a flood 
of  impertinence  would  break  in upon us, as would  render 
society  wholly  intolerable.  For  this  reason  custom  has 
established  it  as a  rule,  in  common  societies,  that  men 
should not indulge themselves  in self-praise, or even  speak 
much of  themselves ;  and it is only among intimate friends 
or people of  very manly behaviour, that one is allowed to do 
himself justice.  No  body finds fault with MAURICE,  Prince 
of  ORANGE,  for  his  reply to  one, who asked  him,  whom  he 
esteemed the first general of the age, The marquis of  SPINOLA, 
said he, is the second.  Though it is observable, that the self- 
praise implied  is here  better  implied, than  if  it had been 
directly expressed, without any cover or disguise. 
He must be a very superficial thinker, who imagines, that 
all instances of  mntual  deference  are to be  understood  in 
earnest, and that a man would be more esteemable for being 
ignorant of  his own merits and accomplishments.  A small 
bias  towards modesty,  even  in the internal  sentiment,  is 
favourably regarded, especially in young people ;  and a strong 
bias is required, in the outward behaviour : But this excludes 
not a noble pride and spirit, which may openly display itself 
in its full extent, when one lies under calumny or oppression 
of  any  kind.  The  generous  contumacy  of  SOCRATES,  as 
CICERO  calls it, has been  highly  celebrated  in all ages ;  and 
when joined to the usual  modesty of  his  behaviour, forms a 
shining character. IPHICRATES,  the ATHENIAN,  being accused 
of betrayi~g  the interests of  his country,  asked his accuser, 
Would you, says he, have,  on a like occasio~,  been  guilty of  that 
crime ?  By ng means, replied the other.  And  can you  thm 
imagine,  cried  the hero,  that IPHICRATES  would be  guilty?' 
In short,  a  generous  spirit  and  self-value,  well  founded, 
decently  disguised,  and courageously supported under dis- 
' QUINCTIL.  lib. v. cap. 12. 
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tress and calumny, is a great excellency, and seenis to derive  SECT. 
VIII.  its merit from the noble  elevation  of  its sentiment,  or its .-, 
immediate  agreeableness to its possessor.  In  ordinary cha- 
racters,  we  approve of  a bias  towards  modesty,  which is a 
quality immediately agreeable to others : The vicious  excess 
of  the former  virtue,  namely,  insolence or haughtiness,  is 
immediately disagreeable to others : The excess of the latter 
is so to the possessor.  Thus are the boundaries of  these 
duties adjusted. 
A  desire of  fame,  reputation,  or a character with others, 
is so far from  being blameable,  that it  seems  inseparable 
from virtue,  genius,  capacity,  and a generous or noble  dis- 
position.  An attention even to trivial  matters, in order to 
please, is also expected and demanded by society ;  and no one 
is surprised, if he find a man in company, to observe a greater 
elegance of  dress and  more  pleasant  flow  of  conversation, 
than when he passes  his time  at home,  and with his own 
family.  Wherein, then, consists VANITY, which is so justly 
regarded  as a  fault or imperfection.  It  seems  to  consist 
chiefly in such  an intemperate display  of  our advantages, 
honours, and accomplishments ;  in such an importunate and 
open  demand of  praise  and  admiration,  as is  offensive  to 
others, and encroaches too far on their secret vanity and am- 
bition.  It  is besides  a  sure symptom of  the want of  true 
dignity and elevation of mind, which is so great an ornament 
in any character.  For why that impatient desire of applause ; 
as if you were not justly entitled to it, and might not reason- 
ably expect,  that it would  for  ever  attend you?  Why so 
anxious to inform us of  the great company which  you  have 
kept;  the obliging  things  which  were  said  to you; the 
honours,  the distinctions  which  you met with ;  as if  these 
were not things of course, and what we could readily, of our- 
selves, have imagined, without being told of them ? 
\ 
DECENCY, or a proper regard to age, sex, character, and 
station in the world,  may be ranked  among  the qualities, 
which  are immediately  agreeable  to others,  and which, by 
that means, acquire praise and approbation.  An effeminate 
behaviour in a man, a rough manner in a woman ;  these are 
ugly because unsuitable to each character, and different from 
the qualities which  we  expect in the sexes.  It is as if  a 
tragedy  abounded  in comic beauties, or a comedy in tragic. 
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SECT.  sentiment to the spectators, the source of  blame  and disap- 
VIII  . , .  probation.  This  is  that indecorum,  which  is explained  SO 
.much at large by CICERO  in his Offices. 
Among the other virtues,  we  may  also give CLEANLI- 
NESS  a  place;  since it naturally  renders  us  agreeable  to 
others, and is no inconsiderable source of  love and affection. 
No  one will deny,  that a negligence  in this particular is a 
fault; and as faults are nothing but  smaller  vices,  and this 
fault can have  no  other  origin than tlie  uneasy  sensation, 
which it excites in others ;  we  may,  in this instance, seem- 
ingly so trivial, clearly discover the origin of  moral distinc- 
tions, about which the learned  have  involved  themselves in 
such mazes of  perplexity and error. 
But besides all the agreeable qualities, the origin of  whose 
beauty,  we  can,  in some  degree  explain  and  account for, 
there still remains  something mysterious  and inexplicable, 
which  conveys an immediate  satisfaction to the spectator, 
but how, or why, or for what  restson,  he  cannot pretend  to 
determine.  There  is  a  MANNER,  a  grace,  an  ease,  a 
genteelness,  an I-know-not-what,  which  some  men  possess 
above others, which  is  very  different  from  external beauty 
and comeliness,  and which,  however,  catches  our  affection 
almost as suddenly and powerfully.  And though this manner 
be chiefly talked of  in the passion between the sexes, where 
the concealed magic is easily explained, yet  surely much of 
it prevails in all our  estimation of  characters,  and forms no 
inconsiderable part of  personal merit.  This class of accom- 
plishments,  therefore,  must be trusted  kmtirely to the blind, 
but sure testimony of taste and sentiment; and must be con- 
sidered as a part of  ethics,  left  by  nature  to baffle  all the 
pride of  philosophy, and  make  her  sensible of  her  narrow 
boundaries and slender acquisitions. 
We  approve  of  another,  because  of  his  wit,  pciliteness, 
modesty, decency,  or  any  agreeable  quality which  he  pos- 
sesses ;  although  he  be  not  of  our  acquaintance,  nor  has 
ever given LS any entertainment, by means of  these  accom- 
plishments.  The idea,  which we  form of  their effect on his 
acquaintancc, has an agreeable influence on our imagination, 
and  gives us the sentiment of  approbation.  This principle 
enters into  all  the judgments,  which  we  form concerning 
manners and characters. 
PART  I. 
IT  may justly appear surprising, that any man, in so late an  SECT. 
age, should find it requisite to prove, by elaborate reasoning,  '7- . 
'that  PERSONAL  MERIT  consists  altogether  in  the  PARTI. 
possession  of  mental  qualities,  ~~seful  or agreeable  to  the 
person himself  or to others.  It might be  expected, that this 
principle would have occurred even to the first rude, unprac- 
tised enquirers concerning  morals,  and  been received  from 
its own  evidence,  without  any  argument  or  disputation. 
Whatever is valuable in any kind, so naturally classes itself 
under the  division of  zcsqfq~l or  agreeable,  the utile  or the 
dulce, that it is not easy to imagine, why we should ever seek 
farther, or consider the question as a matter of nice research 
or enquiry.  And as every thing useful  or  agreeable  must 
possess these qualities with regard  either to the person him- 
self or to others,  the compleat  delineation  or  description of 
merit seems to be performed as naturally as a shadow is cast 
by the sun,  or  an image  is  reflected  upon  water.  If the 
ground,  on  which  the shadow is  cast,  be  not  broken  and 
uneven;  nor the surface, from which  the image is reflected, 
disturbed  and  confused;  a just  figure  is immediately  pre- 
sented,  without  any  art  or  attention.  And  it  seems  a 
reasonable  presumption,  that systems  and hypotheses have 
perverted  our  natural  understanding; when  a  theory,  so 
simple  arid  obvious,  could  so  long have  escaped the most 
elaborate examination. 
But however the case may have fared with philosophy;  in 
common life, tliese principles are still implicitly maintained, 
nor is any other topic of  praise  or blame  ever recurred  to, 
when  we  employ any panegyric or  satire,  any applause or 
censure of human action and behaviour.  If we observe men, 
in  every intercourse of  business  or pleasure,  in evejy  dis- 
course  and  conversation; we  shall  find  them  no  where, 
except in the schools, at any loss upon  this  subject.  What 
so natural, for instance, as the following dialogue ?  You are 
very happ~,  we shall suppose one to say, addressing himself 
to another, that you have given your daughter to CLEANTHES. 
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SECT.  He is a man of  honour and humanity.  Every one, who has  .  IX  any intercourse with him, is sure of fair and kind treatment.' 
PART  1-  ;I  congratulate you too,  says another on  the promising ex- 
pectatiolls of  this  son-in-law ;  whose  assiduous  applicatioli 
to the study of  the laws, whose quick  penetration and early 
knowledge  both  of  men  and  business,  prognosticate  the 
greatest  honours  and ad~ancernent.~  You  surprise me, re- 
plies a third, when you talk of  CLEANTHES  as a man of busi- 
ness  and  application.  I met  him  lately  in a circle of  the 
gayest  company,  and he was  the very life and soul of  our 
conversatioll : So much  wit  with  good  manners ;  so  much 
gallantry without affectation ;  so much ingenious knowledge 
so genteelly delivered, I have never  before  observed in any 
one.3  You  would  admire  him  still more,  says a fourth, if 
SOU  knew  him  more  familiarly.  That chearfulness,  which 
you  might  remark  in him, is not a sudden flash  struck out 
by company : It  runs  through  the whole  tenor of  his life, 
and preserves a perpetual  serenity on his  countenance,  and 
tranquillity in his soul.  He has met with severe trials, mis- 
fortunes as well as dangers ;  and  by  his  greatness of  mind, 
was  still superior  to all of  them.4  The image,  gent,lemen, 
which you have here delineated of CLEANTHES,  cry'd I, is that 
of  accomplished merit.  Each of you has given a stroke of  the 
pencil to his figure ;  and you have unawares exceeded all the 
pictures drawn by GRATIAN  or CASTIGLIONE.  A philosopher 
might select this character as a model of  perfect virtue. 
And  as every quality, which is useful or agreeable to our- 
selves  or others,  is,  in common life, allowed to be a part of 
personal merit ;  so no other will ever be received, where men 
judge of  things by their natural, unprejudiced  reason, with- 
out the delusive  glosses of  superstition  and  false  religion. 
Celibacy, fasting, ,penance, mortification,  self-denial, hurni- 
lity, silence, solitude, and the whole train of monkish virtues ; 
for  what  reason  are they  every where rejected by  men  of 
sense,  but  because  they  serve  to  no  manner  of  purpose; 
neither  advunce a man's  fortune  in  the world, dor render 
him a more ~aluable  member of society ;  neither qualify him 
for the entextainment of  company, nor increase his power of 
self-enjoyment?  We observe,  on  the contrary,  that they 
1  Qualities useful to  others.  others.  Section VIII. 
* Qualities useful to the person him-  '  Qualities immediately agreeable to 
self.  Section VI.  the person hidelf.  Section VII. 
Qualities immediately agreeable to 
cross all these desirable ends ;  stupify the understanding and  SECT. 
harden the heart,  obscure the fancy and sour  the temper.  ,  I* 
We justly,  therefore,  transfer them to the opposite  column,  PART  L 
and place them in the catalogue of vices ;  nor has any super- 
stition  force  sufficient  among  men of  the world, to pervert 
entirely these  natural  sentiments.  A gloomy, hair-brained 
enthusiast, after his death, may have a place in the calendar ; 
but will scarcely ever be admitted, when alive, into intimacy 
and society, except by those who are as delirious and dismal 
as himself. 
It seems a happiness in the present theory, that it  enters 
not into that vulgar dispute  concerning the degrees of  bene- 
volence or self-love,  which prevail in human nature ;  a,  dis- 
pute which is never likely to have any issue,  both because 
men,  who  have  taken  part,  are not  easily convinced, and 
because the phaenomena,  which  can be  produced  on either 
side,  are so  dispersed, so uncertain, and subject to so many 
interpretations, that it is scarcely possible accurately to com- 
pare them, or draw from  them any determinate inference or 
conclusion.  It is sufficient for our present  purpose, if  it be 
allowed, what surely, without the greatest absurdity, cannot 
be disputed, that there is some benevolence,  however  small, 
infused into our bosoln ;  some spark of friendship for human 
kind;  some  particle of  the dove,  kneaded into our  frame, 
along with the elements of  the wolf and serpent.  Let these 
generous  sentiments be supposed ever so weak;  let them be 
insufficient  to move even a hand or finger of  our body;  they 
must still direct the determinations of  our mind, and where 
every thing else is equal,  produce a cool  preference of  what 
is useful  and serviceable to mankind,  above what is perni- 
cious and dangerous.  A moral distilzctimz, therefore,  imme- 
diately arises ;  a general sentiment of blame and approbation ; 
a tendency,  however  faint, to the objects of  the one, and a 
proportionable aversion to those of the other.  Nor will those 
reasoners, who so earnestly maintain the predominant selfish- 
ness of  human kind, be any wise  scandalized  at hearing  of 
the weak sentiments of virtue, inlplanted in our nature.  On 
the contrary,  they are found  as ready to maintain the one 
tenet as the other;  and their  spirit of  satire (for such it 
appears,  rather than of  corruption) naturally gives rise  to 
both opinions ;  which  have,  indeed,  a. great md almost an 
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SECT.  Avarice, ambition, vanity, and all passions vulgarly, though 
IX.  -  improperly, comprized under  the  denomination  of  self-love, 
PARTI-  . are here excluded from our theory  concerning  the origin of 
morals,  not  because they  are too  weak,  but  because  they 
have  not a  proper  direction,  for that purpose.  The notion 
of  morals, implies  sonie  sentiment  common to all mankind, 
which  recommends the game  object  to general approbation, 
and makes  every man,  or  most  men,  agree  in  the same 
opinion  or  decision  concerning  it.  It  also  implies  some 
sentiment, so universal and  comprehensive  as  to  extend  to 
all mankind, and render the actions and conduct, even of  the 
persons  the most remote, an object  of  applause  or censure, 
according as they agree or disagree with that rule of  right 
which  is  established.  These  two  requisite  circumstances 
belong alone to the sentiment of  humanity  here insisted  on. 
The  other  passions  produce,  in every  breast, many strong 
sentiments of  desire and aversion, affection and hatred; but 
these neither are felt so much in common, nor  are so  com- 
prehensive, as to be  the foundation  of  any  general  system 
and established theory of blame or approbation. 
When a man denominates another his enemy, his rival, his 
nlztagonist,  his  adversary,  he  is understood  to  speak  the 
language of  self-love, and  to express sentiments, peculiar to 
himself, and arising from  his  particular  circumstances  and 
situation.  But when he bestows on any rnan the epithets of 
vicious or odious or depraved, he then speaks another language, 
and expresses sentiments,  in which, he expects, all his audi- 
ence  are to  concur  with  hirn.  He must  here,  therefore, 
depart from his private  and  particular  situation,  and  must 
chuse a point of view, common to him with others : He  must 
move  some  universal  principle  of  the  human  frame,  and 
touch a string, to which  all  mankind  have  an  accord  and 
symphony.  If he mean, therefore, to express, that this man 
possesses qualities, whose tendency is  pernicious  to society, 
he has chosen this common point  of  view,  and has touched 
the principla  of  humanity,  in  which  every  man,  in some 
degree, concDlrs. While the human heart is compounded of 
the  same  e:ements  as at present,  it will  never  be  wholly 
indifferent  to  public  good, nor  entirely unaffected with the 
tendency  of  characters  and  manners.  And  though  this 
affection of  humanity  may  not  generally  be  esteemed  so 
strong as vanity or ambition, yet, being  common to all men, 
it can alone be  the foundation of  morals, or of  any general  SEC'r. 
IX.  system  of  blame  or  praise.  One  man's  ambition  is  not .,, 
another's ambition ;  nor will the same event or object satisfy  PUT 1. 
both: But  the  humanity  of  one  man  is the  humanity of 
every one ;  and the same object  touches  this  passion  in  all 
human creatures. 
But the sentiments, which  arise  from  humanity,  are not 
only the same in all human creatures, and produce the same 
approbation or censure ;  but they also comprehend all human 
creatures;  nor  is there any one whose conduct or character 
is not, by their means, an object, to every one, of  censure or 
approbation.  On the contrary, those  other  passions,  com- 
monly denominated selfish, both produce different sentiments 
in each individual, according to his particular situation ;  and 
also  contemplate  the  greater  part  of  mankind  with  the 
utmost  indifference and unconcern.  Whoever  has  a  high 
regard  and  esteem  for  me  flatters my vanity; whoever ex- 
presses  contempt  mortifies  and displeases  me : But  as my 
name  is known  but  to a small part of  mankind, there are 
few, who come within the sphere  of  this  passion, or excite, 
on its account,  either  my  affection or disgust.  But  if  you 
represent  a  tyrannical,  insolent, or barbarous behaviour,  in 
any country or in any  age of  the  world; I soon  carry  my 
eye to the  pernicious  tendency  of  such a conduct, and feel 
the sentiment of  repugnance and displeasure towards it.  No 
character can  be  so  remote  as  to be, in this light, wholly 
indifferent to me.  What is beneficial  to  society  or  to the 
person himself  must still be  preferred.  And  every  quality 
or action, of  every  human  being,  must,  by  this  means,  be 
ranked  under  some  class  or denomination,  expressive of 
general censure or applause. 
What more, therefore, can we  ask to distinguish the senti- 
ments,  dependant  on  humanity,  from those connected with 
any other passion, or to satisfy  us,  why the former  are the 
origin of  morals, not the latter?  Whatever conduct  gains 
my  approbation,  by  touching my  humanity,  procures  also 
the applause of  all mankind, by affecting the same principle 
in thein : But what  serves  my  avarice  or ambition pleases 
these passions in me alone, and affects not the avarice  and 
ambition of  the rest of  mankind.  There is no circumstance 
of conduct in any man, provided it have a beneficial tendency, 
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SECT.  person :  But every man, so far removed  as neither  to cross 
IX  . , .  nor serve my  avarice  and  ambition,  is regarded  as  wholly 
PART  L  .  indifferent by  those  passions.  The distinction,  therefore, 
between  these  species  of  sentiment  being  so  great  and 
evident, language-must soon be moulded upon  it, and must 
invent  a  p&uliar  set of  terms,  in  order  to express  those 
universal sentiments of  censure  or  approbation,  which arise 
from humanity, or fro111 views of  general usefulness  and its 
contrary.  VIRTUE aL1d  VICE become then known :  Morals 
are recognized : Certain general ideas are framed of  human 
conduct and behaviour : Such  measures  are expected  from 
men,  in  such  situations : This action  is determined  to be 
conformable to our abstract rule ;  that other, contrary.  And 
by such universal principles are the particular sentiments of 
self-love frequently controuled and limited.' 
From  instances  of  popular  tumults,  seditions,  factions, 
panics,  and of  all passions, which are shared with a multi- 
tude; we may learn the influence of  society, in exciting and 
supporting any  emotion;  while  the  most  ungovernable 
disorders  are raised,  we  find,  by  that  means,  from  the 
slightest and most frivolous occasions.  SOLON  was  no very 
criel, though  perhaps,  an unjust  legislator,  who  punished 
neuters  in civil  wars;  and  few,  I believe,  mould, in such 
cases, incur the penalti, were their  affection  and disoourse 
allowed  sufficient  to  absolve  them.  No  selfishness,  and 
scarce any philosophy, have their  force  sufficient to support 
a total coolness and indifference ;  and  he must  be  more  or 
less than man, who kindles not in the common blaze.  What 
It seems certain, both from reason 
and experience, that a  rude, untaught 
savage regulates  chiefly  his  love  and 
hatred by the ideas of  private  utility 
and injury, and has but  faint concep- 
tions of  a  general  rule  or  system  of 
behaviour.  The man who stands oppo- 
site to him in battle, he hates  heartily, 
not only for tho present moment, vhich 
is almost  unavoidable,  but  for  ever 
after; nor  is he  satisfied  without  the 
most  extreme  punishment  and  ven- 
geance.  But we, accustomed to society, 
and to more  enlarged  reflections,  con- 
sider, that this man is serving  his own 
country and community ;  that any man, 
in rbe  wme  situation, would  do the 
same; that we  ourselves,  in  like cir- 
cumstances,  observe  a  like  conduct ; 
that, in general, humarl  society is Letit 
supported  on  such  maxims:  And  by 
these  suppositions and views,  we  cor- 
rect, in  so'me  measure,  our ruder and 
narrower passions.  And  though much 
of  our  friendship  and enmity  be  still 
regulated  by private  considerations of 
benefit and harm, we pay, at  least, this 
homage to general rules, which we are 
accustomed  to  respect,  that wo  com- 
monly pervert our adversary's  conduct, 
by imputing malice or injustice to him, 
in order to give rent to those passions, 
which arise from  self-love  and  private 
interest.  When  the  heart  is  full  of 
rage, it never  wants  pretences  of  this 
nature ;  though sometimes as frivolous, 
as those from which HORACE,  being al- 
most  crushed  by  the  fall  of  a  tree, 
affects  to accuse  of  parricide  thc first 
planter of  it. 
wonder, then, that moral sentiments are kund of such influ-  SECT. 
ence  in  life ;  though  springing from principles, which ma4y ,  IX. 
appear, at first  sight,  somewhat  small  and  delicate?  But  PART  I. 
these principles, we  must  remark,  are social and universal : 
They form, in a manner,  the party  of  human-kind  against 
vice or disorder,  its common enemy : And  as the benevolent 
concern for others is diffused, in a  greater  or less  degree, 
over all men, and is the same in all, it occurs more frequently 
in discourse, is cherished by  society  and conversation,  and 
the blame  and  approbation,  consequent  on it, are thereby 
rouzed  from  that lethargy,  into which  they  are  probably 
lulled, in solitary and uncultivated  nature.  Other passions, 
though  perhaps  originally  stronger,  yet  being  selfish  and 
private,  are often  overpowered  by  its force,  and yield the 
dominion of  our breast to those social and public principles. 
Another  spring of  our  constitution, that brings  a  great 
addition of  force to moral  sentiment, is, the love of  fame ; 
which rules, with such uncontrolled authority, in all generous 
minds,  and  is often  the  grand  object of  all their  designs 
and undertakings.  By our continual  and earnest pursuit of 
a  character,  a  name, a  reputation  in the world, we  bring 
our own deportment and  conduct  frequently in review, and 
consider how they appear in the eyes of  those who approach 
and regard us.  This constant habit of  surveying ourselves, 
as it  were, in reflection, keeps  alive  all the  sentiments  of 
right and  wrong,  and begets,  in  noble  natures,  a  certain 
reverence  for  themselves  as  well  as  others; which  is  the 
surest guardian of  every virtue.  The animal  conveniencies 
and pleasures sink gradually in their value ;  while every in- 
ward beauty and moral grace is studiously acquired, and the 
mind is accomplished in every perfection, which  can  adorn 
or embellish a rational creature. 
Here is the most  perfect  morality with which we  are ac- 
quainted :  Here is displayed  the force of  many sympathies. 
Our moral sentiment is itself a feeling chiefly of that nature: 
And our regard  to a  character with  others seems to  arise 
only from  a  care of  preserving  a  character with ourselves; 
and in order to attain this end, we  find it necessary to prop 
our tottering judgment on the correspondent  approbation of 
mankind. 
But,  that we  may acconlmodate  matters,  and remove, if 
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SECT.  be  false.  Let us  allow, that, when we  resolve  the pleasure, 
&  which  arises  from views  of  utility, into the  sentiments  of 
PART  I.  humanity and sympathy, we  have  embraced  a wrong hypo- 
thesis.  Let  us  confess  it  necessary  to  find  some  other 
explication  of  that  applause,  which  is  paid  to  objects, 
whether inanimate,  animat'e,  or  rati~na~l,  if  they  have  a 
tendency to promote the welfare and advantage of  mahkind. 
However difficult it be to conceive, that an object is approved 
of on account of  its tendency to a certain end, while the end 
itself  is totally  indifferent;  let  us  swallow this absurdity, 
and  consider  what  are the consequences.  The preceding 
delineation or definition  of  PERSONAL MERIT must still 
retain its evidence  and authority : It nlust  still be  allowed, 
that every quality of  the mind, which  is  useful  or agreeable 
to  the person himsev or  to others, communicates a  pleasure 
to the spectator, engages his  esteem, and is admitted under 
the honourable  denomination of  virtue  or  merit.  Are not 
justice, fidelity, honour, veracity, allegiance, chastity, esteemed 
solely on account of  their  tendency to promote  the good of 
society?  Is not that tendency inseparable  from  humanity, 
benevolence,  lenity,  generosity,  gratitude,  moderation, ten- 
derness, friendship, and all  the other  social  virtues ?  Can 
it possibly  be  doubted,  that industry, discretion,  frugality, 
secrecy,  order,  perseverance,  forethought, judgment,  and 
this whole  class  of  virtues and accomplishments, of  which 
manypages  would not contain the catalogue; can it  be doubted, 
I say,  that the tendency  of  these qualities to promote  the 
interest and happiness of  their possessor, is the sole founda- 
tion of their merit ?  Who can  dispute that a  mind, which 
supports  a  perpetual  serenity  and  ehearfulness,  a  noble 
dignity and undaunted  spirit, a  tender affection and good- 
will to all around;  as it has inore enjoyment within itself, is 
also a more animating and rejoicing spectacle, than if dejected 
with melancholy, tormented with anxiety, irritated with rage, 
or sunk into the most abject baseness and degeneracy?  And 
as to the qualities, immediately agreeable to others, they speak 
sufficiently for themselves ;  and he must be unhappy, indeed, 
either in his own temper, or in his  situation and  company, 
who has never  perceived  the charms of  a  facetious wit or 
flowing affability, of a delicate modesty or decent genteelness 
of address and manner. 
I am sensible, that nothing  can be  more unpl~ilosophical  SECT. 
than to be positive or dogmatical on  any subject;  and that,  IX 
even if excessive scepticisin could be maintained, it would not  PART  I. 
be more destructive to all just reasoning and enquiry.  I am 
convinced, that, where men  are the most  sure and arrogant, 
they are commonly the most mistaken, and have there given 
reins to passion, without  that proper  deliberation  and sus- 
pence,  which  can  alone  secure  them  from  the  grossest 
absurdities.  Yet, I must confess, that this enumeration puts 
the matter in so  strong a  light, that I cannot, at present, 
be more assured of  any truth, which I learn from reasoning 
and argument, than that personal merit  consists entirely in 
the usefuliiess  or  agreeableness  of  qualities  to tlie  person 
himself possessed of  them, or to others, who have any inter- 
course  with him.  But when  I reflect,  that,  though  the 
bulk and figure  of  the earth have  been  measured  and de- 
lineated, though the motions of  the tides have been accounted 
for, the order and economy of the heavenly bodies subjected 
to their proper laws, and INFINITE itself reduced to calcu- 
lation; yet men  still  dispute  concerning  the foundation of 
their moral duties : When I reflect on this, I say, I fall back 
into diffidence and scepticism, and suspect, that an  hypothesis, 
so  obvious,  ha'd it been  a  true  one, would, long  ere  now, 
have been received  by the unallimous  suffrage and amsent 
of mankind, 
PART 11. 
Having expressed the moral  approbation  attending merit 
or virtue,'  there remains nothing, but briefly to consider our 
interested obligation to it, and to enquire, whether every man,. 
who has any regard  to his own  happiness  and welf'dre,  will 
not best find his account in tlie prpctice of  every mora,l duty. 
If this can be clearly ascertaiiied from the foregoing theory, 
we shall have the satisfaction  to reflect, that we  have  ad- 
vanced principles, which not only, it is hoped, will stand the 
test  of  reasoning  and enquiry,  but  may contribute  to the 
amendment of  men's lives, and their improvement in morality 
and social virtue.  And though the philosophical  truth  of 
any proposition  by  no  means  depends  on  its te~ldency  to 
promote the interests of  society ;  yet  a  man  has but a bad 
grace, who delivers a theory, however true, which,  he muat 
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SECT.  confess, leads to a practice dangerous and pernicious.  Why  .  rake into those corners of  nature, which  spread  a  nuisance 
PART  11. . all around 1 Why dig up the pestilence from the pit, in which 
it is buried ?  The ingenuity of  your  researches may be  ad- 
mired ;  but your systems will be detested : And mankind will 
agree, if  they cannot refute them, to sink them, at least, in 
eternal silence  and  oblivio;~.  Truths, which  are pernicious 
to society, if  any such  there be, will  yield  to errors, which 
are salutary and adva~tageous. 
But what philosopl~ical  truths can  be  inore advantageous 
t3 society, than those here delivered, which represent virtue 
in all her genuine  and most  engaging charms, and make us 
approach her  with  ease,  familiarity,  and  affection?  The 
dismal  dress  falls off, with  which  many divines,  and some 
philosophers  have  covered  her;  and nothing  appears  but 
gentleness,  humanity,  beneficence,  affability ;  nay  even, at 
proper  intervals, play, frolic, and  gaiety.  She talks not of 
useless austerities and rigours, suffering and self-denial.  She 
declares, that her sole purposa is, to make her votaries and 
all  mankind,  during  every  instant  of  their  existence,  if 
possible,  cheerful  and  happy; nor  does  she ever willingly 
part with any pleasure but in hopes of  ample compensation 
in some other period of  their lives.  The sole trouble, which 
she demands, is that of  just calculation, and a steady pxfer- 
ence of the greater happiness.  And if any austere pretenders 
approach her, eneniies to joy and pleasure,  she either rejects 
them as hypocrites and deceivers ;  or if  she  admit them in 
her train, they are ranked however, among the least favoured 
of her votaries. 
And, indeed, to drop all figurative  expression, what hopee 
can we ever have of  engaging mankind  to a practice, which 
we confess full  of  austerity and rigour? Or what  theory of 
morals can ever serve any useful purpose, unless it can show, 
by a  particular  detail, that all the duties, which it recom- 
mends, are' also  the true  interest  of  each  individual ?  The 
peculiar advantage of the foregoing system seems to be, that 
it furnishes proper mediums for that purpose. 
That the virtues which are immediately useful or agreeable 
to the person possessed  of  them, are  desirable  in a view to 
self-interest,  it  mould  surely  be  superfluous  to  prove. 
Moralists, indeed, may spare themselves all the pains, which 
they often  take in recoinmending  these  duties.  To what 
purpose  collect  arguments  to  evince,  that  temperance  is 
advantageous, and  the exceszes of pleasure hurtful  P  When it  SECT. 
appears,  that  these  excesses  are  only  denominated  such, .  I* , 
because  they  are hurtful ; and  that,  if  unlimited  use  of  PART  u. 
strong liquors, for instance, no more  impaired health or the 
faculties of  mind  and body than the use of  air or water, it 
would not be a whit more vicious or blameable. 
It seems equally superfluous to prove, that the companion- 
able virtues of  good nianners and wit, decency and genteel- 
ness, are more desirable than the contrary qualities.  Vanity 
alone, without any other consideration, is a sufficient motive 
to make us wish for the possession of these accomplishments. 
No man was ever willingly deficient in this particular.  All 
our failures here proceed  from bad education, want of  capa- 
city, or  a  perverse  and  unpliable  disposition.  Would  you 
have your  company coveted, admired, followed ;  rather than 
hated, despised,  avoided ?  Can  any one  seriously  deliberate 
in the case P  As  no  enjoyment is sincere, without some re- 
ference to company and society ;  so no society can be agree- 
able, or even tolerable, where  a  man feels  his presence un- 
welcome, and discovers all around him symptoms of  disgust 
and aversion. 
But why, in the greater society or confederacy of mankind, 
should not the case be  the same as in particular clubs and 
companies?  W11y  is it  more  doubtful,  that the  enlarged 
virtues  of  humanity, generosity,  beneficence,  are desirable 
with a view to happiness and  self-interest,  than the limited 
endowments of  ingenuity and politeness ?  Axe we apprehen- 
sive, lest those  social  affections  interfere, in a greater and 
more immediate degree than any other pursuits, with private 
utility,  and  cannot  be  gratified,  without  some important 
sacrifice of  honour and advantage ?  If so, we are but ill in- 
structed in the nature of  the human passions, and are more 
influenced by verbal distinctions than by real differences. 
Whatever contradiction may vulgarly be supposed between 
the selfsh  and  social  sentiments or  dispositions,  they  are 
really no more  opposite  than  selfish  and ambitious, selfish 
and revengeful,  selfish and vain.  It is  requisite, that there 
be an original propensity of some kind, in order to be a basis 
to self-love, by giving a relish  to the objects of  its pursuit; 
and none  more  fit  for  this purpose  than  benevolence  or 
humanity.  The goods of  fortune are spent in one gratifica- 
tion  or another:  The miser,  who  accumulates  his  annual 
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SECT.  the gratification of  his avaiice.  And it would be difficult to 
IX  . '  show, why a man is more a loser  by a generous action, than 
'A  11  by any other method  of  expence ;  since  the  utmost  which 
he can attain, by the most  elaborate  selfishness, is  the in- 
dulgence of some affection. 
Now if  life, without  passion,  must  be  altogether insipid 
and tiresome ;  let a  nlan suppose that he has full power of 
modelling his own  disposition,  and let him deliberate what 
appetite or desire  he  would  choose  for  the  foundation  of 
his happiness  and  enjoyment.  Every  affection,  he would 
observe, when gratified by  success, gives  a  satisfaction pro- 
portioned to its force and violence : but besides  this advan- 
tage, common to all,  the immediate  feeling  of  benevolence 
and friendship, humanity  and  kindness, is  sweet,  smooth, 
tender, and agreeable, independent  of  all fortune  and acci- 
dents.  These  virtues  are besides  attended with a pleasing 
consciousness or remembrance,  and keep us in humour wit11 
ourselves  as  well  as  others ;  while we  retain tile agreeable 
reflection  of  having  done  our  part  towards  mankind  and 
society.  And though all men show a jealousy of our success 
in the pursuits of  avarice arid ambition ;  yet  are we almost 
sure  of  their  good-will  and  good-wishes,  so  long  as we 
persevere in the paths of  virtue, and employ ourselves in the 
execution  of  generous  plans  and  purposes.  What  other 
passion  is there  where  we  shall find  so  many advantages 
united ;  an agreeable sentiment, a pleasing consciousness, a 
good reputation P  But of these truths, we may observe, men 
are,  of  themselves, pretty  much  convinced ;  nor  are they 
deficient in their  duty to society, because  they would  not 
wish to be generous, friendly, and humane; but because they 
do not feel themselves such. 
Treating vice  with the greatest  candour,  and making it 
all possible concessions, we must acknowledge,  that there is 
not, in any instance, the smallest  pretext  for  giving it the 
preference  above virtue, with a view to self-interest;  except, 
perhaps, in the case of  justice,  where  a  man, taking things 
in a  certain  light,  may  often  seem  to be  a  loser  by  his 
integrity.  And though it is allowed, that, without a  regard 
to property, no society could  subsist ;  yet,  according to the 
imperfect  way  in  which  human  affairs  are  conc'ucted,  a 
sensible  knave,  In particular  incidents,  may think, thak an 
act of iniquity or  infidelity will make a considerable addition 
to his fortune,  without causing  any considerable  breach in 
the social union  and confederacy.  That I~onesty  is the best  SECT. 
policy, may be  e  good  general rule ;  but is liable to many .  IX. , 
exceptions : And he,  it may,  perhaps, be thought, conducts  PART  11. 
himself  with most  wisdom,  who  observes  the general  rule, 
and takes advantage of all the exceptions. 
I niust confess, that, if  a  man think,  that this reasoning 
much requires an answer, it will be  a  little difficult  to find 
any,  which  will  to him appear satisfactory and convincing. 
If his heart rebel not against such pernicious maxims, if he 
feel no reluctance to the thoughts of villany or baseness,  he 
has indeed lost a considerable niotive to virtue ;  and we may 
expect,  that his practice will  be  answerable to his specu- 
lation.  But  in  all ingenuous  natures,  the  antipathy  to 
treachery and roguery  is too  strong to be  counterbalanced 
by  any views  of  profit  or  pecuniary  advantage.  Inward 
peace  of  mind, consciousness of  integrity, a satisfactory re- 
view  of  our  own  conduct;  these  are  circumstances  very 
requisite to happiness,  and will be  cherished  and cultivated 
by every honest man, who feels the importance of them. 
Such a one has, besides, the frequent satisfaction of seeing 
knaves,  with  all  their  pretended  cunning and abilities, be- 
trayed by  their  own  maxims ;  and while  they  purpose  to 
cheat with  moderation and secrecy, a tempting incident oc- 
curs, nature is frail,  and they give into the snare; whence 
they can never  extricate  themselves, without a total loss of 
reputation, and the forfeiture of  all future trust and confi- 
dence with mankind. 
But were  they  ever  so  secret and successful, the honest 
man, if  he has any tincture of  philosophy, or even common 
observation and reflection, will discover that they themselves 
are, in the end, the greatest dupes,  and have sacrificed  the 
invaluable enjoyment of a character, with themselves at  least, 
for  the acquisition  of  worthless  toys  and  gewgaws.  How 
little is requisite to supply the necessities of nature ?  And in 
a view to pleasure,  what comparison between  the unbought 
satisfaction of  conversation, society, study, even  health and 
the  common  beauties  of  nature,  but above all the peaceful 
reflection on one's  own  conduct :  What comparison,  I  say, 
between these, and the feverish, empty amusements of luxury 
and expence P  These  natural  pleasures,  indeed,  are really 
without price; both because they are below all price in their 
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APPENDIX  I.--Concernilng  Moral Bentiment. 
APP. L  IF  the foregoing  hypothesis be received, it will now be easy  -  for us to determine the question first started,' concerning the 
general principles of  morals ;  and  though we postponed the 
decision of  that question, lest it  should  then  involve  us  in 
intricate  speculations, which  are unfit for moral discourses, 
we may resume  it at present,  and examine  how  far either 
reason  or  sentiment  enters  into  all  decisions  of  praise  or 
censure. 
One principal  foundation of  moral  prai~e  being supposed 
to lie in the usefulness of any quality or action ;  it is evident, 
that reason  must enter for a considerable  share in all deci- 
sions of  this  kind;  since  nothing  but  that  faculty can in- 
struct us in the tendency of  qualities and actions, and point 
out their beneficial consequences to society and to their pos- 
sessor.  In many cases,  this is an affair liable to great con- 
troversy : Doubts may arise ;  opposite  interests  may occur ; 
and a preference  must be given to one  side,  from  very nice 
views, and a sniall  overbalance of  utility.  This is particu- 
larly remarkable  in questions  with regard  to justice ;  as is, 
indeed, natural to suppose, from that species of utility, which 
attends this ~irtue.~  Were every single instance of  justice, 
like that of  benevolence,  useful  to society; this would be a 
more simple  state of  the  case,  and  seldom liable to  great 
controversy.  But  as  single  instances  of  justice  are often 
pernicious in their first and immediate tendency, and as the 
advantage to society results only from the observance of  the 
general rule, and from the  concurrence  and  combination of 
several persor s in the same equitable conduct; the case here 
becomea more intricate and involved.  The various  circum- 
stances of society ;  the various consequences of any practice ; 
the various  interests,  which  may  be  proposed:  These,  on 
1 Sect. I.  Of the General Principles  See  Appendix  111.  Some farther 
of  Morals.  Considerations with regard to Justice. 
many occasions, are doubtful, and subject to great discussion  APP. I. 
and enquiry.  The object of  municipal laws is to fix all the - 
questions with  regard to justice :  The debates of  civilians ; 
the reflections of  politicians ;  the precedents of  history and 
public records, are  all directed to the same purpose.  And a 
very accurate reason  or judgment  is  often  requisite, to give 
the true determination, amidst such intricate doubts  arising 
from obscure or opposite utilities. 
But though  reason, when  fully assisted and improved, be 
sufficient to instruct us in the pernicious or useful tendency 
of  qualities and actions; it is not alone sufficient to produce 
any moral blame or approbation.  Utility is only a tendency 
to a certain end ;  and were the end totally indifferent to us, 
we  should feel the same indifference towards the means.  It 
is requisite a sentiment should  here display itself, in order to 
give a preference to the useful above the pernicious  tenden- 
cies.  This  sentiment can be no other than a feeling for the 
happiness of  mankind,  and  a  resentment  of  their misery ; 
since these are the different ends which virtue and vice have 
a tendency to promote.  Here, therefore, reason instructs us 
in the several  tendencies of  actions,  and  humanity makes a 
distinction in favour of those which are useful and beneficial. 
This partition between the faculties of  understanding and 
sentiment, in all moral decisions, seems clear from the pre- 
ceding  hypothesis.  But I shall  suppose  that  hypothesis 
false : It will then be requisite to look  out  for  some  other 
theory,  that  may  be  satisfactory;  and I dare  venture  to 
affirm, that none such will ever be found, so long as we sup- 
pose reason to be the sole  source of  morab.  To prove this, 
it will be proper to weigh the five following considerations. 
I. It  is  easy for a false  hypothesis to maintain  some ap- 
pearance of  truth, while it keepa  wholly in generals,  makes 
use of  undefined terms, and employs comparisons, instead of 
instances.  This is particularly remarkable in that philosophy, 
which  ascribes  the discernment of  all moral distinctions to 
reason  alone,  without  the concurrence of  sentiment.  It is 
impossible that, in any particular instance,  this  hypothesis 
can so much as be rendered  intelligible ; whatever  specious 
figure it map make in general declamations  and discourses. 
Examine the crime of  ingratitude,  for  instance; which has 
place, wherever we observe good-will, expressed and known, 
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APP. I.  return of ill-will or indifference, with ill-offices or neglect on  --  the other : Anatomize all t,hese circunastan~es,  and examine, 
by your reason alone, in what consists the demerit or blame : 
You never will come to any issue or conclusion. 
Reason judges  either of  matter  of  fact  or of  relations. 
Enquire then, Jirst, where is that matter of fact, which we here 
call crime ;  point it out; determine the time of its existence; 
describe its essence or nature ;  explain  the sense or faculty, 
to which it discovers  itself.  It resides in the mind of  the 
person,  who  is ungrateful.  He must, therefore, feel it, and 
be conscious of  it.  But nothing is there, except the passion 
of  ill-will  or  absolute  indifference.  You  cannot say,  that 
these, of  themselves,  always,  and in all circumstances,  are 
crimes.  No : They are only crimes,  when  directed  towards 
persons, who have  before expressed and displayed good-will 
towards us.  Consequently,  we  may infer, that the crime of 
ingratitude is not any particular individual fact ;  but arises 
fbm  a  complication  of  circumstances,  which,  being  pre- 
sented to the spectator, excites the sentiment of blame, by the 
particular structure and fabric of  his mind. 
This representation, you say, is false.  Crime, indeed, con- 
sists not in a particular fact,  of whose reality we are assured 
by reason :  But it consists in certain moral re7ations, discovered 
by reason, in the saine manner as we discover, by reason, the 
truths of  geometry or algebra.  But what are the relations, 
I ask, of  which you here talk?  In  the case stated  above, I 
see  first  good-will  and good-offices in one person;  then ill- 
will and ill-offices in the other.  Between these, there is the 
relation of  contrariety.  Does the crime consist in that rela- 
tion ?  But suppose a person bore me ill-will  or did me  ill- 
offices; and  I, in return,  were  indifferent towards him, or 
did him  good-offices : Here  is the same relation of contra- 
riet.y ;  and yet my coiiduct is often highly laudable.  Twist 
and turn this matter as much as you will, you can never rest 
the morality  on relation;  but  must  have  recourse  to the 
decisions of  sentinlent. 
When it ig affirmed, that two and three are  equal to the 
half of ten ; ',his relation of equality, I understand perfectly. 
I conceive,  that if  ten be  divided into two parts,  of  which 
one has  as many units  as the other; and if any of  these 
be coilpared  to two added to three, it will contain as 
many units as that compound number.  But when you draw 
thence a  comparison  to  moral  relations,  I own  that I am 
altogether at a loss  to understand  you.  A  moral  action, a 
cri&e,  such as ingratitude,  is a  co-~n~licated  object.  ~ies 
morality  consist in the relation of  its parts to each other. 
How P  After what manner P  Specify the relation :  Be more 
particular  and explicit  in your  propositions ;  and you will 
easily see their falsehood. 
No,  say  you,  the  morality  consists  in  the  relation  of 
actions to the rule of right; and they are denominated good 
or  ill, according as they agree or disagree with it.  What 
then is this rule  of  right?  In what does it consist P  How 
is it determined?  By reason, you  say, which  examines the 
moral  relations  of  actions.  So  that  moral  relations  are 
determined  by  the comparison  of  actions to a  rule.  And 
that rule  is determined  by considering the moral  relations 
of  objects.  Is not this be  reasoning P 
All this is metaphysics, you cry : That is enough :  There 
needs nothing Inore  to give  a  strong presumption  of  false- 
hood.  Yes, reply I : Here are metaphysics surely : But they 
are all on your  side, who  advance  ail abstruse hypothesis, 
which can never be made intelligible,  nor quadrate with any 
particular  instance or  illustration.  The  hypothesis  which 
we embrace is plain.  It  maintains, that morality  is deter- 
mined by sentiment.  It defines virtue to be whatever mental 
action or quality gives to  a spectator  the pleasing sentiment of 
approbation;  and vice  the contrary.  We then  proceed  to 
examine  a  plain  matter of  fact, to wit, what actions have 
this influence : We consider all the circumstances,  in which 
these  actions agree : And thence endeavour  to extract some 
general observations with regard to these sentiments.  If you 
call this metaphysics, and find  any thing abstruse here, you 
need only conclude, that your turn of  mind is not suited to 
the nloral sciences. 
11.  When a  man, at any time, deliberates concerning his 
own  conduct  (as,  whether  he  had  better,  in  a  particular 
emergence, assist  a brother  or a  benefactor), he must  con- 
sider  these  separate relations,  with  all the circumstances 
and  situations  of  the persons,  in order  to determine  the 
superior  duty  and obligation:  And in  order  to determine 
the proportion  of  lines  in any triangle,  it is necessary  to 
examine the nature  of  that figure, and the relations which 
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UP.  I.  this  appearing  similarity  in  the  two  cases,  there  is,  at  -  bottom, an extreme difference between them.  A speculative 
reasoner concerning triangles or circles considers the several 
known and given relations of the pmts of  these figures ;  and 
thence  infers  some  unknown  relation,  which is dependent 
on the former.  But  in  moral  deliberations,  we  must  be 
mquainted, before-hand, with all the objects,  and all their 
relations to each other; and from a comparison of  the whole, 
fix our choice or approbation.  No new fact to be ascertained : 
No  new relation to be discovered.  All the circumstances  of 
the case  are supposed to be  laid  before us, ere we  can  fix 
any sentence of  blame or approbation.  If any material cir- 
cumstance be yet unknown or doubtful, we  inust first employ 
our enquiry or intellectual  faculties  to assure us  of  it; and 
must  suspend  for  a  time  all moral  decision  or sentiment. 
While we  are ignorant, whether  a  man  were  aggressor  or 
not, how  can we  determine whether  the person who  killed 
him, be criminal or innocent P But after every circumstance, 
every relation is known, the understanding has no  farther 
room to operate, nor any object  on  which it  could  employ 
itself.  The approbation or blame,  which then ensues, cannot 
be the work of the judgment, but of  the heart; and is not a 
speculative proposition  or affirmation, but an active feeling 
or  sentiment.  In the disquisitions  of  the  understanding, 
from known circumstailces and relations, we  infer some new 
and  unknown.  In moral  decisions,  all  the  circumstances 
and  relations  must  be  previously  known ;  and  the mind, 
'  from  the contemplation  of  the whole, feels  some  new  im- 
pression of  affection or disgust, esteem  or  contempt, appro- 
bation or blame. 
Hence the great difference between a mistake of fact and 
one of  right;  and hence  the reason  why  the one  is com- 
monly  criminal  and not  the other.  When   DIPU US  killed 
LAIUS,  he  was  ignorant  of  the relation,  and from  circum- 
stances, innocent and involuntary, formed erroneous opinions 
concerning t'ne action which he committed.  But when NERO 
killed AGRIPFINA,  all the relations  between himself  and the 
person,  and  all the  circumstances  of  the  fact,  were  pre- 
viously known to him:  But the motive  of  revenge, or fear, 
or interest, prevailed in his savage heart over the sentiments 
of  duty and humanity.  And when we  express that detesta- 
tion  against  him,  to which  he,  himself,  in  a  little  time, 
became  insensible ;  it is not,  that we  see any relations, of  APP.  I. 
which he was ignorant ;  but that, from the rectitude  of  our - 
disposition,  we  feel  sentiments,  against  which  he  was 
hardened, from flattery and a long perseverance  in the most 
enormous  crimes.  In these  sentiments,  then,  not  in a 
discovery of  relations  of  any kind, do  all moral determina- 
tions consist.  Before we  can pretend  to form any decision 
of  this kind, every thing must be known and ascertained on 
the side of  the object  or action.  Nothing  remains  but  to 
feel, on our part, some sentiment of  blame or approbation ; 
whence we pronounce the action criminal or virtuous. 
111.  This doctrine will  become  still more  evident, if we 
compare  moral  beauty  with  natural,  to  which,  in  many 
particulars,  it bears  so near  a  resemblance.  It  is  on  the 
proportion, relation,  and position  of  parts, that all natural 
beauty  depends ;  but  it  would  be  absurd  thence to infer, 
that the  perception  of  beauty,  like that of  truth in geo- 
metrical  problems,  consists  wholly  in  the  perception  of 
relations, and was performed entirely  by the understanding 
or intellectual faculties.  In  all the sciences, our mind, from 
the known relations, investigates  the unknown : But in all 
decisions of  taste or external beauty,  all the relations  are 
befare-hand obvious to the eye; and we  thence  proceed to 
feel a sentiment of  complacency or disgust, according to the 
nature of the object, and dispositi0.n of our organs. 
EUCLID  has fully explained all the qualities of  the circle; 
but has not, in any proposition, said  a word  of  its beauty. 
The reason  is evident.  The beauty is not a  quality of  the 
circle.  It  lies  not in any part of  the line, whose  parts are 
equally distant from a common center.  It is only the effect, 
which that figure  produces upon  the mind, whose peculiar 
fabric or structure renders it susceptible of  such sentiments. 
In  vain would you look for it in the circle, or seek it, either 
by  your  senses  or  by  mathematical reasonings,  in all the 
properties of ,that figure. 
Attend to PALLADIO  and PERRAULT,  while they explain all 
the parts  and  proportions  of  a  pillar : They talk  of  the 
cornice and frieze  and base  and entablature and shaft and 
architrave;  and give the description and position of  each of 
these  members.  But  should  you  ask  the  description  and 
position  of  it0 beauty,  they  would  readily  reply,  that the 
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APP. I.  results  from  the  whole,  when  that  complicated  figure  is  -  presented to an intelligent mind, susceptible  to those  finer 
sensations.  'Till such  a, spectator appear, there is nothing 
but a figure of  such particular dimensions and proportions : 
From his sentiments alone arise its elegance and beauty. 
Again;  attend to CICERO,  while he paints the crimes  of  a 
VERRE~  or  a  CATILINE  ; you  must  acknowledge  that the 
moral turpitude results, in the same manner, from  the con- 
templation  of  the whole, when  presented  to a being, whose 
organs have such a particular structure and formation.  The 
orator may paint rage, insolence, barbarity on  the one side : 
Meekness, suffering, sorrow, innocence on t'he other : But if 
you feel no indignation or compassion arise in you from this 
complication  of  circumstances, you would  in vain  ask him, 
in what  consists  the  crime  or villany,  which  he  so  vehe- 
mently exclaims against:  At what time, or on what  subject 
it first began  to exist: And what has a  few months after- 
wards  become  of  it, when  every disposition and thought  of 
all the actors is totally altered, or  annihilated.  No  satis- 
factory answer can be given to any of  these  questions, upon 
the  abstract  hypothesis  of  morals;  and  we  must  at last 
acknowledge, that the crime or immoralitj is no  particular 
fact or relation, which can be the object  of  the understand- 
ing : But arises entirely from  the sentiment of  disapproba- 
tion, which, by the structure of  human nature, we  unavoid- 
ably feel on the apprehension of  barbarity or treachery. 
IV. Inanimate objects may bear to each other all the same 
relations,  which  we  observe  in  moral  agents;  though the 
former can  nevr be  the object  of  love  or  hatred, nor  are 
consequently susceptible of merit or iniquity.  A young tree, 
which over-tops  and destroys  its parent,'  stands  in  all  the 
same  relations  with  NERO,  when  he  murdered AGRIPPINA  ; 
and  if  morality  consisted  merely  in  relations,  would,  no 
doubt, be equally criminal. 
V. It appears  evident, that the  ultimate  ends of  human 
actions  can  neTer, in any ease, be  accounted  for by reasols, 
but recomm2nd themselves entirely  to the sentiments and 
affections  of  mankind, without  any  dependance  on  the in- 
tellectual faculties.  Ask  it man, why he  uses exercise ;  he will 
answer,  because  he  desires  to  keep  his  health.  If  you  then 
enquire, why  he  desires  health, he  will  readily reply, because 
J  [From whose seed it sprung: Editions G & K.1 
sickness is painful.  If  you  push your enquiries farther, and -  UP.  1. 
desire a  reason, why  he  hates pain, it is impossible he can 
ever give any.   hisi is an ultimate end, and is never referred 
to any other object. 
Perhaps, to your second question, why  he  desires health, he 
may also reply, that it is necessary for  the exercise of  his call- 
ing.  If  you  ask,  why  he  is  anxious  on  that  head,  he  will 
answer, because he  desires to  get money.  If you demand Why? 
It  is the instrument of  pleaszlre, says he.  And beyond this it 
is an absurdity to ask  for a reason.  It is impossible there 
can  be  a  progress  in,  injnitum;  and  that one  thing can 
always be  a  reason,  why  another  is  desired.  Something 
must  be  desirable  on its own account,  and because  of  its 
immediate accord or agreement with human sentiment and 
affection. 
Now  as  virtue  is  an end,  and  is  desirable  on  its own 
account, without  fee or reward,  merely,  for the immediate 
satisfaction  which  it conveys ; it  is  requisite  that  there 
should be some sentiment, which it touches ;  some internal 
taste or feeling, or whatever you please to call it, which dis- 
tinguishes moral good and evil, and which  embraces the one 
and rejects the other. 
Thus the distinct boundaries  and offices  of  reason  and of 
taste are easily ascertained.  The former conveys the know- 
ledge of truth and falsehood :  The latter gives the sentiment 
of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue.  The one discovers 
objects, as they really stand in nature, without  addition  or 
diminution : The other has a productive faculty, and gilding 
or  staining  all natural objects  with the colours, borrowed 
from internal sentiment, raises, in a manner, a new creation. 
Reason, being cool and disengaged, is  no  motive to action, 
and directs  only the impulse  received from  appetite or in- 
clination, by showing  us  the means  of  attaining happiness 
or avoiding misery : Taste, as it  gives pleasure or pain, and 
thereby constitutes happiness  or  misery, becomes  a  motive 
to action, and is the first spring or  impulse to desire and 
volition.  From circumstances and relations, known  or  sup- 
posed, the former leads us  to the discovery of  the concealed 
and unknown :  After all circumstances and relations are laid 
before  UB, the latter makes  us  feel from the whole  a  new 
sentiment  of  blame  or approbation.  The shildard  of  the 
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APP.  I.  inflexible, even  by  the will  of  the  Supreme  Being : The  -  standard of  the other, arising from the internal  frame and 
constitution  of  animals,  is  ultimately  derived  from  that 
Supreme Will, which  bestowed  on  each  being  its peculiar 
nature,  and  arranged  the  several  classes  and  orders  of 
existence. 
APPERDIX  11.'-Of  Self-love. 
THERE  is  a,  principle,  supposed  to  prevail  among  many, 
which is utterly incompatible with  all virtue or moral senti- 
ment;  and as it can  proceed  from  nothing  but the most 
depraved disposition, so in its turn  it tends  still further to 
encourage  that  depravity.  This  principle  is,  that  all 
benevolence  is  mere  hypocrisy,  friendship  a  cheat,  public 
spirit  a  farce,  fidelity  a  snare  to procure  trust and  con- 
fidence;  and that, while  all of  us, at bottom,  pursue  only 
our private interest, we  wear these fair disguises, in order to 
put others off  their guard, and expose thein the more to our 
wiles and machinations.  What heart one must be possessed 
of  who  professes such principles, and who  feels no  internal 
sentiment that belies  so  pernicious  a  theory, it  is  easy to 
imagine :  And also, what degree of  affection and benevolence 
he can bear  to a  species, whom  he  represents  under such 
odious colours, and supposes so little susceptible of gratitude 
or any return of  affection.  Or if we  should not ascribe these 
principles  wholly  to a  corrupted  heart, we  must,  at least, 
account  for  them  from the most  careless  and  precipitate 
examination.  Superficial reasoners, indeed, observing many 
false  pretences %mong mankind,  and  feeling,  perhaps,  no 
very strong restraint in their own  disposition, might draw a 
general and a hasty conclusion, that all is equally corrupted, 
and that men, different  from  all other animals, and indeed 
from all other species of  existences, admit  of  no degrees of 
good or bad, but  are, in  every instnirce, the same  creatures 
under different disguises and appearances. 
There  is  another  principle,  somewhat  resembling  the 
former ;  which has been  much  insisted  on  by philosophers, 
and has been the foundation of  many a system ;  that, what- 
ever affection one may feel, or imagine  he feels for  others, 
no passion  is, or can be disinterested ;  that the most  gene- 
''  [In editions G  to Q this flppeilrccl as I';i<t I. of Section II., ' Of  Benerolence.'] 
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love;  and that, even  unknown  to ourselves, we  seek only 
our  own  gratification,  while  we  appear  the  most  deep$ 
engaged  in schemes for  the liberty and happiness of  man- 
kind.  By a turn of  imagination, by a  refinement  of  reflec- 
tion, by an enthusiasm  of  passion, we  seem to take part in 
the interests of  others, and imagine ourselves divested of a11 
selfish considerations : But,  at bottom,  the most  generous 
patriot and most niggardly miser, the bravest hero and most 
abject coward, have, in every action, an equal regard to their 
own happiness and welfare. 
Whoever  concludes  from  the seeming  tendency  of  this 
opinion,  that  those,  who  make  profession  of  it,  cannot 
possibly  feel  the  true sentiments  of  benevolence,  or  have 
any regard  for  genuine  virtue,  will  often  find himself,  in 
practice, very much mistaken.  Probity and honour were no 
strangers to EPICURUS  and his sect.  ATTICUS  and HORACE 
seem to have enjoyed from  nature, and cultivated by reflec- 
tion, as generous and friendly dispositions as any disciple of 
the austerer schools.  And among the modern, HOBBES  and 
LOCKE,  who maintained  the selfish  system  of  morals, lived 
irreproachable lives ;  though  the former  lay not under any 
restraint of  religion, whicli might supply the defects  of  his 
philosophy. 
An EPICUREAN  or a HOBBIST  readily allows, that there is 
such a thing as friendship  in the world, without  hypocrisy 
or  disguise;  though  he  may  attempt,  by  a  philosophical 
chymistry, to resolve the elements  of  this passion, if  I may 
so  speak, into  those  of  another, and explain every affection 
to be self-love, twisted and moulded, by a particular turn of 
imagination, into a variety of  appearances.  But as the same 
turn of  imagination prevails not in every man, nor gives the 
same  direction  to  the  original  passion;  this  is  sufficient, 
even  according to the  selfish  system,  to make  the widest 
difference in humalr  characters,  and denominate  one  mail 
virtuous and humane, another vicious and meanly interested. 
I esteem the man, whose  self-love, by whatever means, is so 
directed as to give him a concern for others, and render him 
serviceable to society : As I hate or despise him, who has no 
regard to any thing beyond his own gratifications and enjoy- 
ments.  In vain would  you  suggest, that these  characters, 
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difference between  them.  Each character, notwithstanding 
these inconsiderable  differences, appears to me,  in practice, 
pretty durable and untransmutable.  And I find not in this 
more than  in  other  subjects, that the natural  sentiments, 
arising from  the generai  appearances of  things, are easilj 
destroyed by subtile reflections concerning the minute origin 
of  these appearances.  Does not  the lively, chearful colour 
of a countenance inspire me with complace~cy  and pleasure ; 
even though I learn from  philosophy,  that all difference of 
colnplexion arises from the most minute differences of thick- 
ness,  in the most  minute parts of  the  skin ;  by  means  of 
which a superficies is qualified to reflect one of  the original 
colaurs of light, and absorb the others P 
But  though  the  question,  concerning  the  universal  or 
partial  selfishness of  man  be not  so  material, as is usually 
imagined, to morality  and practice, it  is certain$- of  con- 
sequence  in the  speculative  science  of  human  nature, and 
is -a  proper  object of  curiosity  and enquiry.  It  may not, 
therefore,  be  unsuitable,  in  this  place,  to  bestow  a  few 
reflections upon it.' 
The most  obvious  objection  to the selfish hypothesis, is, 
that,  as it  is  contrary to  common  feeling  and  our  most 
unprejudiced notions, ihere is  required the highest  stretch 
of  philosophy to establish  so  extraordinary a paradox.  To 
the most  careless  observer,  there  appear  to be  such  dis- 
positions  as benevolence and generosity ;  such affections as 
love,  friendship,  compassion, gratitude.  These  sentiments 
have  their  causes,  effects,  objects,  and operations,  marked 
by  common  language  and  observation,  and  plalnly  dis- 
tinguished from those of the selfish passions.  And as this is 
th;  obvious  appearance  of  things, it must be admitted;  till 
some hypothesis be discovered, which, by penetrating deeper 
into human  nature, may prove  the former  affections to be 
Benevolence  nattually divides into 
two klnJs, the gen~ral  ancl thepnrti~71- 
lnr.  The first  is,  where  we  have  no 
friendship or connexion  or esteem  for 
the  person,  but  feel  only  a  genc.r,tl 
sympathy with him or a compassion for 
his pains,  arid  a  congratulation  with 
his  pleasures.  The  othor  species  of 
benevolenco  is foundec7  on  an opi11io11 
of  virtue,  on  services  done  us, or on 
crone particula~  conneuians.  Both thew 
sentiments  must  be  allowed  real  in 
human  nature;  but  whether  they will 
resolve into some nice considerations  of 
self-love,  is a  question  more  curious 
tllan important.  The former sentiment, 
to wit, that of  general benevolence, or 
humanity, or sympa.thy, we  shall hare 
vccasion  frequently to  treat of  in the 
course of this enquiry ; and I assume it 
as real, from general  experience, with- 
out any other proof. 
nothing  but  modifications  of  the  latter.  All  attempts of  APP. 11. 
this kind  have  hitherto  proved fruitless, and seem  to have 
-4 
proceeded entirely,  from that love of  simplicity, which has 
been the source  of  much  false reasoning  in philosophy.  I 
shall not here  enter into any detail on  the present sdbject. 
Many  able  philosophers  have  shown  the  insufficiency  of 
these systems.  And I shall take for granted what, I believe, 
the smallest  reflection will make evident to every impartial 
enquirer. 
But the nature of  the subject furnishes the strongest pre- 
sumption, that no better system will  ever, for the future, be 
invented, in order to account for the origin of the benevolent 
from  the  selfish  affections,  and  reduce  all  the  various 
emotions  of  the human  mind to a perfect  simplicity.  The 
case  is  not  the  same  in this  species  of  philosophy  as in 
physics.  Many  an hypothesis  in  nature,  contrary to first 
appearances,  has been  found,  on  more  accurate  scrutiny, 
solid  and satisfactory.  Instances  of  this  kind  are so  fre- 
quent, that a judicious,  as well  as witty  philosopher,l lias 
ventured to affirm, if  there be more than one way, in which 
any phsenomenon  may be  produced, that there is a general 
presumption  for its arising from the causes, which  are the 
least  obvious  and  familiar.  But  the  presumption  always 
lies on the other side, in all enquiries  concerning the origin 
of our passions, and of the internal operations of  the human 
mind.  The  simplest  and  most  obvious  cause,  which  can 
there be assigned for any phznomenon, is probably the true 
one.  When a philosopher, in the explication of  his system, 
is obliged to have recourse to some very intricate and refined 
reflections, and to suppose them  essential to the production 
of  any passion or emotion, we have  reason  to be  extremely 
on  our  guard  against  so  fallacious  an  hypothesis.  The 
affections  are  not  susceptible  of  any  impression  from  the 
refinements of reason or imagination ;  and it is always found, 
that a vigorous exertion  of  the latter faculties, necessarily, 
from  the narrow capacity of  the human  mind, destroys all 
activity in the former.  Our predominant motive  or inten- 
tion is, indeed, frequently concealed from  ourselves, when it 
is mifigled and  confounded with  other  motives, which  the 
mind, from  vanity or  self-conceit, is  desirous of  supposing 
more  prevalent:  But there is no  instance,  that a  conceal- 
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APP. 11.  ment  of  this nature has ever  arisen  from the abstruseness 
and intricacy of  the motive.  A man, that has lost a friend 
and patron, may flatter himself, that all his grief arises from 
generous  sentiments,  witliout  any  mixture  of  narrow  or 
interested  consideratiqns:  But  a  man,  that grieves  for a 
valuable friend, who  needed  his patronage and protection ; 
bow can we  suppose, that his  passionate  tenderness  arises 
from some metaphysical regards to a self-interest,  which has 
no foundation  or reality ?  We may  as well  imagine, that 
minute  wheels  and  springs,  like  those  of  a  watch,  give 
motion  to a  loaded  waggon,  as  account  for  the origin  of 
passion from such abstruse reflections. 
Animals  are found  susceptible of  kindness, both to their 
own species and to ours ;  nor is there, in this case, the least 
suspicion of  disguise  or  artifice.  Shall we  account for  all 
their sentiments too, from refined deductions of self-interest ? 
Or if  we  admit  a  disinterested benevolence in the inferior 
species, by  what  rule  of  analogy  can  we  refuse  it  in  the 
superior ? 
Love between  the sexes begets  a complacency and good- 
will,  very  distinct  from  the  gratification  of  an  appetite. 
Tenderness to their offspring, in all sensible beings, is com- 
monly able alone to counter-balance the strongest motives of 
self-love, and has no manner of  dependance  on  that affec- 
tion.  What interest can a  fond mother  have in view, who 
loses her health by assiduous attendance on  her sick child, 
and afterwards languishes and dies of  grief, when  freed, by 
its death, from the slavery of that attendance ? 
Is gratitude no affection of  the human breast, or is that a 
word merely, without any meaning or reality ?  Have we no 
satisfaction in one man's  company above  another's,  and no 
desire of  the welfare of  our friend, even though  absence or 
death  shmld prevent  us from  all participation  in it?  Or 
what is it commonly, that gives  us  any participation in  it, 
even while alive and present, but our affection and regard to 
him ? 
These  and a thousand  other  instances  are  marks  of  a 
general benevolence in human nature, where no real interest 
binds  us  to the object.  And  how  an imaginary  interest, 
known and avowed  for  such, can be  the origin of  any pas- 
sion or emotion, seems difficult to explain.  No satisfactory 
hypothesis of  thin kind has yet been discovered ;  nor is there 
the smallest probability, that the future industry of men will  UP. 11. 
ever be attended with more favourable success.  - 
But farther, if we  consider rightly of  the matter, we shall 
find, that  the  hypothesis, which  allows  of  a  disinterested 
benevolence,  distinct  from  self-love,  has really  more  sint- 
plicity  in it,  and  is more  confor~nable  to  the analogy  of 
nature, than that which  pretends to resolve all  friendship 
and humanity into this latter principle.  There are bodily 
wants or appetites, acknowledged by every one, which neces- 
sarily precede  all sensual  enjoyment, and carry us  directly 
to seek possession of  the object.  Thus, hunger and thirst 
have eating and drinking for their end; and from the grati- 
fication of  these primary appetites arises  a  pleasure, which 
may become the object of  another species of desire or  incli- 
nation, that is secondary and interested.  In  the same manner, 
there are mental passions, by which we are impelled  inime- 
diately to seek particular objects, such as fame, or power, or 
vengeance, without any regard to interest; and when  these 
objects  are  attained, a  pleasing  enjoyment  ensues,  as  the 
consequence of  our  indulged  affections.  Nature must,  by 
the internal frame and constitution of  the mind,  g'  ive  an 
original propensity to fame, ere we  can reap  any  pleasure 
from that acquisition, or pursue it from motives of  self-love, 
and a  desire  of  happiness.  If I have  no vanity, I take no 
delight in praise :  If I be void of  ambition, power  gives me 
no  enjoyment:  If I be  not  angry, the punishment  of  an 
adversary is  totally  indifferent  to me.  In all these  cases, 
there is a passion, which  points  immediately to the object, 
and constitutes it our good or happiness ;  as there are other 
secondary passions, which afterwards  arise, and pursue it as 
a part of our happiness, when once it  is constituted such by 
our original affections.  Were there no appetite of  any kind 
alitecedent  to self-love,  that propensity  could  scarcely ever 
exert itself; because we  should, in that case, have  felt few 
and  slender  pains  or  pleasures,  and  have  little  misery  or 
happiness to avoid or to pursue. 
Now where  is the difficulty in conceiving, that this may 
likewise  be  the  case  with  benevolence  and  friendship, 
and  that, from  the original  frame  of  our  temper, we  may 
feel a desire of  another's happiness or good, which, by means 
of  that affection, becomes our own  good, and is  afterwards 
pursued, from the combined motives of benevolence and self- 272  CONCERNING  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  MORALS.  FARTHER CONSIDERATIONS WITH  EEGARD TO  JUSTICE.  273 
enjoyment  P  Who sees  not that vengeance, from  the force 
alone of  passion, may be  so eagerly pursued, as to make us 
.knowingly neglect  every  consideration  of  ease, interest, or 
safety ; and, like some -vindictive  animals,  infuse  our very 
souls  into the wounds  we  give  an  enemy l?  And  what a 
malignant  philosophy  must  it be,  that will  not  allow,  to 
humanity  and  friendship,  the  same  privileges,  which  are 
undisputably granted to the darker passions  of  enmity and 
resentment  iJ  Such a philosophy  is more  like a  satyr than 
a true delineation or description of human nature ;  and may 
be a good foundation for paradoxical wit and raillery, but is 
a very bad one for any serious argument or reasoning. 
APPENDIX  III.2-S~rne  farther  Considerations with regard  to 
Justice. 
THE intention of  this Appendix  is to give  some  more par- 
ticular explication of the origin and nature of Justice, and to 
mark some differences between it and the other virtues. 
The social virtues of humanity and benevole~~ce  exert their 
influence  immediately,  by  a  direct  tendency  or  instinct, 
which  chiefly keeps  in view the simple object, moving  the 
affections, and con~prehends  not any scheme or system, nor 
the consequences resulting from the concurrence, imitation, 
or example  of  others.  A parent  flies  to the relief  of  his 
child ;  transported by that natural sympathy, which actuates 
him, and which  affords  no  leisure  to reflect  on  the senti- 
ments  or conduct  of  the rest  of  mankind  in  like circum- 
stances.  A  generous  man  chearfully  embraces  an oppor- 
tunity of  serving his  friend ;  because he then feels  himself 
under  the dominion  of  the beneficent  affections, nor  is  he 
concerned  whether any other person  in the u~riverse  were 
ever  before  actuated  by  such noble  motives,  or  will  ever 
afterwards  prove  their  influence.  In all  these  cases,  the 
social passions  have in view a single  individual  object, and 
pursue  the  safety  or happiness  alone  of  the person  loved 
and esteemed.  With this they are satisfied:  In this, they 
acquiesce.  And  as the good, resulting  from  their benign 
influence, is in itself  compleat and entire, it also excites the 
moral  sentiment of  approbation,  without  anq- reflection on 
Animasque in vulnere ponunt.  VIRGI.  Ira, 1.  i, 1. 
Geor. 4,  238.  Durn  alteri  noceat,  sui  '  [Appendix ii. in Editions G t3 Q.] 
negligens,  says  SENECA  of  Anger.  De 
farther consequences, and without  any more enlarged views  APP.  LU. 
of  the concurrence  or  imitation of  the other  members  of - 
society.  On  the contrary, were  the generous  friend or dis- 
interested patriot  to stand  alone in the practice  of  benefi- 
cence;  this would rather enhance his value in our eyes, and 
join the praise of  rarity and novelty to  his other more exalted 
merits. 
The case is not the same with the social virtues of justice 
and fidelity.  They are highly  useful, or  indeed  absolutely 
necessary  to the well-being  of  mankind:  But the benefit, 
resulting from  them, is not the consequence of  every indi- 
vidual  single act;  but  arises  from  the whole  scheme  or 
system, concurred  in by  the whole, or  the greater  part ot 
the society.  General peace  and order  are the attendants of 
justice or a general abstinence from the possessions of others : 
But a particular  regard to the particular right of  one indi- 
vidual  citizen  may  frequently, considered  in itself,  be pro- 
ductive  of  pernicious  consequences.  The  result  of  the 
individual acts is here, in many instances, directly opposite 
to that of  the whole system of  actions;  and the former may 
be  extremely  hurtful,  while  the latter  is,  to the highest 
degree, advantageous.  Riches, inherited from a parent, are, 
in a bad man's  hand, the instrument of  mischief.  The right 
of  succession  may,  in one instance, be hurtful.  Its benefit 
arises only from  the observance of  the general rule ;  and it 
is suficient, if compensation be thereby made for all the ills 
and inconveniencies, which flow from  partlicular characters 
and situations. 
CYRUS,  young and unexperienced, considered only the in- 
dividual  case before  him, and  reflected on a  limited fitness 
and convenience, when he assigned the long coat to the tall 
boy,  and the short  coat to the other  of  smaller  size.  His 
governor instructed him better ;  while he pointed out  more 
enlarged views  and consequences, and informed his pupil or 
the general,  inflexible  rules,  necessary  to support  general 
peace and order in society. 
The happiness  and  prosperity of  mankind, arising from 
the social virtue of  benevolence and its subdivisions, may be 
compared to a wall, built by inmy hands ;  which still  rises 
by each stone, that is heaped upon  it, and receives  increase 
proportional  to the  diligence  and  care  of  each  vorkinan. 
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T- where  each  individual  stone  would,  of  itself,  fa11  to the 
ground ;  nor is the whole fabric supported but by the mutual 
assistance and combination of its corresponding parts. 
All the laws of  nature, which regulate property, as well as 
all  civil  laws, are  general, and regard alone  some essential 
circumstances of  the case, wit'hout taking into consideration 
Lhe  characters,  situations,  and  connexions  of  the  person 
conceriied, or any particular consequences which  may result 
from the determination of  these laws, in any particular case 
which  offers.  They  deprive,  without  scruple, a  beneficent 
man of  all his possessions, if  acquired by mistake, without a 
good title ;  in order to bestow them on a  selfish miser, who 
has already heaped up immense stores of  superfluous riches. 
Public utility requires, that property should  be regulated by 
general  inflexible rules ;  and  though such rules are adopted 
as best  serve the same end of  public utility, it is impossible 
for them to prevent all particular hardships, or  make bene- 
ficial consequences  result from every individual  case.  It  is 
~ufficient,  if  the whole  plan  or  scheme be  necessary to the 
support  of  civil society, and if  the balance of  good, in the 
main,  do  thereby  preponderate  much  above  that of  evil. 
Even  the general laws of  the universe, though  planned  by 
infinite wisdom, cannot exclude  all evil or inconvenience, in 
every particular operation. 
It has  been  asserted  by  some,  that justice  arises from 
HUMAN CONVENTIONS, and proceeds from the voluntary 
choice, consent, or combination of mankind.  If by  c o~aven~tion 
be here meant $promise (which is the illost usual sense of the 
word) nothing can  be more absurd than t,his position.  The 
observance of pronlises is  itself one of  the most considerable 
parts of  justice ;  and we  are not  surely bound  to keep  our 
word, because we  have given our word to keep it.  But if by 
convention be meant a sense of  comlnon interest; which sense 
each  man feels in his own fi'reast,  which  he remarks  in his 
fellows, and .ivhich  carries him, in concurrence with  others, 
into a general plan or system of actions, which tends to pub- 
lic utility; it  must be owned, that, in this sense, justice arises 
from  human  conventions.  For  if it  be  allowed  (what  is, 
indeed, evident) that the particular consequences of  a particu- 
lar act of  justice may be  hurtful  to the public as well  as to 
individuals ;  it follows, that every man, in  embracing  that 
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virtue, must  have an eye to the whole  plan or system, and  APP.  IIL 
must expect  the concurrence of his fellows in the same con- - 
duct  and  behaviour.  Did all  his views  terminate in  the 
consequences  of  each act of  his own,  his benevolence  and 
humanity, as well  as his self-love, might often prescribe to 
him  measures of  conduct  very different  from  those, which 
are agreeable to the strict rules of right and justice. 
~h;s two men pull the oars of  a boat by common conven-  - 
tion, for conlmon interest, without any promise or contract : 
Thus gold  and silver are made  the measures  of  exchange ; 
thus speech  and words  and language are fixed by  human 
convention  and  agreement.  Whatever is advantageous to 
two or more persons, if all perform their part ;  but what loses 
all advantage, if  only one  perforin, can  arise from no  other 
principle.  There would otherwise be  no motive for  any one 
of them to enter into that scheme of  conduct.' 
The word, natural, is comrnonly taken in so many senses, 
and is of  SO loose a  signification, that it seems vain  to dis- 
pute, whether justice be natural or not.  If self-love, if bene- 
volence  be  natural to nian ; if  reason  and  forethought be 
also natural ;  then may the same epithet be applied to justice, 
order,  fidelity,  property,  society.  Men's  inclination,  their 
necessities lead them to combine ;  their understanding and 
experience  tell  them,  that this  combination  is impossible, 
where  each governs himself  by no rule,  and pays  no regard 
ho  the possessions of  others : And  from  these passions  and 
reflections conjoined, as soon as we  observe like passions and 
reflections in others, the sentiment of justice, throughout all 
ages, has  infallibly and certainly had place, to some degree 
or  other, in every individual  of  the human  species.  In  so 
sagacious an animal, what necessarily arises from  the exer- 
This  theory concerning  the  origin 
of  property,  and consequently  of  jus- 
tice, is, in the main, the  same with that 
hinted  at and  adopted  by  GROTIUS. 
'  Hinc  discimus,  quae  fuerit  causa,  ob 
quam  a  primaeva  commnnione  rerum 
primo mobilium, deinde & immobilium 
discessum est : nimirum  quod cum non 
content  homines  vesci  sponte  natis, 
antra habihre, corpore  aut nudo agere, 
aut corticibus arborum  ferarumro pel- 
libus vestito, vitae genus exquisitus  de- 
legissent,  industria  opus  fuit,  quam 
singuli rebus gingulis adhiberent  Quo 
minus autem fructus  in  commune  con. 
ferrentur, .primurn obstitit  locorum,  in 
quz  homlncs  discesserunt,  distantia, 
deinde jlistitiae & amoris  defectus,  per 
qliem  ficbat, ttt  riec  in  labore,  nec  In 
onsumtione  fructuum,  quae  debebat, 
=qualitas  servaretur.  Simul discifnus, 
quomodo  res  in  proprietatem  iverint; 
non  animi  actu solo,  neque enim scire 
a!ii  poterant,quid alii suum esse vellent, 
ut eo  abstinerent, & idem  vdle plures 
poteritnt ; sed  pacto  quodam  aut  es- 
presso, ut per divisionem, ant tacito, ut 
per  occupationem.'-De  Jurc Eelli  & 
Pacis.  Lib. ii. cap. 2.  5  2, art. 4 & 5. 27G  CONCERNING  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF MORALS. 
APP,  III. tion  of  his intellectual  faculties,  may  justly  be  esteemed  -  naturad. 
.  Among all  civilized nations, it  has been the  constant en- 
deavour to remove every thing arbitrary and partial from the 
decision  of  property, and to fix  the sentence of  judges  by 
such general  views and  considerations, as may be  equal to 
every member of the society.  For besides, that nothing could 
be more dangerous than to accustom the bench, even in *the 
smallest instance, to regard private friendship or enmity; it 
is certain, that men, where they imagine, that there was no 
other reason for the preference of their adversary but personal 
favour, are apt to entertain the strongest ill-will against the 
magistrates  and  judges.  When natural reason,  therefore, 
points out no fixed view of public utility, by which a contro- 
versy  of  property  can be  decided, positive  laws  are  often 
framed  to supply its plaoe, and  direct the procedure  of  all 
courts of judicature.  Where these too fail, as often happens, 
precedents  are called  for; and  a  former  decision,  though 
given  itself  without  any sufficient  reason, justly becomes  a 
suscient reason for a new decision.  If direct laws and pre- 
cedents be wanting, imperfect and indirect ones are brought 
in aid ;  and the controverted case is ranged under them, by 
analogical reasonings and comparisons,  and similitudes, and 
correspondencies,  which  are often  more  fanciful  than real. 
In general, it  may safely be  affirmed, that jurisprudence is, 
in this respect, different  from all the sciences;  and that in 
many of its nicer questions, there cannot properly be said to 
be  truth or  falsehood on  either side.  If  one pleader  bring 
the  case  under  any former  law or precedent, by  a  refined 
analogy or comparison ;  the opposite  pleader is not at a loss 
to find an opposite analogy or comparison:  And the prefer- 
ence given by the judge is often  founded more on taste and 
imagination than on  any solid argument.  Public  utility is 
the general object of all courts of judicature ;  and this utility 
too requires  a  stable rule  in all controversies.  But where 
1  Natural may be opposed, either to 
what is zcfiusual, miraculous,  or  nrti- 
jicial.  In  the twr, former senses,  justice 
and property are undoubtedly natural. 
But as they suppose reason, forethought, 
dekgn,  and  a  social  union  and  con- 
federacy among men, perhaps, that epi- 
thet cannot  strictly, in the last sense, 
be  applied  to  them.  Had  men  lived 
without  society,  property  ha.'  never 
been  known,  and  neither  just~ce  nor 
injustice had ever existed.  But t:ociety 
among human  creatures, bad  beev im- 
possible,without reason,and forethought. 
Inferior animals, that unite, are guided 
by instinct, which supplies the place of 
reason.  But  all  these  disputes  are 
merely verbal. 
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several rules, nearly equal and indifferent, present themselves, YP.  115 
it is a very slight tnrn of  thought, which fixes  the decision 
in favour of either party.' 
1  That there be  a  separation  or dis- 
tinction  of  possessions, and  that this 
gepardtion be steady and constant ; this 
is absolutely required  by the interests 
of  society, and hence the origin  of  jus- 
tice  and  property.  What  possessions 
are assigned to particular persons ;  this 
is, generally speaking, pretty indiffer- 
ent; and is often determined  by  very 
frivolous views and considerations.  We 
shall mention a few particulars. 
Were a society formed among several 
independent members, the most obvious 
rule, which  could  be  agreed on, would 
be  to annex property topresent posses- 
sion,  and leave  every  one  a right  to 
what he at  present enjoys.  The relation 
of possession, which takes place between 
the  person  and  the  object,  naturally 
draws on the relation of property. 
For a like reason, occupation  or first 
possession  becomes  the  foundation  of 
property. 
Where  a  man  bestows  labour  and 
industry upon  any object, which before 
bclonged to no body ;  as in cutting down 
and  sllaping  a  tree,  in  cultivating  a 
field, &c., ths alteration which  he  pro- 
duces,  causes  a  relat.ion  between  him 
and the  object, and naturally  engages 
us to annex it to him  by the new rela- 
tion of  property.  This cause here con- 
curs with the public utility, which con- 
sists  in  the  encouragement  given  to 
industry and labour. 
Perhaps  too,  private  humanity  to- 
wards  the  possessor,  concurs, in  this 
instance,  with  the other  motives, and 
engages us to leave with him what he 
has acquired by his sweat and labour ; 
and what he  has flattered himself  in 
the constant enjoyment of.  For though 
private humanity can, by no  means, be 
the origin of justice ;  since,  the latter  vir- 
tue so often contradicts the former ;  yet 
when the rule of  separate and constant 
possession is once formed by the indis- 
pensible  necessities  of  society, private 
humanity, and an aversion to the doing 
a hardship to another may, in a  par- 
ticular inshnco, give rise to a particular 
rule of property. 
I am much inclined to think, that the 
right of  succession or inheritance much 
depends  on  those  connexions  of  the 
imagination, and that the relation to n\ 
former  proprietor  begetting a relation 
to the object, is the cause why  the pro- 
perty is transferred to a  man  after the 
death of  his kinsman.  It is true ; in- 
dustry is more encouraged by the trans- 
ference  of  possession  to  children  or 
near relations : But  this consideratiorl 
will  only  have  place  in  a  cultivateti 
society ;  whereas the right of  succession 
is  regarded  even  among  the greatest 
Barbarians. 
Acquisition  of  property  by accession 
?an be explained no way but by having 
recourse to  the relations and conncxions 
of the imagination. 
The property of  rivers, by  the laws 
of  most  nations,  and by  the  natural 
turn of our thought, is attributed to the 
proprietors  of  their  banks,  excepting 
such  vast rivers as the RHINE  or the 
DANUBE,  which  seem  too  large to fol- 
low  as an accession to the property of 
the neighbouring fields.  Yet even these 
rivers are considered as the property of 
that nation,  through whose  dominions 
they run ; the idea of  a nation being of 
a suitable bulk to eorrespond with them, 
and bear  them such a relation  in  tho 
fancy. 
The accessions,  which  are  made  to 
land, bordering upon  ri~ers,  fallow the 
land, say the civilians,  provided  it bo 
made by what they call alluuion, that is, 
insensibly  and  imperceptibly ; which 
are circumstances, that assist the imagi- 
nation in the conjunction. 
Where there is any considerable por- 
tion  torn  at Gnce  from one  bank  and 
added  to another,  it becomes  not  his 
property, whose  land it falls on, till it 
unite with  the land, and  till the  trees 
and plants have spread their roots into 
both.  Before  that,  the  thought  does 
not sufficiently join them. 
In short,  we  must  ever  distinguish 
between  the necessity of  a  separation 
and constancy in men's  possession, and 
the rules, which  assign  particular  ob- 
jects  to particular  pemons.  The first 
necessity is obvious, strong, and invin- 
cible:  The  latter  may  depend  on  a 
public utility more light and frivolous, 
on  the  sentiment of  private humanity 
and  aversion  to  private hardship,  on 
positive  laws, on  precedents, analogies. 
and very fine  connexions  and  turns of 
the imagination.  [This note was added 
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APP. 111.  'We  may  just  observe, before  we  conclude this subject,  -  that, after the laws of  justice  are fixed  by views of  general 
utility, the injury, the hardship, the harm, which  result to 
ally  individual from  a  violation  of  them, enter very much 
into consideration,  and are a great  source of  that universal 
blame, which ;~.ttends  every wrong or iniquity.  By the laws 
of society this coat, this horse, is mine, and ought  to remain 
perpetually in my possession : I reckon on the secure enjoy- 
ment of it : By depriving me of it, you disappoinc, my expec- 
tations, and doubly displease me, and offend every bystander. 
It  is a  public wrong,  so far as the rules of  equity are vio- 
lated : It is a private harm, so far as an individual is injured. 
And though  the second  consideration could  have no place, 
were not the former  previously  established: For otherwise 
the  distinction  of  mine  and  thine  would  be  unknown  in 
society : Yet there is no question, but the regard to general 
good is much enforced  by the respect  to particular.  What 
injures the community, without  hurting any individual, is 
often  more  lightly  thought  of.  But where  the greatest 
public  wrong  is  also  conjoined  with  a  considerable  pri- 
vate one, no wonder  the highest  disapprobation attends so 
iliiquitous a behaviour, 
APPENDIX  IV.2-Of  some  Verbal  Disputes. 
.NOTHING  is more usual than for philosophers to encroach upon 
the province of  grammarians ;  and to engage in  disputes of 
words, while they imagine, that they are handling contro- 
versies of  the deepest importance  and ~oncern.~  It was  in 
order to avoid  altercations so frivolous  and endless, that I 
endeavoured  to state with the utmost  caution the object of 
1 [ Some copies of  Ediiion G do not 
contain this paragraph.  In  others, the 
page  having been torn out, a new page 
was inserted, containing the paragraph.] 
[This appears as Part i. of  Section 
vi., Of  Qualities useful to Ourselves,  in 
Editions G to N.] 
[Editions  G  to  M  omit  from this 
point to  &It  seems  indeed certain, &c.' 
p. 281, and substitute as follows :- 
Thus, were  we  here to a~so~t  or to 
deny, that all latcduble quc~1ztic.s  of  the 
mind  were  to  be  consider'd  as virtws 
or  moral  attrib!6tes,  many  would 
imagine that we had  enter'd  upon  one 
of  the  profoundest  specu!ations  of 
Ethics; tho'  'tis probable, all the while, 
that the greatest  part  of  the dispute 
would  be  found  entirely verbal.  To 
avoid, therefore, all frivolous snbtilties 
and  altercations, as much  as possible, 
we shall content onrselres with obserr- 
ing,  first,  that,  in  common  life,  the 
sentiments, of  censure or approbation, 
produc'd  by  mental qualities  of  every 
kind,  are rery similar ; and  secondly, 
that  all  antient  Moralists  (the  best 
models),  in  troating  of  them,  make 
little or no difference amongst them. 
Edition N omits as far  as 'Were we to 
say, &c.'  p. 280, and snbstitutes as fol- 
lows :--Thus  were we to seek  an exact 
definition or description of those mental 
qualities,which are denominated virtlces; 
we  might be  somewhat  at a  loss, an(\ 
might find ourselv~s  at first involved in 
inextricable difficulties.] 
our present enquiry;  and proposed simply to collect on  the  APP. IV. 
one  hand,  a  list of  those  mental  qualities  which  are the - 
object of love or esteem, and form a part of personal merit, and 
on the other hand, a catalogue of  those qualities, which are 
the object of censure or reproach, and which detract from the 
character of the person, possessed of  them; subjoining some 
reflections concerning the origin of  these sentiments of praise 
or blame.  On  all  occasions, where  there might  arise  the 
least hesitation, I avoided the terms virtz~e  and vice ;  because 
some of those qualities, which I classed among the objects of 
praise,  receive,  in the ENGLISH  language, the appellation 
of  talents, rather than of virtues;  as some of  the blameable 
or censurable  qualities are often called  defects,  rather  than 
vices.  It  may  now,  perhaps,  be  expected, that, before  we 
conclude this moral enquiry, we should exactly separate the 
one from the other;  should mark the precise  boundaries of 
virtues and talents, vices  and. defects ;  and should  explain 
the reason and origin of  that distinction.  But in order  to 
excuse myself  from  this undertaking, which mould, at last, 
prove  only a  grammatical enquiry, I shall subjoin the four 
following reflections, which shall contain all that I intend to 
say on the present subject. 
First, I do not  find, that in the ENGLISH,  or any  other 
modern  tongue, the boundaries  are exactly  fixed  between 
virtues and talents, vices  and defects, or that a precise defi- 
nition can  be given of  the one as contradistinguished from 
the other.  Were we  to  say, for  instance, that the esteem- 
able qualities alone, which are voluntary, are entitled to the 
appellation of virtues ;  we should soon recollect the qualities 
of courage, equanimity, patience,  self-command ;  with many 
others, which almost every language classes under this appel- 
lation, though they depehd little or not at all on our choice. 
Should we affirm,  that the qualities  alone,  which prompt us 
to act our  part in society, are entitled to that honourable 
distinction ;  it must inimediately occur, that these are indeed 
the most valuable qualities, and are commonly denominated 
the social virtues ;  but that this very epithet supposes, that 
thpe are also  virtues of  another  species.'  Should we lay 
hold of the distinction between intellect,ual and moral endow- 
'  [Edition  N apper~cls  the following  is said to be virtuous or is denominated 
note .-  a  man of  virtue. we  chiefly regard his 
It  seems to me, that in our language  social qunlities,  which  are indeed  the 
there are always  said to be  virtues of  most  r:iluable.  They  are  callea  the 
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APP.  IV. ments, and affirm the last alone  to be the real and genuine  -  virtues, because  they alone lead to action; we  should find, 
that  many  of  those  qualities,  usually  called  intellectual 
virtues, such  as prudence,  penetration,  discernment, discred 
tion, had also a considerable influence on conduct.  The dis- 
tinction between the heart and the head may also be adopted: 
The qualities  of  the first mi~y  be  defined  such  as in their 
immediate exertioi~  are accompanied with a feeling or senti- 
ment; and these  alone may be  called  the genuine virtues. 
But  industry, frugality, temperance,  secrecy,  perseverance, 
and  many other laudable  powers or  habits, generally stiled 
virtues, are exerted without any immediate sentiment in the 
person possessed of  them; and  are only known  to him  by 
their effects.  It is fortunate, amidst all this seeming per- 
plexity, that the question, being merely verbal, cannot pos- 
sibly be of any importance.  A moral, philosophical discourse 
needs not enter into all these caprices of  language, which are 
so variable in different dialects, and in different ages of  the 
same  dialect.'  But  on  the whole,  it seems  to me,  that, 
though it is always  allo~red,  that there are virtues of many 
different  kinds, yet,  when  a  man  is  called  vi~tuous,  or is 
denominated  a  man  of  virtue, we  chiefly regard  his  social 
qualities, which are, indeed, the most valuable.  It is, at the 
same time, certain, that any remarkable  defect  in courage, 
temperance,  ceconomy,  industry,  understanding,  dignity  of 
mind, would  bereave even  a very  good-natured, honest man 
of  this honourable  appellation.  Who did  ever  say, except 
by way of  irony, that such a one was a man of  great virtue, 
but an egregious ?lockhead  ? 
But, secondly, it is  no wonder, that languages  should not 
be very precise  in marking  the boundaries  between  virtues 
and talents, vices  and defects ;  since  there  is so  little dis- 
tinction made in our internal estimation of  them.  It  seems 
indeed  certain,  that the selztiment  of  conscious  worth,  the 
self-satisfaction  proceeding from  a  review  of  a  man's  own 
[For  the next  four sentences Edi- 
tion N substitut6s as follows :- 
It may  happe!~, that, in treating of 
ethics,  we  may  sometimes  mention 
laudable  qualities, which  the ENGLISH 
tongue does not always rank under the 
appellation of  virtue ;  but we do it only 
because we  are at a loss  how to draw 
the exact line between the one  and  the 
other; or at least because we consider 
the  question  as  merely  gr:tnimstical. 
And the more fully to justify our prac- 
tice  in  this particular, we  shall endea- 
vour to make  it appear, jirst, that in 
common life, the sentiments of  censure 
or  approbation,  produced  by  mental 
q~tities  of  every  kind,  are  nearly 
similar; and ~econdty,  that all antient 
moralists, (the best models) in treating 
of  them,  make  little  or  no difference 
among them.] 
conduct and  character;  it  seems  certain, I say,  that this e.  IV. 
sentiment,  which,  though the most  common  of  all  others, 
C 
has no  proper  name in our language,l arises from  the en- 
dowments of  courage and capacity, industry and ingeauity, 
as well as from any other mental excellencies.  Who, on the 
other  hand, is not  deeply mortified  with  reflecting  on  his 
own  folly and  dissoluteness, and feels not  a secret  sting or 
compunction, whenever his memory presents any past occur- 
rence, where he behaved with stupidity or ill-manners?  No 
time can efface the cruel  ideas of  a man's  own  foolish con- 
duct,  or  of  affronts,  which  cowardice  or  imprudence  has 
brought  upon  him.  They  still haunt his  solitary hours, 
damp  his  most  aspiring  thoughts, and  show  him, even  to 
himself, in the most  contemptible  and most  odious  colours 
imaginable. 
What is there too we  are more  anxious  to conceal from 
others than  such  blunders,  infirmities, and meannesses, or 
more dread to have  exposed by raillery and satire P  And is 
not  the chief  object of  vanity, our bravery or learning, our 
wit or breeding, our eloquence or address, our taste or abili- 
ties ?  These we  display with care, if  not with ostentation ; 
and we commonly show more ambition of  excelling in them, 
than  even  in the social  virtues  themselves,  which  are,  in 
reality,  of  such  superior  excellence.  Good-  nature  and 
honesty, especially the latter, are so  indispensably required, 
that, though  the  greatest censure  attends any violation  of 
these duties, no eminent praise follows such common instances 
of  them, as seem essential to the support of  human society. 
And hence the reason, in my opinion, why, though men often 
extol so liberally the qualities of  their heart, they are shy iin 
commending  the endowments  of  their head:  Because  the 
latter virtues, being supposed  more  rare and extraordinary. 
are observed to be the more usual objects of  pride and self- 
conceit ;  and when  boasted  of, beget  a strong  suspicion  of 
these sentiments. 
It is hard to tell, whether you hurt a  an's character most 
by calling him a  knave or a  coward, and whether a  beastly 
The teh,  pride, is commonlytaken  FRENCH  express  this sentiment by the 
in  a  bad  sense;  hut  this  sentiment  term, amour propre,  but  as they  also 
seems  indifferent,  and may  be  either  express self-love  as well  as vanity, by 
gosd  or bad, according as it is well  or  the  same  term,  there  arises  thence a 
ill founded, and according to the other  great confusion in ROCHEFOUCAULT,  and 
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APP.m.  glutton or drunkard be not as odious  and contemptible, as a  -  selfish, ungenerous miser.  Give me  my choice, and I would 
rather,  for  my  own  happiness  and  self-enjoyment,  have  a 
friendly, humane heart, than possess all the other virtues of 
DEMOSTHENES  and PHILIP  united:  But I would rather pass 
with the world for one  endowed with extensive  genius  and 
intrepid courage, and should thence expect stronger instances 
of  general  applause  and admiration.  The  figure which  a 
man  makes  in life, tlie  reception  which  he meets  with in 
company, the esteem paid him by his acquaintance; all these 
advantages depend as much upon  his good sense and judg- 
ment, as upon any other part of  his character.  Had a nlan 
the best  intentions  in the world, and were  the farthest re- 
nloved  from  all  injustice and violence, he would  never  be 
able to make himself be much regarded, without  a moderate 
share, at least, of  parts and understanding. 
What is it then we can here dispute about P  If sense and 
courage,  temperance an'd  industry, wisdom  and  knowledge 
confessedly form a considerable part  of  personal merit:  if  a 
man,  possessed  of  these  qualities,  is  both better  satisfied 
with himself, and better entitled to the goodwill, esteem, and 
services  of  others, than one  entirely destitute of  them;  if, 
in sbort, the sentiments are similar, which  arise from these 
endowments and from the social virtues ;  is there any reason 
for being so extremely scrupulous about a. word, or disputing 
whether they be entitled to the denomination of virtues P  It 
may, indeed, be pretended, that  the sentiment of approbation, 
which  those  a~.complishments  produce,  besides  its  being 
inferior,  is also somewhat dzferent  from that, which  attends 
the virtues of justice and humanity.  But this seems not a 
sufficient reason  for  ranking  them  entirely under different 
classes and appellations.  The character of  CASAR  and that 
of  CATO,  as drawn by SALLUST,  are both of them virtuous, in 
the strictest and most  limited  sense of  the word;  but in a 
[Editions  G  to M add  in a  note : 
Lt seems to  me, that in our language, 
conrage, temperance, industry,frugality, 
&c.,  accordihg  to  popular  stile,  are 
called virtues ; but when a man is said 
to  be  virtuous,  or  is  denominated  a 
man  of  virtrue,  we  chiefly  rt gard his 
soaial  qualities.  'Tis  needless  for  a 
moral, philosophical d:,  ,<COII~S~  to enter 
into all  these  caprices  of  language, 
which are so variable  in different  dia- 
lects, and in different ages of  the same 
dialect.  The srntiments of  men, being 
more uniform, as well  as more impor- 
tant, are a fitter subject of speculation : 
Tho'  at the  same  time,  we  may just 
observe, that wherever the social virtues 
are  talked  of. 'tis  plainly imply'd,  by 
this  distinction,  that  there  are  also 
other virtues of  a different naturo.] 
different way : Nor  are the  sentiments  entirely the same,  P:  IV- 
which arise from them.  The one produces  love ;  the other, 
esteem : The one is amiable ;  the other  awful : We should 
wish to meet the one  character  in a  friend ;  the other we 
sliould  be  ambitious  of  in  ourselves.  In like  manner  the 
approbation, which attends temperance  or industry  or fru- 
gality, may be somewhat different from that which is paid to 
the social virtues, without making them entirely of  a different, 
species.  And, indeed,  we  may observe, that these  endow- 
ments, more than the other virtues, produce not, all of them, 
the  same  kind  of  approbation.  Good  sense  and  genius 
beget esteem and regard : Wit and humour excite  love  and 
affection.' 
Most people, I believe, will  naturally, without  premedita- 
tion, assent  to the definition  of  the elegant and judicious 
poet, 
Virtue (for mere good-nature is a fool) 
Is  sense and spirit with h~manity.~ 
What pretensions has a inan to our  generous  assistance 
or good  offices,  who  has dissipated  his wealth  in profuse 
expences, idle vanities, chimerical projects, dissolute pleasures, 
or extravagant gaming?  These vices (for we  scruple not to 
call  them  such)  bring  misery  unpitied,  and contempt  on 
every one addicted to them. 
ACHAUS,  a wise and prudent prince, fell into a fatal snare, 
which cost him  his crown  and life, after having used  every 
reasonable precaution to guard himself  against it.  On that 
1  Love  and  esteem  are  nearly  the 
same passion, and arise from  similar 
causes.  The  qualities,  which  produce 
both, are such as communicate pleasure. 
But where this pleasure  is  severe and 
serious ; or where  its object  is  great 
ancl  makes  n  strong  impression,  or 
where it produces any degree  of  hnmi- 
lity  and awe: In all theee  cases,  the 
pab"on,  which arises from the pleasure, 
is  more  properly  denominated  esteem 
than love.  Benevolence  attends both : 
But is  connected with love  in  more 
eminent  degree.  There  seems  to  be 
still a stronger mixture of pride in con- 
tempt than of  humility in esteem; and 
the reason  would not be difficult to one, 
who  studied  accurately  the  passions. 
All  these  various  mixtures  and  com- 
positions and appearances of  sentimeld 
form R very curious subject of  specula- 
tion, but  are wide of  our present  pur- 
pose.  Throughout  this  enquiry,  we 
always consider in  general, what quali- 
ties are a subject of praise or of censure, 
without  entering  into all  the  minute 
cligerences  of  sentiment,  which  they 
excite.  It is evident, that whatever is 
contemned, is also disliked, as well  as 
wh:rt is hated ; and here we  endeavour 
to take objects, according to their most 
simple views  and appearances.  These 
sciences  are but too  apt, to appear ab- 
stract to common readers, even with all 
the precautions  which we  can take to 
clear  them  from  superfluous specula- 
tions,  and  bring them  down  to evory 
capacity. 
Armstrong : The Art of preserving 
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AJ?P.IVe  account, says the historian, he is a just object of  regard and  - 
compassion : His betrayers alone of  hatred and contempt.' 
The  precipitate  flight  and  improvident  negligence  of 
POMPEY,  at the beginning  of  the civil  wars, appeared such 
notorious blunders to CICERO,  as quite palled  his  friendship 
towards that great  man.  In the  same manner, says he, as 
want  of  cleanliness,  decency,  or discretion in, a  mistress  are 
found  to alienute our afections.  For so he expresses himself, 
where he talks, not in the character of  a philosopher, but in 
t>hat  of  a  statesman  and  man  of  the  world, to his friend 
ATTIC US.^ 
But  the  same  CICERO,  in  imitation  of  all  the  ancient 
moralists, when  he  reasons  as a philosopher, enlarges  very 
much his  ideas  of  virtue, and  comprehends  every laudable 
quality or endowment  of  the mind,  under  that honourable 
appellatioh.  a This leads to the third  reflection, which  me 
proposed to make, to wit, that the ancient moralists, the besl 
models, made  no  material  distinction  among  the different 
species of  mental  endowments and  defects, iut treated  all 
alike under the appellation  of  virtues  and  vices, and made 
them indiscriminately the object of  their  moral reasonings. 
The prudence explained in CICERO'S  O$i~es,~  is that sagacity, 
which leads to the discovery of  truth, and preserves  us fro111  - 
error  and  mistake.  Magnanimity,  temperance,  decency,  are 
there  also  at large discoursed of.  ~nd  as  that eloquent 
moralist followed the common received  division of  the four 
cardinal virtues, our social duties form but one head, in the 
general distribution of  his ~ubject.~ 
1  POLYBIUS,  lib. viii. cap. 2, 8 & 9. 
Lib. ix. epist.  10, 2. 
[This sentence was added in Edi- 
tion 0.1  '  Lib. i. cap. 6. 
6  The following passage  of  CICERO  ie 
worth quoting, as being  the most  clear 
and express  to our purpose, that any- 
thing can be  imagined, and, in a  dis- 
pute, which is chiefly verbal, must, on 
account of  the author, carry an  autho- 
rity,  from which  there can  be  no  ap- 
peal. 
'Virtus autem, quae  est per  se  ipsa 
laudabilie, et sine qua nihil laudari po- 
test, tamen habet plures partes, quarum 
alia  est  ali% ad  laudationem  aptior. 
Sunt enim  alia virt~~tes,  quae videntur 
in  moribus  hominum  et  quadam  co- 
mikite  ac  beneficentia  posita::  alis, 
quae  in  ingenii  aliqua  facultate,  aut 
animi  magnitudine  ac  robore.  Nam 
dementia,  justitia,  benignitas,  fides, 
fortitudo  in periculis  communilus, ju- 
cunda  est  auditn  in  laodationibus. 
Omnes enim hae  virtutes non tam  ipsis, 
qui eas in se habent, quam generi homi- 
num  fructuoss  putantur.  Sapientia, 
et  magnitudo  animi,  qua  omnes  res 
humans tenues et pro nihilo putnntur; 
et in  cogitando ris quzdam ingenii et 
ipsa eloquentia admirationis h.  ,t b  et non 
minus, jucunditiitis minus.  Ipsos enim 
magisvidetur, quos l;:utlamus, quarn illos, 
apud quos laudamus, ornare ac tueri :  sed 
tamen-.in laudando jungenda  sunt etiani 
hsc  genera virtu tun^.  Ferunf enim aures 
hominum, cum illa qu~  jucunda et  gmta, 
tun1  etiam  illa, qus mirabilia  sunt in 
virtnte, laudari.'  De Orat. Lib. 2. cap. 84. 
We need only peruse the titles of  chapters in ARISTOTLE'S  APP. TP.  -  Ethics to be convi~lced,  that he ranks courage, temperance, 
magnificence, magnanimity, modesty, p-rudence, and a manly 
openness, among the virtues, as well as justice and friendship. 
To sustain and to abstain, that is, to be  patient  and con- 
tinent, appeared  to some  of  the ancients & summary com- 
prehension of  all morals. 
EPICTETUS  has scarcely ever mentioned  the sentiment of 
humanity and compassion, but in order  to put his disciples 
on their guard against it.  The virtue of  the Stoics seems to 
consist chiefly in a firm temper, and a sound understanding. 
With them, as with SOLOMON  and the eastern moralists, folly 
and wisdom are equivalent to vice and virtue. 
Men will praise thee, says DAVID,'  when  thou  dost  well 
unto thyself.  I hate a wise man, says the GREEK  poet, who 
is not wise to hirn~elf.~ 
PLUTARCH  is no more  cramped  by  systems  in his phi- 
losophy than in his history.  Where he compares the great 
men of  GREECE  and ROME,  he fairly sets  in opposition  all 
their blemishes and accomplishments of  whatever kind, and 
omits  nothing  considerable,  which  can  either  depress  or 
exalt their characters.  His moral discourses contain the same 
free and natural censure of  men and manners. 
The  character  of  HANNIBAL,  as  drawn  by  LIVY? is 
esteemed  partial,  but  allows him  many  eminent  virtues. 
Never was  there a genius, says the historian, more  equally 
fitted for those opposite offices of  commanding and obeying ; 
and it were, therefore, difficult to determine whether he ren- 
dered himself dearer to the general or to the army.  To none 
would HASDRUBAL  entrust more willingly the conduct of any 
dangerous enterprize ;  under none, did the soldiers discover 
more  courage  and  confidence.  Great  boldness  in facing 
danger ;  great prudence in the midst of  it.  No labour could 
fatigue his body or subdue his mind.  Cold  and heat were 
indifferent to him :  Meat and drink he sought as supplies to 
I suppose, if  CICERO  were  now alive, 
it would  be  found  difficult  to  fet,ter 
his moral  sentiments  by narrow  sys- 
tems; or  persuade  him, that no  quali- 
ties were  to  be  admitted as virtues, or 
acknowledged  to be  a part of  persnnnl 
merit,  but what were  recommended  by 
The Whole  Duty of  Man.  [This note 
was added in Edition Q.  J 
Psalm 40th. 
MLU;  UO+LUT+V  8urrs  066'  a674 
uo+ds.  EURIPIDES.  Fr. 11 1.  [Edition 
G gives as the  reference : Incert. apud 
Lucianum, apologia  pro  mercede con- 
ductis.  Edition K does the same in the 
Text, but  makes  the correction in the 
Errata.] 
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DP.IV.  the necessities of  nature, not  as gratifications  of  his volup-  -  tuous  appetites : Waking or rest he used  indiscriminately, 
by night or by day.--These  great VIRTUES were balanced 
by  great VICES : Inhuman  cruelty ; perfidy  more  than 
punic ; no truth, no  faith, no regard to oaths, promises, or 
religion. 
The character of  ALEXANDER  the Sixth, to be  found in 
GUICCIARDIN,~  is pretty similar, but juster ;  and is a proof, 
that even the nloderns, where they speak naturally, hold the 
same  language  with  the ancients.  In this  pope, says he, 
there  was  a  singular  capacity  and  judgment:  Admirable 
prudence ; a  wonderful  talent  of  persuasion ; and in  all 
moment'ous enterprizes, a diligence and  dexterity incredible. 
But these  virtues  were  infinitely overbalanced  by his vices ; 
no faith, no religion, insatiable avarice, exorbitant ambition, 
and a more than barbarous cruelty. 
POLYBIUS,~  reprehending TIMBUS  for his partiality against 
AGATHOCLES,  whom he himself  allows to be  the most  cruel 
and  impious  of  all  tyrants,  says:  If  he  took  refuge  in 
SYRACUSE,  as asserted by that historian, flying the dirt  and 
smoke and toil of  his former profession  of  a  potter;  and if 
proceeding from such slender beginnings, he became master, 
in a little time,  of  all SICILY  ;  brought  the  CARTHAGINIAN 
state into the utmost  danger; and at last died  in old  age, 
and  in possession  of  sovereign  dignity : Must  he not be 
allowed something prodigious and extraordinary, and to have 
possessed great talents and capacity for business and action I) 
His historian, therefore, ought not to have alone related what 
tended  to his reproach  and  infamy;  but  also what  might 
redound to his ERAISE and HONOUR. 
In general, we may observe, that the dipltinction of  volun- 
tary or  involuntary was  little regarded  by the ancients in 
their  moral  reasonings ;  where  they  frequently treated the 
question  as very doubtful, whether  viq-tue could  be  taught  or 
not Z8  They justly  considered,  that cowardice,  meanness, 
levity, anxiety, impatience, folly, and many other qualities of 
the mind, inight appear ridiculous tind deformed, contemptible 
and odious, though independent of  the will.  Nor  could  it 
Lib. i.  Vz/.tulem  doctrina  paret, saaturane clonct. 
2  Lib. xii. 15.  Ey~at,.  lib.  i. ep. 18,  100.  BSCHIN~CS 
3  \'id.  PLATO  in MENONE,  SENECA  de  SGC~BATICUS.  Dial, i.  [Tte refcrencc to 
otio  ,yap. cap.  31.  So  also  HORACE, Ah.  Soc. was added in hclition 0.1 
be  supposed, at all times,  in  every man's  power  to attain  APP.IV.  -  every kind of  mental, more than of  exterior beauty. 
And here there occurs the  fourth  reflection  which I  pur- 
posed to make, in suggesting the reason, why modern  phi- 
losophers  have  often  followed  a  course,  in  their  moral 
enquiries, so different  from that of  the ancients.  In later 
times,  philosophy  of  all kinds, especially  ethics, have  been 
more  closely  united  with  theology  than  ever  they  were 
observed  to  be  among  the  Heathens ; and as this latter 
science admits of  no terins of  composition, but bends  every 
branch  of  lcnowledge  to its  own  purpose,  without  much 
regard  to the  phzenomena  of  nature,  or to the unbiassed 
sentiments of  the mind, hence reasoning, and even language, 
have been warped from their natural course, and distinctions 
have been endeavoured to be established, where the  difference 
of the objects was, ix  a manner, imperceptible.  Philosophers, 
or rather divines under that disguise, treating all morals,  as 
on a like footing with civil laws, guarded by the sanctions of 
reward and punishment, were  necessarily led to render this 
circumstance, of  voluntary or  involuntary, the foundation  of 
their whole theory.  Every one may employ terms  in what 
sense  he pleases : But  this,  in the  mean  time,  must  be 
allowed, that sentiments are every day experienced  of  blame 
and praise, which have objects  beyond tlie doniinioil  of  the 
will or choice, and of which it behoves us, if not as moralists, 
as speculative philosophers at least, to give some satisfactory 
theory and explication. 
A blemish,  a fault, a vice, a crime ;  these expressions seem 
to denote different  degrees of  censure  and disapprobatio~l; 
which are, however, all of them, at tlle bottom, pretty ne:~rly 
of the same kind or species.  The explication of one will easily 
lead us into a just  conception of  the others ;  "nd  it is of 
greater consequence to attend to things than to verbal appel- 
lations.  Tliat we owe a duty to  ourselves is confessed even in 
the most  vlxlgar  system of  morals;  and  it must  be of  con- 
sequence to examine that duty, in order to see, wl~ether  it bears 
any affinity to that which we owe to society.  It is probable, 
that the approbation, attending the observance of  both, is of 
a, similar nature, and arises froin similar principles ;  whatever 
appellation lve may give to either of these excellencies. 
[This  sentence  and  the  next  do  treating, &c.J 
not  occur  in  Editions  G  to N,  which  [Tlie  rt.ni:linde~ of  the  para,graph 
resume :  But  modern  philosoyl~ers,  was adder!  in Erlition  N.] A  DIALOGUE.' 
MY friend,  PALAMEDEB,  who  is  as great  a  rambler  in his 
principles  as in his person, and who has run over, by study 
and travel, almost every region of the intellectual and material 
world, surprized me lately with an account of  a nation, with 
whom, he told me, he had passed a considerable part of  his 
life, and whom, he found, in the main,  a people extremely 
civilized and intelligent. 
There is a country, said he, in the world, called FOURLI,  no 
matter for its longitude or latitude, whose inhabitants have 
ways of  thinking,  in many things,  particularly in morals, 
diametrically opposite to ours.  When I came among them, 
I found that I mist subdit to double pains ;  first to learn the 
meaning of the terms in their language, and then to know the 
import of  those terms,  and the praise or blame attached to 
them.  After a word had been explained to me, and the cha- 
racter, which it expressed,  had been described, I concluded, 
that such an epithet must necessarily be the greatest reproach 
in the world ;  and was extreinely surprized  to find one in a 
public company, apply it to a person, with whom he lived in 
the strictest intimacy and friendship.  You fancy,  said I, one 
day, to an acquaintance, that CHANGUIS  is your mortal enemy : 
I  love to extinguish qwrrrels;  and I  must, therefore,  tell you, that 
I  heard hirn talk of  you in the most  obliging manner.  But  to 
my great astonishment,. when I repeated CHANGUIS'S  words, 
though I  had both rementbered and understood them perfectly, 
I found, that they were taken for the most mortal affront, and 
that I had very innocently rendered the breach between these 
persons altogether irreparable. 
As it was my fortune to come among this people on a very 
advantageous footing, I was  immediately  introduced to the 
best company ;  and being desired by ALCHEIO  to live with him, 
I readily accepted of his invitation ;  as I  found him universally 
[For  the  Author's  opinion  cif  this  Dialogue, see '  History of  the Edition& 
Vol. 111. p. 52.-ED.] 290  A  DIALOGUE. 
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esteemed for his personal merit, and indeed regarded by everj 
one in FOURLI,  as a perfect character. 
One evening he invited me, as an amusement, to bear him 
company in a serenade, which  he intended to give to GULKI, 
with whom, he told me, he was extremely enamoured ;  and I 
soon found that his taste was not singular : For we  met many 
of his rivals, who had come on the same errand.  I  very natu- 
rally concluded, that this  mistress of  his must be one of the 
finest women in town ;  and I already felt a secret inclination 
to see her, and be  acquainted with her.  But as the moon 
began to rise, I was much surprized to find, that we were in 
the midst of the university, where GULKI  studied :  And I  was 
somewhat ashamed for having attended my friend, oil such an 
errand. 
I was afterwards told, that ALCHEIC'S  choice of  GULKI was 
very much approved of by all the good company in  town ;  and 
that it was expected, while he gratified  his own passion, he 
would perform to ths t young man the same good office, which 
he had himself owed to ELCOUF. It seems ALCHEIC  had been 
very handsome in his youth, had been courted by many lovers; 
but had bestowed his favours chiefly on the sage ELCOUF;  to 
whom he  was supposed to owe, in a great measure, the astonish- 
ing progress which he had made in philosophy and virtue. 
It gave me some surprize, that ALCHEIC'S  wife (who by-the- 
by happened also to be his sister) was no wise scandalized at 
this species of infidelity. 
Much  about  the same  time I discovered  (for it was not 
attempted to be  kept a  secret from me  or any body)  that 
ALCHEIC  was a murderer and a parricide, and had put to death 
an innocent person, the most nearly connected with him, and 
whom he was bound  to protect and defend by all the ties of 
nature and humanity.  When I asked, with all the caution 
and  deference  imaginable,  what  was  his  motive  for  this 
action ;  he replied coolly, that he was not then so much at 
ease in his circumstances as he is at  present, and that he had 
acted, in that particular, by the advice of all his friends. 
Having heard ALCHEIC'S  rirtue so extremely celebrated, I 
pretended to join him in the general voice of acclamation, and 
only asked, by way of curiosity, as a stranger, which of all his 
noble actions was most highly applauded; and I soon found, 
that all sentiments were united in giving the preference to the 
[This flame of  his : Elitions G and K.] 
assassination of  USBEK. This USBEK  had been to the last 
moment ALCHEIC'S  intimate friend, had laid many high obli- 
gations upon him, had even saved his life on a certain occasion, 
and had, by his will, which was found after the murder, made 
him heir to a considerable part of  his fortune.  ALCHEIC,  it 
seems, conspired with  about  twenty or thirty more, most of 
then1 also USBEK'S  friends ; and falling all together on  that 
unhappy man, when he was not aware,  they had torne him 
with a  hundred wounds ; and given him that reward for all 
his past favours  and obligations.  USBEK,  said the general 
voice of  the people, had many great and good qualities : His 
very vices were shining, magnificent, and generous : But this 
action of  ALCHEIC'S  sets him far above USBEK  in the eyes 
of  all judges of  merit; and is one of  the noblest  that ever 
perhaps the sun shone upon. 
Another  part of  ALCHEIC'S  conduct,  which I also fonnd 
highly applauded,  was  his behaviour  towards  CALISH,  with 
whom he was joined in a project or undertaking of  some im- 
portance.  CALISH,  being  a  passionate man,  gave ALCHEIU, 
one day,  a  sound  drubbing;  which  he took very patiently, 
waited the return of  CALISH'S  good-humour, kept still a fair 
correspondence with him; and by that means  brought  the 
affair, in which they were joined, to a happy issue, and gained 
to himself  immortal honour  by his remarkable temper  and 
moderation. 
I have  lately received  a  letter from  a  correspondent  in 
FOURLI,  by which I learn, that, since my departure, ALCHEIC, 
falling into a bad state of health, has fairly hanged himself; 
and has died universally regretted and applauded in that coun- 
try.  So virtuous and noble a life, says each FOURLIAN,  could 
not be better crowned than by so noble an  end ;  and ALCHEIC 
has proved  by this, as well  as by all his other actions, what 
was his constant principle during his life, and what he boasted 
of near his last moments, that a wise Inan is scarcely inferior 
to the great god, VITZLI.  This is the name of  the supreme 
deity among the FOURLIANS. 
The notions of  this people,  continued PALAMEDES,  are as 
extraordinary with regard to good-manners and sociableness, 
as with regard to morals.  My friend ALCHEIC  formed once s 
party for my entertainment, composed of all the prime wits and 
philosophers  of  FOURLI;  and each of  us brought  his mess 
along with him  to the place where we assembled.  I observed 292  A  DIALOGUE.  A  DIALOGUE.  293 
one of  them to be worse provided than the rest, and offered 
him a share of my mess, which happened to be a roasted pullet : 
And I could not but remark, that he and all  the rest of  the 
conipany smiled at my simplicity.  I  was told, that ALCHEIC 
had once so much  interest with  his club  as to prevail with 
them to eat in common, and that he had made use of an  artifice 
for that purpose.  He persuaded those, whom he observed to 
be worst  provided, to offer their mess to the company;  after 
which, the others, who had brought more delicate fare, were 
ashamed not to ma.ke the same offer.  This is regarded as so 
extraordinary  an event> that it has since, as I learn, been 
recorded in the history of ALCHEIC'S  life, composed by one of 
the greatest geniuses of FOURLI. 
Pray, said I, PALAMEDES,  when you were at  FOURLI,  did you 
also learn the art of turning your friends into ridicule, by tell- 
mg them strange stories, and then laughing at them, if they 
believed you.  I assure you, replied he, had I been disposed 
to learn such a lesson, there was no place in the world more 
proper.  My friend, so often mentioned, did nothing, from morn- 
ing to night, but sneer, and banter, and rally ;  and you could 
scarcely ever distinguish, whether he were in jest or earnest. 
But you think then, that my story is improbable;  and that I 
have used, or rather abused the privilege of  a traveller.  To 
be sure, said I, you  were but in jest.  Such barbarous  and 
sa,vage manners  are not only incompatible with a  civilized, 
intelligent  people,  such  as  you  said  these  were ; but  are 
scarcely compatible with human nature.  They exceed all we 
ever read of, among the MINGRELIANS,  and TOPINAMBOUES. 
Have a care, cried he, have a care !  You are not aware that 
you are speaking blasphemy, and are abusing your favourites, 
the GREEKS,  especially the ATHENIANS,  whom I have couched, 
all along, under these bizarre names I  employed.  If you con- 
sider aright, there is not one stroke of  the foregoing character, 
which  might  not  be  found i11  the man of  highest  merit at 
ATHENS,  without diminishing in the least from the brightness 
of his character.  The amours of the GREEKS,  their marriages  I, 
and the exposing of  their children cannot but strike you ini- 
mediately.  The death of  USBEK  is an exact counter-part to 
that of  CBSAR. 
The  laws  of  ATHENS  allowed  a  as being an act of  too great dignity for 
man to marry his sister by the  father.  such mean persons, 
SOLON'S  law forbid pederasty to slaves, 
All to a trifle, said I, interrupting him: You did not mention 
that USBEK  was an usurper. 
I did not, replied he ;  lest you should discover the parallel I 
aimed at.  But even adding this circumstance, we should make 
no scruple, according to our sentiments of morals, to denomi- 
nate BRUTUS,  and CASSIUS,  ungrateful traitors and assassins : 
Though you know, that they are, perhaps, the highest cha- 
racters of  all antiquity ;  and the ATHENIANS  erected statues 
to them; which they placed near  those  of  HARB~ODIUS  and 
ARISTOGITON,  their own deliverers.  And if you think this cir- 
cumstance, which you mention, so material  to absolvt, these 
patriots, I shall compellsate it by another, not  mentioned, 
which will equally aggravate their crime.  A few days before 
the execution of  their fatal purpose, they all swore fealty to 
CBSAR  ;  and protesting to hold his person ever sacred, they 
touched the altar with those hands, which they had  already 
armed for his destruction.' 
I need not remind you of  the famous and applauded story 
of  THRMISTOCLES,  and of  his patience towards  EURYBIADES, 
the SPARTAN,  his commanding officer, who, heated by debate, 
lifted his cane to him in a council of  war (the same thing as 
if he had cudgelled him), Strike !  cries the ATHENIAN,  strike ! 
but hear m,e. 
You  are too  good a scholar not to discover the ironical 
SOCRATES  and  his  ATHENIAN  club  in  my  last  story;  and 
you  will  certainly  observe,  that it  is  exactly  copied  from 
XENOPHON,  with  a  variation  only  of  the names.2  And  I 
think I have fairly made  it appear, that an ATHENIAN  man 
of  merit  might  be  such  a  one  as with ua would  pass  for 
incestuous, a parricide, an  assassin, an ungrateful, perjured 
traitor, and  something else  too  abominable  to be  named ; 
not to mention  his rusticity and ill-manners.  And having 
lived in this manner, his death might be  entirely suitable : 
He  might  conclude  the  scene  by  a  desperate act of  self- 
murder, and die  with the most  absurd  blasphemies  in  his 
mouth.  And notwithstanding all this, he shall have statues, 
if not  altars, erected to his memory ;  poems  and  orations 
shall be composed in his praise ;  great sects shall be  proud 
of  calling  themselves  by  his  name; and the  most  distant 
posterity  shall  blindly continue  their  admiration : Though 
1  APPIAN.  Bell. Civ. lib. i!'. 106.  SUETONIUS  in vita CXSARIS,  84. 
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were such a, one to arise among themselves, they would justly 
regard him with horror and execration. 
. I might  have  been  aware,  replied  I,  of  your  artifice. 
You seem to take pleasure in this topic :  and are indeed the 
onl~  man I ever  knew, who  was  well  acquainted  with the 
ancients, and did not extremely admire them.  But instead 
of attacking their philosophy, their eloquence, or poetry, the 
usual subjects of  controversy between  us, you  now  seem to 
impeach  their morals,  and accuse  them of  ignorance  in a 
science, which is the only one, in my opinion, in mhich they 
are  not  surpassed  by  the  moderns.  Geometry,  physics, 
astronomy, anatomy, botany, geography, navigation ;  in these 
we justly claim the superiority : But what have we to oppose 
to their moralists ?  Your  representation of  things is falla- 
cious.  You  have no  indulgence for the manners  and cus- 
toms of  different ages.  Would you  try a  GREEK  or ROMAN 
by the common law of ENGLAND?  Hear him defend himself 
by  his own maxims ;  and then pronounce. 
There are no manners so innocent or reasonable, but may 
be rendered  odious or ridiculous, if  measured by a standard, 
unknown to the persons ;  especially, if  you  employ a little 
art or  eloquence, in aggravating  some  circumstances,  and 
extenuating others, as  best  suits the  purpose  of  your  dis- 
course.  A11  these  artifices may easily be  retorted  on  you. 
Could I inform the ATHENIANS,  for  instance, that there was 
a; nation, in which  adultery, both  active  and passive, so to 
speak, was in the highest vogue and esteem : In  which every 
man of  education chose  for  his mistress  a married woman, 
the wife, perhaps, of  his friend and companion ;  and valued 
himself  upon  these infamous  conquests, as  much  as if  he 
had been  several times  a  conqueror in boxing or wrestling 
at the  Olympic  games : In which  every  man  also  took  a 
pride  in his tameness  and facility with regard  to his  own 
wife,  and  was  glad  to make  friends  or  gain  interest  by 
allowing  her to prostitute  her  charms ;  and even,  without 
any  such  motive, gave  her  full  liberty and indulgence : 1 
ask, what sentiments the ATHENIANS  would entertain of  such 
a people ;  they who  never  mentioned  the crime of  adultery 
but  in  conjunction  with  robbery  and poisoning ?  Which 
would they admire most, the villany or the meanness of such 
a, conduct P 
Should I add, that the same people were as proud of their 
slavery and dependance  as the ATHENIANS  of  their liberty ; 
and though a man  among them were oppressed, disgraced, 
impoverished, insulted, or imprisoned by the tyrant, he would 
still regard  it as the highest  merit to love, serve, and obey 
him ;  and  even  to  die for  his  smallest  glory  or  satisfac- 
tion : These noble GREEKS  would  probably ask me, whether 
I spoke  of  a  human  society,  or  of  some  inferior,  servile 
species. 
It  was then I might inform  my ATHENIAN  audience, that 
these people, however, wanted  not spirit and bravery.  If a 
man, say I, though their intimate friend, should throw out, 
in a  private  company, a  raillery against  them,  nearly ap- 
proaching any of  those, with which your generals and dema- 
gogues every day regale each other, in the face of  the whole 
city,  they never  can  forgive him ;  but in  order to revenge 
themselves, they oblige him immediately to run them through 
the body, or be himself murdered.  And if a man, who is an 
absolute stranger to them, should desire them, at the peril 
of their own life, to cut the throat of  their bosom-companion, 
they in~media~tely  obey, and think themselves highly obliged 
and honoured by the commission.  These are their maxims 
of  honour : This is their favourite morality. 
But  though so  ready  to draw  their  sword against  their 
friends and countrymen;  no  disgrace,  no  infamy, no pain, 
no poverty will  ever  engage these  people to turn the point 
of it against their own breast.  A man of rank would row in 
the gallies, would  beg  his bread, would languish in prison, 
would  suffer any tortures;  and still preserve  his wretched 
life.  Rather  than escape his  enemies by a  generous con- 
tempt of death, he would  infamously receive the same death 
from  his enemies, aggravated by  their triumphant  insults, 
and by the most exquisite sufferings. 
It is very usual too, continued I, among this people to erect 
jails,  where  every art of  plaguing  and tormenting  the un- 
happy prisoners  is carefully studied  and practised:  And  in 
these jails  it  is usual for  a parent voluntarily to shut up 
several of  his children ;  in order, that another child, whom 
he owns to have  no  greater  or  rather  less merit than the 
rest, may enjoy his whole  fortune, 311d wallow in every kind 
of voluptuousness and pleasure.  Notlling so virtuous in their 
opinion as this barbarous partiality. 
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to  the ATHENIANS,  is,  that  a  frolic  of  yourH  dunng the 
SATURNALIA',  when the slaves,hre served by their  masters, 
. is seriously continued by them throughout  the whole year, 
and throughout the whole course of their lives ;  accompanied 
too  with  some  circumstances, whicb  still  farther augment 
t'he absurdity and  ridicule.  Your  sport only elevates for  a 
few days those  whom  fortune has thrown  down, and whom 
she too, in sport, may really elevate for ever above you : But 
this nation gravely exalts those, whom  nature has subjected 
to them, and whose inferiority and infirmities are absolutely 
incurable.  The  women,  though  without  virtue,  are  their 
masters  and  sovereigns : These  they reverence,  praise, and 
magnify : To  these, they pay the highest  deference and re- 
spect : And  in  all places  and  all times,  the superiority of 
the females  is  readily  acknowledged  and submitted  to  by 
every one, who  has  the least  pretensions to education and 
politeness.  Scarce  any crime  would  be  so  universally de- 
tested as an infraction of this rule. 
You need go no further, replied PALAMEDES  ;  I can easily 
conjecture the people whom you  aim  at.  The strokes, with 
which you have painted  them, are pretty just;  and yet you 
must acknowledge, that scarce any people  are to be  found, 
either in ancient or modern  times, whose  national character 
is, upon the whole, less liable to exception.  But I give you 
thanks for  helping  me  out with  my argument.  I had  no 
intention  of  exalting the  moderns  at the  expence  of  the 
ancients.  I only meant  to represent  the uncertainty of  all 
these  judgments  concerning  characters ; and  to  convince 
you, that fashion, vogue, custom,  and  law,  were  the chief 
foundation  of  all  moral  determinations.  The ATHENIANS 
surely, were a civilized, intelligent people, if ever there were 
one;  and yet their man of merit might, in this age, be held 
in horror  and execration.  The FRENCH  are also, without 
doubt, a very civilized, intelligent people ;  and yet their man 
of  merit  might,  with the ATHENIANS,  be  an object  of  the 
highest contempt and ridicule, and even hatred.  And what 
renders the matter more  extraordinary : These  two  people 
are  supposed to be  the most similar in their national cha- 
racter of  any in ancient and modern times;  and while the 
ENGLISH  flatter themselves  that they resemme the ROMANS, 
their neighbours on the continent draw the parallel between 
themselves and those polite GREEKS. What wide difference, 
therefore, in  the  sentiments of  morals, must  be  found  be- 
tween civilized nations and Barbarians, or between  nations 
whose  characters  have  little in common?  How  shall  we 
pretend to fix a standard for judgments of this nature ? 
By tracing matters, replied I, a  little higher, and exami- 
ning the first principles, which  each  nation  establislle~,  of 
blame  or  censure.  The  RHINE  flows  north,  the  XHONE 
south;  yet  both  spring from the  same mountain, and  are 
also  actuated,  in  their  opposite  directions,  by  the  same 
principle  of  gravity.  The  different  inclinations  of  the 
ground, on which they run, cause  all the difference of  their 
courses. 
In how  many circumstances would  an ATHENIAN  and a 
FRENCH  man of  merit certainly resemble each other 3  Good 
sense, knowledge, wit,  eloquence, humanity,  fidelity, truth, 
justice,  courage,  temperance,  constancy,  dignity  of  mind: 
These you have  all omitted; in order to insist only on the 
points, in which  they may, by accident,  differ.  Very well : 
I am willing to comply with you; and shall endeavour  to 
account for these differences from the most  universal, estab- 
lished principles of morals. 
The  GREEK  loves, I care not to examine  more  particu- 
larly.  I shall  only observe,  that, however  blameable, they 
arose  from  a  very  innocent  cause,  the  frequency  of  the 
gymnastic  exercises  among that people ;  and were  recom- 
mended, though absurdly, as the source of  friendship, sym- 
pathy, mutual attachment, and fidelity ; qualities esteemed 
in all nations and all ages. 
The marriage of  half-brothers  and sisters seems no great 
difficulty.  Love  between the nearer relations is contrary to 
reason  and public  utility;  but the precise  point, where we 
are to stop, can scarcely be determined by natural reason; 
and is therefore a very proper  subject for  municipal law or 
custom.  If the ATHENIANS  went  a. little too far on the one 
side, the canon  law has  surely pushed matters a  great way 
into the other extreme.2 
Had you  asked  a  parent  at ATHENS,  why  he bereaved 
The GREEKS  kept the feast of SATURN  or  CHRONUS,  as well as the  ROMANS.  See 
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his child of  that life, which  he had  so lately given it.  It 
is because I love it, he would reply ;  and regard the poverty 
which it must inherit from  me, as a greater evil than death, 
which it is not capable of  dreading, feeling, or resenting.' 
How  is public  liberty, the most valuable of  all blessings, 
to be  recovered  from  the hands of  an usurper or tyrant, if 
his power shields him from public rebellion, and our scruples 
from private vengeance ?  That his crime is capital by law, 
you acknowledge : And must the highest  aggravation of  his 
crime, the putting  of  himself  above lam, form  his  full  se- 
curity?  You  can reply nothing, but by showing the great 
inconveniencies of  assassination ;  which  could any one have 
proved clearly to the ancients, he had reformed their senti- 
ments in this particular. 
Again, to cast your eye on the picture which I have drawn 
of  modern  manners;  there  is almost  as great difficulty, I 
acknowledge, to justify FRENCH  as GREEK  gallantry ;  except 
only, that the former is much  more  natural and agreeable 
than the latter.  But our neighbours, it seems, have resolved 
to sacrifice some of  the domestic to the sociable pleasures ; 
and to prefer  ease, freedom,  and an open  commerce, to a 
strict, fidelity and constancy.  These ends are both good, and 
are somewhat difficult to reconcile ;  nor need we be surprised, 
if the customs of nations incline too much, sometimes to the 
one side, sometimes to the other. 
The most inviolable attachment to the laws of  our country 
is  every where  acknowledged  a  capital  virtue;  and where 
the people are not so happy, as to have any legislature but 
a  single  person, the strictest loyalty  is,  in that case,  the 
truest patriotism. 
Kothing  surely can be  more  absurd  and barbarous than 
the practice of  duelling ;  but  those, who justify it, say, that 
it  begets  civility and  good-manners.  And  a  duellist, you 
may observe, always  values  himself  upon  his  courage, his 
sense of  honour, his fidelity and friendship ;  qualities, which 
are here  indeed  very  oddly  directed,  but which  have  been 
esteemed universally,  since the foundation of the world. 
Have the gods forbid self-murder ?  An ATHENIAN  allows, 
that it ought to be  forborn.  Has the Deity permitted it? 
A FRENCHMAN  allows, that death is preferable to pain  and 
infamy. 
You see then, continued I, that the principles upon which 
men reason in morals are always the same; though the con- 
clusions which  they  draw  are often  very  different.  That 
they all reason aright with regard to this subject, more than 
with regard to any other, it is not incumbent on any moralist 
to  show.  It  is  sufficient,  that the original  principles  of 
censure or blame are uniform, and that erroneous conclusions 
can be corrected by sounder reasoning and larger experience. 
Though many ages have  elapsed  since  the fall of  GREECE 
and ROME  ;  though many changes have  arrived in religion, 
language, laws, and customs ;  none of  tkeoe revolutions has 
ever produced  any considerable  innovation  in the primary 
sentilnents of  morals, more than in those of external beauty. 
Some minute differences, perhaps, may be  observed in both. 
HORACE  celebrldtes a  low  forehead, and  ANACREON  joined 
eye-brows :  5ut the APOLLO  and the VENUS  of  antiquity 
are still our  models  for  male  and  female  beauty ;  in like 
manner as the character of  SCIPIO  continues our standard for 
the glory of  heroes, and that of  CORNELIA  for the honour of 
matrons. 
It appears, that there never was any quality recommended 
by any one, as a virtue  or moral excellence, but on account 
of its being useful,  or agreeable to a man himself, or to others, 
For what  other reason  can  ever be assigned  for praise  or 
approbation ?  Or where  would be the sense of  extolling a 
good character or action, which, at the same time, is allowed 
to be  good  for  nothing ?  All  the differences, therefore,  in 
morals, may be reduced  to this one general foundation, and 
may be  accounted  for  by the different views, which  people 
take of these circumstances. 
Sometimes men differ in their judgment  about the useful- 
ness  of  any habit  or  action : Sometimes also the peculiar 
circumstances of things render one moral quality more useful 
than others, and give it a peculiar preference. 
It  is not surprising, that, during a period of war and dis- 
order,  the military virtues  should  be  more  celebrated than 
tbe pacific,  and attract more  the admiration  and attention 
PLUT,  de amore prolis, sub fine.  Epist. lib. i. epist. 7, 26.  Also lib. i.  Ode 28. PETROXIUS  (cap. 126) joins 
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of  mankind.  '  How usual  is it,'  says TULLY,'  '  to find CIM- 
BRIANS,  CELTIBERIANS,  and other Barbarians, who bear, with 
inflexible constancy, all the fatigues and dangers of the field; 
but are immediately dispirited  under the pain and hazard of 
a  languishing distemper : While,  on  the other hand,  the 
GREEKS  patiently endure the slow approaches of death, when 
armed with  sickness  and  disease ; but  timorously  fly  his 
presence, when  he attacks them  violently with  swords and 
falchions ! '  So different is even the same virtue of  courage 
among warlike  or  peaceful  nations !  And  indeed, we  may 
observe, that, as the difference between war and peace  is the 
greatest  that arises  among  nations  and  public  societies, it 
produces also the greatest variations in moral sentiment, and 
diversifies the most our ideas of virtue and persolla1 merit. 
Sometimes too,  magnanimity, g~eatness  of  mind,  disdain 
of  slavery,  inflexible  rigour  and  integrity,  may  better  suit 
the circumstances of  one  age  than  those  of  another,  and 
have a more kindly influence, both on public affairs, and on a, 
man's  own  safety  and  advancelllent.  Our  idea  of  merit, 
therefore, will  also vary a little  with  these variations ;  and 
LABEO,  perhaps,  be  censured  for  the same qualities, which 
procured CATO  the highest a~pprobation. 
A  degree of  luxury may be  ruinous  and  pernicious  in a 
native  of  SWITZERLAND,  which  only  fosters  the  arts,  and 
encourages industry in a FRENCHMAN  or ENGLISHMAN.  We 
are not,  therefore,  to expect,  either  the  same  sentiments, 
or  the  same lawe in  BERNE,  which  prevail  in  LONDON  or 
PARIS. 
Different  customs  have  also  some  influence  as well  as 
different utilities;  and by giving an early biass to the mind, 
may produce  a  superior  propensity,  either to the useful or 
the agreeable qualities ;  to those which regard self, or those 
which extend to society.  These four sources of moral sentiment 
still  subsist;  but  particular  accidents  may,  at one  time, 
make  any one of  them flow with  greater abundance than at 
another. 
The custonis  of  some nations shut up  the women  from 
all social commerce :  Those of others make them so essential 
a part of society and conversation, that, except where business 
is transacted, the male-sex alone are supposed almost wholly 
Tusc. Quest. lib. ii. 27. 
incapable of  mutual discourse  and entertainment.  As  this 
difference is the most material that can  happen  in private 
life, it must also produce the greatest variation in our moral 
sentiments. 
Of  all  nations  in the world,  where  polygamy  was  not 
allowed, the GREEKS  seem  to have been  the most  reserved 
in their commerce with the fair sex, and to have imposed on 
them the strictest laws of  modesty and decency.  We have a 
strong instance of  this in an oration of  LYSIAS.' A widow 
injured,  ruined,  undone,  calls  a  meeting  of  a  few  of  her 
nearest  friends  and  relations;  and  though  never  before 
accustomed, says the orator, to speak in the presence of men, 
the distress of  her circumstances constrained her to lay the 
case before them.  The very opening of  her mouth in such 
company required, it seems, an apology. 
When DEYOSTHENES  prosecuted  his tutors, to make them 
refund  his  patrimony,  it  became  necessary for him, in the 
course of the law-suit, to prove that  the marriage of APHOBUS'S 
sister with ONETER  was entirely fraudulent, and that, notwith- 
standing her sham marriage, she had lived with her brother 
at ATHENS  for two years past, ever since her divorce from her 
former husband.  And  it is remarkable, that though these 
were  people  of  the first fortune  and distinction in the city, 
the orator could prove this fact no way, but by calling for her 
female  slaves to be put to the question, and by the evidence 
of  one physician, who  had seen  her in her brother's house 
during her illness.=  So reserved were GREEK  manners. 
We may be  assured,  that an extreme purity of  manners 
was the consequence of  this reserve.  Accordingly we  find, 
that,  except  the fabulous  stories  of  an HELEN  and a  CLY- 
TEMNESTEA,  there  scarcely  is  an  instance of  any  event  in 
the GREEK  history, which proceeded  from  the intrigues of 
women.  On  the other hand, in modern  times, particularly 
in a neighbouring nation,  the females enter into all transac- 
tions and all management of church and state : And no man 
can expect success, who  takes not care to obtain their good 
graces.  HARRY  the third, by incurring the displeasure of the 
fair, endangered his crown, and lost  his life,  as much as by 
his indulgence to heresy. 
It is needless to dissemble:  The consequence of  a  very 
free commerce  between the sexes, and  of  their living much 
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together,  will  often  tern~inate  in  intrigues  and  gallantry. 
We must  sacrifice somewhat  of  the useful,  if  we  be  very 
anxious  to obtain  all the  agreeable  qualities ; and cannot  , 
pretend  to reach  alilie  every kind of  advantage.  Instances 
of  licence, daily multiplying,  will weaken  the scandal with 
the one  sex,  and teach the other, by degrees, to adopt the 
famous maxim  of  LA  FONTAINE,  with regard to female infi- 
delity, that $ one  knows  it, it is but  a  small matter; $  one 
knows it not, it is nothing.' 
Some people  are  inclined to think, that the best way of 
adjusting all differences, and of  keeping the proper medium 
between the agreeable and the useful qualities of the sex, is to 
live with them after the manner of the ROMANS  and the EN* 
LISH (for the customs of these two nations seem similar in this 
respect  ; that is, without gallsntr~~  and  without jealousy. 
By a  parity of  reason, the customs of  the SPANIARDS  and of 
the ITALIANS  of  an age ago (for the present are very different) 
must be the worst of any ;  because they favour both gallantry 
and jealousy. 
Nor will these different customs of  nations affect the one 
sex only:  Their idea of personal merit in the males must also 
be somewhat different with regard, at least, to conversation, 
address, and humour.  The  one nation, where  the men live 
much  apart, will  naturally more  approve  of  prudence;  the 
other of gaiety.  With the one simplicity of manners will be 
in the highest esteem ;  with the other, politeness.  The one 
mill  distinguish  themselves  by  good-sense and  judgment ; 
the  other,  by  taste and delicacy.  The  eloquence  of  the 
former will  shine most  in the senate; that of the other, on 
the theatre. 
These, I say, are the natural effects of  such customs.  For 
it must be confessed, that chance has a  great influence on 
national manners;  and many events happen in society, which 
are not to be  accounted  for by general rules.  Who could 
imagine,  for  instance,  that  the ROMANS,  who  lived  freely 
Quand on le spit,  c'est peu de chose ; 
Quand on l'ignore, ce n'est rien: 
* During the  time  of  the emperors, 
the  ROMANS  seem  to  hare  been  more 
given to intrigues and  gallantry  than 
the  ENGLI~E  are  at present: And  the 
women  of  condition. in order  to  retain 
their lovers, endeavoured to fix a name 
of  reproach on those who were addicted 
to  wenching  and  low  amours.  They 
were called ANCILLUIOLI. See SENECA 
de beneficiis.  Lib. I. cap, 9.  See also 
MARTIAL.  Lib.  12. epig. 68. 
'  The  gallantry here  meant is that 
of  amom and  attachments, not  that 
of complaisance, which is as much paid 
to  the fair-sex in  ENOXAND  as in any 
other county. 
with  their women,  should be  very  indifferent  about  music, 
and esteem dancing infamous :  While the GREEKS,  who never 
almost saw a woman but in their own houses, were c~ntinually 
piping, singing, and dancing ? 
The differences of  moral  sentiment, which naturally arise 
from a  republican or monarchical government, are also very 
obvious ;  as well as those which  proceed from general riches 
or poverty, union or faction, ignorance or learning.  I shall 
conclude this long  discourse with observing,  that different 
customs and situations vary not the original ideas of  merit 
(however they may, some consequences) in any very essential 
point,  and prevail  chiefly with regard  to young  men,  who 
can  aspire to the  agreeable  qualities, and may attempt to 
please.  The MANXER, the ORNAMENTS, the GRACES, 
which  succeed in this shape, are more arbitrary and casual : 
But the merit of riper years is almost every where the same; 
and consists  chiefly  in integrity,  humanity,  ability,  know- 
ledge,  and the other more solid and useful qualities  of  the 
human mind. 
What you  insist on,  replied PALAMEDES,  may have  some 
foundation, when you  adhere to the maxims of  common life 
~nd  ordinary conduct.  Experience and the practice of  the 
world  readily correct any great extravagance on either side. 
But what say you to artijcial lives and manners?  How  do 
you  reconcile the maxims, on which,  in different  ages and 
nations, these are founded ? 
What do you understand by artijcial lives and manners ? 
said I.  I explain myself, replied he.  You know, that religion 
had, in ancient times, very little influence  on  common life, 
and that,  asfter  men had performed  their duty in sacrifices 
and  prayers  at the temple, they thought, that the gods left 
the rest of their conduct to themselves, and were little pleased 
or offended  with those virtues or vices, which only affected the 
peace  and happiness of  human  society.  In those  ages, it 
was the btlsiness of  philosophy alone to regulate men's  ordi- 
nary behaviour  and deportment;  and accordingly, we  may 
observe, that this being  the sole principle, by which a man 
could elevate himself  above his fellows, it acquired a mighty 
ascendant  over  many,  and  produced  great singularities of 
maxims and of  conduct.  At present, when philosophy has 
lost the allurement of novelty, it has no such extensive influ- 
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the closet ;  in the same  manner, as the ancient religion was 
limited to sacrifices in the temple.  Its place is now supplied 
by the modern religion, which  inspects  our whole  conduct, 
and prescribes an universal rule to our actions, to our words, 
to our  very thoughts and inclinations ;  a  rule so much  the 
more  austere,  as it is guarded by infinite,  though distant, 
rewards and punishmerlts ;  and no infraction  of  it can ever 
be concealed or disguised. 
DIOGENWB  is  the most  celebrated  model  of  extravagant 
philosophy.  Let us seek a parallel  to him in modern times. 
We shall not disgrace any philosophic name by a comparison 
with the DOYINICS  or LOYOLAS,  or  any canonized monk  or 
friar.  Let us  compare  him  to PASCAL,  a man of  parts and 
genius as well as DIOGENES  himself;  and perhaps too, a man 
of  virtue,  had  he  allowed  his virtuous inclinations  to have 
exerted and displayed themselves. 
The foundation of  DIOGENES'S  conduct was an endeavour 
to render himself  an independent being as much as possible, 
and to confine all his wants and desires and pleasures within 
himself  and his own mind:  The aim of  PASCAL  was to keep 
a  perpetual  sense  of  his  dependence  before his  eTes,  and 
never to forget his numberless  wants and  infirmities.  The 
ancient  supported  himself  by  magnanimity,  ostentation, 
pride, and the idea of  his  own superiority above his  fellow- 
creatures.  The modern made constant prufession of humility 
and abasement,  of  the contempt and hatred of  himself;  and 
endeavoured to attain these supposed virtues, as far as they 
are attainable.  The austerities of  the GREEK  mere in order 
to inure himself  to hardships, and prevent his ever suffering : 
Those  of  the FRENCHMAN  were  embraced  merely for their 
own sake, and in order to suffer  as much  as  possible.  The 
philosopher indulged himself  in  the most  beastly pleasures, 
even in public : The saint refused himself the niost innocent, 
even in private.  The former thought it his duty to love his 
friends, and to rail at them,  and reprove  them, and scold 
them : The latter  endeavoured  to be  absolutely indifferent 
towards his nearest relations, and to love and speak  well  of 
his enemies.  The great object of  DIOGENES'S  wit was every 
kind of  superstition, that is every kind of  religion known in 
his time.  The mortality of  the soul was his standard  prin- 
ciple ;  and even his sentiments of  a divine  providence  seem 
to have been licentious.  The most  ridiculous  superstitions 
directed PA~CAL'S  faith and practice ;  and an extreme con- 
tempt of  this life, in comparison of  the future, was the chief 
fouidation of  his contluct. 
In such a remarkable  contrast  do these  two  men  stand : 
Yet both of  them hare met with general admiration  -  -- in  -. their  . 
-  - 
different ages, and have been proposed as models of  imitatlon. 
Where then is the universal standard  of  morals, which  you 
talk of?  And what rule shall we establish for the many dif-  -. 
ferent, nay contrary sentiments of  mankind ? 
An experiment, said I, which succeeds in the air, will not 
always succeed  in a vacuum.  When men  depart  from  the 
maxims of  common reason, and affect these  arti$cial  lives, 
as you call them, no one can answer for what will  please  or 
displease them.  They are  in a different  elemenk  from  the 
rest of  mankind; and the natural  principles  of  their  mind 
play not with the same regularity, as if  left  to themselves, 
free  from  the illusions of  religious  superstition  or  philo- 
sophical enthusiasm. THE 
NATURAL  HISTORY 
0  I? 
RELIGION. THE 
NATURAL  HISTORY OF  RELIGION. 
INTRODUCTION. 
AS every enquiry, which  regards religion, is of  the utmost 
importance,  there are  two  questions in particular,  which 
challenge our attention, to wit, that concerning its founda- 
tion in reason,  and  that concerning  its  origin in  human 
nature.  Happily, the first  question, which is the most  im- 
portant, admits of  the most  obvious, at least, the  clearest 
solution.  The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent 
author ;  and no rational enquirer can, after serious reflection, 
suspend  his  belief  a  moment  with  regard to the primary 
principles of  genuine Theism and  Religion.  But the other 
question, concerning the origin of  religion in human nature, 
is exposed to sonie more  difficulty.  The  belief  of  invisible, 
intelligent power has been very  generally diffused over the 
human race, in all places and in all ages ;  but it has neither 
perhaps been so  universal  as to admit of  no  exception,  nor 
has it been, in any degree, uniform in the ideas, which it has 
suggested.  Some nations have been  discovered, who  enter- 
tained no sentiments of  Religion, if travellers and historians 
may be credited ;  and no  two  nations, and scarce  any two 
men, have ever agreed precisely in the same sentiments.  It 
would appear, therefore, that this preconception springs not 
from an original  instinct  or  primary impression  of  nature, 
such as gives rise  to self-love, affection between  the  sexes, 
love of  progeny, gratitude, resentment ;  since  every instinct 
ions  of this kind has been found absolutely universa.1  in all n  to 
and ages, and has always a precise determinate object, which 
it inflexibly pursues.  The first religious principles must  be 
[For the circumstances attending the publication of this Treatise, see '  History 
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INTRO-  secondary ;  such as may easily be perverted  by various acci-  DUCTION.  -  dents and causes, and whose  operation  too, in  some  cases, 
may, by an extraordinary concurrence  of  circumstances,  be 
altogether  prevented.  What  those  principles  are,  which 
give rise to the original beliei, and what those accidents and 
causes are, which direct its operation, is the subject  of  our 
prcsci ,l:  e oquiry. 
SECT.  SECT.  I.-That  Polytheism was the  primary Religion of  Men. 
I. -  It appears to me, that, if  we  consider the improvement of 
human  society, from  rude  beginnings  to a state  of  greater 
perfection, ~ol~theisrn  or idolatry was, and necessarily must 
have been, the first and most  ancient  religion  of  mankind. 
This opinion I shall endeavour to confirm  by the following 
arguments. 
It is a matter of  fact incontestable, that about 1,700 years 
ago  all  mankind  were  'polytheists.  The  doubtful  and 
sceptical principles of  a few philosophers, or the theism, and 
that too  not entirely pure, of  one  or  two  nations, form no 
objection worth regarding.  Behold then the clear testimony 
of  history.  The farther we  mount  up into  antiquity,  the 
more do  we  find  mankind  plunged  into  polytheism.  No 
marks,  no  symptoms  of  any  more  perfect  religion.  The 
most  ancient  records  of  human  race still present  us  with 
that  system  as  the  popular  and  established  creed.  The 
north, the  south, the east,  the west, give  their unanimous 
testimony to the same fact.  What can be opposed to so full 
an evidence ? 
As far as writing or  history reaches, mankind, in ancient 
times, appear universally to have been polytheists.  Shall we 
assert, that, in more ancient times, before  the knowledge of 
letters, or  the discovery of  any art or  science, men  enter- 
tained the principles of  pure  theism ?  That is, while they 
were ignorant and barbarous, they discovered truth : But fell 
into error, as soon as they acquired learning and  politeness. 
But in this assertion you not only contradict all appearance 
of  probability,  but  also  our present  experience  concerning 
the  principles  and  opinions  of  barbarous  nations.  The 
savage tribes of AMERICA,  AFRICA,  and ASIA  are all idolaters. 
[Idolaters : Editions L t6 Q.]  [Idolatry : Editions L to Q.] 
Not a  single  exception  to this rule.  Insomuch, that, were  SXCT  L 
a traveller to transport himself  into any unknown region ;  if  , 
he found inhabitants cultivated with arts and science, though 
even upon that supposition there are odds against their being 
theists, yet could he not safely, till farther inquiry, pronounce 
any thing on that head : But if  he found them ignorant and 
barbarous, he might beforehand declare them idolaters ;  and 
there scarcely is a possibility of  his being mistaken. 
It seems certain, that, according to the  natural  progress 
of  human thought, the ignorant multitude must first enter- 
tain soille groveling and familiar notion  of  superior powers, 
before they stretch their conception  to that perfect  Being, 
who bestowed order on the whole frame of  nature.  We may 
as reasonably imagine,  that men  inhabited  palaces before 
huts and cottages, or  studied  geometry before  agriculture ; 
as assert that the  Deity appeared  to  them  a  pure  spirit, 
omniscient,  omnipotent,  and  omnipresent,  before  he  was 
apprehended to be  a  powerful,  though limited being, wit11 
human passions and appetites, limbs and organs.  The mind 
rises  gradually,  from  inferior  to superior : By  abstracting 
from what is imperfect, it forms an idea  of  perfection : And 
slowly distinguishing the nobler parts of  its own frame from 
the  grosser,  it learns  to  transfer  only  the  former,  much 
elevated and refined, to its divinity.  Nothing could  disturb 
this natural  progress  of  thought,  but  some  obvious  and 
invincible  argument,  which  might  immediately  lead  the 
mind into the pure principles  of  theism, and make it over- 
leap, at one  bound,  the vast  interval  which  is  interposed 
between the human and the divine  nature.  But though  l. 
allow, that the order and frame of  the universe, when  accu- 
rately examined, affords such an argunient ;  yet I can nerer 
think, that this  consideration  could  have  an influence  on 
mankind,  when  they  formed  their  first  rude  notions  of 
~~eligion. 
The  causes  of  such  objects, as  are  quite  familiar to us, 
never strike our attention or  curiosity ;  and however  extra- 
ordinary or surprising these objects in themselves, they  are 
passed  over,  by  the raw  and ignorant  multitude,  without 
much  examinat,ion or  enquiry.  ADAM,  rising  at once,  in 
paradise, and in the full  perfection  of  his  faculties, would 
naturally, as represented  by  MILTON,  be  astonished  at the 
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SfcT-  earth, his own organs and members ;  and would be led to ask, 
I  --A  whence this woilderful scene arose.  But a barbarous, neces- 
-  sitous animal (such as a man is on the first origin of societj), 
pressed by such numerous walits and passions, has no leisule 
to admire the regular face of  nature, or make enquiries con- 
cerning the cause of those objects, to which from his infancy 
he  has  been  gradually  accustomed.  On  the  contrary, the 
more regular and unifonn, that is, tlie  more  perfect  nature 
appears,  the  more  is  he  fhmiliarized  to  it,  and  the  less 
inclined to scrutinize  and  exanline it.  A  morlstrou,+ birtlr 
excites his  curiosity,  and  is  deemed a prodigy.  It alarms 
him from its novelty ;  and immediately sets him a trembling, 
and sacrificing, and  praying.  But an  animal, compleat  in 
all its limbs and organs, is to hiin an ordinary spectacle, and 
produces no religious opinion or affection.  Ask him, whence 
that animal arose ;  he will tell  you, from  the copulation  of 
its parents.  And  these, whence ?  Front the copulation of 
theirs.  A  few  removes  satisfy  his  curiosity,  and  set  the 
objects  at such a  distance, that he  entirely loses  sight of 
them.  Imagine not, that he will so much as start the ques- 
tion, whence the first animal ;  much less, whence the whole 
system  or  united  fabric  of  the universe  arose.  Or, if  you 
start such a question to him, expect not, that he will employ 
his mind with any anxiety about a subject, so remote, so un- 
interesting, and which so much  exceeds the bounds  of  his 
capacity. 
But farther, if  men were at first led into the belief  of  one 
Supreme Being, by reasoning fro111 the frame of nature, they 
could never  possibly leave  that belief, in order  to embrace 
* polytheism ; but  the same  principles  of  reason, which  at 
first produced and  diffused over mankind, so magnificent an 
opinion, must  be  able, with  greater facility, to preserve  it. 
The first invention and proof  of  any doctrine is much  more 
difficult than the supporting and retaining of  it. 
There  is a great  difference between  historical  fa'cts and 
speculative opinions ;  nor is the knowledge of  the one  pro- 
pagated in the  same  manner with  that of  the  other.  An 
historical  fact, while  it passes  by oral  tradition  from  eye- 
witnesses and coiltemporaries, is disguised in every successive 
narmtion, and may at last retain but very small, if  any, re- 
semblance of  the original  truth, on  which  it was  founded.  SECT. 
The frail memories of  men, their love of  exaggeration, their . , 
supine  carelessness ; these  principles,  if  not  corrected  by 
books  and writing,  soon  pervert  the account  of  historical 
events ;  where argument or reasoning has little or  no place, 
nor can ever recal the truth, which  has  once  escaped  those 
narrations.  It  is  thus the fables  of  HERCULES,  THESEUS, 
BACCHUS  are  supposed  to have  been  originally founded  in 
true  history,  corrupted  by  tradition.  But  with  regard  to 
speculative  opinions,  the  case  is  far  otherwise.  If  these 
opinions be founded  on  arguments so clear  and obvious as 
to carry conviction with the generality of  mankind, the same 
arguments, which at first diffused the opinions, will still pre- 
serve them  in their  original  purity.  If the arguments be 
Inore abstruse, and lnore remote from  vulgar  apprehension, 
the opinions will always be confined to a few persons ;  and as 
soon  as  men  leave the contemplation of  the arguments, the 
opinions will immediately be lost and be buried  in  oblivioli. 
Whichever side of  this dilemma we  take, it must appear irn- 
possible, that  theism  could, from  reasoning, have  been  the 
primary religion of  human race, and have afterwards, by its 
corruption, given birth to polytheism  and to all tlie various 
superstitions of  the heathen world.  lieason, when  obvious, 
prevents  these  corruptions : When abstlruse, it  keeps  the 
principles  entirely from  the knowledge  of  the vulgar, who 
are alone liable to corrupt any principle or opinion. 
SECT.  11.-Origin  of  Polytheism. 
If we  would, therefore, indulge our curiosity, ir,  enquiring 
concerning the origin of religion, we  must turn our thoughts 
towards  polytheism, the primitive  religion  of  uninstructed 
mankind. 
Were men led into the apprehension of  invisible, intelli- 
gent power by a contelnplation of  the works of  nature, they 
coilld  never  possibly  entertain any  conception  but,  of  one 
single being, who bestowed existence and order on this vast 
machine, and adjusted alL its parts, according $0 one regular 
plan  or  connected  system.  For though,  to persons  of  n 
certain  turn of  mind, it may not appear  altogether absurd, 
that several independent beings, endowed with superior wis- 
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SECT.  dom, might conspire in the contrivance and execution of one 
11 
.  .  regular  plan ; yet  is  this a  merely  arbitrary  supposition, 
.which, even if allowed possible, must be confessed neither to 
be supported by probability nor necessity.  All things in the 
universe  are evidently of  a piece.  Every thing is adjusted 
to every thing.  One  design  prevails throughout the whole. 
And  this uniformity  leads  the mind  to acknowledge  one 
author; because the conception of different authors, without 
any distinction of attributes or operations, serves only to give 
perplexity to the imagination, without  bestowing  any satis- 
Paction on the understanding.  The statue of  LAOCOON,  as 
we  learn  from PLINY,  was  the work of  three artists : But it 
is certain, that, were we  not told so, we  should  never have 
imagined, that a  groupe of figures, cut from one stone, and 
united in one plan, was not the work and contrivance of one 
statuary.  To  ascribe  any single effect  to the combination 
of  several causes, is not surely a natural and obvious suppo- 
sition. 
On  the  other  hahd,  if,  leaving the works  of  nature, we 
trace the footsteps of invisible power in the various and con- 
trary events of  human life, me are necessarily led into poly- 
theism  ad  to the acknowledgment of  several limited  and 
imperfect deities.  Storins and tempests ruinwhat is nourished 
by the sun.  The sun destroys what is fostered  by the mois- 
ture of dews and rains.  War may be favourable to a nation, 
whom  the  inclemency of  the  seasons afflicts  with fdmine. 
Sickness and pestilence  may depopulate  a  kingdom, amidst 
the most  profuse plenty.  The same  nation  is not,  at the 
same time,  equally successful by  sea  and by land.  And  a 
nation,  which  now  triumphs  over  its enemies, may  anon 
submit to their more prosperous arms.  In  short, the conduct 
of evats, or what we  call the plan of a particular providence, 
is  so  full of  variety and uncertainty,  that, if  we  suppose it 
immediately  ordered  by  any  intelligent  beings,  we  mwt 
acknowledge a  contrariety in their designs and intentions, 
a  constant combat  of  opposite  powers, and a repentance or 
change  of  intention  in the same p,ower, from impotence or 
levity.  Each nation  has  its tutelar deity:  Each  element 
is subjected to its invisible power or agent.  The province of 
each  god  is  separate from  that of  aiother.  Nor  are  the 
[Tho reniitixlder of the paragraph was giren as a note in Edkions L to P.1 
operations  of  the same god  always certain  and invariable.  SECT. 
To-day he protects:  To-morrow he abandons  us.  Prayers  * 
and sacrifices, rites and ceremonies, well or ill performed, are 
the sources of  his favour or enmity, and produce all the good 
or ill fortune, which are to be found amongst mankind. 
We may conclude,  therefore,  that,  in all nations, which 
have embraced  polytheism,'  the first ideas of  religion arose 
not from a contemplation of  the works of nature, but from a 
concern  with  regard  to the  events of  life,  and from  the 
incessant  hopes and fears, which  actuate the human mind. 
Accordingly,  we  find,  that  all  idolaters, having  separated 
the provinces of  their deities, have recourse to that invisible 
agent, to whose  authority they are  immediately  subjected, 
and  whose  province  it  is  to  superintend  that  course  of 
actions,  in which  they are,  at any  time,  engaged.  JUNO 
is invoked  at marriages ; LUCINA  at birthrr,  NEPTUNE  re- 
csives the prayers  of  seamen;  and MARS  of  warriors.  The 
husbandman  cultivates  his  field  under  the  protection  of 
CZRES  ; and  the merchant  acknowledges  the  authority  of 
MERCURY.  Each natural event is supposed to be governed 
by some intelligent agent; and nothing prosperous or adverse 
can happen in life, which may not be the subject of  peculiar 
prayers or thanksgivings  .a 
It  must  necessarily, indeed, be  allowed,  that, in order  to 
carry men's  intention beyond the present course of things, or 
lead them into any inference concerning invisible intelligent 
power, they must be actuated by some passion, which prompts 
their  thought  and  reflection ; some  motive,  which  urges 
their  first  enquiry.  But what  passion  shall we  here  have 
recourse  to, for  explaining an effect of  such mighty conse- 
quence ?  Not  speculative curiosity surely, or  the pure love 
of  truth.  That motive is too refined  for  such gross appre- 
hensions ; and would  lead men  into enquiries  concerning 
the frame of  nature, a subject too large and comprehensive 
for their narrow capacities.  No  passions, therefore, can be 
1  [Polytheism  or  idolatry: Editions  these seems still too great for their num- 
L to  &.I  ber. The provinces of the deities were so 
'Fragilis & laboriosa mortalitas in  subdivided, that there was  even  a God 
partes  ista,  digessit,  infirmitatis  ~uae  of  S?z~ezing.  Pee  ARIST.  Prohl.  sect. 
memor, ut portionitus coleret quisque,  33.  cap.  7.  The  province  of  copula- 
quo  maxime  indigeret.'  PLIN. lib. ii.  tion,  suitably  to  the  importance  ant1 
cap. 5.  SQ  early as HESIOD'S  time there  dignity of it, was divided among several 
wl  'ro 30,000 deities.  Oper. 4 Dier.  1ib.i.  deities. 
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BECT.  supposed to work  upon  such  barbarians,  but  the ordinary 
I1  . ; ,  affections of  human life ;  the anxious concern for ha,ppiness, 
the dread  of future misery, the terror of death, the thirst of 
revenge,  the  appetite  for  food and other necessaries.  Agi- 
tated by hopes and fears of  this nature, especially the latter, 
men  scrutinize,  with  a  trembling  curiosity, the course of 
future causes, and examine  the various and contrary events 
of human life.  And in this disordered scene, with eyes still 
more  disordered  and  astonished,  they see the first obseure 
traces of  divinity. 
SECT.  111.-The  same subject continued. 
We are placed in this world, as in a great theatre, where 
the true springs and causes of  every event are entirely con- 
cealed  from  us ;  nor  have  we  either  sufficient  wisdom  to 
foresee,  or  power  to prevent  those  ills,  with which me  are 
continually  threatened.  We  hang  in  perpetual  suspence 
between  life  and  death,  health  and  sickness, plenty  and 
want;  which  are  distributed  amongst  the human  species 
by secret  and unknown  causes, whose operation is oft unex- 
pected,  and  always unaccountable.  These  unknown  Lauses, 
then, become the constant  object of  our hope and fear ;  and 
while the passions are kept in perpetual alarm by an anxious 
expectation  of  the events,  the  imagination  is  equally em- 
ployed  in forming ideas of  those powers, on which we have 
so  entire  a  dependance.  Could  men  anatomize  nature, 
according to the most probable, at least the most intelligible 
philosophy, they would  find, that these  causes  are nothing 
but the particular fabric and structure of  the minute parts 
of their own  bodies and  of  external objects;  and that, by a 
regular  and  constant  machinery,  all  the events  are  pro- 
duced, about which they are so  much  concerned.  But this 
philosophy exceeds the co~nprehension  of  the ignorant mill- 
titude, who can only conceive the unknown causes in a general 
and confused manner;  though their imagination, perpetually 
employ'ed  on  the  same  subject,  must  labour  to form  some 
particular and distinct  idea  of  them.  The more  they mn- 
sider these  canses themselves, and the fincertainty of  their 
operation,  the  less  satisfaction do  they meet with  in  their 
researches ;  and, however unwilling,  they must at last have 
abandoned so arduous an  nttelnpt, were it not for s propen- 
sity in human  nature, which leads into a system, that gives  SECT. 
them some satisfaction.  11:. - 
There is an universal  tendency among  mankind  to con- 
ceive  all  beings like  themselves,  and  to  transfer  to  every 
object, those  qualities,  with which  they are familiarly  ac- 
quainted, and of  which  they are intimately conscious.  We 
find human faces in the moon, armies in the clouds;  and by 
a natural  propensity,  if  not  corrected  by  experience  and 
reflection,  ascribe  malice  or  good-will to  every thing, that 
hurts or pleases us.  Hence the frequency and beauty of  the 
prosopopmia in poetry ;  where  trees, mountains  and streams 
are  and  the inanimate parts of  nature acquire 
sentiment and passion.  And  though  these poet-ical figures 
and expressions  gain  not on  the belief, they may serve,  at 
least, to prove a certain  tendency in the imagination, with- 
out which they could neither be beautiful nor natural.  Nor 
is a river-god or hamadryad always taken for a mere poetical 
or imaginary personage ;  but  may sometimes enter into the 
real creed of  the ignorant vulgar; while  each  grove or field 
is represented as possessed of  a particular genius or invisible 
power,  which  inhabits  and  protects  it.  Nay,  philosophers 
cannot entirely exempt themselves from this natural frailty ; 
but have oft ascribed  to inanimate matter the horror of  a 
vaculcrn,  sympathies,  antipathies,  and  other  affections  of 
human nature.  The absurdity is not less, while we  cast our 
eyes upwards;  and  transferring,  as  is  too  usual,  human 
passions and infirmities to the deity, represent him as jealous 
and revengeful, capricious and partial, and, in short, a wicked 
and foolish man, in every respect but his superior power and 
authority.  No wonder, then, that mankind, being placed in 
such an absolute ignorance of  causes, and being at the same 
time  so  anxious  concerning  their  future  fortune,  should 
immediately acknowledge a dependence on  invisible powers, 
possessed of sentiment and intelligence.  The unknown causes, 
which  continually employ their  thought, appearing  always 
in the same aspect, are all apprehended  to be  of  the same 
kind or species.  Nor  is it long before we  ascribe  to  them 
thought  and  reason  and passion, and  sometimes  even  the 
limbs and figures of  men, in order to bring thein nearer to a 
resemblance with ourselves. 
In proportion  as any man's  course of  life is governed by 
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SNT.  as  may  particularly be  observed of  gamesters  and sailors,  .=-  who,  though,  of  all  mankind,  the least capable  of  serious 
reflection, abound most in frivolous and superstitious appre- 
hensions.  The gods, eays  CORIOLANUS  in DIONYSIUB,~  have 
an influence in every affair ;  but above  all, in war; where 
the event is so  uncertain.  All human life, especially before 
the institution of  order and good government, being subject 
to fortuitous accidents ;  it is natural, that superstition should 
prevail every where  in barbarous  ages, and-put men on the 
most earnest enquiry concerning those inviaible powers, who 
dispose of their happiness or misery.  Ignorant of astronomy 
and the anatomy ofilants and animals, and too little curious 
to  observe the admirable  adjustment of  final causes ;  they 
remain still unacquainted with  a  first and supreme creator, 
dnd  with that infinitely  perfect  spirit,  who  alone,  by  his 
almighty will, bestowed order on the whole frame of  nature. 
Such a  magnificent  idea  is too  big for their  narrow  con- 
ceptions, which can neither  observe the beauty of  the work, 
nor  comprehend the grandeur of  its author.  They suppose 
their deities, however potent and invisible, to be nothing but 
a  species  of  human  creatures, perhaps  raised  from among 
mankind,  and retaining  all human  passions and appetites, 
together  with  corporeal  limbs  and  organs.  Such  limited 
beings, though masters of human fate, being, each of  them, 
illcapable  of  extending his influence every  where, must  be 
vastly multiplied, in order to answer that variety of  events, 
which  happen  over  the whole  face of  nature.  Thus every 
place  is  stored  with  a  crowd  of  local  deities;  and thus 
polytheism  has  prevailed,  and  still  prevails,  among  the 
greatest part of uninstructed mankind.% 
Any of  the human affections may lead  us  into the notion 
of invisible, intelligent power ;  hope as well as fear, gratitude 
as well as affliction :  But if  we  examine  our  own  hearts, or 
observe what passes around  us,  we  shall find, that men  are 
' Lib. viii. 33. 
The following  lines  of  EURIPIDES 
are so  much  to  the  present  purpose, 
that I cannot forbear quoting them :  '  There is nothing secure in the world ; 
no glory, no prosperity.  The gods toss 
all life into confusion ; mix every thing 
with  its reverse ; that  all of  us, from 
our ignorance and uncertainty, may pay 
them the more worship and reverence! 
much oftener thrown on their knees by the melancholy than  SECT. 
by the agreeable passions.  Prosperity is  easily received  as .  'I1*  , 
our due, and few questions are asked concerning its cause or 
author.  It begets cheerfulness and activity and alacrity and 
a lively enjoyment of every social and sensual pleasure : And 
during this state of  mind, men  have little leisure or inclina- 
tion  to think  of  the unknown  invisible  regions.  On  the 
other hand, every disastrous  accident alarms us, and sets us 
on  enquiries  concerning  the  principles  whence  it arose : 
Apprehensions  spring  up  with  regard  to  futurity : And 
the mind, sunk into diffidence,  terror,  and  melancholy, has 
recourse  to  every method  of  appeasing  those  secret intel- 
ligent powers, on whom  our  fortune  is supposed entirely to 
depend. 
No  topic is more  usual  with  all popular  divines  than to 
display  the advantages of  affliction,  in bringing  men  to a 
due  sense  of  religion;  by  subduing  their  confidence  and 
sensuality, which, in times of  prosperity, make them forget- 
ful of  a divine providence.  Nor is this topic confined merely 
to modern  religions.  The ancients  have  also employed  it. 
Portune has ncsver  liberally, without  envy,  says  a  GREEK  his-, 
torian,l  bestowed  an ?tnmCxed happiness on  mankind ;  but with 
all her gifts has ever  conjoined  some  disastrous circumstance, 
in order  to  chastize men  into a reverence for  the  gods, whom, 
in a continued course of  prosperity, they are apt to neglect  and 
forget. 
What age or period of  life  is the most addicted to super- 
stition?  The weakest  and most  timid.  What sex?  The 
same  answer  must  be  given.  The  leaders and  examples  of 
every kip~d  of  superstition, says  STRABO,~  are the women.  These 
escite the men  to  devotion and supplications, and the observance 
of  religious days.  It  is rare to  meet  with  one that lives apart 
from  the females,  and yet  is  addicted  to  such  practices.  And 
nothing  can, for  this  reason,  be  more  improbable,  than  the 
account given of  an order of  men  among the  GETES,  who  prac- 
tised  celibacy,  and  were  notwithstanding  the  most  religious 
fanatics.  A method  of  reasoning, which  would  lead  us  to 
entertain a bad idea of  the devotion of  monks ;  did we  not 
know by an experience, not so common, perhaps, in STRABO'S 
days, that one  may practise  celibacy, and profess chastity; 
and yet  maintain  the  closest  connexions  and most  entire 
sympathy with that timorous and pious sex. 
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IV. -  .  SECT.  IT.-Deities  ~ot  considered  as creators  or  formers of  the 
world. 
The only point of  theology, in which  we  shall find rt con- 
sent of  mankind almost universal, is, that there is invisible, 
intelligent power in the world : But whether  this power  be 
supreme or subordinate, whether  confined  to one being, or 
distributed  among  se~eral,  what  attributes, qualities,  con- 
nexions, or principles of action ought to be ascribed to those 
beings;  concerning  all these  points,  there  is  the  widest 
difference in the popular systems of theology.  Our ancestors 
in EUROPE,  before the revival of  letters, believed, as we  do 
at present, that there was  one  supreme  God, the author of 
nature,  whose  power, though  in itself  uncontroulable,  was 
yet often exerted by the interposition of  his angels and sub- 
ordinate ministers, who executed  his sacred purposes.  But 
they also believed, that all nature was full of  other invisible 
powers ; fairies,  goblins,  elves,  sprights ;  beings,  stronger 
and mightier than men, but much  inferior to the celestial 
natures, who  surround the throne of  God.  Now,  suppose, 
that any one, in those ages, had denied the existence of  God 
and of  his  angels; would  not  his impiety justly  have de- 
served the appellation of  atheism, even though he had still 
allowed, by some odd  capricious reasoning, that the popular 
stories  of  elves  and fairies  were just  and well-grounded? 
The difference, on the one hand, between  such a person and 
a genuine theist is infinitely greater than that, on the other, 
between him and one that absolutely excludes all invisible 
intelligent  power.  And  it  is  a  fallacy,  merely  from  the 
casual  resemblance  of  names,  without  any  conformity  of 
meaning,  to  rank  such op~osite  opinions  under  the  same 
denomination. 
To  any one,  who  considers justly of  the matter, it  will 
appear, that the gods of  all polytheists  are no  better  than 
the elves or fairies of  our  ancestors, and merit as little any 
pious worship  or veneration.  These pretended  religionists 
are really s  kind of  superstitious  atheists, and acknowledge 
no being, that corresponds  to our idea of  a deity.  No first 
principle of  mind or thought : No supreme government and 
a,dministration : No  divine contrivance or intention  in the 
fabric of the world. 
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The CRINESE,  when  their prayers are not answered, beat  SECT. 
IV.  their idols.  The deities of  the  LAPLANDERS  are any large , 
stone which they meet with of  an extraordinary shape.= The 
EGYPTIAN  mythologists, in order  t'o account for animal wor- 
ship,  said, that the gods, pursued  by the violence of  earth- 
born men, who were their enemies, had formerly been obliged 
to disguise themselves under the semblance of   beast^.^  The 
CAUNII,  a natiol~  in the Lesser  ASIA,  resolving to admit no 
strange  gods  among  them,  regularly,  at certain  seasons, 
assembled themselves  compleatly armed,  beat  the air with 
their lances, and proceeded in that manner to their frontiers ; 
in order, as they said, to expel the foreign deitie~.~  Not even 
the immortal gods, said  some  GERMAN  nations to CBSAR,  are 
a match  for the SUEVI.~ 
Many  ills,  says  DIONE  ill  HOMER  to VENUS  wounded  by 
DIOMEDE,  many ills, my daughter, have the gods inflicted on 
men:  And  many ills,  in return, have  men  inflicted  on the 
godse6  We need  but open  any classic author to meet  with 
these  gross  representations  of  the deities ;  and LONGINUS 
with reasoil observes, that such ideas of the divine nature, if 
literally taken, contain a true atheism. 
Some writersw have been  surprized, that the impieties of 
ARISTOPHAXEB  should have been tolerated, nay publicly acted 
and applauded by the ATHENIANS  ;  a  people so superstitious 
and so jealous of the public religion, that, at that very time, 
they put  SOCRATES  to death for  his imagined  incredulity. 
But these writers do not consider, that the ludicrous, familiar 
images, under which the gods are represented by that coinic 
poet, instead of  appearing impious, were the genuine lights 
in which the ancients conceived their divinities.  What con- 
duct can be  more  criminal or  mean,  than that of  JUPITER 
in the AMPHITRION  ?  Yet that play, which  represented his 
gallante exploits, was supposed  so  agreeable to  him, that it 
was  always acted  in  ROME  by  public  authority,  when  the 
state was threatened with pestilence, famine, or any general 
~alarnity.~  The ROMANS  supposed, that, like all old letchers, 
Pere le Compte.  Ces.  Comment.  de  be110  Gallic", 
Regnard, Voyage de Japonie.  lib. iv. 7. 
Diod. Sic. lib. i. 86.  Lucian. de Sa-  Lib. r. 382. 
crificiis. 14.  O~ID  allucles to the same  Cap. ix. 
tradition, Metam. lib. v. 1.  321.  So illso  Pere  Brumoy, Theatre des  Grecs 
MANILIUS,  lib. iy. 800.  & Fontenelle, Histoire des Oracles. 
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he  would  be  highly pleased  with the recital of  his former 
feats of prowess and vigour, and that no topic was so proper, 
upon which to flatter his vanity. 
The  LACEDEMONIANS,  says  XENOPHON,~  always,  during 
war,  put  up  their  petitions  very  early in the morning,  in 
order  to be  beforehand  with  their enemies,  and,  by being 
the first solicitors, pre-engage the gods in their favour.  We 
may gather from  SENECA,^ that it was usual, for the votaries 
in the temples, to make  interest  with the beadle or sexton, 
that they might have a seat near the image of  the deity, in 
order to be the best heard in their prayers  and applications 
to him.  The TYRIANS,  when besieged by ALEXANDER,  threw 
chains  on  the statue of  HERCULES,  to prevent  that deity 
from deserting to the enemy.3  AUGUSTUS,  having twice lost 
his fleet by storms, forbad  NEPTUNE  to be  carried  in pro- 
cession along with the other gods;  and fancied, that he had 
sufficiently revenged himself by that expedient.*  After GER- 
MANICUS'S  death, the people were  so  enraged at  their gods, 
that they stoned them  in their  temples ; and  openly  re- 
nounced all allegiance to them5 
To ascribe the origin  and fabric of  the universe  to these 
imperfect beings  never  enters into the imagination of  any 
polytheist  or idolater.  HESIOD,  whose  writings, with those 
of HOMER,  contained the canonical  system of  the heavens ; 
HESIOD,  I say, supposes gods and rnei to have sprung equally 
from the unknown powers of  nat~re.~  And throughout  the 
whole theogony of that author, PANDORA  is the only instance 
of  creation  or  a  voluntary  production;  and she  too  was 
formed by the gods  merely from  despight  to PROMETHEUS, 
who had furnished  men  with  stolen fire from  the celestial 
 region^.^  The ancient  mythologists, indeed, seem through- 
out  to  have  rather  embraced  the idea  of  generation than 
that of  creation or formation ;  and to have tbence accounted 
for the origin of  this universe. 
OVID,  who lived in a learned age, and had been instructed 
by philosophers in the principlesof  a divine creation 06 for- 
mation of  tho world ;  finding, that such an idea would not 
De Laced. Rep.  13.  Herodot. lib. ii. 53.  Lucian, Jupiter 
2 Epist. xli.  confutn,+us,  de luctu,  Saturn, &c. 
Quint. Curtius, lib. iv. cap. 3.  Diod.  'hs  bpd8ev  yeydaar  Or01  Ovqr01  7' 
Sic. lib. xvii. 41.  bvOporror.  Hes. Opera & Dies. 1.  108. 
Suet. in vita Aug. cap.  16.  Theog. 1.  570. 
Id. in vita Cal. cap. 5. 
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agree with the popular  mythology, which he delivers, leaves 
it, in a manner, loose and detached from his system.  Quisquis 
f~it  ilte Deorum ?  Whichever of  the gods  it was, says he, 
that  dissipated  the  chaos,  and  introduced  order  into  the 
universe. It could neither be SATURN,  he knew, nor JUPITER, 
nor NEPTUNE,  nor  any of  the received deities of  paganism. 
His theological  system  had taught him  nothing upon  that 
head ;  and he leaves the matter equally undetermined. 
DIODORUS  SICULUS,~  beginning  his work  with an enume- 
ration of the most reasonable opinions concerning the origin 
of  the world,  niakes  no  mention  of  a  deity or  intelligent 
mind ;  though  it  is evident from  his  history, that  he was 
much more prone to superstition than to irreligion.  And in 
another passage:  talking of  the ICHTHYOPHAGI,  a nation in 
INDIA;  he  says,  that,  there  being  so  great  difficulty  in 
accounting for their descent, we  must  conclude them t'o be 
aborigines, without any beginning of their generation, propa- 
gating their race from  all eternity ;  as some of  the physio- 
logers, in treating of the origin of nature, have justly observed. 
'  But in such subjects as these,'  adds the historian, '  which 
exceed all human  capacity, it may well  happen, that those, 
who discourse the most, know the least ;  reaching a specious 
appearance of truth in their reasonings, while extremely wide 
of the real truth and matter of fact:' 
A  strange  sentiment  in our  eyes,  to be  embraced  by  a 
professed  and  zealous  religionist!  But it  was merely  by 
accident,  that the  question  concerning  the  origin  of  the 
world did ever in ancient times enter into religious systems, 
or was  treated  of  by  tlieologers.  The philosopliers  alone 
made profession of  delivering systems of  this kind ;  and it 
was  pretty  late too  before  these  bethought  themselves  of 
having recourse  to a mind  or  supreme intelligence, as the 
first cause of all.  So far was it from being esteemed profane 
in those days to account  for the origin of  things without  a 
deity, that THALES,  ANAXIMENES,  HERAGLITUS,  and  others, 
who embraced that system of  cosmogony, past unquestioned ; 
Metamorph. lib. i. 1.  32.  accidents  of  life,  earthquakes, inunda- 
Lib. i. 6 et seq.  tions,  and  tempests ;  and  devoptly 
"ib.  iii. 20.  ascribes these to the anger  of  JUPITER 
The same author, who can thus ac-  or NEPTUNE.  A plain proof, whence ho 
coant for the origin of  the world with-  derived his ideas  of  religion.  See  lib. 
out  ix I)city, esteems it impious  to  ex-  xv. c. 48. p. 364.  Ex  edit. RHODOMANNI. 
plain fronl physical causes, the common 
SECT. 
IV. 
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ss6.  while  ANAXAGORAS,  the first  undoubted  theist  anlong the  .  'V.  philosophers, was  perhaps the first that ever was accused of 
atheism.' 
We are told by SEXTUS  EMPIRICUS,~  that EPICURUS,  when 
a boy, reading with his preceptor these verses of HESIOD, 
Eldest of beings, chaos first arose ; 
Next earth, wide-stretch'd,  the seat of  all : 
the young  scholar first  betrayed  his inquisitive genius,  by 
asking, And  chaos  whence ?  But was  told  by his preceptor, 
that he must have recourse to the philosophers for,a  solufiou 
of  such questions.  And from this hint EPICURUS  left philo- 
logy and all other studies, in order to betake himself to that 
science, whence alone he expected  satisfaction with regard 
to these sublime subjects. 
The common  people  were  never  likely  to push  their re- 
searches so far,  or derive from  reasoning their systems  of 
religion; when philologers and mythologists, we see, scarcely 
ever discovered so much penetration.  And even the philoso- 
phers, who discoursed of  such topics, readily hssented to the 
grossest  theory, and admitted the joint  origin of  gods  and 
men from night and chaos ;  from fire, water, air, or whatever 
they established to be the ruling element. 
Nor was it only on  their first origin,  that the gods were 
supposed dependent on the powers of  nature.  Throughout 
the whole period of their existence they were subjected to  the 
dominion of  fate or destiny.  Think of  the force  of  necessity, 
says AGRIPPA  to the ROMAN  people, that force,  to  which  even 
the gods must s~bmit.~  And  the Younger PLINY~,  agreeably 
to this way of  thinking, tells us,  that amidst the darkness, 
horror, and confusion, which ensued upon the first eruption 
of  VESUVIUS,  several concluded, that all nature was going to 
*  It  will  be  easy  to give  rr,  reason, 
why THALES,  ANAXIMANDER,  and those 
early  philosophers,  who  really  were 
atheists, might be very orthodox  in the 
pagan  creed;  arid  why  ANAXAGORAS 
and SOCRATEG,  thcugh real theists, must 
naturally, in ancitnt times, be esteemed 
impious.  The blind, unguided  powers 
of  nature, if  they could  produce  men, 
might  also  produce  such  beings  as 
Jnrr'r~R  and  NEPTUNE,  who  being the 
most powerfr~l,  intelligent existences  in 
the world, would  he  proper  objects of 
worship.  But where a supreme intel- 
ligence, the first cause of all, is  admitted, 
these capricious beings, if  they exist at 
all. mu~t  appear  very subordinate and 
dependent, and consequently be excluded 
from the rank of deities.   PLAT^ (de leg. 
lib. x, 886 D.) assigns  this reason  for 
the imprltation thrown on ANAX~OOHAS, 
namely. his denying the divinity of  the 
stars, planets, and other created objects. 
Ad~ers~~s  MATHEM,  lib. 480. 
DIONYS.  Hacrc. lib. vi. 54 
Kpist. lib. vi. 
wrack, and that gods and men were perishing in one common  8:;:  ruin.  -F 
It is great complaisance, indeed, if we dignify with the name 
of  religion such an imperfect system of  theology, and put it 
on a level with later systems, which are founded on principles 
more  just  and more sublime.  For my part, I can scarcely 
allow the principles even of  MARCUS  AURELIUS,  PLUTARCH, 
apd some other Stoics and Academics, though much more re- 
fined than the pagan superstition, to be worthy of the honour- 
able  appellation  of  theism.  For  if  the  mythology  of  the 
heathens resemble the ancient EUROPEAN  system of  spiritual 
beings, excluding God  and angels,  and leaving only fairies 
and sprights ;  the creed of  these philosophers may justly be 
said to exclude a deity, and to leave only angels and fairies. 
SECT. V.-'Various  Rorma  of  ?oly,theism:  Allegory,  Hero- 
Wo~ship  . 
But it is chiefly our present business to conside:  the gross 
polytheism  of  the vulgar, and to trace all its various appear- 
ances,  in the principles of  human  nature, whence  they are 
derived. 
Whoever learns by  argument, the existence  of  invisible 
intelligent power, must reason from the  admirable contrivance 
of  natural objects,  and  must suppose  the world  to be  the 
workmanship of  that divine being, the original cause of  all 
things.  But the vulgar polytheist, so far from admitting that 
idea, deifies every part of  the universe, and conceives all the 
conspicuous productions of  nature, to be themselves p many 
real divinities.  The sun, moon, and stars, &re  all gods acuord- 
ing to his system : Fountains are inhabited by nymphs,  and 
trees by hamadryads:  Even monkies,  dogs,  cats, and other 
animals often become sacred in his eyes, and strike him with 
a religious veneration.  And thus, however strong men's  pro- 
pensity to believe invisible, intelligent power in nature, their 
propensity is equally strong to rest their attention on sensible, 
visible objects ;  and in order to reconcile these opposite incli- 
nations, they are led to unite the invisible power with some 
visible object. 
The distribution  also of  distinct proriilces  to the several 
deities is apt to cause some allegory, both physical and moral, 
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SECT.  to enter into the vulgar  systems of  polytheism.  The god of  .  war will naturally be represented as furious, cruel,  and im- 
petuous :  The god of  poetry as elegant, polite, and amiable : 
The god of merchandise, especially in early times, as thievish 
and deceitful.  The allegories, supposed in HOMER  and other 
mythologists, I allow, have often been so strained, that men 
of  sense are apt entirely to reject them, and to consider them 
as the production  merely of  the fancy and  conceit of  critics 
and commentators.  But that allegory really has place in the 
heathen mythology is undefiiable even on the least reflection. 
CUPID  the son of VENUS  ;  the Muses the daughters  of Memory ; 
PBOMETHEUS,  the wise brother, and EPIMETHEUS  the foo1ip.h ; 
HYGIEIA  or the goddess of health descended from BSCULAPIUS 
or the god of  Physic :  Who sees not, in these, and in many 
other instances, the plain  traces of  allegory P  When a god 
is supposed to preside over any passion, event, or system of 
actions,  it is almost unavoidable to give him a genealogy, 
attributes, and adventures, suitable to his supposed powers 
and influence ;  and to carry on that similitude and comparison, 
which is naturally so rigreeable to the mind of man. 
Allegories, indeed, entirely perfect, we ought not to expect 
as the productions of  ignorance and superstition ;  there being 
no work of  genius that requires a nicer hand, or has been more 
rarely executed with success.  That Fear and Terror are the 
sons of  MARS  is just ;  but why by VENUS?  That Harmony 
is the daughter of  VENUS  is regular ;  but why by  MARS  ?a 
That Bleep is the brother of Death is suitable; but why describe 
him as enamoured of  one of  the GracesP3  And  since the 
ancient mythologists fall into mistakes so gross and palpable, 
we  have no reason surely to expect such refined and long-spun 
allegories, as some have endeavoured to deduce  from  their 
fictions. 
LUCRETIUS  was plainly seduced by the strong appearance 
of  allegory, which is observable in the pagan  fictions.  He 
first addresses himself to VENUS  as to that generating power, 
which animates, renews, and beautifies the universe :  But is 
soon betrayed by the il~ythology  into incoherencies, while he 
prays to that allegorical  personage to appease the furies of 
her lover Maas :  An idea not drawn from allegory, but  from 
1  HRSIOD.  Theog 1. 935.  [This  paragraph is given as a note 
2  Id. ibid. $ PLW.  in vita PELUP.  10.  in Edltlor~s  L  t  P 
ILJAU.  xiv. 267. 
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the popular religion, and which LUCRETIUS,  as an EPICUREAN,  SECT. 
could not consistent17 admit of.  v. - 
The deities of  the vulgar  are so little superior to human 
creatures, that, where men are affected with strong sentiments 
of  veneration or gratitude for any hero or public benefactor, 
nothing can be more natural than to convert him into a god, 
and fill the heavens, after this manner, with continual recruits 
fron. among mankind.  Most of  the divinities of the ancient 
world are sipposed to have once been men, and to have been 
beholden for their apotheosis to the admiration and affection 
of the people.  The real history of their adventures, corrupted 
by tradition, and elevated by the n~arvellous,  became a plenti- 
ful source of  fable;  especially in passing through the hands 
of  poets, allegorists, and priests,  who successively improved 
upon the wonder and astonisliinent of the ignorant multitude. 
Painters too and sculptors came in for their share of profit 
in the sacred  mysteries;  and furnishing men with sensible 
representations  of  their divinities, whom  they cloathed  in 
h;man  figures, gave great encrease to the public  devotion, 
and determined its object.  It  was probably for want of these 
arts in rude and barbarous ages, that men deified plants, ani- 
ma,ls, and even brute, unorganized matter ;  and rather than 
be without a sensible object of worship, affixed divinity to such 
ungainly forms.  Could any statuary of  SYRIA,  in early times, 
have formed a just figure of APOLLO,  the conic stone, HELIO- 
GABALUB, had never become the object of  such profound adora- 
tion, and been received as a representation of the solar deity.' 
STILPO  was  banished  by  the  council of  AREOPAGUS,  for 
affirming that the MINERVA  in the citadel was no divinity ; 
but the workmanship of PHIDIAS,  the sc~lptor.~  What degree 
of reason must we  expect in the religious belief of  the vulgar 
in other nations ;  when ATHENIANS  and AREOPAGITES  could 
entertain such gross conceptions P 
These then are  the general principles of polytheism, founded 
in humau nature, and little or nothing dependent on caprice 
and  accident.  As  the  causes,  which  bestow  happiness  or 
misery, are, in general, very little known and very uncertain, 
our anxious concern endeavours to attain a determinate idea 
HEBODIAN.  lib. v. 3, 10.  JUPITER  as their deity.  ARNOB.  lib. vi  496 A.  So 
Amo~  is represented by CURTIUS  as a  much  did their foliy exceed that of the 
deity  of  the  same hind, lib.  iv.  cap.  EGYPTIANS. 
7.  ?'he  ARABIANS  and  PES~INENTIAS~  "IUD.  LAERT.  lib. ii.  116. 
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secx  of them ;  and finds no better expedient than to represent them 
as  intelligent voluntary agents, like ourselves ;  only somewhat  .-+ 
superior in power and wisdom.  The limited influence of these 
agents, and their great proxinlity to huinan weakness, intro- 
duce the various distribution and division of their authority ; 
and thereby give rise to  allegory.  The  same principle8 naturally 
deify mortals, superior in power, courage, or understanding, 
and produce hero-worship ;  together with fabulous history and 
inythological tradition, in all its  wild and unaccountable forms. 
And  as  an invisible  spiritual intelligence  is an object too 
refined for vulgar apprehension, men naturally affix it  to  some 
sensible representation ;  such as either the more conspicuous 
parts of nature, or the statues, images, and pictures, which a 
more refined age fornis of its divinities. 
Almost all idolaters, of whatever age or country, concur in 
these general principles and conceptions ;  and even the par- 
ticular characters and provinces, which  they assign to their 
deities, are not extremely different.'  The GREEK  and ROMAN 
travellers and conquerors, without much difficulty, found their 
own deities every where ;  and said, This is MERCURY,  that 
VENUS; this MARS, that NEPTUNE  ;  by  whatever title the 
strange gods might be denominated.  The goddess HERTHA 
of  our SAXON  ancestors seems  to be  no other, according to 
TACIT US,^ than the Mater Teilus of the ROMANS  ;  and his con- 
jecture was evidently just. 
SECT.  TI.--Origin  of  Theism from  Polytl~eism. 
The doctrine of one supreme deity, the author of  nature, is 
very ancient, has spread itself over great and populous nations, 
and among them has been embraced by all ranks and condi- 
tions of men : But whoever thinks that it  has owed its success 
to the prevalent force of those invincible reasons, on which it 
is undoubtedly founded, would show himself little  acquainted 
with  the ignorance  and  stupidity of  the people,  and their 
incurable  prejudices in favour of their particular superstitions. 
Even at this day, and in EUROPE,  ask any of the vulgar, why 
he believes  in an omnipotent creator of  the world;  he will 
never mention the beanty of final causes, of which he is wholly 
ignorant : He  will not hold out his hand, and bid you contem- 
See CBSAR of  the  religioii  of  the GAULS,  De bello Gallico, lib. vi.  17. 
De moribus GERM.  40. 
plate the suppleness and variety of joints in his fingers, their  SECT. 
bending all one way, the counterpoise which they receive from  -75 
the thumb, the softness and fleshy parts of  the inside of  his 
hand, with  all the other circumstances, which render that 
inember fit for the use, to which it was destined.  To these 
he has been  long accustomed;  and he  beholds  them with 
listlessness and unconcern.  He will  tell you of  the sudden 
and unexpected death of  such a one : The fall and bruise of 
such another :  The excessive drought of this season : The co1.d 
and rains of  another.  These he ascribes to the immediate 
operation  of  providence:  And  such  events,  as,  with  good 
reasoners, are the chief  difficulties  in  admitting a supreme 
intelligence, are with him the sole arguments for it. 
Many  theists,  even  the most  zealous  and refined,  have 
denied a particular  providence,  and  have  asserted, that the 
Sovereign mind or first principle of  all things, having fixed 
general  laws, by which  nature  is  governed, gives  free  and 
uninterrupted course to these laws, and disturbs not, at every 
turn,  the  settled  order  of  events  by  particular  volitions. 
From the beautiful connexion, say they, andrigid observance 
of  established rules, we draw the chief argutlient for theism ; 
and fro111 the same principles are enabled to answer the prin- 
cipal objections against it.  Bnt so  litile is  this understood 
by the generality  of  nlankind, that, wherever  they observe 
any one to ascribe all events to natural causes, and to remove 
the particular interposition of a deity, they are apt to suspect 
him of  the grossest infidelity.  A  little philosophy, says lord 
BACON,  makes me?%  atheists : A  great  deal  reconciles  them  to 
religion.  For men, being taught, by superstitious prejudices, 
to lay the stress on  a wrong place ;  when that fails them, and 
they discover, by a little reflection, that the collrse of nature 
is regular and uniform, their whole faith totters, and falls to 
ruin.  But being  taught, by more  reflection, that this very 
regularity and  uniformity  is  the  strongest  proof  of  design 
and  of  a  supreme  intelligence, they return  to that belief, 
which they had deserted ;  and thrg are now able to establish 
it on a firmer and more durable foundation. 
Conrulsions  in  nature,  disorders,  prodigies,  miracles, 
though the most ~pposite  to-the plan of  a  wise  superinten- 
dent,  impress  mankind  with  the  strongest  sentiments  of 
religion;  the  causes  of  events seonlilig  then  the most  un- 
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SECT.  inflamed imagination, though they sink  Inen nearest  to the 
VI  .  , . .  level  of  beasts, are, for a like  reason, often  supposed to be 
the only dispositions, in which we  can  have  any immediate 
communication with the Deity. 
We may conclude, therefore, upon  the whole, that,  since 
the vulgar, in nations, which have embraced  the doctrine of 
theism, still build it upon  irrational and superstitious prin- 
ciples, they are never led into that opinion by any process of 
argument, but by a certain train of  thinking, more  suitable 
to their genius and capacity. 
It  may  readily  happen,  in  an  idolatrous  nation,  that 
though men admit the existence  of  several  limited  deities, 
yet is there some  one  God, whom, in a particular  manner, 
they make the object of  their worship and adoration.  They 
may either  suppose, that, in the distribution of  power  and 
territory among the gods, their nation was  subjected  to the 
jurisdiction of  that particular  deity ; or reducing  heapenly 
objects to the model of things below, they may represent one 
god  as the prince  or supreme magistrate of  the rest,  who, 
though of  the same nature, rules  them with  an  authority, 
like that which an earthly sovereign exercises  over his sub- 
jects  and vassals.  Whether  this  god,  therefore,  be  con- 
sidered as their peculiar patron, or as the general  sovereign 
of  heaven, his votaries  will  endeavour, by every art, to in- 
sinuate themselves into his favour ;  and supposing him to be 
pleased,  like themselves,  with praise  and flattery,  there is 
no eulogy  or  exaggeration,  which  will  be  spared  in their 
addresses to him.  In  proportion as men's  fears or distresses 
become more urgent, they still invent new strains of  adula- 
tion ;  and even he who  outdoes his predecessor  in swelling 
up the titles  of  his  divinity, is sure to  be  outdone by his 
successor  in newer  and  more  pompous  epithets of  praise. 
Thus they proceed ;  till at last they arrive  at infinity itself, 
beyond which there is no farther  progress : And  it  is well, 
if, in striving to get farther, and to represent a magnificent 
simplicity,  they  run  not  into  inexplicable  mystery,  and 
destroy the intelligent nature of  their deity, on which alone 
any rational worship  or adoration  can be  founded.  While 
they confine themselves to the notion of  a perfect being, the 
creator  of  th'e  world,  they  coincide,  by  chance,  with the 
principles of Teason and  true  philosophy ;  though  they are 
guided to that notion, not by reason, of  which they are in a 
great lneasure incapable, but by the adulation  and  fears of  SECT. 
the most vulgar superstition.  L~  VI. 
VS'e  often find, amongst barbarous nations, and eve11 some- 
times amongst  civilized, that, when  every strain of  flattery 
has  been  exhausted  towards  arbitrary princes, when  every 
human  quality  has  been  applauded  to  the utmost;  their 
servile  courtiers  represent them, at last, as real  divinities, 
and point  them  out to the people as objects of  adoration. 
How much more natural, therefore, is it, that a liinited deity, 
who at first is supposed  only the immediate  author  of  the 
particular goods and ills in life, should in  the end be  repre- 
sented as sovereign maker and modifier of  the universe? 
Even  where  this notion  of  a  supreme  deity  is  already 
established ;  though it ought naturally to lessen  every other 
worship, and abase every object of  reverence, yet if a nation 
has entertained the opinion of a subordinate tutelar divinity, 
saint, or angel ;  their addresses to that being  gradually rise 
upon  them,  and  encroach  on  the adoration  due  to  their 
supreme  deity.  The  Virgin  Mary,  ere  checked  by  the 
reformation,  had  proceeded,  from  being  merely  a  good 
woman, to  usurp  many  attributes  of  the Almighty:  God 
and St. NICHOLAS  go hand  in hand, in all the prayers  and 
petitions of  the MUSCOVITES. 
Thus the deity, who, from  love, converted  himself  into a 
bull, in order to carry off  EUROPA  ;  and who, from ambition, 
dethroned his father, SATURN,  became the OPTIMUS  MAXIMUS 
of  the heathens.  Thus, the God  of  ABRAHAM,  ISAAC,  and 
JACOB,  became the supreme deity or JEHOVAH  if the  JEWS. 
The JACOBINS,  who  denied  the inlmaculate conception, 
have ever been very unhappy in their doctrine, even- though 
political reasons  have  kept  the  ROYISH  church  from  con- 
demniiig it.  The  CORDELIERS  have  run  away with  all the 
popularity.  But in the fifteenth century, as we  learn fiom 
BOULAINVILLIERS,~  an  ITALIAN  Cordelier  maintained,  that, 
during the three days, when CHRIST  was interred, the  hypo: 
static union was dissolved, and that his human  nature was 
1  [For this sentence theproof reads :  many  vulgar  Jms seem  still to have 
Thps the deity, whom  the vulgar Jews  conceived  the supreme Being as a mere 
conceived only as the God of Ahmham,  topical deity or national protector.] 
Isaac, and Jacob,  became their Jehovah  [This paragraph is given as a note 
and Creator of  the world.  to the word '  Almighty '  in the last para- 
Editions  L  to  N read:  Thus,  not-  graph but one, in Editions L to P.] 
withstinding the sublime ideasuggested  Histoire abreghe, p. 490. 
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SECT.  not a proper object of adoration, during that period.  With-  .  ''.  .  out the art of divination, one might foretel, that so gross and 
impious a blasphemy would not fail to be  anathematized  by 
the people.  It was the occasion of  great insults on the part 
of  the JACOBINS  ;  who  now  got some  recompense  for  their 
misfortunes in the war about the immaculate conception. 
Rather than relinquish this propensity to adulation, reli- 
gionists, in all ages, have involved themselves in the greatest 
absurdities and contradictions. 
HOMER,  in  one  passage,  calls  OCEANUS  and TETHYS  the 
original parents of  all things, conformably tjo  the established 
mythology and tradition of  the GREEKS  : Yet, in other pas - 
sages,  he  could  not forbear  complimenting  JUPITER,  the 
reigning  deity,  with  that  magnificent  appellation;  a~ld 
accordingly denominates him  the  father  of  gods  and men. 
He forgets, that every temple, every street  was full  of  the 
ancestors, uncles, brothers, and sisters of  this JUPITER  ;  who 
was in reality nothing but an upstart parricide and  usurper. 
A like contradiction is observable in HESIOD  ;  and is so much 
the less excusable, as his professed  intention  was to deliver 
a true genealogy of  the gods. 
Were there a religion (and we may suspect Mahometanism 
of  this inconsistence) which sometimes painted the  Deity in 
the most sublime colours, as the creator of heaven and earth ; 
sometimes  degraded him nearly to a level with human crea- 
tures in his powers and faculties;  while at the same time it 
ascribed to him suitable infirmities, passions, and partialities, 
of  the moral kind : That religion, after it was extinct, would 
also be  cited as  an  instance  of  those  contradictions, which 
arise from the gross, vulgar, natural conceptions of  mankind, 
opposed to their  continual  propensihy towards  flattery and 
exaggeration.  Nothing indeed would  prove  more  strongly 
the divine origin of  any religion, than to find  (and happily 
this is the case with Christjanity) that it is free from a con- 
tradiction, so incident to human nature. 
1  [The Proof reads : ' Sometimes de-  descending from heaven to inform him- 
graded him so far to a level with human  self  of  what  passes  on  earth : while, 
creatures as to represent  him wrestling  &c.'  The pen  is  drawn  through  all 
with a man, walking in the  cool of  the  from ' as' to ' earth :  ' and for  60  far' 
evening,  showing  his  back parts,  and  the margin gives '  ~early.'] 
CONFIRMATION  OF THIS  DOCTRINE. 
SECT.  VI1.-Conjrmation  of  this Doctrine. 
It  appears  certain, that, though the  original  notions  of  SECT. 
VII.  the  vulgar  represent  the  Divinity as a  limited being, and  --,-# 
consider him only as the particular cause of  health or  sick- 
ness ;  plenty  or want ; prosperity  or  adversity ;  yet  when 
more magnificent ideas are urged upon them, they esteem it 
dangerous to refuse their  assent.  Will you  say, that your 
deity is finite and bounded in his perfections ;  may be  over- 
come by  a greater force ;  is subject to human passions, pains, 
and infirmities ; has  a  beginning, and  may have  an end ? 
This they dare not affirm ;  but thinking it safest to comply 
with  the higher encomiums, they endeavour, by an affected 
ravishment and devotion, to ingratiate themselves with him. 
As a confirmation of this, we  may observe, that the assent of 
the vulgar is, in this case, merely verbal, and  that they are 
incapable of  conceiving those sublime  qualities, which  they 
seemingly attribute to the  Deity.  Their  real  idea  of  him, 
notwithstanding their pompous language, is still as poor and 
frivolous as ever. 
That  original  intelligence,  say  the MAGIANS,  who  is the 
first principle of  all things, discovers himself  immediaiely to 
the mind and understanding alone ;  but has placed  the  eurl 
as his irnage in the visible universe ;  and  when that bright 
luminary diffuses its beams over the earth and the firmament, 
it is a faint  copy of  the glory, which  resides  in the higher 
heavens.  If you would escape the displeasure of'this divine 
being, you must be careful never to set your bare  foot upon 
the ground, nor spit into a fire, nor throw any water upon it, 
even though it were  consuming  a  whole  city.'  Who can 
express the perfections of the Almighty P say the Mahometans. 
Even the noblest of  his works,  if  compared to him, are but 
dust and rubbish.  How much more must human conception 
fall short of  his infiriite perfections ?  His smile and  favour 
renders men for ever happy ; and to obtain it  for your  chil- 
dren, the best method is to cut off  from them, while infants, 
a little bit of skin, about half the breadth of a farthing.  Take 
two bits of  cloth,P say the Roman catholies, about an inch or 
HYDE  de  Relig. veterum P~nsannar.  ?  Called the Scapulaire. SECT. 
VII.  - 
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an inch  and a half  square,  join  them by  the corners with 
two strings or pieces of tape about sixteen inches long, throw 
this over your head,  and  make one  of  the bits  of  cloth  lie 
upon your breast,  and  the  other  upon  your  back, keeping 
them next your skin : There is not a better secret for recom- 
mending  yourself  to that infinite  Being,  who  exists from 
eternity to eternity. 
The GETES,  commonly called  immortal, from their steady 
belief  of  the  soul's  immortality, were  genuine  theists and 
unitarians.  They affirmed ZAMOLXIS,  their deity, to be the 
only true god;  and asserted the worship of  all other nations 
to be  addressed  to mere  fietioils  and  chimeras.  But were 
their religious  principles  any  illore  refined,  on account  of 
these magnificent pretensions?  Every fifth year they sacrificed 
a  human victim,  whom they sent as a  messenger  to their 
deity, in order to inform hiin of  their wants and necessities. 
And  when  it  thundered,  they were  so  provoked,  that,  in 
order to return the defiance, they let fly arrows at him, and 
declined not  the  combat  as unequal.  Such at least is the 
accounh, which HERODOTUS  gives of the theism of the immortal 
GETES.' 
SECT.  VII1.-Fluz  and refzuz of  Polytheism and Theism. 
It is remarkable, that the principles of religion have a kind 
of flux and reflux  in the human mind, and that men have s 
natural tendency to rise from idolatry to theism, and to sink 
again from theism into idalatry.  The vulgar, that is, indeed, 
allmankind, a few excepted, being ignorant and uninstructed, 
never  elevate their contemplation  to the heavens,  or pene- 
trate  by  their  disquisitions  into  the  secret  structure  of 
vegetable or animal bodies ;  so  far as to discover a supreme 
mind or original providence, which bestowed order on every 
part of  nature.  They consider these  admirable works  in a,  , 
more  confined  and  selfish  view;  and  finding  their  own 
happiness  and misery to depend on  the secret influence and 
unforeseen  concurrence  of  external  objects,  they  regard, 
with perpetual  attention, the unknown causes, which  govern 
all  these  natural events, and distribute pleasure  and pain, 
good and ill, by their powerful, but silent, operation.  The 
Lib. iv. 94. 
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unknown  causes are still appealed  to on  every emergence ;  SECT. 
and in this  general appearance or confused image, are the LVy 
perpetual objects of human hopes and fears, wishes and appre- 
hensions.  By degrees, the active imagination of men, uneasy 
in this abstract conception of  objects, about which it is inces- 
santly employed, begins to render them more particular, and 
to  clothe them in shapes more suitable to its natural compre- 
hension.  It  represents  them  to  be  sensible,  intelligent 
beings,  like  mankind;  actuated  by  love  and  hatred,  and 
flexible  by  gifts  and  entreaties,  by  prayers  and sacrifices. 
Hence the origin of religion :  And hence the origin of idolatry 
or polytheism. 
But the same anxious concern for happiness, which begets 
the idea  of  these  invisible,  intelligent  powers,  allows  not 
mankind to remain  long in the first  simple  conception  of 
them ;  as powerful,  but  limited  beings ;  masters of  human 
fate, but slaves to destiny and the course  of  nature.  Men's 
exaggerated  praises  and compliments  still swell their idea 
upon them ;  and elevating their deities to the utmost bounds 
of perfection, at last beget the attributes of unity and infinity, 
simplicity and spirituality.  Such refined ideas, being some- 
what disproportioned  to vulgar comprehension,  remain not 
long in their original purity ;  but require to be supported by 
the notion of inferior mediators or subordinate agents, which 
interpose between mankind and their supreme deity.  These 
demi-gods or middle beings, partaking more of human nature, 
axid  being more  fainiliar  to us, become the chief  objects of 
devotion, and gradually recal  that idolatry, which had been 
formerly banished by the ardent prayers  and panegyrics  of 
timorous  and  indigent mortals.  But as these  idolatrous 
religions fall every day into grosser and more vulgar concep- 
tions,  they  at last  destroy  themselves,  and  by  the  vile 
representations, which they form of  their deities,  make the 
tide turn  again  towards theism.  But so  great is the pro- 
pensity, in this alternate revolution of  human seTitiment's, to 
'return back  to idolatry, that the utrnost  precaution  is not 
able  effectually to prevent  it.  And  of  this,  some  theists, 
particularly the JEWS  and MAHOMETANS,  have been seilsible ; 
as appears by their banishing all the arts of  statuary and 
painting, and not allowing the representations, even of  human 
figures, to be taken  by marble or colours ;  lest the ccmmon 
infirmity of  mankind should thence  prodnce  idolatry.  The SECT. 
VIII. 
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feeble apprehensions of  men  cannot be  satisfied with  con- 
ceiving their deity as a  pure spirit and perfect intelligence; 
and yet  their  natural terrors  keep thein from imputing  to 
him the least shadow of' limitation and imperfection.  They 
fluctuate  between  these  opposite  sentiments.  The  same 
infirmity still  drags them downwards,  from  an omnipotent 
and spiritual deity, to a limited and corporeal one, and from 
a corporeal and limited  deity to a statue or visible represen- 
tation.  The same endeavour  at elevation still pushes then1 
upwards, from the statue or material image to the invisible 
power ;  and from the invisible power to an infinitely perfect 
deity, the creator and sovereign of  the universe. 
SECT.  1X.-Comparison  of  these Reliyions, with regard to 
Persecution and Toleration. 
Polytheism  or idolatrous worship, being founded entirely 
in vulgar traditions, is liable to this great inconvenience, that 
any practice or opinion, however barbarous or corrupted, may 
be authorized by it ; and full scope  is  given, for  knavery to 
impose  on  credulity, 'till morals and humanity be  expelled 
the religious systerns of  mankind.  At the same time, idolatry 
is attended wihh this evident advantage, that, by limiting the 
powers  and functions  of  its deities,-it naturally admits the 
gods  of  other  sects and nations to a  share of divinity, and 
renders all the various  deities, as well  as rites, ceremonies, 
or traditions, compatible with each other.'  Theism is opposite 
both  in  its advantages and disadvantages.  As that system 
supposes one sole deity, the perfection of reason and goodness, 
it should, if justly prosecuted, banish every thing frivolous, un- 
reasonable, or inhuman froill religious worship, and set before 
men  the most  illustrioua  example, as well as the most com- 
manding motives, of justice and benevolence.  These mighty 
advantages  are  not  indeed  over-balanced  (for that is not 
VERRIUS  FLACCUS,  cited  by PLINY, 
lib. xxviii. cap. 2.  affirmed, that  it was 
usual for the  ROMANS  before  they laid 
siege to any town, to invocate the- tute- 
lar deity of the place, and by promising 
him  greater  honours  than those  he  at 
present enjoyed, bribe him to betray his 
old  friends  and  votaries.  The  name 
of the  tutelar  deity  of  ROME  was  for 
this reason kept a most  religious  mys- 
tery ; lost the enemies  of  the  republic 
shoulcl be able, in the same  manner, to 
draw  him  over to  their  serrice.  For 
without the name, they thought, nothing 
of tliat kind could be p~xctised. PLIXY 
&:iys,  that the colnmon  form  of  invocrt- 
tion  was  preserved  to  his time  in the 
ritual of  the pontiffs.  And NACROBIUS 
hiis  transmitted ;t  copy  of  it from the 
bccret things of  Sanmo~~cns  SERENUS. 
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possible),  but  somewhat  diminished,  by  inconveniencies, 
which arise from the vices and prejudices of mankind.  While 
one  sole object of  devotion  is acknowledged, the worship of 
other deities  is regarded as absurd and impious.  Nay, this 
unity of  object  seems naturally to require the unit1 of  faith 
and ceremonies, and furnishes designing men with a pretence 
for representing their adversaries as profane, and the objects 
of  divine as well as human vengeance.  For as each  sect  is 
positive that its own faith and worship are entirely acceptable 
to the deity, and as no one can conceive, that the same being 
should be pleased with different and opposite rites and prin- 
ciples ;  the  several  sects  fall  naturally into animosity, and 
mlltually discharge on each other that sacred zeal and rancour, 
the most furious and implacable of all human passions. 
The  tolerating  spirit  of  idolaters,  both  in  ancient  and 
modern  times, is very obvious  to any one, who  is  the least 
conversant in the writings of historians or travellers.  When 
the oracle of  DELPHI  was asked, what rites or  worship  was 
most  acceptable  to the  gods?  Those which are legally es- 
tablished  in  each  city, replied the oracle.'  Even priests, in 
those ages, could, it seems, allow salvation to those of  a dif- 
ferent  communion.  The  ROMANS  commonly  adopted  the 
gods  of  the  conquered  people;  and never  disputed  the at- 
tributes of  those local and national deities, in whose territories 
they  resided.  The religious wars  and persecutions  of  the 
EGYPTIAN  idolaters are indeed an exception to this rule ;  but 
are accounted for by ancient  authors from  reasons  singular 
and  remarkable.  Different  species  of  animals  were  the 
deities of  the  different  sects  among  the  EGYPTIANS  ;  and 
the deities being in continual war, engaged their votaries in 
the same contention.  The worshippers of  dogs could not long 
remain  in peace with  the adorers of  cats or wol~es.~  But 
where that reason took not place, the EGYPTIAN  superstition 
was not so incompatible as is comnlonly imagined ;  since we 
learn from  HERO DOT US,^  that very large contributions  were 
given by AMASIS  towards rebuilding the temple of  DELPHI. 
The intolerance of  almost all religions, which  have  main- 
tained  the unity  of  God, is as remarkable  as the contrary 
principle  of  ~olytheists. The  implacable  narrow  spirit of 
the JEWS  is well  known.  MAHOMETANISM  set out with  still 
1 Xenoph: Menor. lib. i. 3,l.  * Plutarch. de Isid. & Osiricle. C. 72,  Lib. ii. 180. 
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8Em.  more bloody principles ;  and even to this day, deals out dam- 
IX  .  .  *-  nation, though not fire and faggot, to all other sects.  And 
if,  among  CHRISTIANS,  the  ENGLISH  and DUTCH  have  em- 
braced  the principles of  toleration, this singularity has pro- 
ceeded from the steady resolution of  the civil magistrate, in 
opposition to the continued efforts of priests and bigots. 
The  disciples  of  ZOROASTER  shut  the doom  of  heaven 
against all but the MAGIANS.~  Nothing could more obstruct 
the progress of the PERSIAN  conquests, than the furious zeal of 
tha't nation against the temples and images of  the GREEKS. 
And after the overthrow of  that empire we  find ALEXANDER, 
as a  polytheist, immediately  re-establishing  the worship  of 
the BABYLONIANS,  which their former princes, as monotheists, 
had  carefully  abolished.=  Even  the  blind  and  devoted 
attachment  of  that conqueror  to  the GREEK  superstition 
hindered  not  but  he  himself  sacrificed  according  to  the 
BABYLONISH  rites and ~eremonies.~ 
So  sociable  is  polytheism,  that  the  utmost  fierceness 
and antipathy, which it meets with in an opposite religion, is 
scarcely able  to disgust it, and keep it at a  distance.  ilu- 
GUSTUS praised extremely the reserve of  his grandson, CAI~TS 
CBSAR, when  this latter  prince,  passing  by  JERUSALZM, 
deigned  not  to sacrifice according to the JEWISH  law.  But 
for  what  reason  did  AUGUSTUS  so  much  approve  of  this 
conduct?  Only,  because  that religion was by  the PAGANS 
esteemed ignoble and barbarous.' 
I may venture  to affirm,  that few  corruptions of  idolatry 
and  polytheism  are  more  pernicious  to  society  than  this 
corruption  of  thei~m,~  when  carried  to the utmost  height. 
The  human  sacrifices  of  the  CARTHAGINIANS,  MEXICANS, 
and  many  barbarous  nati~us,~  scarcely  exceed  the  inqui- 
sition  and  persecutions  of  ROME  and  MADRID. For be- 
Hyde de Relig. vet Persarum. 
Arrian. de Exped, lib. iii. 16.  Id. 
lib. vii. 17. 
Id. ibid. 
Sueton. in vita Bug. c.  93. 
ti  Corruptw opt ;mi pessirna. 
Most nations  have fallen into this 
quilt of  human sacrifices ;  though, per- 
haps,  this  impious  superstition  has 
never  prevailed  very  much  in  any 
ci-iilizod nation,  unless  we  except  the 
CARTHAQINIANS.  For the TYRIANY  soon 
abolishetl  it.  A  sacrifice is conceived 
as a  present;  and any present  is de- 
livered to !heir  deity by destroying  it 
and rend1 ~rng  it useless  to  men;  by 
burnink  .\ b at is solid, pouring  out  the 
liquid,  and  killing the  animate.  FOE 
want of  a better way of doing him ser- 
vice, WA  do  ourselves  an  injury; and 
fancy that we thereby express, at least, 
the heartiness of our good-will and ado- 
ration.  Thus our mercenary devotion 
deceives ourselves, and imagines it de- 
ceives the deity. 
sides, that the effusion of  blood may not be  so  great in  the  sem. 
former case as in the latter ;  besides this, I say, the human  -?. 
victims, being chosen by lot, or by some exterior signs, affect 
not, in  sp  considerable a degree, the rest of the society. Where- 
as virtue, knowledge, love  of  liberty, are the qualities, which 
call down  the fatal vengeance of  inquisitors;  and when  ex- 
pelled, leave the society in the most shameful ignorance, cor- 
ruption, and bondage.  The illegal murder  of  one man by a 
tyrant is  more  pernicious  than the death of  a thousand by 
pestilence, famine, or any undistinguishing calamity. 
In the temple  of  DIANA  at ARICIA  near  ROME,  whoever 
murdered the present  priest, was  legally entitled to  be in- 
stalled  his succe~sor.~  A very  singular institution!  For, 
however  barbarous  and  bloody  the  common  superstitions 
often are to the laity, they usually turn to the advantage of 
the holy order. 
SECT,  X.-With  regard to courage or abmemmt. 
From the comparison of theism and idolatry, we may form 
some other observations, which will also confirm  the vulgar 
observation, that the corruption of  the best things gives rise 
to the worst. 
Where the deity is represented as infinitely superior to  man- 
kind, this belief, though altogether just, is apt, when joined 
with  superstitious  terrors, to sink the human mind illto the 
lowest submission and abasement, and to represent the monkish 
virtues of  mortification, .p:nance,  humility, and passive suf- 
fering, as the  only qualities  which  are  acceptable  to him. 
But where the gods hre conceived to be only a little superior 
to mankind, and to have been, many of them, advanced from 
that inferior rank, we  are more at our ease in our addresses to 
them,  and may even, without profaneness, aspire sometimes 
t~  a rivalship and emulation of  them.  Hence activity, spirit, 
courage,  magnanimity,  love  of  liberty, and all  the  virtues 
which aggrandize a people. 
The heroes in paganism correspond exactly to the saints in 
popery and  holy dervises  in MAHOMETANISM.  The place of 
HERCULES,  THESEUS,  HECTOR,  ROMULUS,  is  now supplied by 
DOMINIC,  FRANCIS,  ANTHONY,  and  BENEDICT.  Instead  of  , 
the destruction  of  monsters,  the  subduing  of  tyrants,  the 
defence  of  our  native  country ;  whippings  and  fastiiigs, 
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SECT.  cowardice and humility, abject submission and slavish obedi- 
X  .  *  ence, are become ,the means  of  obtaining  celestial honours 
among mankind. 
One great incitement to the pious ALEXANDER  in his war- 
like expeditions was his rivalship of HERCULES  and BACCHUS, 
whom he justly pretended to have excelled.'  BRASIDAS,  that 
generous and noble SPARTAN,  after falling in battle, had heroic 
honours paid  him  by the inhabitants of  AMPHIPOLIS,  whose 
defence he had embraced.3  And in general,  all founders of 
states and colonies  among the GREEKS  were  raised to this 
inferior rank of  divinity, by those who reaped the benefit of 
their labours, 
This gave rise to the observation of  MACHIAVEL~,  that the 
doctrines of  the CHRISTIAN  religion  (meaning -the catholic ; 
for he knew no other) which recommend only passive courage 
and suffering, had subdued  the spirit of  mankind, and had 
fitted them for slavery and subjection.  An observation, which 
would certainly be just,  were  there not  many other circum- 
stances in human  society  which  controul  the  genius  and 
character of  a religion. 
BRASIDAS  seized a mouse,  and being  bit by  it, let it go. 
There is nothing so  contemptible, said he, but what may be safe, 
if it has but courage to defend  itself.4  BELLARMINE  patiently 
and humbly allowed the fleas and other odious vermin to prey 
upon him.  We  shall have heaven, said he, to reward us  for  our 
sqerings :  But these poor  creatures have nothing but the enjoy- 
ment of  the present  lifeG5 Such difference is there between the 
maxims of a GREEK  hero and a CATHOLIC  saint. 
SECT.  XI.-With  regard to reason or  absurdity. 
Here is another observation to the same purpose, and a new 
proof that the corruption of the best things begets the worst. 
If  we examine, without prejudice, the ancient heathen mytho- 
logy, as contained in the poets,  we  shall not discover in it 
any such ~nonstrous  absurdity, as we may at first be apt to 
apprehend.  Where is the difficulty in conceiving, that the 
same powers or principles, whatever they were, which formed 
this visible w~rld,  men aind  animals, produced aho a species 
1  Arrian passim. 
2  Thucyd. lib. v. 1  L 
Discorsi. lib. vi. 
Plut. Apopth. 
ti  Bayle, Article BELURMINB. 
of intelligent creatures, of more refined substance slid greazer  SECT. 
XI.  authority than the rest P  That these creatures may be capri- .- 
ciow, revengeful, passionate, voluptuous, is easily conceived ; 
nor  is  any  circumstance  more  apt,  among  ourselves,  to 
engender such vices, than the licence of  absolute authority. 
And  in short, the whole mythological  system is so natural, 
that, in the vast variety of  planets and  worlds, contained in 
this universe, it seems more than probable, that, somewhere 
or other, it is really carried into execution. 
The chief objection to it with regard to this planet, is, that 
it is not ascertained by any just  reason  or authority.  The 
ancient tradition, insisted on by heathen  priests and theolo- 
gers, is but a weak  foundation ;  and transmitted also such a 
number of  contradictory reports,  supported,  all of  them,  by 
equal authority, that it became absolutely impossible to fix a 
preference amongst  them.  A  few  volumes,  therefore, must 
contain all the polemical writings of pagan priests : And their 
whole theology must  consist more of  traditional stories and 
supe~atitious  practices  than of  philosophical  argument  and 
controversy. 
But where theism forms the fundamental  principle of  any 
popular religion, that tenet is so conformable to sound reason, 
that philosophy is apt to incorporate itself with such a system 
of  theology.  And  if  the other dogmas  of  that system  be 
contained in a sacred book, such as the Alcoran, or be deter- 
mined by any visible authority, like that of the ROMAN  pontiff, 
speculative  reasoners  naturally  carry on  their  assent,  and 
embrace a theory, which has been instilled into them by their 
earliest education, and which also possesses some degree ot 
consistence and uniformity.  But as these  appearances are 
sure, all of them, to prove deceitful, philosophy will soon find 
herself  very  unequally  yoked  with her new  associate;  and 
instead of regulating each principle, as they advance together, 
she is at every turn perverted to serve the purposes of super- 
stition.  For  besides  the unavoidable  incoherences,  which 
must be reconciled and adjusted;  one may safely affirm, that 
all popular  theology, especially the scholastic, has a kind of 
appetite for  absurdity and  contradiction.  If that theolog~ 
went  not beyond reason  and common  sense, her  doctrines 
would  appear  too  easy  and  familiar.  Amazement  must of 
necessity be raised:  Mystery affected: Darkness and obscurity 
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SECT.  votaries, who desire an opportunity of subduing their rebellious 
XJ  -',  reason, by the belief of  the most unintelligible sophisms. 
Ecclesiastical history sufficiently confirms these reflections. 
When a controversy is started, some people  always pretend 
with certainty to foretell the issue.  Whichever opinion, say 
they, is most contrary to plain sense is sure to prevail;  even 
where the general  interest of  the system requires not that 
decision.  Though the reproach of  heresy may, for some time, 
be bandied about among the disputants, it always rests at  last 
on the side of reason.  Any one, it is pretended, that has but 
learning enough of this kind to know the definition of ARIAN, 
PELAGIAN,  ERASTIAN,  SOCINIAN,  SABELLIAN,  EUTYCHIAN,  NES- 
TORIAN,  MONOTEELITE,  &c. not to mention PROTESTANT,  whose 
fate is yet uncertain, will be convinced of  the truth of  this 
observation.  It is thus n system becomes more absurd in the 
end, merely from its being reasonable and philosophical in the 
beginning. 
To oppose the torrent of  scholastic religion by such feeble 
maxims as these, that it is impossible for  the same tlbing  to be 
and not to be, that the wlzole is greater than a part, that two and 
three make Jive;  is pretending  to stop the ocean with a bull- 
rush.  Will you set up profane reason against sacred mystery? 
No punishment is great enough for your impiety.  And  the 
same fires, which were kindled for heretics, will serve also for 
the destruction of philosaphers. 
SECT.  XI1.-With  regard to Dozcbt  or Conviction. 
We meet every day with people so sceptical with regard to 
history, that they assert it impossible for any nation ever to 
believe such absurd principles as those of  GREEK  and EGYP- 
TIAN  paganism;  and at the same time so  dogaatical with 
regarit to religion, that they think the same absurdities are to 
be found in no other communion.  CAMBYSES  entertained like 
prejudices ;  and very impiously ridiculed, and even wounded, 
APIS,  the great  god of  the EGYPTIANS,  who appeared to his 
profane senses nothing but a large spotted bull.  But HERO- 
DOTUS * judiciously ascribes this sally of passion to a real mad- 
ness or disorder of  the brain : Otherwise, says the historian, 
he never would have openly affronted any established worship. 
For on that head, continues he, every nation are best satisfied 
[Editions L to Q give the reference,  lib. iii. c. 38.1 
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with their own, and think they have the advantage over every 
other nation.  L 
It must be allowed, that the ROMAN  CATHOLICS  are a very 
learned sect;  and that no one communion, but that of  the 
church of ENGLAND,  can dispute their being the most learned 
of  all the Christian churches : Yet AVERROES,  the famous 
ARABIAN,  who, no doubt, had heard of  the EGYPTIAN  super- 
stitions, declares, that, of  all religions, the most absurd and 
nonsensical is  that, whose votaries eat, after having created, 
their deity. 
I believe, indeed, that there is no tenet in all paganism, 
which would give so fair a scope to ridicule as this of the real 
presence :  For it is so absurd, that it  eludes the force of  all 
argument.  There are even some pleasant stories of that kind, 
which, though somewhat profane, are commonly told  by the 
Catholics  themselves.  One  day,  a  priest,  it is said,  gave 
inadvertently, instead of the sacrament, a counter, which had 
by accident fallen among the holy wafers.  The communicant 
waited patiently for some time, expecting it  would dissolve on 
his tongue :  B&t finding that it still remained entire, he took 
it off.  I  wish, cried he to the priest, you  have not committed 
some mistake : I wish you have not given ma  God the Father :  He 
is so  hard and tough there is  no swaZlowing him. 
A famous general, at that time in the MUSCOVITE  service, 
having come to PARIS  for the recovery of  his wounds, brought 
along with him a young TURK,  whom he had taken prisoner. 
Some of the doctors of  the SORBONNE  (who are altogether as 
positive as the demises of  CONSTANTINOPLE)  thinking it a pity, 
that the poor TURK  should be damned for want of instruction, 
solicited MUSTAPHA  very hard to turn Christian, and promised 
hirn, for his encouragement, plenty of  good wine in this world, 
and paradise in the next.  These allurements were too powerful 
to be resisted ;  and therefore, having been well instructed and 
catechized,  he at last agreed  to receive the sacraments of 
baptism and the Lord's supper.  The priest, however, to make 
every thing sure and solid, still continued his instructions 
and began  the next day with the usual question, How many 
Go&  are there ?  None at all, replies BENEDICT  ;  for,  that was 
his new tlame.  How!  None  at all! cries the priest.  To be 
sure, said the honest  proselyte.  You have  told me  all along 
that there is but one God: And yesterdccy  I eat him. 
Such are the doctrines of  our brethren the Catholics.  But 344  THE  NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  RELIGION. 
SEm.  to these dochines we are so accustomsd, that we never wonder 
' .=,  at  them : Though in  a,  future age, it will  probably become 
difficult  to persuade some nations, that any human, two-legged 
creature could ever  embrace  such principles.  And it  is  a 
thousand  to  one,  but these  nations  themselves  shall have 
something full as absurd in their own creed, to which they 
will give a most implicit and most religious assent. 
I lodged1 once at PARIS  in the same hotel with an ambas- 
sador from TUNIS,  who, having passed some years at LONDON, 
was  returning  home  that way.  One  day I observed  his 
MOORISH  excellency diverting himself  under the porch, with 
surveying  the splendid  equipages  that drove  along ;  when 
there chanced to pass that way some Capucin friars, who had 
never seen a TURK  ;  as he, on his part, though accustomed to 
the EUROPEAN  dresses, had never seen the grotesque figure of 
a Capucin :  And there is no expressing the mutual admiration, 
with which they inspired  each other.  Had the chaplain of 
the embassy entered into a dispute with these FRANCISCANS, 
their reciprocal surprize had been of the same nature.  Thus 
all mankind  stand staring at one another;  and there is nc\ 
beating it into their heads, that the turban of the AFRICAN  is 
not just a.s good or as bad a fashion as the cowl of the EURO- 
PEAN.  He is a  very honest man, said the prince of  SALLEE, 
speaking of de RUYTER.  It is apity he were a Christian. 
How can you worship leeks and onions ?  we  shall suppose 
a  SORBONNIST  to say  to  a  priest  of  SAIS.  If we  worship 
them, replies  the latter ; at least, we  do  not, at the  same 
time, eat them.  But what strange objects of  adoration  are 
cats and monkies?  says  the  learned  doctor.  They  are at 
least as good as the relics or rotten bones of martyrs, answers 
llis no less learned antagonist.  Are you not mad, insists the 
Catholic, to cut one another's throat about the preference of 
;I.  cabbage or a cuounlber  ?  Yes, says the pagan ;  I allow it, 
if yon will  confess, that those  are  still madder, who  fight 
aborlt  the  preference  among  volumes  of  sophistry,  ten 
thousand of  which are not equal in value to one  cabbage  or 
~ucumber.~ 
Every by-stander will easily judge  (but unfortunately  the 
bystanders are few) that, if  nothing were requisite to estab- 
lish  any  popular  system,  but exposing  the absurdities  of 
1  [Probably in 1734.  ED.]  religion. though  so absurd, should  yet 
2  It  is  strange that the EGYPTIAN  have  borne  so  great a resemblance  to 
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other systems, every voter of  every superstition  could give a  SECT. 
sufficient reason for his blind and bigotted attachment to the .  xfr* 
principles in which he has been  educated.  But  without  so 
extensive a knowledge, on  which  to ground  this  assurance 
(and perhaps, better without it), there is not wanting a suffi- 
cient  stock  of  religious  zeal  and  faith  among  mankind. 
DIODORUS  SICULUS~  gives  a  remarkable  instance  to  this 
purpose, of  which  he  was  himself  an eye-witness.  While 
EGYPT  lay under the greatest terror of  the ROMAN  name,  a 
legionary  soldier  having inadvertently  been  guilty  of  the 
sacrilegious  impiety of  killing a cat, the whole  people rose 
upon him with  the utmost  fury ;  and  all the efforts of  the 
prince were not able to save him.  The senate and people of 
ROME,  I am persuaded, would not, then, have been so delicate 
with regard to their national  deities.  They very frankly,  a 
little after that time, voted AUGUSTUS  a place in the celestial 
mansions ;  and would have dethroned every god  in  heaven, 
for  his  sake,  had  he  seemed to  desire  it.  Presens  divus 
habebitur  AUGTJSTUS,  says  HORACE. That  is  a  very  im- 
portant point:  And  in other  nations  and other  ages, the 
same  circumstance has  not  been deemed  altogether indif- 
ferent.a 
Notwithstanding the sanctity  of  our  holy  religion,  says 
TULLY,~  no crime is more  common  with  us  than  sacrilege : 
But was  it  ever  heard  of,  that an EGYPT~AN violated  the 
temple of  a cat, an ibis, or a crocodile  ?  There is no torture, 
the JEWISH,  that ancient writers even of 
the greatest  genius  were  not  able  to 
observe  any  difference  between  them. 
For  it is  very  remarkable  that  both 
TACITUS  and  SUETONIUS,  when  they 
mention that decree of the senate, under 
TIBERIUB,  by which  the  EGYPTIAN  and 
JEWISH  proselytes were  banished  from 
ROME, expressly treat these religions as 
the same; and it appears, that even the 
decree itself was founded  on  that sup- 
position.  'Actunl & de  sacris BUI-P- 
TIIS JUDAICISQUE  pellendis ; factumque 
patrum  consulturn,  ut quatuor  millia 
libertini generis ea  superstitione infect., 
quis idonea &as,  in insulam Sardiniam 
veherentur, coercendis  illic latrociniis ; 
& si ob gravitatem caeli interissent, vile 
damnum :  Ceteri  cederent  IT&=,  nisi 
certam anto diem profanos  ritus exuis- 
sent.'  TACIT.  ann. lib.  ii. c. 85.  Ex- 
ternas  wremonias, BQYPTIOS  JUDAI- 
COSQUE  ritus  compescuit ; coactis  qui 
superstitione  ea  tenebantur,  religiosas 
vestes cum invtruento omni cornburere, 
&c.'  SUETON.  TIBER. C.  36.  These 
wise heathens, observing  something in 
the general air, and genius, and spirit 
of  the two religions to be the same, es- 
teemed the differences of  their  dogmas 
too frivolous to deserve any attention. 
Lib. i. 83. 
When  LOUIS  the XIVth took  on 
himself  the protection  of  the Jesuit's 
College  of  CLERMONT,  the  society 
odered  the  king's  arms  to  be  put 
up  over  the  gate, and  took  down the 
cross  in  order  to  make  wy  for  it: 
Which gare occasion  to the following 
epigram : 
Sustulit hinc Christi, posuitque insignia 
Regis : 
Impia  gens, alium nescit habereDeum, 
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f3ECT.  an EGYPTIAN  would  not  undergo,  says  the same author in 
w- "  .  X"6  ,  another place,'  rather than injure  an ibis, an  aspic, a cat, a 
dog, or a crocodile.  Thus it is  strictly true, what DRYDEN 
observes, 
'  Of whatsoe'er descent their godhead be, 
'  Stock,  stone, or other homely pedigree, 
In his defence his servants are as bold 
As if he had been born of beaten gold.' 
ABSALOM  and ACEITOPEEL. 
Nay, the baser  the materials  are,  of  which  the divinity is 
composed, the greater devotion is he likely to excite in the 
breasts of  his deluded votaries.  They exult in their  shame, 
and make a merit with their deity, in braving, for his  sake, 
all the ridicule  and  contumely of  his  enemies.  Ten thou- 
sand  2 Crusader8 inlist themselves  under the holy banners ; 
and  even  openly triumph  in those  parts  of  their  religion, 
which their adversaries regard as the most reproachful. 
There occurs, I own, a difficulty in the  EGYPTIAN  system 
of theology; as indeed, few systems of that kind are entirely 
free from  difficulties.  It  is  evident, from  their  method  of 
propagation, that a couple of cats, in fifty years, would stock 
a whole kingdom ;  and if  that religious veneration were still 
paid  them, it would, in twenty more, not  only be  easier in 
EGYPT  to find a god than a man, which PETRONIUS  says was 
the case in some parts of  Italy ;  but the gods must  at last 
entirely starve the men, and leave themselves neither priests 
nor votaries remaining.  It is probable, therefore, that this 
wise nation, the  most  celebrated  in  antiquity for  prudence 
and sound  policy, foreseeing  such  dangerous  consequences, 
reserved all their worship for  the full-grown  divinities, and 
used the freedom to drown the holy spawn or little  sucking 
gods, without any scruple or  remorse.  And thus the prac- 
tice of  warping the tenets of  religion, in order to serve tem- 
poral interests, is not, by any means, to  be  regarded  as an 
invention of  these later ages. 
The learned, philosophical VARRO,  discoursing of  religion, 
pretends not  to deliver  any thing beyond  probabilities and 
appearances : Such was his goad sense and moderation ! But 
the  passionate,  the  zealoile  AUGUSTIN,  insults  the  noble 
ROMAN  on his scepticism and reserve, and professes the most 
thorough belief and a~surance.~  A  heathen  poet, however, 
1  Tusc. Quaest. lib. v. 27.  a  De civitate Dei, 1. iii. c. 17. 
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contemporary with the saint, absurdly esteems  the religious  eEm 
system of  the latter so false, that even the credulity of  ohil- .  xu 
dren, he says, could not engage thenz to believe it.' 
Is  it strange, when mistakes are so common, to find every 
one positive and dogmatical P  And that the zeal often  rises 
in proportion to the error ?  Moverunt, says SPARTIAN,  k  ea 
tempestate, Judcei bellurn pod  vetabantur mutilcwe gmitali~.~ 
If ever there was a nation or a time, in  which the public 
religion lost all  authority over  mankind, we  might expect, 
that infidelity in ROME,  during the  CICERONIAN  age, would 
openly have erected its throne, and  that CICERO  himself,  in 
every speech and action, would have been its most  declared 
abettor.  But it  appears, that, whatever  sceptical  liberties 
that great man might take, in  his writings or in philosophical 
conversation ;  he yet avoided, in the cotnmon conduct of life, 
the imputation of  deism and profaneness.  Even  in his own 
family, and to his wife  TERRNTIA,  whom  he highly trusted, 
he  was  willing  to appear  a  devout  religionist ; and  there 
remains  a  letter,  addressed  to her,  in  which he  seriously 
desires her to offer sacrifice to APOLLO  and B~GULAPIUS,  in 
gratitude for the recovery of  his health.3 
POMPEY'S  devotion was much more sincere :  In all his con- 
duct, during the civil wars, he paid a great regard to auguries, 
dreams,  and  prophesies.'  AUGUSTUS  was  tainted  with 
superstition  of  every kind.  As  it is  reported  of  MILTON, 
that his poetical genius never flowed with ease and abundance 
in the spring ;  so AUGUSTUS  observed, that his  own  genius 
for dreaming  never was  so  perfect  during that season, nor 
was so much to be relied on, as during the rest of  the year. 
That great  and able  emperor  was  also extremely  uneasy, 
when  he  happened  to  change  his shoes, and put the right 
foot shoe on the left foot.5  In short  it cannot be  doubted, 
but the rotaries of  the established  superstition of  antiquity 
were  as  numerous in every  state, as those  of  the  modern 
religion  are  at present.  Its influence  was  as  universal ; 
though  it was not  so  great.  As  many  people  gave their 
assent to it ;  though that assent was not seemingly so strong, 
precise, and affirmative. 
We .may observe,  that, notwithstanding  the dogmatical, 
'  Clirudii  Rutilii  Numitiani  iter,  4  Cicero de Divin. lib. ii. c. 24. 
lib. i. 1. 394.  Sueton Aug. cap. 90, 91,  92.  Plin. 
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SECT.  imperious  style  of  all  superstition,  the  conviction of  the 
XI1 
,  religionists,  in  all  ages,  is more  affected  than  real,  and 
scarcely ever approaches, in any degree, to  that solid belief 
and persuasion, which governs us  in the common  affairs  of 
life.  Men dare not avow, even to their own hearts, the doubts 
wliich they entertain  on such  subjects : They make a merit 
of  implicit faith; and disguise  to themselves their real  in- 
fidelity,  by  the strongest asseverations  and  most  positive 
bigotry.  But nature is too hard for all their endeavours, and 
suffers not the obscure, glimmering  light, afforded  in those 
shadowy regions, to equal the strong  impressions, made  by 
common sense and by experience.  The usual course of men's 
conduct belies their  words, and shows, that their  assent in 
these matters is some  unaccountable operation of  the mind 
between  disbelief  and  conviction,  but  approaching  much 
nearer to the former than to the latter. 
Since, therefore, the mind of  man appears of  so loose and 
unsteady  a  texture,  that, even  at present,  when  so  many 
persons find an interest in  continually employing on  it the 
chissel and the hammer, yet  are they not  able  to engrave 
theological  tenets  with  any lasting impression;  how  mncli 
more must  this have  been the  case in ancient times, when 
the retainers to the holy function were  so  much  fewer  in 
comparison P  No  wonder, that the appearances were  then 
very inconsistent, and that men,  on  some  occasions, might 
seem  determined  infidels,  and  enemies  to  the  established 
religion,  without  being  so in reality ;  or  at least,  without 
knowing their own minds in that particular. 
Another cause, which rendered the ancient religions much 
looser than the modern, is, that the former were  traditional 
and the latter are scriptural ;  and the tradition in the former 
was complex, contradictory, and, on many occasions, doubtful ; 
so that it could not possibly be reduced to any standard  and 
canon,  or  afford  any  determinaw articles  of  faith.  The 
stories of  the gods were numberless like the popish legends ; 
and though every one, almost, believed a part of these stories, 
yet no one could believe  or know the whole : While, at the 
sarne  time, all must have  acknowledged, that no  one  part 
stood on a better foundation than the rest.  The traditions 
of  different cities and nations were also, on many occasions, 
directly opposite ;  and no reason  could be  assigned  for pre- 
ferring  one to the  other.  And  as  there  was  an infinite  SECT. 
number of  stories, with regard to which tradition was nowise  xfl. 
positive ;  the gradation was insensible, from the most funda- 
mental articles of  faith, to those loose and precarious fictions. 
'l'he  pagan religion, therefore, seemed to vanish like a cloud, 
whenever one  approached to it, and examined  it  piecemeal. 
It could never be ascertained by any fixed dognias  and prin- 
ciples.  And  though  this  did  not  convert  the  generality 
of mankind from so absurd a faith ;  for when will the people 
be  reasonable P  yet  it  made  them  faulter  and  hesitate 
more  in maintaining their principles, and was  even apt to 
produce, in certain dispositions  of  mind, some practices and 
opinions,  which  had  the  appearance  of  determined  infi- 
delity. 
To which we  may add, that the  fables  of  the pagan  re- 
ligion  were, of  themselves, light, easy,  and familiar;  with- 
out  devils, or  seas  of  brimstone,  or  any object  that could 
much terrify the imagination.  Who could  forbear  smiling, 
when  he thought of  the loves of  MARS  and YENUS,  or the 
amorous  frolics  of  JUPITER  and PAN  P  In this respect,  it 
was i~ true poetical religion ;  if  it had  not  rather too  much 
levity for the grayer  kinds  of  poetry.  We find that it has 
been adopted by modern bards; nor have  these talked with 
greater freedom and irreverence. of  the gods, whom they re- 
garded as fictions, than the ancients did  of  the real  objects 
of  their devotion. 
The inference  is by  no  means just, that,  because a  sys- 
tem of  religion has made no deep inipression  on  the  minds 
of a people, it must  therefore  have  been  positively rejected 
by all men of  common sense, and that opposite principles, in 
spite of  the  prejudices  of  education, were  generally  estab- 
lished  by argument and reasoning.  I know not, but a con- 
trary inference may be more probable.  The less importunate 
and  assuming any species of  superstition  appears,  the less 
will it provoke uen's spleen and indignation, or engage them 
into enquiries concerning its foundation and origin.  This in 
the mean  time  is  obvious, that the empire of  all religious 
faith  over  the understanding  is  wavering  and  uncertain, 
subject  to every variety  of  humour,  and  dependent  on  the 
present  incidents, which  strike  the  imagination.  The dif- 
ference is only in the degrees.  An ancient will place a stroke 
of  impiety and one of  superstition alternately, throughout a 360  TIIE  NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  RELIGION. 
SECT.  whole discourse :  A  modern  often thinks in the same way,  .  X'l.  though he map be more guarded in his expression. 
LUCIAN  tells us express1yyY  that whoever  believed  not the 
most  ridiculous  fables  of  paganism  was  deemed  by  the 
people  profane  and  impious.  To  what  purpose,  indeed, 
would that agreeable author have  employed  the whole  force 
of  his wit  and satire  against  the national religion, had not 
that religion been generally believed  by his countrymen and 
conten.~poraries  P 
LIVY  acknowledges  as frankly,  as any divine would  at 
present,  the  common  incredulity  of his  age; but  then  he 
condemns  it  as  severely.  And  who  can  imagine,  that  a 
national superstition, which could delude so ingenious a man, 
would not also impose on the generality of  the people? 
The STOICS  bestowed many magnificent and even  impious 
epithets  on  their sage; that he alone was rich, free, a king, 
and equal  to the immortal gods.  They forgot to add, that 
he was not inferior in prudence and understanding to an old 
woman.  For surely  nothing  can be  more  pitiful than the 
sentiments,  which  that sect  entertain with  regard to reli- 
gious matt'era ;  while they seriously agree with the common 
a,ug.urs,  that, when a raven croaks from the left, it  is a good  -  - 
omen; but a  bad  one,  when  a  rook  makes  a  noise  from 
the same quarter.  PANBTIUS  was the only STOIC,  among the 
GREEKS,  who  so  much  as doubted with regard  to auguries 
and di~ination.~  MABCUS  ANTONINUS  tells us, that he him- 
self  had  received  many  admonitions from  the gods in his 
sleep.  It is true, EPICTETUS~  forbids us to reg&d  the lan- 
guage  of  rooks  and ravens ;  but it is not, that they do not 
speak truth : It  is  only,  because  they  can  forte1  nothing 
but the breaking of  our neck or the forfeiture of  our estate ; 
which  are circumstances,  says  he, that nowise  concern us, 
1 Witness this remarkable passage of 
TACITUS: 'Praeter  multipliccs  rerum 
humanarum  casus  coelo  terraque  pro- 
digia & fulminum monitus & futurorum 
przesagia,  laeta  tristia,  ambigua  mani- 
festa.  Nec enim  unquam  atrocioribus 
populi Romani cladibus, magisve justis 
indiciis approbatum est, nor1  esse cur= 
Diis securitatem nostram, esse ultionem.' 
Hist. lib. i. 3.  Auaus~us's  quarrel with 
NEPTUNE  is an  instance  of  the same 
kind.  Had not  the emperor  believed 
NX~UNE  to be a real being, and to have 
dominion  over  the sea, where had' been 
the foundation of  his anger? And if he 
believed  it, what  madness  to  provoke 
still farther that deity?  The same ob- 
servation  may  be  made  upon  QUIN- 
TILIAN'S  exclamation, on account of  the 
death of  his children, lib.  vi.  Pmf. 
Philopseudes.  3. 
Lib. x. cap. 40. 
Cicero de Divin. lib. i. cap. 3 & 7. 
6  Lib. i. § 17. 
Ench. 5 17. 
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Thus the STOICS  join  a  pllilosophical enthusiasm  to  a  reli-  SECT. 
gious superstition.  The force-of their mind, being all turned  x", 
to the side of  morals, unbent itself in that of religion.' 
PLATO  a  introduces SOCRATES  affirming,  that the accusation 
of  impiety raised  against hiin was owing entirely to his re- 
jecting  such  fables,  as  those  of  SATUXN's  castrating  his 
father URANUB,  and JUPITER'S  dethroning  SATURW  : Yet in 
a subsequent dial~gue,~  SOCRATES  confesses, that the doctrine 
of  the mortality of  the soul was the received  opinion  of  the 
people.  Is  there here any contradiction P Yes, surely :  Bnt the 
contradiction is not in PLATO  ;  it is .In the people, whose re- 
ligious principles in general are always composed of  the most 
discordant parts ;  especially in an  age, when superstition sate 
so easy and light upon them.4 
The same CICERO,  who  affected, in his own family, to ap- 
The Stoics, I own, were  not quite 
orthodox  in  the established  religion ; 
but one may see,  from these  inswnces, 
that they went  a  great way:  And  the 
people undoubtedly went every length. 
Euthyphro. 6. 
Pheedo. 
XENOPHON'S  conduct, as reiated by 
himself,  is,  at once,  an  incontestable 
proof  of  the general credulity of  man- 
kind  in those ages, and the incoheren- 
cies, in  all ages, of  men's  opinions  in 
religious  matters.  That  great captain 
and  philosopher, the  disciple  of  Soc- 
RATES,  and one who has delivered  some 
of  the most refined sentiments with re- 
gard to a deity, gave  all  the  following 
marks  of  vulgar,  pagan  superstition. 
By SOCRATES'S  advice, he consulted  the 
oracle  of  DELPHI,  before he would  en- 
gage  in the  expeditiou  of  CYRUS. De 
exped. lib. iii. p. 294,  ex  edit. Leuncl. 
Sees a dream the night after the gene- 
rals were seized; which  he  pays  great 
regard  to, but thinks ambiguous.  Id. 
p.  295.  He and the whole  anny  re- 
gard  sneezing  as a  very lucky  omen. 
Id. p. 300.  Has another  dream, when 
he comes to the river CENTRITES,  which 
his  fellow-general,  CHIROSYHUS,  also 
pays great regard to.  Id.  lib.  iv.  p. 
323.  The  GREEKS,  suffering from  a 
cold north wind, sacrifice to i<;  and the 
historian observes, that it immediately 
abated.  Id.  p.  329.  XENOPHON  con- 
sults the sacrifices  in secret,  before he 
would form any resolution with himself 
about settling a colony.  Lib. v. p. 359. 
He was  himself  a  very  skilful  augur. 
Id. p.  361.  Is determined by  the  ric- 
tims to refuse the sole  command of  the 
army which  was offered  him.  Lib. vi. 
p. 273. CLEANDER,  the SPABTAN,  though 
very desirous of  it, refuses for the same 
reason.  Id. p.  392.  XEKOPHON  men- 
tioils anolJ  dream with theinterpretation 
gircn him, when he first joined  CYRUS, 
p.  373.  Mentions  also  the  place  of 
HERCULES'S  descent into hell as believ- 
ing it, and says the marks of  it are still 
remaining.  Id.  p.  375.  Had almost 
starved the army, rather than lead thein 
to the field  against the  auspices.  Id. 
p. 382, 383.  HIS  friend, EUCLIDES,  the 
augur,  woulcl  not  believe  that he had 
brought no money from the expedition ; 
till he (EUCLIJ)ES)  sacrificed,  and then 
he saw the matter clearly in  the  Ex&. 
Lib.  rii. p.  425.  The  same  philoso- 
pher, proposing a  project of  mines  for 
the encrease of the ATHENIAN  revenues, 
advises them first to consult  the oracle. 
De rat. red. p.  392.  That all  this  de- 
votion was not a farce, in orderto serve 
a  political  purpose, appears both from 
the  facts  themselves,  and  from  the 
genius  of  that age, when  little or no- 
thing  could  be  gained  by  hypocrisy. 
Besides,  XENOPHON,  as  appears  from 
his Memorabilia, was  a kind of  heretic 
in those  times, which  no  political  de- 
votee  ever  is.  It is for the same rea- 
son, I maintain, that NEWTON,  LOCKE, 
CLARKE,  &LC.  being Arinns or  Socinians, 
were very sincere in the creed they pro- 
fessed:  And I always oppose this argu- 
ment to some libertines, who will needs 
have it,, that it was impossible but that 
these  philosophers must have been  hy- 
poerit cs. 362  THE  NATURAL  HISTORY  OF  RELIGION. 
SECT.  pear a devout religionist, makes no scruple, in a public court 
"'.  of  judicature,  of treating the doctrine of  a  future state as a 
ridiculous fable, to which no body could give  any attention.' 
SALLUST  represents CBSAR  as speaking the same language 
in the open ~enate.~ 
But  that all  these  freedoms implied not a total and uni- 
versal infidelity and scepticism amongst the people, is too ap- 
parent  to be  denied.  Though  some  parts  of  the national 
religion  hung loose  upon  the  minds  of  men,  other  parts 
adhered more closely to them :  And it was the chief business 
of the sceptical philosophers to show, that there was no more 
foundation for one than for the other.  This is the artifice of 
COTTA  in the dialogues concerning the nature of  the gods.  He 
refutes the whole system of mythology by leading the orthodox 
gradually,  from  the  more  momentous  stories,  which were 
believed, to the  more  frivolous, which every one  ridiculed : 
From the gods to  the  goddesses ;  from the goddesses to the 
nymphs ;  from the nymphs  to tbe fawns  and  satyrs.  His 
master,  CARNEADES,  had  employed  the  same  method  of 
reasoning? 
Upon  the whole,  the greatest  and  most  observable dif- 
ferences  between a traditional, mythological  religion,  and  a 
sustematical, scholastic one are two :  The former is often more 
u 
reasonable,  as  consisting  only  of  a  multitude  of  stories, 
which, however  groundless, imply no  express  absurdity and 
demonstrative contradiction; and sits also so easy and light 
on  men's  minds, that, though it  may be  as universally re- 
ceived,  it bappily  makes  no  such  deep  impression  on the 
affections and understanding. 
SECT.  XII1.-  Impious  conceptions  of  the  divine  nature  in 
-  popular religions of  both  kinds. 
The primary religion of  mankind arises chiefly from an anxi- 
ous fear of  future events ;  and what ideas will naturally be en- 
PRO  CLUENTIO,  cap. 61. 
De bello CATILIN.  5 1. 
CICERO  (TUSC.  Quaest. lib. i. cap. 5, 
6) and SENIXA  (Epist. 24:),  as also Ju- 
v~~a(Satyr.  2.149), maintain that  there 
is no boy or old woman so ridiculous as 
to  believe the poets in their accounts of 
a  future  state.  Why  then  does  Lu- 
CRETIUS  so highly exa?.t his master for 
freeing us from these terrors  ?  Perhaps 
the generality of  mankind were then in 
the disposition  of  CEPHALUS  in PLATO 
(de Rep. lib, i. 330 D.) who while he was 
young and healthful could ridicule these 
stories ;  but as soon as  he became old and 
infirm, began to entertain apprehensions 
of  their  truth.  Tliis we  may observe 
not to be unusual even at present. 
SEXY.  EMPIR.  advers. ~~IATHEM.  lib. 
ix. 429. 
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tertained of  invisible, unknown  powers, while men lie under  SECT. 
XIII.  dismal apprehensions of  any  kind,  may easily be conceived. . ,  a 
Every image of vengeance, severity, cruelty, and malice must 
occur, and must augment the ghastliness  and  horror,  which 
oppresses  the  amazed  religionist.  A  panic  having  once 
seized the mind, the  active  Cancy still farther multiplies the 
objects of  terror;  while that profound darkness, or, what is 
worse,  that glimmering light, with which we  are environed, 
represents  the spectres  of  divinity under the most  dreadful 
appearances imaginable.  And no idea of perverse wickedness 
can be framed, which those terrified  devotees do not readily, 
without scruple, apply to their deity. 
This appears the natural state of  religion, when surveyed 
in one  light.  But  if  we consider, on  the other hand, that 
spirit  of  praise  and eulogy, which necessarily has  place  in 
all  religions,  and which  is the  consequence of  these  very 
terrors, we  must expect a quite contrary system  of  theology 
to prevail.  Every virtue, every excellence, must be  ascribed 
to the divinity, and no exaggeration will be deemed sufficient 
to  reach those perfections, with which he is endowed.  What- 
ever  strains  of  panegyric  can be invented, are immediately 
embraced, without consulting any arguments or phm-iomena : 
It  is esteemed a suEicient confirnlation of  them, that they 
give  us  more  magnificent ideas of  the divine objects of  our 
worship and adoration, 
Here therefore is a kind of  contradiction between the dif- 
ferent principles of  human nature, which enter into religion. 
Our  natural terrors present the  notion  of  a  devilish  and 
~nalicious  deity:  Our  propensity  to  adulation  leads  us  to 
acknowledge an excellent and divine.  And  the influence of 
these opposite principles are various, according to the different 
situation of  the human understanding. 
In very  barbarous  and  ignorant  nations,  such  as  the 
AFRICANS  and INDIANS,  nay  even the JAPONESE,  who  can 
form  no extensive  ideas  of  power  and knowledge, worship 
may be paid to a being, whom they confess to be wicked and 
detestable ;  though they  may be  cautious,  perhaps, of  pro- 
nouncing  this judgment  of  him in public, or in his temple, 
where he may be supposed to hear their reproaches. 
Such  rude, imperfect ideas of  the Divinity adhere long to 
all idolaters ;  and it may safely be aflirmed, that the GREEKS 
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SECT.  by XENOPHON,'  in praise of  SOCRATES,  that this philosopher 
XI11  . , '  assented not to the vulgar opinion, which supposed the gods 
to know some things, and be  ignorant of  others : He mair- 
tained, that they knew every thing ;  what was  done, said, or 
even thought.  But as this was a train of  philosophy '  much 
above  the conception  of  his  countrynlen,  we  need  not be 
surprised,  if very frankly, in  their  books  and conversation, 
they  blamed  the deities,  whom  they  worshipped  in their 
temples.  It  is  observable,  that  HERODOTUS  in  particular 
scruples  not, in many passages, to ascribe envy to the gods ; 
a sentiment, of  all othere,  the most  suitable to a mean  and 
devilish nature.  The pagan hymns, however, sung in public 
worship,  contained  nothing  but  epithets  of  praise;  even 
while the actions ascribed to the gods were the most  barba- 
rous and detestable.  When TIMOTHEUS,  the poet, recited a 
hymn to DIANA,  in which he enumerated, with  the greatest 
eulogies, all the actions and attributes of  that cruel, capri- 
cious goddess : May  your daughter, said one  present, become 
such as the deity whom you ~eleh.ate.~ 
But as men farther exalt their idea of  their divinity;  it is 
their  notion  of  his power  and  knowledge  only, not of  his 
goodness, which  is  improved.  On  the contrary, in propor- 
tion  to  the supposed  extent of  his science  and authority, 
their terrors naturally augment ;  while they believe, that no 
secrecy can conceal them from his scrutiny, and that even the 
inmost  recesses  of  their breast lie  open before him.  They 
must then be careful not to form  expressly any sentiment of 
blame  and  disapprobation.  All  must  be  applause, ravish- 
ment, extacy.  And while their gloomy apprehensions make 
them  ascribe to him measures  of  conduct, which, in human 
creatures, would  be highly blamed, they must  still affect to 
praise and admire that conduct in the object  of  their  devo- 
tional addresses.  Thus it may safely be affirmed, that  popular 
religions are really, in the  conception  of  their  more vnlgar 
votaries, a species of  dremonism ;  and the higher  the deity 
is exalted  in  power  and  knowledge, the lower  of  course is 
he depressed in goodiiess and benevolence ;  whatever epithets 
of  praise  may be  bestowed  on  hiin  by his amazed adorers. 
1  Mem. lib. i. 1, 19.  but  was extended  every where;  as we 
It was  considered  among  the  an-  learn  from  LUCIAN. Hennotimus  siw 
cients, as a very extraordinary, philoso-  De  spctis,  81. 
phical paradox, that the presence of the  PLWTARCH,  de Supemtit. 10 
gods was  not  confined to the heavens, 
Among idolaters,  the words may be false, and belie the secret  SECT. 
opinion : But among  more  exalted  religionists, the opinion  *I:. 
itself  contracts  a  kind of  falsehood, and belies the  inward 
sentiment.  The  heart  secretly  detests  such  measures  of 
cruel  and  implacable  vengeance ;  but the judgment  dares 
not but pronounce them perfect and adoramble. And the ad- 
ditional misery of  this inward  struggle  aggravates  all the 
other terrors, by which  these  unhappy victims  to supersti- 
tion are for ever haunted. 
LUCIAN observes that a young man, who reads the history 
of  the  gods  in HOMER  or HESIOD,  and finds  their  factions, 
wars, injustice, incest,  adultery,  and  other  immoralities  so 
highly  celebrated,  is much  surprised  afterwards,  when  he 
comes  into the world, to observe  that punishments  are by 
law  inflicted  on  the same  actions,  which  he  had  been 
taught  to  ascribe to superior  beings.  The  contradiction 
is still perhaps stronger between  the  representations given 
us by  some later religions  and our natural ideas of  gene- 
rosity,  lenity,  impartiality,  and  justice ; and  in  propor- 
tion to the multiplied  terrors  of  these  religions,  the bar- 
barous  conceptions  of  the divinity are  nzultiplied  upon us.% 
Nothing  can preserve  untainted the genuine  principles  of 
l  Necyomantia, 3. 
2 Bacchus, a divine  being,  is repre- 
sented by the heathen mythology as the 
inventor  of  dancing  and the theatre. 
Plays were  ancien.tly  even  a  part  of 
public worship on the most solemn occa- 
bions,  and often  employed  in  times  of 
pestilence,  to  appease  the  offended 
deities.  Rut they have been zealously 
proscribed  by the godly in later ages; 
and  the  playhouse,  according  to  a 
learned divine, is the porch of hell. 
But in order to shoa more evidently, 
that it  is possible for a religion to repre- 
sent the divinity in still a more immoral 
and unami:tble  light  than he was  pic- 
tured  by  the ancients, we  shall cite a 
long passage  from  an  author  of  taste 
and  imagination,  who  was  surely  no 
enemy to Christianity.  It  is the Chevn- 
lier RAM~AY,  a wliler, who had so laud- 
able  an  inclination  to  be  orthodox, 
that hisreason never foundany difficulty, 
c ven in the doctrines which free-thinkers 
hcruple the  most, the trinity, incrtrna- 
tion,  and  wtisfaction :  His  humanity 
alone, of  which he seems to  hare had a 
great  stock,  rebelled  against  the  doc- 
trines  of  eternal reprobation and pre- 
destination.  He  expresses himself thus : 
'What  strange ideas,'  says he,  'would 
an Indian  or  a  Chinese  pllilosopher 
have of  our holy religion, if they judged 
by  the  schemes  given  of  it by  our 
modern  free-thinkers,  and pharisaical 
doctors of  all sects ?  According to the 
odious and too  vulgar  system  of these 
incredulous scoffers and crehlous scrib- 
blers, "  The God of  the Jews is a most 
cruel,  unjust,  partla!,  and  fantastical 
being.  He created, about  6000  years 
ago, a man  and a  woman,  and placed 
them in a fine garden of  ASIA,  of  which 
there are no remains.  This garden wits 
fulnished with all sorts of  trees,  foun- 
tains, and flowers.  He  allowed them the 
use  of  all the fruits of  this beautiful 
garden,  except  one,  that was  planted 
in the midst thereof, and that had  in it 
a  secret  rirtue of  preserving  them  in 
continual health and rigour of  body and 
mind, of  exalting  their natural powers 
and making them wise.  The  devil  en- 
tered  into the  Lodj oi a  serpent. and 
solicited the first woman  to eilt of this 
forbidden fruit ; she  engaged  her hus- 356  THE  NATURAL  IIISTORY  OF  RELIGION. 
SECP.  morals  in our  judgment  of  human  conduct,  but the  ab- 
LXfll~  solute  necessity  of  these  principles  to  the  existence  of 
society.  If  comliion  conception  can  indulge  princes  in 
a  system of  ethics,  somewhat  difl'erent  from  that  which 
should  regulate  private  persons;  liow  much  more  those 
band  to do the same.  To punish this 
slight curiosity and natural desire of life 
and knowledge, God not only threw our 
Arst parents out of paradise, but he con- 
demned all their  posterity to temporal 
misery, and  the greatest  part of  them 
to  eternal  pains, though  the  souls  of 
these innocent  children  have  no  more 
relation to that of  ADAM  than to those 
of NERO  and MAHOYET  ;  since, according 
to the  scholastic  drivellers, fabulists, 
and mythologists, all souls  are created 
pure,  and  in'fused  immediately  into 
mortal bodies, so  soon  as the fetus is 
formed.  To accomplish the barbarous, 
partial  decree  of  predestination  and 
reprobation, God abandoned all nations 
to darkness, idolatry, and superstition, 
without any saving knowledge or salu* 
tary graces ;  unless it  was one particular 
nation, whom  he chose  as his  peculiar 
people.  This chosen  nation was, how- 
ever, tts  most stupid, ungrateful, rebel- 
lious  and  perfidious  of  all  nations. 
After God had thus kept the far greater 
part of  all the human  species,  during 
near  4000 years, in  a  reprobate  state, 
he changed all of  a sudden, and took a 
fancy for other nations beside the JEWS. 
Then he sent  his  only begotten  Son to 
the  world, under  a human form, to ap- 
pease  his wrath, satisfy  his vindictive 
justice,  and die for the pardon of  sin. 
Very few nations, however, have  heard 
of this gospel ;  and all the rest, though 
loft in invincible ignorance, are damned 
without excepti~n,  or any possibility of 
remission.  The greatest  part of  those 
who  have  heard  of  it, have  changed 
only  some  speculative  notions  about 
God, and some  external forms  in wor- 
ship : For, in other respects, the bulk of 
Ctlristians have continned as corrupt as 
the  rest  of  rnttllkind  in  their morals ; 
yea,  so much  the  more  perverse  and 
criminal, that their lights were greater. 
Unless it be a rely small select number, 
all other  Christians,  like. the pagans, 
will be for ever damned ;  the great sac- 
rifice offered  up for them  will  become 
void  and of  no  effect;  God  will  take 
delight for erer, in their  torments and 
blasphemies ; and though he can, by one 
fiat  change  their hearkq, yet  they will 
remain fa  ever unconverted and uncon- 
vertible, because he will be for ever un- 
appeasable  and  irreconcileable.  It  is 
true, that all this makes  God  odious, 
a hater of  souls, rather  than a lover of 
them;  a  cruel, vindictive  tyrant,  an 
impotent or a  wrathful daemon, rather 
than an all-powerful, beneficent  father 
of  spirits:  Yet all this is a  mystery. 
He  has secret reasons  for his  conduct, 
that are impenetrable;  and though he 
appears unjust  and barbarous, yet  we 
must believe the contrary, because what 
is  injustice,  crime,  cruelty,  and  the 
blackest malice in us, is in him justice, 
mercy, and sovereign  goodness."  Thus 
the incredulous free-thinkers, the juda- 
izing Christians, and the fatalistic doc- 
tors  have  disfigured  and  dishonoured 
the sublime mysteries of our holy faith ; 
thus they have  confounded  the nature 
of  good  and  evil;  transformed  the 
most  monstrous  passions  into  divine 
attributes, and surpassed the pagans in 
blasphemy, by ascribing to the eternal 
nature, as perfections, what  makes the 
most horrid crimes amongst men.  The 
grosser  pagans  contented  themselves 
with divinizing lust,  incest, and adul- 
tery ; but  the  predestinarian  doctors 
have  divinized  cruelty,  wrath,  fury, 
vengeance, and all the blackest  vices! 
See  the  Chevalier  RA>SSAY'S  phtloso- 
phical principles of natural and revealed 
religion, Part ii. p. 401. 
The  same  author  asserts,  in  other 
places, that the Arminian and Molinist 
schemes serve  very  little to  mend the 
matter: And having thus thrown him- 
self out of  all received  sects  of  Chris- 
tianity, he is obliged to advance a system 
of his own, which is a kind of  Origeuis?n, 
and supposes  the  pre-existence  of  the 
souls both  of  men  and beasts, and the 
eternal salvation and coilversion  of  all 
men, beasts, and devils.  But this notion, 
being quite peculiar to himself, we need 
not treat of.  I thought the opinions of 
this ingenious author very curious ;  but 
I pretend  not  to warrant the justness 
of  them. 
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superior  beings,  whose  attributes,  views,  and  nature  are  SECT. 
XIII.  so  totally  unk~iown  to us?  8unt superis  sua  jura.'  The .  ,  fl 
gods have maxims of  justice peculiar to themselves. 
SECT.  X1V.-  Bad  injueme  a  of  popular religions on  morality. 
Here I cannot  forbear  observing  a  fact,  which  may  be 
worth the attention of such as make human nature the object 
of  their enquiry.  It is certain, that, in every religion, how- 
ever sublime the verbal definition which it gives of its divinity, 
many of  the votaries, perhaps the greatest number, will still 
seek the divine favour, not by virtue and good morals, which 
alone can be acceptable to a perfect being, but either by fri- 
volous  observances, by  intemperate zeal, by  rapturous  ex- 
ta,sies,  or by the belief  of  mysterious  and absurd opinions. 
The least part of the Sadder, as well as of the Pentateuch, con- 
sists in precepts of  morality;  and we  may also be  assured, 
that that part was  always the least observed and regarded. 
When the old ROMANS  were attacked with a pestilence, they 
never  ascribed  their  sufferings  to their  vices,  or  dreamed 
of  repentance  and  amendment.  They never  thought, that 
they were the general robbers  of  the world, whose  ambition 
and avarice  made  desolate  the earth, and reduced  opulent 
nations to want and beggary.  They only created a dictatorY3 
in order to drive a nail into a door;  and by that means, they 
thought  that  they had  sufficiently appeased  their incensed 
deity. 
In &GINA,  one faction forming a conspiracy, barbarously 
and treacherously assassinated seven hundred of their fellow- 
citizens ;  and  carried  their  fury so  far, thst, one  miserable 
fugitive having fled to the temple, they cut off  his hands, by 
which  he clung to the gates, and carrying  him  out of  holy 
ground,  immediately  murdered  him.  By  this impiety, says 
HERODOTUS,"~O~  by the other many cruel assassinations) they 
ofended  the gods, and contracted an irbexpiable guilt. 
Nay, if we should suppose, what never happens, that a popu- 
lar  religion were found, in which it was  expressly dedared, 
that nothing but morality could gain the divine favour ;  if  an 
order of  priests were instituted to inculcate  this opinion, in 
1  OVID.  BIetam. lib. ix. 490.  causa.  T. LIVII,  1.  vii, c.  3. 
[Most popular : Editions L to Q.]  Lib. vi. 91. 
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SECT.  daily  sermons, and with  all  the  arts of  persuasion;  yet so 
inveterate are the people's prejudices, that, for want of  some  - 
other superstition, they would  make the very attendance on 
these  sermons  the essentials  of  religion, rather than place 
them  in virtue  and  good  morals.  The sublime prologue of 
ZALEUCUS'S  laws ' inspired  not  the LOCRIANS,  so far as we 
can  learn,  with  any  sounder  notions  of  the  measures  of 
acceptance with  the deity, than were  familiar  to the  other 
GREEKS. 
This  observation,  then,  holds  universally : But  still  one 
may be at some loss to account for it.  It is not sufficient to 
observe, that the people, every  where, degrade  their  deities 
into a  siivilitude with themselves, and consider them merely 
as a species of human creatures, somewhat more  potent  and 
intelligent.  This will not  remove the difficulty.  For there 
is no man so stupid, as that, judging  by his natural reason, 
lle  would  not esteenl  virtue and  honesty the most  valuable 
qualities, which any person could possess.  Why not ascribe 
the same  sentiment  to  his  deity?  Why not  make  all 
religion, or the chief part of  it, to consist  in  these  attain- 
ments ? 
Nor is it satisfactory to say, that the practice of  morality 
is more difficult than that of  superstition ;  and  is therefore 
rejected.  For, not to mention the excessive penances of  the 
Brachrnans and Talapoins ;  it is certain, that the Rharnadan of 
the TURKS,  during which the poor wretches,  for  many days, 
often in the hottest months of  the  year, and in some of  tho 
hottest climates of  the world, remain without eating or drink- 
ing from the rising to the setting sun ;  this Rhamadan, I saj-, 
must be  more  severe than the practice of  any moral duty, 
even to the most vicious and de.praved of mankind.  The four 
lents of  the MUSCOVITES,  and the austerities of  some Roman 
Catholics, appear more disagreeable than meekness and bene- 
volence.  In short, all virtue, when men are reconciled to it 
by  ever so little practice, is agreeable :  All superstition is for 
ever odious and burthensome. 
Perhaps, the following  account may be received as a true 
solution of  tEle  difficulty.  The duties, which a man performs 
as a friend or parent, seem  merely owing  to  his benefactor 
or children;  nor can he be wanting  to these duties, without 
breaking  through all the ties  of  nature  and morality.  A 
To be found in DIUD.  SIC.  lib. xii. 120. 
strong inclination may prompt  him to the performance : A  SECT. 
sentiment  of  order  and moral obligation joins  its force to . 
these natural ties : And the whole  man, if truly virtuous, is 
drawn  to his  duty, without any effort or  endeivour.  Even 
with regard to the virtues, which are more austere, and more 
fonnded on reflection, such as public  spirit, filial duty, tern- 
perance,  or integrity ;  the moral  obligation,  in  our  appre- 
hension, removes all pretension to religious  merit ;  and the 
virtuous  conduct is deemed no more  than what we  owe  to 
society and to ourselves.  In all  this, a  superstitious  man 
finds nothing, which he has properly performed  for the sake 
of  his deity, or nhich can peculiarly recommend  him  to the 
divine  favour  and protection.  He considers  not,  that the 
most genuine method of  serving the divinity is by promoting 
the happiness of  his creatures.  He still looks out for some 
more immediate service of the supreme Being, in order to allay 
those terrors, with which he is haunted.  And any practice, 
recommended to him, which  either  serves to no purpose in 
life, or offers the strongest violence  to his natural  inclina- 
tions ;  that practice  he will  the more readily embrace,  on 
account of those very circumstances, which should make him 
absolutely reject it.  It seems the more purely religious, be- 
cause it proceeds from no mixture of any other motive or con- 
sideration. And if, for its sake, he sacrifices much of his ease 
and quiet, his claim of  merit appears still to rise upon  him, 
in proportion  to the zeal  and devotion which he discovers. 
In  restoring a loan, or paying a debt, his  divinity is. nowise 
beholden to him ;  because these acts of  justice  are what  he 
was  bound  to perform,  and  what  niany  would  have  per- 
formed, were there no god in the universe.  But if  he fast a 
day,  or  give  himself  a  sound whipping;  this has  a  direct 
reference,  in his opinion,  to the service of  God.  No other 
motive could engage him to such austerities.  By these dis- 
tinguished  marks  of  devotion,  he has  now  acquired  the 
divine favour;  and  may expect,  in recompence, protection 
and safety in this world, and eternal happiness in the next. 
Hence the greatest  crimes  have  been  found, in many in- 
stances, compatible with s  superstitious piety and devotion : 
Hence,'it is justly regarded  as unsafe to draw any certain in- 
ference in favour of  a man's morals, from the fervour or strict- 
ness of his religious exercises, even though be himself believe 
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SECT.  the blackest dye have been rather apt to  produce superstitious 
XIV  .  .  terrors, and encrease the religious passion.  BOMILCAR,  having 
formed a conspiracy for assassinating at  once the  whole senate 
of CARTHAGE,  and invading the liberties of  his country, lost, 
the opportunity, from a continual regard to  omens and prophe- 
cies.  Those who undertake the most criminal and most dangerous 
enterprizes are  commonly the most superstitious ;  as an ancient 
historian  remarks on this occasion.  Their devotion and spiri- 
tual faith rise with their fears.  CATILIPU'E  was not contented 
with the established deities and received rites of  the national 
religion : His anxious terrors made him seek new inventions 
of  this kind ;  which  he  never  probably  had  dreamed  of, 
had he remained a good citizen, and obedient  to the laws of 
his country. 
To which we may add, that, after the commission of crimes, 
there arise reniorses and secret horrors, which  give no rest 
to the mind, but make it have recourse to religious rites and 
ceremonies, as expiations of its offences.  Whatever weakens 
or  disorders  the  internal  frame  promotes  the interests of 
superstition : And nothing is more destructive to them than 
a manly, steady virtue, which either preservts us from disas- 
trous,  melancholy accidents,  or  teaches  us  to  bear  them. 
During such calm sunshine of the mind, these spectres of false 
divinity never make their appearance.  On the other hand, 
while we  abandon  ourselves  to  the  natural  undisciplined 
suggestions of  our  timid  and anxious hearts, every kind of 
barbarity is ascribed to the supreme Being, from the terrors 
with which we  are agitated; and every kind of caprice, from 
the methods which we embrace in order to appease him.  Bar- 
barity, caprice ;  these qualities, however noruinally disguised, 
we  may universally observe, form the ruling character of  the 
deity in popular religions.  Even priests, instead of  correcting 
these depraved ideas of mankind, have often been found ready 
to foster and encourage  them.  The more tremendous  the 
divinity is represented, the more tame and submissive do men 
become to his ministers : And  the more  unaccountable the 
measures of  acceptance required by him, the more necessary 
does it become to abandon our natural reason, and yield  to 
their ghostly guidance and direction.  Thus it may be allowed, 
tllat the artifices of men aggravate our natural infirmities and 
I  Drou. SIC.  lib. xx. 43. 
2  CIC.  CATIL.  i. 6, SALLUST.  de bello CATIL.  22. 
follies of  this kind, but never originally beget them.  Their  ,SECT. 
root strikes deeper into the mind, and springs from the esaen-  x:v-  fl 
tial and universal properties of  human nature. 
SECT.  XV.-Gelzeral  Corollary. 
Though the stupidity of men, barbarous and uninstructed, 
be so great, that they may not see a sovereign author in the 
more obvious works of  nature, to which  they are so much 
familiarized;  yet it scarcely seems possible, that any one of 
good understanding should reject that idea, when once it is 
suggested to him.  A purpose, an intention, a design is evident 
in every thing;  and when our comprehension is so  enlarged 
as to contemplate the first rise of this visible system, we must 
adopt, with the strongest conviction, the idea of  some intel- 
ligent  cause  or  author.  The uniform  maxims  too, which 
prevail throughout the whole frame of  the universe, naturally, 
if not necessarily, lead us to conceive this intelligence as single 
and undivided, where the prejudices of  education oppose not 
so reasonable a theory.  Even the contrarieties of nature, by 
discovering  themselves every where, become proofs of  some 
consistent plan, and establish one single purpose or intention, 
however inexplicable and incomprehensible. 
Good and ill are universally intermingled and confounded ; 
happiness  and  misery,  wisdom  and  folly,  virtue  and  vice. 
Nothing is pure and entirely of  a piece.  All advantages are 
attended  with  disadvantages.  An  universal  compensation 
prevails in all conditions of  being and existence.  And it is 
not possible for us, by our most cllilnerical wishes, to form the 
idea  of  a  station  or  situation  altogether  desirable.  The 
draughts of  life, according  to the poet's  fiction, are always 
mixed from the vessels on each hand of  JUPITER  : Or if  any 
cup be presented altogether pure, it is drawn only, as the same 
poet tells us, from the left-handed vessel. 
The more exquisite any good is, of which a small specimen 
is afforded us, the sharper is the evil,  allied  to it; and few 
exceptions are found to this uniform law of nature.  The most 
sprightly wit  borders  on madness ;  the highest  effusions of 
joy  produce  the  deepest  melancholy ;  the most  ravishing 
pleasures  are  attended with  the  most  cruel  lassitude  and 
disgust ;  the most flattering hopes make way for the severest 
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m.  safety (for happiness is not to be dreamed sf') as the temperate  xv.  ...  and moderate, which maintains, as far as possible, a medioc- 
rity, and a kind of insensibility, in every thing. 
As the good, the great, the sublime, the ravishing are found 
eminently in the  genuine  principles of  theism;  it  may be 
expected,  from  the  analogy  of  nature,  that the base, the 
absurd, the mean, the terrifying will be equally discovered in 
religious fictions and chimeras. 
The universal propensity to believe in invisible, intelligent 
power,  if  not an original instinct, being  at least a  general 
attendant of  human nature, may be considered as a kind of 
mark or stamp, which  the divine workman has set upon his 
work;  and nothing surely can Inore dignify mankind,  than 
to be thus selected from all other parts of  the creation, and 
to bear  the imge or  impression of  the universal Creator. 
But consult this image, as it appears in the popular religions 
of the world.  How is the deity disfigured in our representa 
tions of  him !  What caprice, absurdity, and immorality are 
attributed to him I  How much is he degraded even below the 
character, which we should naturally, in common life, ascribe 
to a man of sense and virtue ! 
What a noble privilege is it of human reason to attain the 
knowledge of the supreme Being ;  and, from the visible works 
of  nature, be enabled to infer so  sublime a  principle as its 
supreme Creator ?  But turn the reverse of the medal.  Survey 
most nations and most ages.  Examine the religious princi- 
ples, which  have, in fact, prevailed  in the world.  You will 
scarcely be persuaded, that they are any thing but sick men's 
dreams :  Or perhaps will regard them more as the playsome 
whimsies of monkies in human shape, than the serious, posi- 
tive, dogmatical asseverations of a being, who dignifies himself 
with the name of rational. 
Hear the verbal  protestations  of  all  men : Kothing  so 
certain as their religious tenets.  Examine their lives :  You 
will scarcely think that they repose the smallest confidence in 
them. 
The greatest and truest zeal  gives us no security against 
hypocrisy :  The most open impiety is attended with a secret 
dread and compunction. 
No theological absurdities  so glaring  that they have not, 
sometimes, been  embraced by men of  the greatest  and most 
cultivated understanding.  No religious precepts so rigorous 
that they have not been adopted by the most voluptuous and 
most abandoned of men. 
Ignorance is the mother of  Devotion :  A maxim that is pro- 
verbial, and confirmed by general experience.  Look out for 
a people, entirely destitute of  religion : If you find them at 
all, be assured, that they are but few degrees  removed from 
brutes. 
What  so  pure  as some of  the niorals,  included in some 
theological systems?  What so corrupt as some of  the prac- 
tices, to which these systems give rise? 
The comfortable views, exhibited by the belief of  futurity, 
are ravishing and delightful.  But how quickly vanish on the 
appearance of its terrors, which keep a more firm and durable 
possession of the human mind? 
The whole is a riddle, an senigma, an inexplicable mystery. 
Doubt,  uncertainty,  suspence of judgment  appear the only 
result of our most accurate scrutiny, concerning this subject. 
But such  is the frailty of  human  reason, and such the irre- 
sistible contagion of  opinion, that even this deliberate doubt 
could scarcely be upheld ;  did we  not enlarge our view, and 
opposing one species of  superstition  to another,  set them a 
quarrelling ;  while we ourselves, during their fury and conten- 
tion, happily make our escape into the calm, though obscure 
regions of philosophy. 
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ESSAY  I.-Of  Essay Writing.'  ESSAY 
I. 
L  THE  elegant Part of  Mankind, who are not immers'd  in the 
animal Life, but employ themselves in the Operations of  the 
Mind, may be divided  into the learned and conversible.  The 
L~arned  are such as have chosen for their Portion the higher 
and  more  difficult  Operations  of  the  Mind,  which  require 
Leisure and Solitude, and cannot be  brought to Perfection, 
without long Preparation and  severe Labour.  The conver- 
sible WorId join  to  a  sociable Disposition, and a Taste of 
Pleasure, an inclination to the easier and more gentle Exer- 
cises of the Understanding, to obvious Reflections on human 
AEairs, and the Duties  of  common Life, and to the Obser- 
vation  of  the Blemishes  or Perfections  of  the  particular 
Objects,  that  surround  them.  Such Subjects of  Thought 
furnish not  sufficient  Employment  in Solitude, but require 
the Company and Conversation  of  our Fellow-Creatures,  to 
render them a proper E:xercise for the  Mind : And this brings 
Mankind together in Society, where  every one displays his 
Thoughts  and Observations in  the best Manner he is able, 
and  mutually  gives  and receives  Information,  as well  as 
Pleasure. 
The Separation of the Learned from the conversible World 
seems to have  been  the great Defect  of  the last Age, and 
must  have  had  a  very  bad  Influence both  on Books  and 
Company : For what Possibility is there of  finding Topics of 
Conversation fit for the Entertainment of rational Creatures, 
without  having  Recourse  sometimes  to  History,  Poetry, 
Politics, a,nd the more obvious Principles, at least, of  Philo- 
sophy P  Must  our whole Discourse be a continued Series of 
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Stun'd and worn out with endless Chat 
Of WILL  did this, and Nu  said that P 
This wou'd  be  to render  the Time spent in Company the 
most unentertaining, as well as the most unprofitable Part of 
our Lives. 
On  the other Hand, Learning has been  as great a Loser 
by being  shut up in Colleges and Cells, and  secluded from 
the World and good Compaily.  By that Means, every Thing 
of what we  call Belles Lettres became totally barbarous, being 
cultivated  by  Men  without  any Taste  of  Life  or Manners, 
and without  that Liberty and Facility of  Thought  and Ex- 
pression, which can only be acquir'd by Conversation.  Even 
Philosophy went to Wrack by this moaping recluse Method 
of  Study, and became  as chimerical  in  her Conclusions  as 
she was  unintelligible in her Stile and Manner of  Delivery. 
And  indeed, what  cou'd  be  expected  from  Men who  never 
consulted  Experience  in any  of  their  Reasonings,  or  who 
never search'd  for that Experience, where  alone  it is to  be 
found, in common Life and Conversation ? 
'Tis with  great Pleasure I observe, That Men  of  Letters, 
In thin Age, have  lost, in a great Measure, that Shyness and 
Bashfulness of Temper, which kept them at a Distance from 
Mankind;  and, at the same Time, That Men  of  the World 
are proud  of  borrowing  from  Books  their  most  agreeable 
Topics of Conversation.  'Tis  to be  hop'd,  that this League 
betwixt the learned and conversible Worlds, which is so hap- 
pily  begun, will  be  still farther improv'd,  to their mutual 
Advantage ; and to that End, I know nothing more  advan- 
tageous  than such Essays  as these with which I endeavour 
to entertain the Public.  In this View, I cannot but consider 
myself as a Kind  of  Resident  or Ambassador from the Do- 
minions  of  Learning  to those  of  Conversation ;  and shall 
think it  my  constant Duty  to promote  a  good  Correspon- 
dence betwixt  these  two States, which  have  so great a I)e- 
pendence  on  each  other.  I shall give Intelligence  to the 
Learned of whatever passes in Company, and shall endeavour 
to import into Company whatever Commodities I find in my 
native  Country  proper  for  their Use  and  Entertainment. 
The Balance  of  Trade we  need  not  be  jealous  of, nor  will 
there be  any Difficulty to preserve  it on  both  Sides.  The  ESSAY 
Materials  of  this  Commerce must  chiefly  be  furnish'd  by  -!-& 
Conversation and commoxl Life :  The manufacturing of them 
alone belongs to Learning. 
As 'twou'd  be an unpardonable Negligence  in an Ambas- 
sador not to  yay his Respects to the Sovereign of  the State 
where  he  is commission'd  to reside;  so it wou'd  be  alto- 
gether inexcusable in me not to address myself, with a par- 
ticular Respect, to the Fair Sex, who  are the Sovereigns of 
the Empire  of  Conversation.  I approach them with Reve- 
rence ;  and were not my Countrymen, the Learned, a stubborn 
independent  Race  of  Mortals,  extremely  jealous  of  their 
Liberty,  and  unaccustom'd  to  Subjection, I shou'd  resign 
into their fair Hands the sovereign Authority over  the Re- 
public  of  Letters.  As  the  Case  stands,  my  Commission 
extends no farther, than to desire a League, offensive and 
defensive, against our common Enemies, against the Enemies 
of Reason and Beauty, People of dull Heads and cold Hearts. 
From  this  Moment  let us pursue  the~n  with  the  severest 
Vengeance :  Let no Quarter be given, but to those  of  sound 
Understandings  and delicate Affections ;  and these Charac- 
ters, 'tis to be presum'd,  we shall always find inseparable. 
To be serious, and to quit the Allusion  before it be worn 
thread-bare, I am of  Opinion, that Women, that is, Women 
of  Sense and Education (for to such alone I address myself) 
are much  better Judges  of  all polite Writing t,han Men  of 
the  same Degree  of  Understanding; and that 'tis  a  vain 
Pannic, if  they be so far terrify'd with the common Ridicule 
that is levell'd against learned Ladies, as utterly to abandon 
every Kind of  Books and Study to our Sex.  Let the Dread 
of  that Ridicule have  no other Effect, than to make them 
conceal their knowledge before Fools, who are not worthy of 
it, nor of them.  Such will still presume upon the vain Title 
of the Male Sex to affect a Superiority above them :  But my 
fair Readers  may be  assur'd,  that all Men  of  Sense, who 
know the World, have a, great Deference for their Judgment 
of such Books as ly within the Compass of their Knowledge, 
and repose more Confidence in the Delicacy of  their Taste, 
tho'  unguided  by  Rules,  than  in  all the dull  Labours  of 
Pedants  and  Commentators.  In a  neiglbouring  Nation, 
equally famous for good Taste, and for Gallantry, the Ladies 
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.  ,  venture upon  the Public, without  the Approbation  of  some 
celebrated  Judges  of  that  Sex.  Their  Verdict  is,  indeed, 
sometimes complain'd  of; and, in particular, I find, that the 
Admirers of  Corneille, to save that great Poet's  Honour upon 
the Ascendant  that Racine  began  to take over him, always 
said, That it was not to be expected, that so old a Man could 
dispute the Prize, before  such Judges, with so young a Man 
as his Rival.  But this Observation  has been  found  unjust, 
since Posterity  seems  to have  ratify'd  the Verdict  of  that 
Tribunal : And Racine, tho'  dead, is still the Favourite of the 
Fair Sex, as well as of the best Judges among the Men. 
There is only one Subject, on which I am apt to distrust 
the Judgment of  Females, and that is, concerning Books of 
Gallantry and Devotion, which they commonly affect as high 
flown  as possible;  and most  of  them seem more delighted 
with the Warmth, than with the justness of  the Passion.  I 
mention  Gallantry and Devotion  as the same  Subject,  be- 
cause, in Reality, they become the same when treated in this 
Manner ;  and we  may observe, that they both  depend  upon 
the very same Complexion.  As  the Fair  Sex  have  a  great 
Share of  the tender  and amorous Disposition,  it perverts 
their Judgment on this Occasion, and makes  them be easily 
affected, even  by  what has no Propriety in the Expression 
nor Nature  in the Sentiment.  Mr. Addison's  elegant  Dis- 
courses of  Religion have no Relish with them, in Comparison 
of Books of  mystic Devotion : And Otway's Tragedies are re- 
jected for the Rants of Mr. Dryden. 
Wou'd  the Ladies correct their false Taste in this Parti- 
cular; Let them accustom themselves a little more to Books 
of  all Kinds : Let  them  give  Encouragement  to  Men  of 
Sense  and  Knowledge  to  frequent  their  Company:  And 
finally, let them concur  heartily in that Union I have  pro- 
jected  betwixt the learned and conversible Worlds.  They 
pay, perhaps, meet with more Complaisance from their usual 
Followers  than  from  Men  of  Learning;  but  they  cannot 
reasonably  expect  so  sincere  an Affection : And,  I  hope, 
they will nevt!r  be guilty of  so wrong a Choice, as to sacrifice 
the Substance to the Shadow. 
ESSAY 
ESSAY  11.-Of  Moral Prejzhdices.'  -  11. 
THERE  is a,  Set of  Men  lately sprung up  amongst  us, who 
endeavour  to  distinguish  themselves  by  ridiculing  every 
Thing, that has hitherto appear'd  sacred  and venerable  in 
the Eyes  of  Mankind.  Reason,  Sobriety, Honour, Friend- 
ship, Marriage,  are the perpetual  S~~bjects  of  their insipid 
Raillery : And  even  public  Spirit,  and  a  Regard  to  our 
Country, are treated as chimerical and romantic.  Were the 
Schemes of these Anti-reformers to hke  Place, all the Bonds 
of Society must be  broke, to make Way for the Indulgence 
of  a licentious  Mirth  and  Gaiety :  The  Companion  of  our 
drunken Frollics  must be  prefer'd  to a Friend or Brother : 
Dissolute  Prodigality must  be  supply'd  at the Expence  of 
every Thing valuable, either in public or private : And Men 
shall have so little Regard to any Thing beyond themselves,  , 
that, at last, a free Constitution of  Government must become 
a  Scheme  perfectly  impracticable  among  Mankind,  and 
must  degenerate  into  one  universal  System  of  Fraud and 
Corruption. 
There  is another  Humour,  which  may be  observ'd  in 
some Pretenders to Wisdom, and which, if not so pernicious 
as  the idle petulant  Humour above-mention'd,  must, how- 
ever, have  a  very bad  Effect  on  those,  who  indulge  it.  I 
mean  that grave  philosophic  Endeavour  after  Perfection, 
which, under Pretext  of  reforming  Prejudices  and  Prrors, 
strikes at all the most  endearing Sentiments of  the Heart, 
and all the most  useful  Byasses  and Instincts, which  can 
govern a human Creature.  The Stoics were remarkable  for 
this Folly among the Antients; and I wish  some of  more 
venerable  Characters in latter Times had not copy'd  thein 
too faithfully in this Particular.  The  virtuous and tender 
Sentiments, or Prejudices, if you will, have suffer'd mightily 
by these Reflections ;  while  a  certain  sullen  Pride or Con- 
tempt of Mankind has prevail'd  in their Stead, and Bas been 
esteem'd  the greatest wisdom  ;  tho7, in Reality, it be the 
most egregious Folly of  all others.  Siatilius being sollicited 
by Brutus to make  one of  that noble  Band, who struck the 
GOD-like  Stroke for the Liberty of  Rome, refus'd  to accom- 
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them. 
My learned  Reader  will here easily recollect the Reason, 
which  an antient Philosopher  gave, why  he  wou'd  not be 
reconcil'd  to his Brother, who sollicited his Friendship.  He 
was too much a Philosopher to think, that the Connexion of 
having  sprung from  the  same  Parent, ought  to  have  any 
Influence on a reasonable  Mind, and exprest his  Sentiment 
after such a Manner as I think not proper to repeat.  When 
your Friend is in Affliction, says Epictetus, you may counter- 
feit a  Sympathy with him, if  it  give him  Relief;  but take 
Care not to allow  any Compassion to sink into your  Heart, 
or disturb that Tranquillity, which is the Perfection of  Wis- 
dom.  Diogenes  being ask'd by his Friends in his  Sickness, 
What  should  be  done  with  him  after  his  Death?  Why, 
says he, throw me  out into the Fields.  What ! reply'd  they, 
to  the  Birds  or  Beasts? '  No : Place  a  Cudgel  by  me,  to 
defend  myself  withal.  To what  Purpose, say they, you will 
not have  any Sense, nor  any Power  of  making  Use  of  it.' 
Then if  t7~e  Beasts shou'd  devour  me,  cries  he, shall I be  any 
more  sensible  of  it?  I know  none  of  the  Sayings of  that 
Philosopher, which shewa more evidently both the Liveliness 
and Ferocity of his Temper. 
How  different  from these are the Maxims by which Eu- 
genius conducts himself!  In his Youth he apply'd  himself, 
with  the  most  unwearied  Labour, to  the  Study of  Philo- 
sophy; and nothing was  ever  able  to  draw  him  from  it, 
except when  an Opportunity offer'd of  serving his  Friends, 
or  doing a Pleasure to some Man of  Merit.  When he was 
about thirty Years of  Age, he was  determin'd  to quit  the 
free Life of  a Batchelor (in which  otherwise he  wou'd  have 
been  inclin'd  to remain), by  considering,  that he  was  the 
last Branch  of  an antient  Family, which  must  have  been 
extinguish'd  had he died without Children.  He made Choice 
of  the virtuous  and beautiful  Emira for  his  Consort, who, 
after being lhe Solace of his Life for many Years, and having 
made  him  the Father of  several  Children, paid  at last the 
general Debt to Nature.  Nothing cou'd  have supported him 
under so severe an Affliction, but the Consolation he receiv'd 
from his young Family, who were now become dearer to him 
on account of  their deceast  Mother.  One Daughter in par- 
ticular is his Darling, and the secret Joy of his Soul ;  because  WAY 
her  Features,  her  Air, her  Voice  recal  every Moment  the 
tender Memory of  his  Spouse, and fill his Eyes with Tears. 
He conceals this Partiality as much  as possible ;  and none 
but his intimate  Friends  are acquainted with it.  To them 
he reveals  all his Tenderness ;  nor is he so affectedly philo- 
sophical, as even to call it by the Kame of  Weakness.  They 
know, that he still keeps the Birth-day of Emira with Tears, 
and a more fond and tender  Recollection of  past  Pleasures ; 
in like manner as it was celebrated in her Lifetime with Joy 
and  Festivity.  They know, that he  preserves  her  Picture 
with  the utmost  Care,  and has  one  Picture in  Minature, 
which he always wears next to his  Bosom : That he has left 
Orders in his last Will, that, in whatever Part of  the World 
he shall happen  to die, his Body shall be  transported, and 
laid in the same  Grave with  her's : And  that a Monument 
shall  be  erected  over  them,  and  their  mutual  Love  and 
Happiness celebrated  in an Epitaph, which  he himself  has 
compos'd  for that Purpose. 
A few Years  ago I receiv'd  a  Letter from a  Friend, who 
was abroad on his Travels, and shall here colnmunicate it to 
the Public.  It contains such an Instance of  a  Philosophia 
Spirit, as 1 I  petty  eextraordinary, and may serve as an 
Example, not to depart too far from the receiv'd Maxims  of 
Conduct and Behaviour, by a refin'd  Search after Happiness 
or  Perfection.  The  Story I have  been  since assur'd  of  as 
Matter of  Fact. 
Paris, Aug. 2, 1137. 
SIR,-I  know  you  are more curious of  Accounts of  Men 
than of  Buildings, and are more  desirous of  being infoxm'd 
of  private  History than of  public  Transactions; for  which 
Reason, I thought the following Story, which is the common 
Topic of  Conversation in this City, wou'd  be no unacceptable 
Entertainment to you. 
A young Lady of  Birth and Fortune, being left intirely at 
her own  Disposal, persisted long in a Resolution of  leading 
a  single  Life, notwithstanding several  advmtageous  Offers 
that had  been  made  to her.  She  had  been  determin'd  to 
embrace  this Resohltion, by  observing  the many  unhappy 
Marriages  among her  Acquaintance,  and  by  hearing  the 
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I:.  Being a Woman of  strong Spirit and an uncommon Way of 
thinking, she found no Difficulty either in forming or main- 
taining  this  Resolution,  and  cou'd  not  suspect herself  of 
such Weakness, as ever  to be  induc'd,  by any Temptation, 
to depart from it.  She had, however, entertain'd  a  strong 
Desire of  having a Son, whose Education she was resolv'd  to 
make the principal Concern of  her  Life, and by that Means 
supply the Place of  those other Passions, which she was re- 
solv7d  for  ever to renounce.  She push'd  her Philosophy to 
such an uncommon Length, as to find no Contradiction be- 
twixt such a Desire and her former Resolution;  and accord- 
ingly look'd  about, with  great  Deliberation, to find, among 
all her Male-Acquaintance, one whose Character and Person 
were agreeable to her, without being  able to  satisfy herself 
on  that Head.  At Length, being  in the  Play-house  ole 
Evening, she  sees in the Parterre, a  young Man of  a  most 
engaging Countenance  and modest  Deportment ;  and feels 
such a Pre-possession in his Favour, that she had Hopes this 
must be the Person  she had  long  sought for in vain.  She 
immediately dispatches a Servant to him ;  desiring his Com- 
pany, at her Lodgings, next Morning.  The young Man was 
over-joy'd  at the Message, and cou'd  not command his Satis- 
faction, upon receiving such  an Advance from a  Lady of  so 
great Beauty, Reputation and Quality.  He was, therefore, 
much  disappointed, when  he found  a,  Woman,  who  wou'd 
allow him no  Freedoms ; and amidst  all her  obliging Be- 
haviour,  confin'd  and  over-aw'd  him  to  the  Bounds  of 
-  rational Discourse and Conversation.  She seem'd,  however, 
willing to commence a Friendship  with  him ;  and told him, 
that his Company wou'd  always be acceptable to her, when- 
ever he had a leisure Hour to bestow.  Ee  needed not much 
Entreaty to  renew his Visits, being  so  struck with her Wit 
and Beauty, that he must have  been  unhappy, had he been 
debarr'd  her Company.  Every Conversation  serv'd only the 
more to inflame his Passion, and gave him more Occasion to 
admire her Person  and Understanding,  as well as to rejoice 
in his own  good-fortune.  He was  not,  however, without 
Anxiety, when he consider'd the Disproportion of their Birth 
and Fortune ;  nor  was his Uneasiness  allay'd  even when  he 
reflected  on the extraordinary Manner  in which  their Ac- 
quaintance  had  commenc'd.  Our  Philosophical  Heroine, 
in the mean  Time,  discover'd,  that her  Lover's  personal  ESSAY 
Qualities did not  belye  his Phisiognomy ;  so  that, judging - 
there  was  no  Occasion  for  any farther  Trial,  she  takes  a 
proper  Opportunity  of  comrn~nicatii~~  to  hi&  her  whole 
Intention.  Their Intercourse continu'd  for  some-tinie, till 
at last her Wishes were  crown'd, and she was now  Mother 
of  a Boy, who  was to be the Object of  her future Care and 
Concern.  Gladly wou'd  she have  continu'd  her  Friendshjp 
with the Father ;  but finding him  too  passionate a Lover to 
remain within the Bounds of  Friendship,  she was  oblig'd to 
put a Violence  upon  herself.  She sends him  a  Letter, in 
which  she had inclos7d a  Bond of  Annuity for  a  Thousaiid 
Crowns;  desiring him, at the same Time, never  to see  her 
more, and to forget, if possible, all past Favours and Famili- 
arities.  He was  Thunder-struck at  receiving this Message ; 
and, having tried, in vain, all the Arts that might win  upon 
the Resolution of  a Woman, resolv'd  at last to attack her 
by her Foible.  He commences a Law-suit against her before 
the Parliament of  Paris ;  and claims his Son, whom he pre- 
tends  a  Right to educate  as he pleas'd,  according  to  the 
usual  Maxims of  the  Law  in such  Cases.  She  pleads, on 
the other Hand, their express Agreement  before their Com- 
merce, and pretends, that he had renounc'd  all Claim to any 
Offspring that might arise from  their  Embraces.  It  is not 
yet known, how  the Parliament  will  determine  in  this ex- 
tr~ordinary  Case, which puzzles all the Lawyers, as much as 
it does  the  Philosophers.  As  soon  as they  come  to  any 
Issue, I shall inform you of it, and shall embrace any Oppor- 
tunity of  subscribing myself, as I do at present, 
Sir, 
Your most  humble 8ervant. 
ESSAY  111.-Of  the Middle Station of  Life.' 
THE Moral  of  the following Fable will easily discover itself, 
without  my  explaining it.  One  Rivulet  meeting  another, 
with whom he had been long united in strictest Amity, with 
noisy Haughtiness  and Disdain  thus bespoke him, "  What, 
Brother ! Still in the same  State !  Still low and creeping I 
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,  in a like Condition with you, am now become a.  great River, 
and  shall shortly be able  to rival the Danube or the Rhine, 
provided those friendly Rains continue, which have favour'd 
my  Banks,  but  neglected  yours."  Very  true,  replies  the 
humble Rivulet: "  You  are  now,  indeed,  swoln to a  great 
Size :  But  methinks  you  are  become,  withal,  somewhat 
turbulent  and muddy.  I am contented with my low Condi- 
tion and my Purity." 
Instead of  commenting upon this Fable, I shall take Occa- 
sion, from it,  to compare the different  Stations of  Life, and 
to perswade such of  my Readers  as are plac'd  in the Middle 
Station to be  satisfy'd  with it,  as the most  eligible of  all 
others.  These form the most numerous Rank of  Men, that 
can be suppos'd susceptible of Philosophy ;  and therefore, all 
Discourses of  Morality ought principally to be address'd  to 
them.  The Great are too much immers'd  in Pleasure ;  and 
the Poor too much occupy'd  in providing for the Necessities 
of Life, to hearken to the calm Voice of  Reason.  The Middle 
Station, as it is most happy in many Respects, so particularly 
in this,  that  a  Man,  plac'd  in it,  can,  with the greatest 
Leisure, consider his own Happiness, and reap a new Enjoy- 
ment,  from  comparing his  Situation with  that of  persons 
above or below him. 
Agur's  prayer  is  sufficiently  noted.  Two  Things  have I 
requir'd of  thee, deny me  them not before I  die, Remove far from 
me  Vanity and Lies ;  Give me  neither Poverty nor Riches, Feed 
me  with Food convenient for  me:  Lest I  be  full and deny thee, 
and say, Who  is the Lord ?  Or  lest I  be  poor, and steal, and 
take  the Name oj' my  GOD in vain.  The middle  Station is 
here justly  recommended,  as affording the fullest Security 
for Virtue ; and I may also add, that it gives Opportunity for 
the most  ample  Exercise  of  it,  and furnishes Employment 
for  every good Quality which  we  can possibly be possest  of. 
Those, who are ylac'd  among  the lower Ranks of  Men, have 
little  Opportunity  of  exerting  any  other  Virtue,  besides 
those  of  Patience,  Resignation,  Industry  and  Integrity. 
Those, who  are advanc'd  into the higher  Stations, have full 
employment  for  their Generosity, Humanity, Affability and 
char it^. When a Man lyes betwixt these tmoExtremes, he can 
exert the former Virtues towards his Szcperiors, anct the latter 
towards  his  Inferiors.  Every  mor;zl  Quality,  which  the 
human  Soul is susceptible  of,  may  have  its Turn,  and be  ESSAY 
called  up to Action : And a  Man may, after this Manner,  .n,l.  , 
be  much  more certain of his Progress in Virtue, than where 
his good Qualities lye dormant, and without Employment. 
Rut there is another Virtue, that seems principally to lye 
among Equals, and is, for that Reason, chiefly calculated for 
the middle  Station of  Life.  This Virtue is FRIENDSBIP. I 
believe  most Men of generous Tempers  are apt to envy the 
Great,  when  they  consider  the  large  Opportunities  such 
Persons have of doing Good to their Fellow-creatures, and of 
acquiring the Friendship and Esteem of  Men of Merit.  They 
make no Advances in vain,  and are not oblig'd  to associate 
with those whom they have little Kindness for; like People 
of inferior Stations, who are subject to have their Proffers of 
Friendship  rejected,  even  where  tliey  wou'd  be  most fond 
of  placing their Affections.  But tho' the Great have inore 
Facility in acquiring Friendships, they cannot be  so certain 
of the Sincerity of  them, as Men of  a lower Rank ;  since the 
Favours, they bestow, may acquire them Flattery, instead of 
Good-will  and  Kindness.  It  has  been  verF  judiciously 
remark'd,  that we  attach  ourselves more by the Services we 
perform  than  by  those  we  receive,  and that a  Man is in 
Danger  of  losiiig his Friends  by obliging them too far.  I 
shou'd,  therefore,  chuse  to lye in the middle Way, and to 
have  my Commerce with  my Friend varied  both  by Obliga- 
tions given and receiv'd.  I have too much Pride to be willing 
that all the Obligations should 1y on  my Side ; and  shou'd 
be afraid, that, if  they all lay on his, he wou'd  also have too 
much Pride to be entirely easy under them, or have a perfect 
Complacency in my Company. 
We may also remark of  the middle Station of Life, that it 
is more  favourable  to the acquiring of  Wisdom and Ability, 
as well  as of  Virtue, and that a man  so situate has a better 
Chance for attaining a Knowledge both of  Men and Things, 
than those of  a more elevated Station.  He enters, with more 
Familiarity,  into  human  Life : Every Thing appears in its 
natural Colours  before  hiin : He has  more Leisure  to form 
Observations;  and has, beside, the Motive of Ambition to  push 
him on in his Attainments ;  being certain, that he can never 
rise to any Distinction or Eminence in the World, without his 
own industry.  And  here  I cannot forbear  communicating 
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=SAY  That 'tis  wisely  ordain'd  by  Providence,  that the  middle  .  "I.  Station shou'd  be  the most favourable to the improving our 
natural Abilities, since there is really more Capacity requisite 
to perform  the  Duties  of  that  Station,  than  is  requisite 
to act in the higher Spheres of  Life.  There are more natural 
.Parts, and a stronger Genius requisite to make a good Lawyer 
or Physician,  than to make  a  great Monarch.  For let us 
take any Race  or  Succession of  Kings, where  Birth  alone 
gives a Title to the Crown : The English Kings, for Instance ; 
who  have  not  been  esteemed the most  shining in History. 
From the Conquest to the Succession of his present Majesty, 
we may reckon twenty eight Sovereigns, omitting those who 
died Minors.  Of  these, eight are esteem'd Princes of  great 
Capacity, viz. the Conpuero~,  Harry 11. Edward I. Edward 111. 
Harry V.  and VII. Elisabeth,  and  the late King William. 
Now,  I believe  every one will  allow,  that,  in the common 
Run of  Mankind,  there are not  eight out of  twenty-eight, 
who  are fitted, by Nature,  to make  a  Figure either on the 
Bench or at the Bar.  Since Charles VII. ten Monarchs have 
reign'd  in France, omitting Francis 11.  Five  of  those have 
been  esteem'd  Princes  of  Capacity, viz, Loiiis XI. XII. and 
XIV. Francis I. and Harry IV.  In short, the governing  of 
Mankind well, requires  a  great deal of  Virtue, Jnstice, and 
Humanity, but not  a  surprising Capacity.  A certain Pope, 
whose Name I have forgot, us'd  to say, Let us divert ourselves, 
my Friends, the World governs itself.  There are, indeed, some 
critical Times, such as those in which Harry IV. liv'd, that 
call for the utmost Vigour ;  and a less Courage and Capacity, 
than what appear'd  in that great Monarch, must have sunk 
under the Weight.  But  such Circulnstances  are rare;  and 
even then, Fortune does, at lea.st, one Half ofthe Business. 
Since  the  conlrnon Professions,  such  as Law  or  Physic, 
require  equal, if  not  superior Capacity, to what  are exerted 
in the higher  Spheres of  Life, 'tis  evident,  that the  Soul 
must be made of  still a finer Mold, to shine in Philosophy or 
Poetry, or in any of  the higher Parts of  Learning.  Courage 
and Resolution  are chiefly requisite  in a  Commander : Jus- 
tice and Humanity in a Statesman : But Genius and Capacity 
in a  Scholar.  Great  Generals  and  great  Politicians,  are 
found in all Ages and Countries of the World, and frequently 
start up,  at once,  even  amongst  the greatest  Barbarians. 
8,weden was  sunk in Ignorance, when  it produc'd  Gustavus 
Ericson,  and  Gustavus  Adolphus:  Buscovy,  when  the  Czar  ESSAY 
appear'd:  and,  perhaps,  Carthage,  when  it  gave  Birth to ,  I* , 
Hannibal.  But England  must  pass  thro'  a  long Gradation 
of  its Spencers, Johnsons, Wal lers,  Dry dens, before it arrive at 
an Addison  or a Pope.  A  happy Talent for the liberal Arts 
and Sciences,  is a  Kind  of  Prodigy among  Men.  Nature 
must  afford  the richest Genius that comes from her hands ; 
Education  and Example must  cultivate it from the earliest 
Infancy;  And  Industry  must  concur  to  carry  it  to  any 
Degree of  Perfection.  No  Man  needs be  surprised to see 
Kouli-Kan  among  the Persians:  but Homer,  in so  early an 
Age,  among  the Greeks,  is  certainly Matter of  the highest 
Wonder. 
A  man  cannot  show  a  Genius  for  War,  who  is  not  so 
fortunate as to be  trusted with Command;  and  it seldom 
happens, in any State or Kingdom, that several, at once, are 
plac'd  in  that  Situation.  How  many  Marlboroughs  were 
there in the confederate Army, who never rose so much as to 
the Command  of  a  Regiment P  But I am perswaded there 
has been  but one Milton in England within  these hundred 
Years ;  because every one  may exert the Talents for Poetry 
who is possest of  them ;  and no one cou'd  exert them under 
greater Disadvantages than that divine Poet,  If no Man were 
allom'd to write Verses, but who was, before-hand,  named to 
be laureat, cou'd  we  expect a Poet in ten thousand Years P 
Were we  to distinguish the Ranks of Men by their Genius 
and  Capacity more  than by  their Virtue  and Usefulness to 
the Public, great Philosophers wou'd  certainly challenge the 
first  Rank, and  must be  plac'd  at the Top of  human Kind. 
So rare is this Character, that, perhaps, there has not, as yet, 
been above two in the World, wlio can lay a just Claim to it. 
At least, Galil~o  and Newton  seem to me  so far to excel all 
the rest, that I cannot  admit any other into the same Class 
with them. 
Great  Poets may  challenge  the  second Place ; and this 
Species of  Genius, tho'  rare, is yet much more frequent than 
the former.  Of  the Greek Poets  that remain, Homer alone 
seems to merit this Character:  Of  the Romans, Virgil, Horace 
and Lucretius : Of  the English,  Milton  and  Pope : Co~neille, 
Racine, Boileau and Voltaire of  the French : And Tasso  and 
Ariosto of the Italians. 




great  Poets:  But  as  the  Opportunities  for  exerting  the 
Talents requisite for Eloquence, or acquiring the Knowledge 
requisite for writing History, depend, in some Measure, upon 
Fortune, we  cannot pronounce these Productions of Genius to 
be more extraordinary than the former. 
I should  now return from this Digression, and show, that 
the middle Station of  Life is more favourable to  Happiness, as 
well  as to Virtue and Wisdom : But as the Arguments, that 
prove this, seem pretty obvious, I shall here forbear insisting 
on them. 
ESSAY  IV.'-Of  Impudence and Modesty. 
I AM of  opinion, That the common  complaints  against Pro- 
vidence are ill-grounded, and that the good or bad qualities 
of  men are the causes  of  their  good  or  bad  fortune,  more 
than what  is generally  imagined.  There  are,  no  doubt, 
instances  to  the contrary, and  these too  pretty numerous; 
but few, in comparison of  the instances we  have of  a  right 
distribution  of  prosperity  and  adversity:  nor  indeed  could 
it be  otherwise  from  the common  course of  human affairs. 
To  be  endowed  with  a  benevolent  disposition, and to love 
others, will almost infallibly procure love and esteem ;  which 
is the chief  circunlstance in life, and facilitates every enter- 
prize and undertaking ;  besides the satisfaction, which  im- 
mediately results from it.  The case is much  the same with 
the other virtues.  Prosperity is naturally, though not neces- 
sarily, attached  to virtue  and merit ;  and adversity, in  like 
manner, to vice and folly. 
I must,  however  confess, that this rule admits  of  an ex- 
ception, with regard to one  moral quality ;  and that modesty 
has a natural tendency to conceal a man's  talents, as impu- 
dence  displays  them  to the utmost, and has been  the only 
cause why many have  risen  in the world, under  all the dis- 
advantages  of  low birth  and little  merit.  Such  indolence 
and  incapacity is there  in the generality  of  mankind, that 
they are apt to regeive a man far whatever he has a mind to 
put himself off  for ;  and admit his overbearing airs as proofs 
of  that merit which he assumes to himself.  A decent assur- 
ance  seems to be  the natural attendant of  virtue ;  and few 
1  [This  Essay  appeared  in  Editions A to N,  1741-60.  See  'History of  the 
Editions,' Vol. III., p.  44.-ED.] 
men  can  distinguish  impudence  from  it : As, oil the other  ESSAY 
hand, diffidence, being  the natural result  of  vice  and folly, ,  '7 
has  drawn  disgrace upon  modesty,  which  in outward ap 
pearance so nearly resembles it.' 
As  impudence, though really a vice, has the same effects 
upon a man's  fortune, as if  it were a virtue;  so we  may ob- 
serve, that it is almost as difficult to be  attained, and is, in 
that respect, distinguished from all the other vices, which are 
acquired  with  little  pains,  and  continually  encrease  upon 
indulgence.  Many a man,  being  sensible  that modesty  is 
extremely  prejudicial  to  him  in  making  his  fortune,  has 
resolved to  be  impudent,  and  to  put a bold  face upon the 
matter ;  But, it is observable, that such  people  have  seldom 
succeeded  in the attempt, but have been obliged to relapse 
into their primitive modesty.  Nothing carries a man through 
the world  like  a  true  genuine  natural  impudence.  Its 
counterfeit  is  good for  nothing, nor  can ever support itself. 
In  any other attempt, whatever  faults a man commits and is 
sensible of, he is so-much the nearer his end.  But when he 
endeavours at impudence, if  he  ever  failed  in  the attempt, 
the remembrance of  that failure will  make him blush, and 
will  infallibly disconcert  him : After which every blush  is a 
cause for new  blushes, till  he be  found out to be an arrant 
cheat, and a vain pretender to impudence. 
If any thing  can  give  a modest  man more  assurance, it 
must  be some advantages of fortune, which chance procures 
to him.  Riches naturally gain a man a favourable reception 
in the world, and give  merit a double  lustre, when a person 
is endowed with it; and supply its place, in a great measure, 
when  it  is  absent.  It is wonderful to observe what airs of 
superiority  fools  and  knaves,  with  large  possessions,  give 
themselves above men of the greatest merit in poverty.  Nor 
do  the men  of  merit  make  any strong opposition  to these 
usurpations ;  or rather seem to favour them  by the modesty 
of  their behaviour.  Their  good  sense and experience make 
them diffident of their judgment, and cause them to examine 
every thing with  the greatest  accuracy:  As,  on  the other 
1 [Editions A  and B, 1741-2,  insert  Coxcombs should rise up to a Figure in 
the following  paragraph: I was lately  the  World:  Upon which he  said there 
lamenting  to  a  Friend  of  mine,  who  was  nothing  surprising  in  the  Case. 
loves a Conceit, That popular  Applause  Popular  Fame, says  he, zs  nothing but 
should be bestowed with so little Judg-  Breath or  Air; and  Air  vwy 9&nturnjLy 
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ESSAY  hand, the delicacy of  their sentiments makes them  timorous  .  'ye  lest they commit faults, and lose in the practice of  the world 
that integrity of  virtue, so  to speak,  of  which  they are  so 
jealous.  To make wisdom  agree with confidence, is as diffi- 
cult as to reconcile vice  and  modest^. 
These  are the reflections which  have  occurred  upon this 
subject  of  impudence and modesty:  and I hope  the reader 
will not be displeased to see them wrought into the following 
allegory. 
JUPITER,  in  the  beginning,  joined  VIRTUE,  WISDOM,  and 
CONFIDENCE  together;  and VICE, FOLLY,  and DIFFIDENCE  : 
And thus connected,  sent them into the world.  But though 
he thought he had matched them with  great judgment, and 
said that Conjdence was  the  natural companion  of  Virtue, 
and that Vice deserved to be  attended with Difldence,  they 
had  not  gone  far  before  dissension  arose  among  them. 
Wisdom, who was the guide of  the one company, was always 
accustomed  before  she  ventured  upon  any  road,  however 
beaten, to examine it carefully ;  to enquire whither it led ; 
what dangers, difficulties  and hindrances might possibly or 
probably occur in it.  In  these deliberations she usually con- 
sumed some time ;  which delay was very displeasing to Con- 
jidence,  who wa.s always inclined to hurry on, without much 
forethought or deliberation, in  the first road he met.  Wisdom 
and Virtue were inseparable : But Conjidence one day, follow- 
ing his impetuo~ls  nature, advanced a considerable may before 
his  guides  and  companions;  and not  feeling  any want  of 
their company, he  never  enquired after them, nor ever met 
with them more.  In  like manner, the other society, though 
joined  by  JUPITER,  disagreed  and  separated.  As  Polly 
saw very little way before her, she had nothing to determine 
concerning  the  goodness  of  roads,  nor  could  give  the 
preference to one above another ;  and this want of resolution 
was encreased by Dijidence, who, with her doubts and scruples, 
always  retarded the journey.  This was a  great annoyance 
to Vice,  who loved not to hear of  difficulties and del~ys,  and 
was never  satisfied without  his  full  career, in whatever  his 
inclinations  led  him to.  Folly, he knew, though she hark- 
ened to Difidence,  would  be  easily managed  when  alone ; 
and therefore, as a vicious horse throws his rider, he openly 
beat away his controller  of  all his pleasures,  and proceeded 
in his journey  with  Folly,  from  whom  he  is inseparable. 
Collfidence  and Difldence being, after this manner, both thrown 
loose from  their  respective  companies,  wandered  for  some 
time ;  till  at last chance  led  them  at the same time tu  one 
village.  Conjdence went directly up to the great house, which 
belonged  to WEALTH,  the lord  of  the village;  and without 
staying for a porter, intruded himself immediately into the in- 
nermost apartments, where he  found Vice and Folly  well re- 
ceived before him.  He joined the train ;  recommended himself 
very quickly to his landlord ;  and entered into such familiar- 
ity  with  Vice,  that he was  enlisted  in the same  company 
with Folly.  They were frequent  guests of  Wealth, and from 
that moment inseparable.  Difidence, in the mean time, not 
daring to approach  the great house, accepted of  an invita- 
tion  from POVERTY,  one  of  the tenants;  and entering the 
cottage,  found  Wisdom  and  Virtue, who  being  repulsed by 
the landlord, had retired thither.  Virtue took compassioii of 
her,  and  Wisdom  found,  from  her  temper,  that she would 
easily  improve : So  they  admitted  her into their  society. 
Accordingly,  by  their  means,  she  altered in a  little  time 
somewhat of  her manner, and becoming much more amiable 
and engaging, was now known by the name of Modesty.  As 
ill company has a greater effect than good, Conjidence, though 
more refractory to counsel. and example, degenerated  so far 
by the society of  Vice  and filly, as to pass by the name of 
IMPUDENCE.  Mankind, who saw these  societies as JUPITER 
first joined them, and know nothing of  these mutual deser- 
tions,  are thereby led  into strange mistakes;  and wherever 
they  see Impudence,  make  account  of  finding  Virtue  and 
Wisdom ; and  wherever  they  observe Modesty,  call her at- 
tendants Vice and Folly. 
ESSAY  V.'-Of  Love and Marriage. 
I KNOW  not whence  it proeeeds, that woinen  are so apt to 
take amiss every thing which is said in disparagement of the 
married state ;  and always consider a  satyr upon matrimony 
as a satyr upon  themselves.  Do  they mean,  that they  are 
the parties  principally concerned,  and that if  a  backward- 
ness to enter into that state should prevail in the world, they 
would be the greatest sufferers?  Or, are they sensible, that 
1  [Th',  Essay appeared  in Editions A  to  N,  1741-60.  See ' Histor  of  the 
Editlono,  Vol.  111..  p. 44.-ED.] 
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ESSAY  misfortunes and miscarriages of  the married state are owing 
V.  .-,.-,  more to their sex than to ours?  I hope  they do  not  intend 
.to confess either of  these two particulars, or to give such an 
advantage  to their  adversaries,  the men,  as even  to allow 
them to suspect it. 
I have often had thoughts of complying with this humour 
of  the fair sex, and of  writing  a  panegyric  upon  marriage : 
But, in looking around for materials, they seemed to be of  so 
mixed a nature, that at the  conclusion  of  my reflections, I 
found  that I was  as much  disposed  to write a satyr, which 
might  be  placed  on  the opposite pages  of  the panegyric: 
And I am afraid, that as satyr is, on most occasions, thought 
to conta'in more  truth than  panegyric, I should have done 
their  cause  more  harm  than good  by  this  expedient.  To 
misrepresent  facts is what, I know, they will  not require of 
me.  I must  be more  a  friend  to truth, than even to them, 
where their interests are opposite. 
I shall tell the women what it is our sex complains of most 
in the married state; and if they be disposed to satisfy us in 
this particular, all the other differences will easily be accoin- 
modated.  If I be not mistaken, 'tis their love of  dominion, 
which is the ground of  the quarrel ;  tho'  'tis very likely, that 
they will think it  an unreasonable  love  of  it in us, which 
makes us insist so much upon that point.  However this may 
be, no passion seems to have more influence on female minds, 
than this for  power ;  and there is a remarkable instance in 
histoiy of  its prevailing  above another passion, which is the 
only one that can be  supposed  a  proper counterpoise for it. 
We are told, that all the women in SCYTHIA  once conspired 
against  the men,  and  kept  the secret  so  well,  that  they 
executed  their  design  before  they  were  suspected.  They 
surprised the men in drink, or asleep ;  bound thein all fast in 
chains ;  and having called a solemn council of the whole sex, 
it was debated what expedient shollld be used to improve the 
present advantage, and prevent their falling again into slavery. 
To  kill all the men did not seem to be the relish of  any part of 
the assenlbly, notwithstanding the injuries formerly received ; 
and they were afterwards pleased  to make  a great merit of 
this lenity of theirs.  It was, therefore, agreed to put out the 
eyes of  the whole male  sex, and thereby resign in all f~iture 
time the vanity mhich they could draw froni their beauty, in 
order to secure their authority.  We must no longer pretend 
to dress and show, said they ;  but then we  shall be free from 
slavery.  We shall hear no more tender sighs; but in return 
we shall hear no more imperious commands.  Love must for 
ever leave us ; but he will carry subjection along with him. 
'Tis  regarded  by some as an unlucky circumstance, since 
the women were resolved to maim the men, and deprive them 
of  some of  their senses, in order to render them humble and 
dependent, that the sense of  hearing could not serve  their 
purpose,  since 'tis  probable  the females would  rather have 
attacked that than the sight : And I  think it is agreed among 
the learned, that, in a married state, 'tis not near so great an 
inconvenience to lose the  former sense as the  latter.  However 
this may be, we  are told  by modern  anecdotes, that some of 
the SCYTHIAN  women did secretly spare their husbands'  eyes ; 
presbming, I suppose, that they could govern them as well by 
means of  that sense as without it.  But so incorrigible and 
untractable were these men, that  their wives were all obliged, 
in a few years, as their youth and beauty decayed, to imitate 
the example of their sisters ;  which it was no difficult matter 
to  do  in a  state where  the female  sex  had  once  got the 
superiority. 
I know not if our SCOTTISH  ladies derive any thing of  this 
humour from their SCYTHIAN  ancestors ;  but,, I must confess 
that I have  often been  surprized to see a woman very well 
pleased  to take a  fool for her mate, that she might govern 
with the less controul ;  and could  not but think her  senti- 
ments, in this respect, still more barbarous than those of  the 
SCYTHIAN  women  above-mentioned;  as much as the eyes of 
the understanding are more valuable than those of  the body. 
But to be just, and to lay the blanie  more equally, I am 
afraid it is the fault of  our sex, if  the women be so fond of 
rule,  and that if we did not abuse our authority, they would 
never think it worth while to dispute it.  Tyrants, we know, 
produce rebels ;  and all history informs us, that rebels, when 
they prevail, are apt to become  tyrants in their turn.  For 
this reason, I could wish there were no pretensions to autho- 
rity on either side ;  but that every thing was carried on with 
perfect equality, as between two equal members of  the same 
body.  And to induce both parties to embrace those a,niicable 
sentiments, I shall deliver  to them PLATO'S  account of  the 
origin of love and marriage. 
Mankind, according to that fanciful philosopher, were not, 
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in their original, divided into male and female, as at  present ; 
but each  individual  person was  a  compound of  both  sexes, 
and was in hiinself both husband and wife, melted down into 
one living creature.  This union, no doubt, was very intire, 
and the parts very well adjusted together, since there resulted 
a perfect  harmony betwixt  the male and female, altho' they 
were obliged to be  inseparable  companions.  And  so  great 
were the harmony and happiness flowing from  it, that the 
ANDROGYNES  (for so PLATO  calls them) or MEN-WOMEN,  became 
insolent upon their prosperity, and rebelled against the Gods. 
To punish them for this temerity, JUPITER  could contrive no 
better  expedient,  than  to  divorce  the  male-part  from the 
female, and make  two  imperfect  beings  of  the compound, 
which was before  so perfect.  Hence the origin of  men and 
women, as distinct creatures.  But notwithstanding this divi- 
sion, so lively is our remembrance of the happiness which we 
enjoyed in  our primzval  state, that we  are never at rest in 
this situation ;  but each of these halves is continually searcrch- 
ing thro' the whole species to find  the other half, which was 
broken  from it :  And when they meet, they join  again with 
the greatest fondness and sympathy.  But it often happens, 
that they axe mistaken in this particular ;  that they take for 
their half  what no way corresponds to them ;  and that the 
parts do not meet nor join  in with each other, as is usual in 
fractures.  In this  case the union was  soon  dissolved,  and 
each part is set loose again to hunt for its lost half, joining 
itself to every one whom it meets, by way of trial, and enjoy- 
ing no rest till its perfect sympathy with its partner shews 
that it has at last been successful in its endeavours. 
Were I disposed to carry on this fiction of  PLATO,  whicL 
accounts for the mutual love betwixt the sexes in so agreeable 
a manner, I would do it by the following allegory. 
When JUPITER  had separated the male from the female, 
and had quelled their pride  and ambition  by  so severe an 
operation, he could not but repent him of  the cruelty of  his 
vengeance, and take compassion on poor  mortals, who were 
now  become incapable of  any repose or tranquillity.  Such 
cravings, such anxieties, such necessities arose, as made them 
curse their creation, and think existence itself a punishment. 
In  vain had they recourse to  every  other occupation and amuse- 
ment.  In vain  did they seek after every pleasure of  sense, 
and every refinement of reason.  Nothing could fill that void, 
which  they felt in their hearts, or  supply the loss of  their  ESSAY 
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this disorder,  and to bestow some  comfort, at least, on the 
human  race  in their forlorn situation,  JUPITER  sent down 
LOVE  and HYMEN,  to collect  the broken  halves of  human 
kind, and piece  them together in the best manner possible. 
These two deities found  such a prompt disposition in man- 
kind to unite again in their prim~vd  state, that they pro- 
ceeded on their work with wonderful success for some time ; 
till at last,  from many unlucky accidents,  dissension  arose 
betwixt them.  The chief counsellor and favourite of  HYMEN 
was CARE,  who was continually filling his patron's  head with 
prospects of futurity ;  a settlement, family, children, servants ; 
so that little else was regarded in all the matches they made. 
On the other hand, Love had chosenP~~~su~~  for his favourite, 
who was as pernicious a counsellor as the  other, and  would never 
allow Love to look beyond  the present  momentary gratifica- 
tion, or the satisfying of  the prevailing  inclination.  These 
two favourites became, in a little time, irreconcileable enemies, 
and made it their chief  business to undermine each other in 
all their undertakings.  No sooner had Love fixed upon two 
halves, which  he was cementing together, and forming to a 
close union, but Care insinuates himself, and bringing HYXEN 
along with him, dissolves the union  produced  by love,  and 
joins each half to some other half, which he had provided for 
it.  To be  revenged of  this, Pleasure creeps  in upon  a pair 
already joined by HYMEN  ;  and calling Love to his assistance, 
they under hand contrive to join each half  by secret links, to 
halves,  which  HYMEN  was  wholly  unacquainted  with.  It 
was  not long  before this quarrel was felt in its pernicious 
consequences ;  and such complaints arose before thc throne 
of  JUPITER,  that he was  obliged  to summon the offending 
parties to appear before him, in order to give an account of 
their proceedings.  After hearing the pleadings on both sides, 
he ordered  an  immediate reconcilement  betwixt  LOVE  and 
HYMEN,  as the only expedient for  giving happiness to man- 
kind :  And  that he might be sure this reconcilement should 
be durable, he laid his  strict injunctions on them never to 
join any halves without consulting  their favourites Care and 
Pleastwe, and obtaining the consent of both to the conjunction. 
Where this order is strictly observed, the Androgyne  is per- 
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, joins the two beings ;  but both of them combine to form one 
perfect and happy creature. 
ESSAY  V1.l-Of  the  8t~cdy  of  History. 
THERE  is nothing which I would recommend more earnestly 
to my female readers than the study of  history, as an occu- 
pation, of  all others, the best  suited  both  to their sex and 
education, much more instructive than their ordinary books of 
amusement, and more entertaining than those serious com- 
positions,  which  are usually  to be  found  in their  closets. 
Among  other important  truths, which  they may learn from 
history, they may be informed of  two particulars, the know- 
ledge of  which may contribute very much to their quiet and 
repose ;  That our sex, as well as theirs, are far from being such 
perfect creatures as they are apt to imagine, and, That Love is 
not the only passion, which governs the male-world, but is 
often overcome by avarice, ambition, vanity, and a thousand 
other  passions.  Whether  they  be  the  false  representa- 
tions  of  mankind  in those  two  particulars,  which  endear 
romances and novels  so much  to the fair sex, I know not; 
but ]nust confess that I am sorry to see them have  such an 
aversion to matter of fact, and such an appetite for falshood. 
I remember I was once desired by a young beauty, for whom 
I  had some passion, to send her some novels  and romances 
for her amusement in the country ;  but was not so ungenerous 
as to  take the advantage, which such a course of reading might 
have given me, being resolved  not to make use of  poisoned 
arms against her.  I therefore sent her PLUTARCH'S  Lives, 
assuring her, at the same time, that there was not a word of 
truth in them from  beginning  to end.  She perused  them 
very attentively, 'till she came to the lives of ALEXANDER  and 
CBSAR,  whose names she had heard of  by accident ;  and then 
returned me the book, with many reproaches for deceiving her. 
I  may indeed be  told that the fair sex have  no such aver- 
sion  to history,  as I have  represented,  provided it be  secret 
history, and contain  some  menlorable transaction proper  to 
excite their curiosity.  But as I do not find that truth, which 
1  [Tvs Egsay appeared in  Ec1ii:ons  A to N,  1741-60.  See '  History  of the 
Editions, Vol. III. p. 44.hED.I 
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study.  However this may be, I see not why the same curios- 
ity might not receive a more proper direction, and lead them 
to desire accounts of  those who lived in past ages, as well 2s 
of  their  cotemporaries.  What  is  it  to  CLEORA,  whether 
FULVIA  entertains a secret commerce of  Love with PHILANDER 
or not?  Has  she not equal reason  to be  pleased, when she 
is informed (what is whispered about anlong historians) that 
CATO'S  sister had an intrigue  with C~SAR,  and palmed  her 
son,  MARCUS  BRUTUS,  upon her husband for his own,  tho' 
in reality he was her  gallant's  ?  And  are not the loves  of 
MESSACINA  or JULIA  as proper  subjects of  discourse as any 
ii~t~igue  that this city has produced of late years ? 
But I know not  whence it  comes,  that I have  been  thus 
seduced into a  kind of  raillery  against  the ladies:  Unless, 
perhaps, it proceed from the same  cause,  which  makes the 
person,  who is the favourite  of  the company, be  often  the 
object of  their good-natured jests and pleasantries.  We are 
pleased to address ourselves after any manner, to one who is 
agreeable to us ;  and, at the same time, presume that nothing 
will be taken  amiss by a person, who is  secure of  the good 
opinion and affections of  every one present.  I shall now pro- 
ceed to handle my subject more seriously, and shall point out 
the many  advantages which  flow from  the study of  history, 
and show how well suited  it is to every one, but particularly 
to those who are debarred the severer studies, by the tender- 
ness of their complexion, and the weakness of  their education. 
The advantages found  in history  seem to be of  three kinds, 
as it amuses the fancy, as it improves the understanding, and 
as it strengthens virtue. 
In reality, what more agreeable entertainment to the mind, 
than to be transported into the remotest 'ages of  the world, 
and to observe human society, in its infancy, making the first 
faint essays towards the arts and sciences :  To see the policy 
of  government, and the civility of  conversation  refining  by 
degrees, and every thing which is ornamental to human life 
advancing towards its perfection.  To remark the rise,  pro- 
gress, declension, and final extinction of the most flourishing 
empires :  The virtues, which contributed to their greatness, 
and the vices, which drew on their ruin.  In short, to see all 
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perplexed  the judgment of  the beholders.  What spectacle 
can be imagined,  so magnificent, so various, so interesting P 
What amusement,  either of  the  senses or  imagination,  can 
be compared  with it P  Shall those  trifling pastimes,  which 
engross so much of  our time, be preferred  as more satisfac- 
tory, and more fit to engage  our  attention P  How perverse 
must that taste be,  which is capable of  so wrong a choice  of 
pleasures P 
But history is a most improving part of knowledge, as well 
as an agreeable  amusement ;  and a great part of  what we 
commonly call Erudition, and value so highly, is nothing but 
an acquaintance with historical facts.  An extensive  knox- 
ledge of this kind belongs to men of letters ;  but I  must think 
it an unpardonable  ignorance in persons of  whatever  sex or 
condition, not to be acquainted with the history of their own 
country, together with the histories of  ancient  GREECE  and 
ROME. A  woman may  behave  herself  with good manners, 
and have even some vivacity  in her turn of  wit; but where 
her mind is so  unfurnished,  'tis  impossible her conversation 
can afford any entertainment to men of  sense and reflection. 
I must  add, that history is not  only  a  valuable  part of 
knowledge,  but  opens  the door  to many  other parts,  and 
affords materials to most of the sciences.  And indeed, if we 
consider the shortness of  human life, and our limited know- 
ledge, even of  what passes in our own time, we must be sen- 
sible that we should be  for ever children  in understanding, 
were it not for this invention,  which extends our experience 
to all  past ages,  and to the most  distant nations ;  making 
them contribute as much  to our improvement in wisdom,  as 
if  they had actually lain under our observation.  A man ac- 
quainted with history may,  in some respect,  be said to have 
lived  from  the beginning  of  the world,  and  to have  been 
making continual additions to his stock of knowledge in every 
century. 
There  is also  an advantage  in that experience  which  is 
acquired by history, above what is learned by the practice of 
the world, that it brings  us  acquainted  with human affairs, 
without diminishing in the least from the most delicate sen- 
timents of  virtue.  And,  to tell the truth,  I know not  any 
study  or  occupation  so  unexceptionable  as history  in  this 
particular.  Poets  can paint virtue  in the most  charming  ESSAY 
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sions, they  often  become advocates  for vice.  Even philoso- 
phers are apt to bewilder themselves in the subtility of their 
speculations ;  and  we  have  seen  some go as far as to deny 
the reality of all moral distinctions.  But I think it a remark 
worthy the attention of  the speculative,  that the historians 
have been, almost without exception, the true friends of virtue, 
and have always represented it in its proper colours, however 
they may  have erred in their judgments  of  particular per- 
sons.  MACHIAVEL  himself  discovers  a  true  sentiment  of 
virtue  in his  history  of  FLORENCE.  When he  talks as a 
Politician, in his general reasonings, he collsiders poisoning, 
assassination and perjury, as lawful arts of power;  but when 
he speaks as an  Historian, in his  particular  narrations,  he 
shows so keen an indignation against vice, and so warm  an 
approbation  of  virtue,  in many  passages,  that I could not 
forbear applying to him that remark of  HORACE,  That if  you 
cllace away nature, tho' with ever so great indignity, she will 
always return upon you.  Nor is this combination of historians 
in favour of virtue at all difficult to be accounted for.  When 
a man of business enters into life and action, he is more  apt 
to consider  the characters of  men,  as they  ba,ve relation to 
his interest, than as they stand in themselves ; and has  his 
judgment  warped  on every  occasion  by  the violence of  his 
passion.  When a  philosopher  contemplates characters  and 
manners in his closet, the general abstract view of  the objects 
leaves the mind so cold and unmoved, that the sentiments of 
nature have no room to play,  and he  scarce feels the differ- 
ence between vice and virtue.  History keeps in a just medium 
betwixt these extremes,  and places the objects in their  true 
point of view.  The writers of history, as well as the readers, 
are sufficiently interested in the  characters and events,  to 
have a lively sentiment of blame or praise;  and, at the same 
time,  have no particular interest or concern  to pervert their 
judgment. 
Vero voces tuna &mum poclore ab imo 
Eliciuntur.  LUCRET.' 
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features than are any where to be met with in nature.  This 
moral kind of painting for the stage has been often compared 
to the painting for  cupolas and ceilings, where the colours 
are over-charged, and every part is drawn excessively large, 
and beyond  nature.  The figures  seem  monstrous  and dis- 
proportioned, when seen too nigh; but become natural and 
regular, when seen at a distance, and placed in that point of 
view, in which they are intended to be surveyed.  For a like 
reason,  when  characters  are exhibited  in theatrical  repre- 
sentations,  the want  of  reality removes,  in a  manner,  the 
personages ;  and rendering them more cold and unentertain- 
ing,  makes  it  necessary  to  compensate,  by  the  force  of 
colouring, what  they want  in substance.  Thus we  find in 
common life, that when a man once allows himself to depart 
from truth in his narrations, he  never  can keep within  the 
bounds of  probability;  but adds still some new circumstance 
to render  his  stories  more  marvellous,  and  to satisfy  his 
imagination.  Two  men  in buckram  suits became eleven to 
Sir JOHN  FALSTAFF  before the end of  the story. 
There is only one vice, which may be found in life with as 
strong features,  and as high a colouring  as needs be  em- 
ployed by any satjrist or comic poet ;  and that is AVARICE. 
Every day we  meet with  men of  immense  fortunes, without 
heirs, and on the very brink of  the grave, who refuse them- 
selves the most common necessaries of life, and go on heaping 
possessions on  possessions,  under  all the real pressures  of 
the severest poverty.  AI~  old  usurer, says the story, lying 
in his last  agonies,  was presented  by  the priest  with the 
crucifix to worship.  He opens his eyes a moment before he 
expires, considers the crucifix, and cries, These jewels  are not 
true; I can only  lend  ten pistoles  upon such a pledge.  This 
was probably-  the invention of  some epigrammatist ;  and yet 
every one, from his own experience, may be able to recollect 
[This  Essay appeared  in Editions  A  to  P, 1741-68:  see  'History of  the 
Editlom' Vol. 111. p.  44.-ED.] 
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himself near death, he sent for some of  the magistrates, and 
gave them  a  bill  of  an hundred  pounds, payable  after his 
decease;  which  sum he intended  should  be  disposed of  in 
charitable uses ;  but scarce were they gone, when  he orders 
them to be called back, and offers them ready money, if they 
would abate five pounds of  the sum.  Another  noted  miser 
in the north, intending to defraud  his heirs, and leave his 
fortune to the building of  an hospital, protracted the drawing 
of  his will from day to day; and 'tis  thought, that if  those 
interested in it had not  paid for the drawing it, he had died 
intestate.  In short,  none  of  the most  furious excesses  of 
love and ambition are in any respect to be  compared to the 
extremes of  avarice. 
The best excuse that can be  made  for  avarice  is, that it 
generally prevails  in old men,  or  in  men  of  cold  tempers, 
where  all the other  affections are extinct;  and the mind 
being incapable of  remaining without  some passion or pur- 
suit, at last finds out this monstrously  absurd  one, which 
suits the coldness and inactivity of  its temper.  At the same 
time, it seems very extraordinary, that so frosty, spiritless a 
passion  should  be  able  to  carry  us  farther  than  all  the 
warmth of youth and pleasure : but if we look more narrowly 
into the matter, we  shall find, that this very circumstance 
renders the explication of  the case more  easy.  When the 
temper is warm  and full of  vigour, it naturally shoots out 
more  ways  than  one,  and  produces  inferior  passions  to 
counter-balance, in some degree, its predominant inclination. 
'Tis  impossible for a person of  that temper, however bent on 
any pursuit,  to be  deprived  of  all  sense  of  shame,  or  all 
regard  to  the  sentiments  of  mankind.  His friendb  must 
have some influence over him : And other considerations are 
apt to have their weight.  All this  serves to restrain him 
within some bounds.  But 'tis no wonder that the avaritious 
man, being, from the coldness of  his temper, without regard 
to reputation, to friendship, or to pleasure, should be carried 
SO  far by his prevailing  inclination, and should  display his 
passion in such surprising instances. 
Accordingly we  find  no vice  so  irreclaimable as avarice : 
And  though  there  scarcely has been  a moralist  or philo- 
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I am more  apt  to approve of  those, who attack it with wit 
and humour, than of  those who treat it in a serious manner. 
There  being  so  little  hopes  of  doing  good  to the people 
infected with this vice, I would  have  the rest  of  mankind, 
at least, diverted by our manner of  exposing it :  As  indeed 
there is no kind of  diversion, of  which they seem so willing 
to partake. 
Among the fables  of  Monsieur  de  la MOTTE,  there is one 
levelled against avarice, which  seems to me  more natural 
and easy, than most of  the fables of  that ingenious author. 
A miser,  says he,  being dead,  and fairly interred, came  to 
the banks of  the STYX,  desiring to be ferried over along with 
the other  ghost,s.  CHARON  demands  his  fare,  and  is  sur- 
prized  to see the miser,  rather than pay  it, throw himself 
into the river,  and swim  over  to the other side,  notwith- 
standing all the clamour and opposition that could  be  uiade 
to him.  All hell was in an uproar ;  and each of  the judges 
was meditating some punishment, suitable to a crime of  such 
dangerous  consequence to the infernal  revenues.  Shall he 
be  ohained  to the  rock  with  PRONETHEUS  ?  Or  tremble 
below  the precipice in company with  the  DANAIDES?  Or 
assist SISYPHUS  in rolling his stone P  No,  says MINOS,  none 
of  these.  We must invent some  severer punishment.  Let 
him be  sent back to the earth, to see the use  his heirs are 
making of  his riches. 
I hope it wiil  not  be  interpreted  as a  design  of  setting 
myself  in opposition to this celebrated author, if I proceed 
to deliver a fable of  my own, which is intended to expose the 
same vice of  avarice.  The hint of  it was taken from these 
lines of  Mr. POPE. 
Dantn'd to  the mines, an equal fate  betides 
The slave that digs it, and the slave that hides. 
Our old mother Earth once lodged an  indictment against 
AVARICE  before  the  courts  of  heaven,  for her wicked  and 
malicious  council  and  advice,  in tempting,  inducing,  per- 
suading,  and  traiterously  seducing  the  children  of  the 
plaintiff to commit the detestable  crime of  parricide  upon 
her,  and,  mangling her body,  ransack  her very bowels for 
hidden treasure.  The indictment was very long and verbose; 
but we  must omit a great part of the repetitions and synony-  ESSAY 
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AVARICE,  being  calIed  before  JUPITER  to  answer  to  this 
charge, had not much to say in her own defence.  The injus- 
tice  was  clearly  proved  upon  her.  The  fact,  indeed, was 
notorious,  and  the  injury  had  been  frequently  repeated. 
When  therefore  the plaintiff  demanded  justice,  JUPITER 
very  readily  gave  sentence  in her  favour;  and  his  decree 
was to this purpose, That since dame Avarice, the defendant, 
had  thus grievously injured  dame Earth,  the plaintiff,  she 
was  hereby ordered to take that treasure, of  which she had 
feloniously  robbed  the  said  plaintiff,  by  ransacking  her 
bosom,  and  in  the same  manner,  as before,  opening  her 
bosom, restore it back to her, without  diminution  or reten- 
tion.  From  this sentence, it  shall  follow,  says JUPITER  to 
the by-standers,  That,  in  all future  ages,  the retainers  of 
Avarice  shall bury and  conceal their  riches,  and  thereby 
restore to the earth what they took from her. 
ESSAY  VII1.-A  Characttw of  6%  Robert Wa7pob.I 
THERE  never was a man, whose actions  and character  have 
been more earnestly and openly canvassed, than those of  the 
present  minister, who, having  governed a  learned  and  free 
nation  for so long  a time, amidst  such  mighty opposition, 
may make a large library of  what  has  been  wrote for and 
against him, and is the subject of  above half the paper that 
has been  blotted  in the nation  within these  twenty years. 
I wish for the honour of our country, that any one character 
of  hiin had been drawn with such judgment  and impartiality, 
as to have credit with posterity, and to .hew,  that our liberty 
has, once at least, been  employed to  good  purpose.  I am 
only afraid, of  failing  in the former  quality  of  judgment: 
But if it  should be so, 'tis but one page more thrown away, 
after an hundred thousand, upon the same subject, that have  . 
perished, and become  useless.  In the mean  time, I shall 
flatter myself  with the pleasing  imagination, that the fol- 
lowing character will be adopted by future historians. 
1 [This Essay first appeared in  Edi-  be reduced to a Science' :  in Edition Q, 
tion C, 1742 ;  in Editions D to P, 1748-  1770, it was  dropt.  See '  History  of 
68, it was printed in a foot-note at the  the Editions,' V91.  111.  p. 45.-ED.] 
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--#  BRITAIN,  is a  man  of  ability, not  a  genius ;  good-natured, 
not virtuous ; constant,  not  magnanimous ;  moderate,  not 
equitable ;  His virtues, in  some  instances,  are  free  from 
the  allay  of  those  vices,  which  usually  accompany  such 
virtues : He is  s generous  friend,  without  being  a  bitter 
enemy.  His vices, in other instances, are not  compensated 
by those virtues which are nearly allyed to them ;  His want 
of  enterprise  is not  attended with frugality.  The private 
character of  the mail is better than the public : His virtues 
more  than his vices : His fortune  greater  than his  fame. 
With many good qualities 'fie has incurred the public hatred : 
With good capacity he has not escaped  ridicule.  He would 
have been esteemed more worthy of  his high station had he 
never  possessed it; and is better  qualified  for  the second 
than for the first place  in  any government.  His ministry 
has been more advantageous to his family than to the public, 
better for this age than  for  posterity, and more  pernicious 
by bad precedents than by real grievances.  During his time 
trade has flourished, liberty declined, and learrling  gone to 
ruin.  As I am a  man, I love hiin ;  as I am a  scholar, I 
hate him ;  as I am a  BRITON,  I calmly wish  his  fall.  And 
were I a member of  either house, I would  give  my vote for 
removing him from ST. JAW'S  ;  but should  be  glad to see 
him retire to HOUGHTON-HALL,  to pass the remainder of  his 
days in ease and pleasure. 
UNPUBLISHED 
ESSAYS. 
Modmte in the  ex era is^ of power, not epuitable in engrossing it. UNPUBLISHED  ESSAYS. 
ESSAY  1.'-Of  the Imrnortulity  of  the Soul. 
By the mere light of  reason  it seems  difficult to prove  the  ESSAY 
Immortality of the Soul.  The arguments for it are cornmonlj- . I. , 
derived either from metaphysical topics, or moral, or physical. 
But in reality, it is the gospel, and the gospel alone, that has 
brought life and inlmortality to light. 
I. Metapllysical topics suppose that the soul is immaterial, 
and that it is i~npossible  for thought to belong to a material 
substance. 
But just  metaphysics  teach  us, that ,the notion of  sub- 
stance is wholly confused  and imperfect, and that we  have 
no  other  idea  of  any substance,  than  as  an aggregate  of 
particular  qualities  inhering  in  an  unknown  something. 
Matter, therefore, and spirit, are at bottom equally unknown ; 
and we cannot determine what qualitip inhere in the one or 
in the other. 
They likewise  teach us,  that nothing can  be  decided  & 
priori concerning any cause or effect ;  and that experience, 
being the only source of  our judgments of  this nature, we 
cannot know  from any other principle,  whether matter, by 
its  structure  or  arrangement,  may  not  be  the  cause  of 
thought.  Abstract reasonings  cannot decide  any question 
of fact or existence. 
But  admitting  a  spiritual  substance  to  be  &spersed 
throughout the universe, like the ethereal fire of  the Stoics, 
and to be  the only  inherent  subject  of  thought, we  have 
reason  to conclude from  analogy, that nature uses  it after 
the manner she does the other substance, matter.  She em- 
1  [Printed from the Proof  Sheets in  the Adroc;ites'  Library, Edinburgh.  See 
'History of  the Editions,'  Vol.  rrr. p.  7 1  .--En.] 
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ESSAY  ploys it as a kind of  paste or clay;  modifies it into a variety  - 5  of forms and existences ;  dissolves  after a time each modifi- 
cation, and from its substance  erects a  new  form.  As  the 
same material substance ma;  successively compose the bodies 
of  all  animals, the saine  spiritual  substance  may  compose 
their minds : their consciousness,  or that system of thought, 
which they formed during life, may be  continually dissolved 
by death ;  and nothing interests then] in the new modifica- 
tion.  The most  positive  assertors  of  the mortality of  the 
soul, never  denied  the immortality of  its  substance.  And 
that an immaterial substance, as well as a material, may lose 
its memory or  consciousness,  appears, in part, from experi- 
ence, if the soul be iinmaterial. 
Reasoning from the common  course of  nature, and with- 
out supposing any new interposition of  the Supreme Cause, 
which ought always to be  excluded from philosophy ;  what 
is incorruptible  must also be ingenerable.  The soul, there- 
fore, if immortal, existed before our birth :  And if the former 
existence noways concerned us, neither will the latter. 
Animals undoubtedly feel, think, love, hate, will, and even 
-reason, though in a more imperfect manner than man.  Are 
their souls also immaterial and immortal  ? 
11.  Let us  now  consider  the  moral  arguments,  chiefly 
those derived from  the justice of  God, ;hich  is supposed to 
be further interested in the further pul~ishrnent  of the vicious 
and reward of the virtuous. 
But these  arguments  are  grounded  on  the supposition, 
that God has attributes beyond  what he has exerted in this 
universe, with which alone  we  are acquainted.  Whence do 
we infer the existence of these attributes  P  - 
'Tis  very safe for us to affirm, that, whatever we know the 
Deity to have actually done, is best;  but it is very dangerous 
to affirm, that he must always do what to us seems best.  In 
how many instances would this reasoning fail us with regard 
to the present world.  , 
But if any purpose of nature be clear, we may affirm, that 
the whole  scope  and intention of  man's  creation, so far as 
we  can judge  by natural reason, is limited  to the present 
life.  With how weak a concern, from the original, inherent 
structure of  the mind and passions, does he ever look fur- 
ther?  What comparison  either  for  steadiness  or efficacy, 
betwixt so floating a.n idea, and the most doubtful persuasion  ESSAY 
of any matter of fact, that occurs in common life P  I. - 
There  arise, indced, in  some  minds, some  unaccountable 
terrors  with  regard  to futurity:  But these  would  qoickly 
vanish, were  they  not  artificially fostered  by  precept  and 
education.  And  those,  who  foster  thern :  what  is  their 
motive?  Only  to gain  a  livelihood, and  to acquire  power 
and riches  in  this  world.  Their  very  zeal  and  industry, 
therefore, are an argument against them. 
What cruelty, what  iniclnity, what injustice in nature, to 
confine thus all our concern, as well as all our knowledge, to 
the present life, if  there be another scene still waiting us,  of 
infinitely greater consequence  P  Ought this barbarous deceit 
to be ascribed to a beneficent and wise Being? 
Observe with what exact proportion  the task to be  per- 
fornied, and the performing powers, are adjusted througllout 
all natilre.  If the reason  of  man  gives  him a great supe- 
riority above other animals, his necessities are proportionably 
multiplied  upon him.  His whole  time, his whole  capacity, 
activity,  courage,  passion,  find  sufficient  employment,  in 
'fencing against the miseries of  his present condition.  And 
frequently, nay almost  always, are too  slender for the busi- 
ness assigned them. 
A  pair  of  shoes, perhaps, was  never  yet  wrought to the 
highest degree of perfection, which that comlnodity is capn- 
hle  of  attaining.  Yet it is necessary, at least very useful, 
that there  should  be  some  politicians  and moralists,  even 
some geometers, poets,  and philosophers anlong mankind. 
The powers of  inen  are no  more  superior to their wants, 
considered merely in this life, than those of  foxes and hares 
are, compared to their wants and to their period of  existence. 
The inference from parity of reason is .therefore obvions. 
On  the theory of  the  soul's  mortality, the inferiority  of 
women's  capacity is  easily  accounted for : Their domestlic 
life requires no higher faculties either of mind or body.  This 
circumstance vanishes  and becomes absolutely insignificant, 
on the religious theory:  The one  sex  has an equal task to 
perform as the other : Their powers of reason and resolutiol~ 
ought also to have  been  equal, and both  of  them infinitely 
greater than at present. 
As every effect  implies  a  cause, and that another, till we 
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E!3SAY  that happens, is ordained by him; and nothing can be tho 
I. ,  object of his punishment or vengeance. 
By what rule  are punishments  and rewards distributed P 
What is the Divine standard  of  merit and demerit P  Shall 
we Suppose, that human sentiments have place in the Deity ? 
However bold that hypothesis, We have no conception of  any 
other sentiments.' 
According  to  human  sentiments,  sense,  courage,  good 
manners, industry, prudence, genius, &c. are  essential parts 
of personal merits.  Shall we therefore  erect  an elysium for 
poets and heroes, like that of the ancient mythology 2  Why 
confine all rewards to one species of virtue P 
Punishment, without any proper end or purpose, is incon- 
sistent with our  ideas of  goodness  and justice;  and no end 
can be serted by it after the whole scene is closed. 
Punishment,  according  to  our  conception,  should  bear 
some proportion  to the offence.  Why theh eternaa punish- 
ment for  the temporary offences  of  so frail  a  creature as 
man P  Can  any  one  approve of  Alexander's  rage, who in- 
tended  to exterminate a  whole  nation,  because  they  bald 
seized his favourite horse, Bucephalus P a 
Heaven and hell suppose two distinct species  of  men, the 
good and the bad.  But the greatest part of  mankind float 
betwixt vice and virtue. 
Were  one  to go round  the world  with  an  intention  of 
giving a good supper to the righteous and a sound drubbing 
to the wicked, he would  frequently be  embarrassed  in his 
choice, and would find, that the merits and demerits of most 
men and women scarcely amount to the value of either. 
To suppose measures of  approbation  and blame,  different 
from  the human,  confounds  every  thing.  Whence  do  we 
learn, that there is such a thing as moral distinctions, but 
from our own sentiments  P 
What man, who  has not met with personal provocation 
(or what good-natur'd  man who has), could inflict on crimes, 
from the sense of  blame alone, even the common, legal, fri- 
volous punishments P  And  does  any thing steel the breast 
of judges and juries 'against the sentiinents of  humanitj but 
reflections on necessity and public interest  P 
By the Roman  law, those who  had been  guilty of  parri- 
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cide, and confessed  their crime, mere put into a anck,  along  ESSAY 
with an  ape, a dog, and a serpent ;  and thrown into the river: . t-  Death alone was the punishment of  those, who denied their 
guilt, however  fully  p~oved.  ,  A  criminal  was  tried  before 
,  Augustus,  and condeinned  after  a full conviction : but the 
humane  emperor, when  he  put the last interrogatory, gave 
it such a turn as to lead the wretch into a denial of his guilt. 
('  Yo,u  yeily,  said  the \p1.iiice,  did  not  kill your father 8" 
This le'nity suits  our natu~al  ideas  of  RIGHT,  even  towards 
the greatest' of  all ci4i!nirl;lls, and even  though it prevents so 
inconsiderable  a  sufferance.  Nay,  even  the  most  bigoted 
priest  mould  naturally,  without  reflection,  approve  of  it ; 
provided  the  crime  was  not 'heresy  or  infidelity.  For as 
these crirrles hu+t himself  in  his  temporal  interest  and ad- 
vantages ;  perhaps he may not' be altogether so indulgent to 
them. 
The chief source of  n.lor:~l  ideas is the reflection on the in- 
terests  of  human  society.  Ought these interests, so short, 
so frivolous, to be  guarded  by punishments, eternal and in- 
finite?  The damnation of  one man  is an infinitely greater 
evil in the universe,  than the subversion of  a thousand 111il- 
lions of kingdoms. 
Nature has rendered human infancy  peculiarly frail and 
mortal;  as it were on purpose to refute  the notion of  a pro- 
bationary state.  The  lialf  of  mankind  die before they are 
rational creatures. 
111.  The physicul  arguments from the analogy of  nature 
are strong for the mortality of the soul : and these are really 
the only  philosophical  arguments,  which  ought to be  ad- 
mitted with regard to this question, or indeed any question 
of fact. 
Where any two  objects  are so  closely connected, that all 
alterations, which we have ever seen in the one, are attended 
with  proportionable  alterations in the other : we  ought to 
conclude, by all rules  of  analogy, that, when  there  are still 
greater alterations produced in t'he former,  and it is totally 
dissolved, there follows a total dissoliztion of  the latter. 
Sleep, a very small effect on the body, is attended with  a 
temporary extinction :  at  least, a great confusion in the soul. 
The weakness of  the body and that of the mind in infancy 
' [Ilow bold  that  hypothesis!  We  ments.  Edition8 of  1777  and 1783.1 
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ESMY  are  exactly  proporticned;  their  vigour  in  manhood,  their 
.  , sympathetic disorder in siclrness, their common gradual de- 
cay in old age.  The step further seems  unavoidable;  their 
common dissolution in death.  - 
The last symptoms, which the mind discovers, are disorder, 
weakness, insensibility, and stupidity ;  the forerunners of its 
annihilation.  The further progress  of  the same causes, en- 
creasing the same effects, totally extinguish it.' 
Judging by the usual analogy of  nature, no f~rm  can con- 
tinue, when  transferred to a  condition of  life very different 
from the original one, in which it was placed.  Trees perish 
in the water ;  fishes in the air ;  animals in the earth.  Even 
so s~nall  a difference as that of climate is often fatal.  Wha,t 
reason then to imagine, that an immense alteration, such as 
is mads oil  tlle  soul  by the dissolution  of  its body, and all 
its organs of thought and sensation, can be effected without 
the dissolution of the whole ? 
Every thing is in common  betwixt  soul  and body.  The 
organs of  the one  are all of  them the organs of  the other. 
The existence therefore of the one must be dependent on the 
other. 
The souls of  animals are allowed to be mortal : and these 
bear  so near  a  resemblance  to the souls  of  men, that the 
analogy from one to the other forms a very strong argument. 
Their bodies are not more resembling : yet no one rejects the 
argument drawn  from  comparative anatomy.  The Metemp- 
sychosis is therefore the only system of  this kind, that philo- 
sophy can hearken to. 
Nothing in this world is perpetual ;  Every thing, however 
seemingly firm, is  in  continual flux and change :  The world 
itself  gives  symptoms of  frailty and  dissolution:  How con- 
trary to analogy, therefore, to imagine, that one single form, 
seeming the frailest  of  any, and subject to the greatest dis- 
orders, is immortal and indissoluble?  What a, daring theory 
is that !  How lightly, not to say how rashly, entertained ! 
How to dispose of the infinite number  of  posthumous  ex- 
istences ought also to enlbarrass the religious theory.  Every 
planet, in every solar system, we  are at liberty to imagine 
with intelligent, mortal  beings : At least we  can fix 
1  [The further progress of  the same causes increasing,  the  same  effecb  toblly 
extinguish it : Editions of  1777 and 1783.1 
2  [What theory is  that !  Editions of  1777 and 1783.1 
on  no. other suppositi~n. For these,  then,  a  new universe  ESSAY 
I.  must, every generation, be created beyond the bounds of  the .-& 
present universe : or one must have been created at first  so 
prodigiously  wide  as to admit of  this  continual influx of 
beings.  Ought such bold suppositions to be received by any 
philosophy : and that merely on the pretext of  a bare possi- 
bility P 
When it is asked, whether Agamemnon, Thersites, Hanni- 
bal,  Nero,'  and every stupid clown, that ever existed in Italy, 
~Scythia,  Bactria, or  Guinea,  are now  alive ; can any man 
think, that a scrutiny of nature will furnish arguments strong 
enough to answer so strange a  question in the affirmative 2 
The want of argument, without revelation, sufficiently estab- 
lishes the negative.  Quanto f  acilizbs,  says Plin~,~  certiusque 
sibi  quem que  credere,  ac  specimen  securitatis  anteg  enit  ali 
sumere experirnento.  Our insensibility, before the composition 
of  the body, seems to natural reason a proof  of  a like state 
after dissolution. 
Were our horrors  of  annihilation an original passion, not 
the effect of  our general love  of  happiness, it would rather 
prove the mortality of  the, soul : For as nature does nothing 
in vain, she would  never  give us a horror against an impos- 
sible event.  She may give us a horror against  an unavoid- 
able event, provided  our endeavours; as in the present case, 
may often remove it to soine distance.  Death is in the end 
unavoidable ;  yet the human  species could not be preserved, 
had not nature inspired us with an aversion towards it.  All 
doctrines are to be suspected which are favoured by our pas- 
sions.  And  the hopes  and  fears which give rise  to  this ' 
doctrine, are very obvious. 
'Tis  an infinite advantage in every controversy, to defend 
the negative.  If the  question be out of  the common expe- 
rienced course of nature, this circumstance is  almost, if  not 
altogether, decisive.  By what  arguments  or analogies can 
we proie any state of existence, which  no one ever saw, and 
which no way resembles any that ever was seen ?  Who will 
repose such trust in any pretended  philosophy, as to admit 
upon  its  testimony  the ~eality  of  so marvellous  a  scene ? 
' [lTnrro  :  Editions  of  1777  and  Text,  and  this  as  a  correction  in  the 
1783.1  Margin.  The Editions  of  1777  and 
"Lib.  7. citp. 56.  1783 read this.] 
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BSAY  Some new species of logic is requisite for that purpose;  and  -5  some new faculties of  the mind, that they may enable us to 
comprehend that logic. 
Nothing could set in a fuller light the infinite obligations 
which  mankind  have  to Divine  revelation;  since we  find, 
that no  other  medium  could  ascertain this great  and im- 
portant truth. 
ESSAY  11.'-Of  Suicide. 
ONE  considerable  advantage that arises from  Philosophy, 
consists in the sovereign antidote which it dords  to supersti- 
tion and false  religion.  All  other  remedies  against  that 
pestilent  distemper  are vain,  or at least  uncertain.  Plain 
good sense and the practice of  the world, which  alone  serve 
most purposes of  life, are here found ineffectual : History as 
well as daily experience  furnish instances of  men  endowed 
with the strongest capacity for business and affairs, who have 
all their lives crouched  under  slavery to the grossest super- 
stition.  Even gaiety and sweetness of  temper, which infuse 
a balm into every other  wound, afford  no remedy to so viru- 
lent a poison ;  as we may particularly observe of the fair Sex, 
who, tho'  commonly possest of  these rich presents of nature, 
feel many of  their joys blasted by this importunate intruder. 
But when  sound  Philosophy  has once gained  possession  of 
the mind, superstition is effectually excluded ;  and one  inay 
fairly affirm, that her triumph over this enemy is more coin- 
plete than over most of the vices and imperfections incident to 
human  nature.  Love  or  anger,  ambition or avarice,  have 
their root in  the temper and affections,  which the soundest 
reason is  scarce ever  able fully to correct;  but superstition 
being  founded  on  false  opinion,  must  immediately  vanish 
when true philosophy has inspired juster sentiments of  supe- 
rior  powers.  The contest  is here  more  equal between  the 
distemper  and  the medicine,  and  nothing  can  hinder  the 
latter from proving  eEectua1,  but its being false and sophis- 
ticated. 
It will here be  superfluous to magnify the merits of philo- 
sophy,  by displaying the pernicious tendency of  that vice of 
which it cures the human mind.  The superstitious man, says 
[Printed from the Edition of  1777, with a few changes  of  punctuation.  See 
'   story of  the Editions,' vol. iii. p. 70.- ED.^ 
TULLY,'  is miserable in every scene, in every incident of  life ; EssAY 
even  sleep itself,  which  banishes all other cares of  unhappy .Ld 
mortals,  affords to him  inatter of  new terror; while  he ex-  . 
amines his dreams,  and finds in those visions of  the night 
prognosticatioils of  future  calamities.  I may add, that tho' 
death alone can put a full period to his misery, he dares not 
fly to this refuge, but still prolongs a miserable existence from 
a vain fear lest he offend his maker, by using the power, with 
which that beneficent being has endowed him.  The presents 
of God and nature are ravished from us by this cruel enemy; 
and notwithstanding that one step would remove us from the 
regions of  pain and sorrow, her  menaces still chain us down 
to  a hated being,  which  she herself  chiefly  coutributes  to 
render miserable. 
'Tis observed by such as have been reduced by the calami- 
ties of  life to the necessity  of  employing this  fatal remedy, 
that if the unseasoiiable care of  their friends deprive them of 
that species of  Death,  which they  proposed to  themselves, 
they seldom venture  upon any other, or can  summon up  SO 
inuch resolution a  second  time, as to execute their purpose. 
So great is our horror of  death, that when it presents itself, 
under any form, besides that to which a man has endeavoured 
to reconcile  his  imagination,  it acquires  new  terrors  and 
overcomes his  feeble  courage : But  when  the menaces  of 
superstition are joined to this natural timidity, no wonder it 
quite deprives men of  all  power over  their lives,  since even 
many pleasures and enjoyments, to which  we  are carried by 
a strong propensity, are torn from us by this inhuman tyrant. 
Let us here endeavour t80  restore men  to their native liberty 
by examining all the common arguments against; Suicide, and 
shewing that that action inay be free  from every imputation 
of  guilt  or  blame,  according  to the sentiments  of  all the 
antient philosophers. 
If  Suicide be criminal,  it must be a  transgression  of  our 
duty either to  God, our  neighbour, or  ourselves.-To  prove 
that suicide is no transgression of  our duty to God, the fol- 
lowing  considerations  may  perhaps  suffice.  In order  to 
govern the material world, the  almighty Creator has  estab- 
lished general and irni~~ut~able  laws by which all bodies, from 
the greatest  planet  to the  smallest  particle  of  matter,  are 
maintained in their proper  sphere and fuaction.  To govern 
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E?S.\P  the animal world, he has endowed  all  living creatures wit11 
11.  .  bodily and mental powers ;  with senses,  passions,  appetites, 
.memory and judgment,  by which  they are impelled or rega- 
lated in that course of life to  which they are destined.  These 
two  distinct  principles  of  the material  and animal  world, 
continually encroach  upon  each other, and mutually retard 
or forward each others operations.  The powers of  men  and 
of all other animals are restrained and directed by the nature 
and qualities of the surrounding bodies ;  and the modifications 
and  actions of  these  bodies  are incessantly  altered  by  the 
operation of  all animals.  Man  is stopt by rivers in his pas- 
sage over the surface of the earth ;  and rivers, when properly 
directed,  lend their force  to the motion of  machines,  which 
serve to the use of man.  But tho' the provinces of the mate- 
rial  and  animal powers  are  not  kept  entirely  separate, 
there results from thence no discord  or disorder in the crea- 
tion ;  on the contrary, from the mixture, union and contrast 
of  all the various  powers  of  inanimate  bodies  and living 
creatures,  arises  that  surprizing  harmony  and proportion 
which affords the surest argument of supreme wisdom.  The 
providence of the Deity appears not immediately in any ope- 
ration, but governs everything by those general and iminut- 
able laws, which have been  established  from  the beginning 
of time.  All  events,  in one  sense, may be pronounced  the 
action of  the Almighty ;  they  all proceed  from those powers 
with which he has endowed  his creatures.  A  house  which 
falls by  its own weight  is  not brought  to ruin by  his pro- 
vidence more than one destroyed  by the hands of  men; nor 
are the human faculties less his workmanship, than the laws 
of  motion and  gravitation.  When the passions play,  when 
the judgment dict'ates, when  the limbs obey ;  this is all the 
operation of  God, and upon these animate principles, as well 
as upon the inanimate, has he established the government of 
the universe.  Every event is alike important  in the eyes  of 
that infinite being, wllo takes in at one glance the most  dis- 
tant regions of space and remotest periods of time.  There is 
no event, however important to us,  which  he has exempted 
frorn the general laws that govern the universe, or which  he 
has peculiarly  reserved  for  his  own  immediate  action  and 
operation.  The  revolnt.ion  of  states and empites  depends 
upon the smallest caprice or passion of  single men; and the 
lives of  men are shortened or extended by the smallest acci- 
dent of  air or diet, sunshine  or tempest.  Nature st111  con-  ESSAY 
11.  tinues her progress  and operation; and if  general  laws  be  - 
ever  broke  by  particular volitions of  the Deity, 'tis  after a 
manner which entirely escapes human  observation.  As,  on 
the one hand, the elements and other inanimate parts of  the 
creation carry on their action without regard to the particular 
interest and situation of  men;  so men are entrusted to their 
own judgment and discretion, in the various shocks of matter, 
and may enlploy every faculty with which they are endowed, 
in order  to provide for  their  ease,  happiness,  or preserva- 
tion.  What is  the meaning then of  that principle,  that a 
man  who,  tired  of  life,  and hunted  by  pain  and  misery, 
bravely  overcomes  all  the  natural  terrors  of  death  and 
makes  his  escape  from  this  cruel  scene;  that  such  a 
man,  I say,  has  incurred  the  indignation of  his  Creator 
by  encroaching  on  the  office  of  divine  providence,  and 
disturbing  the  order  of  the  universe ?  shall  we  assert 
that the Almighty  has reserved  to himself  in any peculiar 
manner the disposal of  the lives of  men, and has not  sub- 
mitted  that event,  in coininon  with  others, to the general 
laws by  which  the universe  is  governed?  This  is plainly 
false ;  the lives of  men  depend upon  the same laws  as the 
lives  of  all other animals;  and these are subjected  to the 
general laws of matter and motion.  The fall of  a  tower, or 
the infusion of a poison, will  destroy a man  ~qually  with the 
meanest  creature;  an inundation sweeps  away  every  thing 
without distinction  that comes within  the reach of  its fury. 
Since therefore  the lives of  men  are for ever dependant on 
the general laws of  matter and motion, is a man's  disposing 
of  his life  criminal, because  in  every case it is criminal to 
enoroach upon these latvs, or disturb their operation?  But 
this seems  absurd;  all ariimals  are entrusted  to their own 
prudence and skill for their conduct in the world, and have 
full axthority, as far as their power  extends, to alter all the 
operations of natu~e. Without the exercise of this authority 
they  could  not  subsist  a  moment ; every  action,  every 
motion of  a  man, innovates on the order of  some  parts of 
matter, and diverts  fro111  their  ordinary  course  the general 
laws  of  motion.  Putting together, therefore,  these conclu- 
sions,  we  find  that human  life  depends  upon  the  general 
laws of  matter and motion, and that it is no encroachment 
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11. 
.-d  of  his  own  life  P  And  may  he  not  lawfully  employ that 
power  with  which  nature  has endowed  him P  In order  to 
destroy  the  evidence  of  this  conclusion, we  must  shew  a 
reason, why this particular  case is  excepted ;  is it because 
human life is of  so great importance, that 'tis a presumption 
for human prudence to dispose of it P  But the life of a man 
is of  no greater importance to the universe than that of  an 
oyster.  And were  it of  ever so great importance, the order 
of nature has actually submitted it to human prudence, and 
reduced  us  to a  necessity in every incident  of  determining 
concerning it.  Were the  disposal of  human  life  so  much 
reserved  as the peculiar  province  of  the Almighty  that it 
were an encroachment on  his  right, for men  to dispose of 
their own lives ;  it would  be equally criminal to act for the 
preservation of  life ao for its destruction.  If I turn aside a 
stone which is falling upon my head, I disturb the course of 
nature, and I invade the peculiar province of  the Almighty 
by lengthening out my life beyond  the period which  by the 
general laws of  matter and motion he had assignes it. 
A hair, a fly, an insect is able to destroy this mighty being 
whose life is of  such importance.  Is it an absurdity to sup- 
pose  that  human  prudence  may  lalvfully  dispose  of  what 
depends on such insignificant causes P  It would be no crime 
in me to divert the Nile  or Danube  from  its course, were I 
able to effect  such purposes.  Where then is the crime  of 
turning a few ounces of blood from their natural channel P- 
Do  you  imagine that I repine  at providence or  curse  my 
creation, because I go out of life, and put a period to a being, 
which, were it to continue, would render me miserable P  Far 
be  such  sentiments  from  me; I am  only  convinced  of  a 
matter of fact, which you yourself acknowledge possible, that 
human  life  may be  unhappy, and  that my existence, if  fur- 
ther prolonged, would  become  ineligible:  but I thank pro- 
vidence,  both  for  the  good  which I have  already  enjoyed, 
and for the power with which I am endowed of  escaping the 
ill that threatens me.'  To you it belongs to repine  at pro- 
vidence, who foolishly imagine that you have no such power, 
and who  must  still  prolong  a  hated  life, tho'  loaded  with 
pain  and sickness,  with  shame and poverty.-Do  you  not 
teach, that when  any  ill  befalls me,  tho'  by  the malice  of 
Agamus Deo gratias, quod nemo in 14ta teneri potest.  SEN.,  Epist.  12. 
my enemies, I ought to be  resigned  to providence, and that  ESSAY 
the actions of  men  are the operations of  the Almighty as . . 
much  as  the  actions  of  inanimate  beings P  When I fall 
upor1 my own  sword, therefore, I receive my death  equally 
from the hands of  the Deity as if  it had proceeded from  a 
lion,  a  precipice,  or  a  fever.  The  submission which  you 
require  to providence,  in  every  calamity  that befalls  me, 
excludes not human  skill and industry, if  possibly by their 
means I can avoid or escape the calamity : And why may I 
not employ one remedy as well  as another ?-If  my life be 
not my own, it were  criminal for me  to put it in danger, as 
well as to dispose of it ;  nor could one man deserve the ap- 
pellation  of  hero  whom  glory  or  friendship transports  into 
the  greatest  dangers,  and  another  merit  the reproach  of 
wretch or miscreant who  puts  s  period  to his life from  the 
same  or  like  motives.-There  is no  being, which possesses 
any power or faculty, that it receives  not from  its Creator, 
nor is there any one, which  by  ever  so  irregular  an action 
can encroach  upon  the plan  of  his providence, or disorder 
the universe.  Its operations are his works equally with that 
chain  of  events, which it invades, and which ever principle 
prevails, we may for that very reason  conclude it to be most 
favoured  by  him.  Be  it animate, or inanimate, rational, or 
irrational ;  'tis  all a case : Its power is still derived from the 
supreme creator, and is alike comprehended in the order of 
his providence.  When the horror of  pain  prevails  over the 
love of life ;  when  a voluntary action anticipates the effects 
of  blind  causes;  'tis  only  in  consequence of  those  powers 
and  principles,  which  he  has  implanted  in  his  creatures. 
Divine providence is still inviolate and placed far beyond the 
reach of human injuries.l  'Tis impious, says the old Roman 
superstition, to divert rivers from their course, or invade the 
prerogatives of nature.  'Tis impious, says the French super- 
stition, to inoculate for  the small-pox, or usurp the business 
of  providence,  by  voluntarily  producing  distempers  and 
maladies.  'Tis  impious,  says the modern  European  super- 
stition,  to put a  period  to onr  own  life, and thereby rebel 
against  our creator ;  and why not  im~ious,  say I, to build 
houses, cultivate  the ground, or  sail  upon  the ocean?  In 
all these actions we employ our powers of mind and body,  to 
produce  some  innovation  in the course  of  nature;  and in 
1 TACIT. Ann. lib. i. 79. 412  UNPUBLISIIED  ESSAYS,  OF SUICIDE,  413 
Essay  none of them do we  any more.  They are all of them there- 
11.  fore  equally  innocent,  or  equally  criminal.-But  you  are 
placed  by  providence,  like  a  centinel in a particular  station, 
and when you  desert  it without  being recalled, you me equally 
guilty  of  rebellion  against  your  almighty sovereign, and have 
incurred  his  displeasure.-I  ask, why  do yon  conclude  that 
providence has placed  me  in this station?  For my part. I 
find that 1  owe my birth to a long chain of  causes, of which 
many depended upon voluntary actions of  men.  But Provi- 
dence  guidfd all tkese  Causes,  and  nothing  happens  in  the 
universe  without  its  consent  and  Co-operation.  V so,  then 
neither does  my  death, however voluntary, happen without 
its consent;  and whenever  pain  or  sorrow so far overcome 
my  patience,  as to make me  tired of  life, I may conclude 
that I am recalled from my station in the clearest and most 
express terms.  'Tis  Providence surely that has placed  me 
at this present  moment  in  this chamber:  But may I not 
leave it when I think proper, without being liable to the im- 
putation of  having  deserted  my post  or  station?  When I 
shall be  dead, the principles  of  which I am composed will 
still perform  their part in the universe,  and will be equally 
useful in the grand fabric, as when  they composed this in- 
dividual  creature.  The difference to t.he whole will  be no 
greater than betwixt my being in a cllamber and in the open 
air.  The one change is of  more importance to me than the 
other ;  but not more so to the universe. 
'Tis  a  kind  of  blasphemy  to imagine  that  any  created 
being  can  disturb the  order  of  the world  or  invade  the 
business  of  providence !  It supposes, that that Being pos- 
sesses powers  and faculties, which  it received  not from its 
creator, and which  are not  subordinate to his government 
and authority.  A  man  may disturb  society no  doubt, and 
thereby  incur  the  displeasure  of  the Almighty:  But the 
government of  the world is placed far beyond  his  reach and 
violence.  And how does it appear that the Almighty is dis- 
pleased  with  those  actions  that disturb  society?  By  the 
principles  which  he has  implanted  in human  nature,  and 
which inspire us with a sentiment of  remorse if we ourselves 
have been guilty of  such actions, and with that of blame and 
disapprobation, if  we  ever  observe them in others.--Let  us 
now  examine,  according  to the method  proposed,  whether 
Suicide be  of  this kind of  actions, and be a  breach of  our 
duty to our ~eighbour  and to society. 
A man,  who  retires  from  life,  does no  harm to society: 
He only ceases to do good ; which, if  it is an injury, is of 
the lowest kind.-All  our obligations  to do good t,o society 
seem to imply something reciprocal.  I receive the benefits 
of society and therefore  ought to promote  its interests, but 
when I withdraw myself  altogether  from  society, can I be 
bound  any longer?  But,  allowing  that our obligations  to 
do good  were  perpetual, they have  certainly some bounds ; 
I am not obliged  to do  a  small good  to society at the ex- 
pence of a great harm to myself;  why then should I prolong 
a.  miserable  existence, because  of  some frivolous  advantage 
which the public  may perhaps  receive  from  me?  If upon 
account  of  age  and  infirmities I  may  lawfully  resign any 
office, and  employ  my  time  altogether  in  fencing  against 
these  calamities,  and  alleviating  as much  as  possible  the 
miseries of  my future life : Why may I not  cut short these 
miseries at once by an action which  is no more  prejudicial 
to society ?-But  suppose that it is no  longer in my power 
to promote  the interest  of  society;  suppose  that I am a. 
burthen  to it ;  suppose that my  life  hinders  some  person 
from being much more  useful to society.  In  such cases my 
resignation of  life must not  only be innocent but laudable. 
And most  people who  lie under  any temptation to abandon 
existence, are in some such situation ;  those, who have health, 
or power, or authority, have commonly better reason to be in 
humour with the world. 
A man is engaged in a conspiracy for the public interest ; 
is seized upon  suspicion ;  is threatened  with the rack; and 
knows from his own weakness that the secret will be extorted 
from  him:  Could  such  a  one  consult  the public  interest 
better than by putting a  quick period  to a  miserable  life? 
This was the case of the famous and brave Xtrozi of Florence. 
-Again,  suppose a  malefactor  is  justly  condemned  to a 
shameful death ;  can any reason be imagined, why he  may not 
anticipate his punishment, and save himself  all the anguish 
of  thinking  on  its dreadful approaches?  He invades the 
business  of  providence  no  more  than the magistrate  did, 
who  ordered  his  execution;  and  his voluntary  death  is 
equally advantageous to society by ridding it of  a pernicious 
member. 
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esSAY  That  ssllicide  may often  be  consistent with  interest  and 
II. -  with our duty to ourselves, no one  ran question, who allows 
that age, sickness, or  misfortune may render life  a burthen, 
and maks it worse  even  than annihilation.  I believe that 
no  man ever threw  away life, while  it  was  worth keeping. 
For such is our natural horror of  death, that small motives 
will never be able to reconcile us to it; and though perhaps 
the situation of  a  man's  health  or fortune did not seem to 
require this remedy, we  may  at least be  assured, that any 
one who, without  apparent reason, has  had  recourse  to it, 
was curst with such an incurable depravity or gloominess of 
temper as must poison all enjoyment, and render him equally 
miserable as if  he had  been  loaded with the most grievous 
misfortunes. -  If  suicide  be  snpposed  a  crime,  'tis  only 
cowardice can impel us to it.  If it be  no crime, both pm- 
dence and courage should engage us to rid ourselves at once 
of existence, when it becomes a burthen.  'Tis  the only way 
that we can then be useful to society, by setting an example, 
which, if  imitated, would  preserve  to every one his chance 
for  happiness in life and would  effectually free him from  all 
danger or misery.' 
It would  be  easy  to  prove  that 
Suicide is as lawful under the Christian 
dispensation as it was to the Heathens. 
There is not a  single  text  of  Scripture 
which prohibits it.  That great ant1 in- 
fallible rule of  fi~ith  and pritctice which 
must controul all philosophy and hnman 
reasoning, has left us in this particular 
to our natural liberty.  Resignation to 
Proyidence  is indeed  recommended  in 
Scripture; but  that implies  only sub- 
mission to ills that are unavoidable, not 
to such as may be remedied by prudence 
or courage.  Thou shalt not kill, is evi- 
dently meant to exclude only the killing 
of  others  over whose  life  we  hare no 
authority.  That this precept. like most 
of the Scripture precepts, must be modi- 
fied  by  reason  and  common  sense,  is 
plain frbm the  practice  of  mi~gistrates, 
who  punish  criminals  capitally,  not- 
withstanding  the  letter  of  the  law. 
But  were  this commandment  ever  so 
express against  suicide,  it would  now 
hare no  authority, for  all the law  of 
Moses is abolished, except so far as it is 
established by the law of Nature.  And 
we hare already endeavoured  to prove, 
that suicide is  not  prohibited  by that 
law.  In  all  cases  Christians  and 
Heathens  are precisely upon  the same 
footing;  Cato and  Brutus, Arria  and 
Portia acted heroically ;  those who now 
imitate their  example ought to  receive 
the same praises from  posterity.  The 
power of committing suicide is regarded 
by  Pliny  as  an advantage which  men 
possess  even above  the  Deity himself. 
'  Deus  non  sibi  potest  mortem  con- 
sciscere  si  velit,  quod  homini  dedit 
optimum  in tantis vita  pcenis.'-Lib. 
ii. cap. 5. 
MSAY 
ESSAY  111.-Of  the Authenticity  qf  Onninn's Poems.l  -  IU 
I THINK  the fate of this production  the most curious effect of 
prejudice, where superstition had no share, that ever was in 
the world.  A tiresome, insipid performance ;  which, if it had 
been  presented  in its real form,  as the work of  a  contem- 
porary, an obscure Highlander, no man could ever have had 
the patience to have once  perused, has, by  passing  for the 
poetry of  a  royal bard, who flourished  fifteen centuries ago, 
been universally read, has been pretty generally admired, and 
has been translated, in prose and verse, into several languages 
of Europe.  Even the style of  the supposed English transl* 
tion  has  been  admired,  though  harsh  and  absurd  in the 
highest degree ;  jumping perpetually from verse to prose, and 
from prose  to verse;  and running, most of  it, in the light 
cadence and measure of  Molly Mog.  Such is the Erse epic, 
which has been puffed with a  zeal and enthusiasm that has 
drawn a ridicule on my countrymen. 
But, to cut off at once the whole source of  its reputation, I 
shall collect a few very obvious arguments against the notion 
of  its great antiquity, with which so many people have been 
intoxicated, and which alone made it  worthy of any attention. 
(1.)  The very  manner in which it was  presented  to the 
public forms a strong presumption against its authenticity. 
The pretended translator goes on a mission to the Highlands 
to  recover  and collect  a work, which,  he  affirmed, was dis- 
persed,  in  fragments, among the natives.  He returns, and 
gives  a quarto volume,  and then another  quarto, with  the 
same unsupported assurance as if it were a translation of the 
Orlando Furioso, or Louisade, or any poem the best-known  in 
Europe.  It might have been expected, at  least, that he would 
have told the public, and the subscribers to his mission, and 
he  purchasers of his book, This part I  got from such a person, 
in such a place;  that other part, from  such another person.  I 
was enabled  to  correct  my first  copy of  such  a passage  by  the 
recital of  such another person ;  a fourth  supplied such a defect 
in  my $rst  copy.  By such a history of his gradual discoveries 
he would have given some face of probability to them.  Any 
man of common sense, who was in earnest, must, in this case, 
' [Mr. Burton su  oses that this Es-  feeling towards Dr. Bla.ir.  See Burton's 
say, found  among  gume's  papers, was  Life of Hume, Vol. rr.  p. 86, and sq.- 
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ESSAY  have seen the peculiar necessity of  that precaution : any man  .  "I.  .  that had regard  to his own character, would have anxiously 
followed  that obvious and easy method.  All  the friends of 
the pret~nded  translator exhorted and entreated him to give 
them and the public that satisfaction.  No ! those who could 
doubt his veracity were fools, whom it was not worth while to 
satisfy.  The most incredible of  all facts mas to be taken on 
his word, whom nobody knew;  and an experiment was to be 
made, I suppose in jest,  how far the credulity of  the public 
would give way to assurance and dogmatical affirmation. 
(2.) But,  to show the utter incredibility of  the  fact,  let 
these following considerations be weighed, or, rather, simply 
reflected on ;  for it seems ridiculous to weigh them.  Consider 
the size of  these poems.  What is given us is as~ert~ed  to be 
only  a  part of  a  much  greater  collection ; yet  even these 
pieces  amount to two  quartos.  And  they were  composed, 
you  say, in the Highlands, about fifteen centuries ago; and 
have been faithfully transmitted, ever since, by oral tradition, 
through  ages totally  ignorant of  letters, by the rudest, per- 
haps, of all the European nations ;  the most necessitous, the 
most  turbulent, the most ferocious, and the most unsettled. 
Did ever any event happen that approached within a hundred 
degrees of  this mighty wonder, even to the nations the most 
fortunate in their climate and situation?  Can  a ballad  be 
shown that has passed, uncorrupted, by oral tradition, through 
three generations, among the Greeks, or Italians, or Ph~ni- 
cians,  or  Egyptians,  or  even  among  the  natives  of  such 
countries  as Otaheite or  Molacca,  who  seen1 exempted  by 
nature from all attention but to amusement, to poetry, and 
music ? 
But the Celtic nations, it is said, had peculiar advantages 
for preserving their traditional poetry.  The Irish, the Welsh, 
the Bretons, are all Celtic nations, much better entitled than 
the Highlanders, from their soil, and climate, and situation, 
to have  leisure for these  amusements.  They,  accordingly, 
present us not with coinplete epic and historical poems,  (for 
they never  had the assurance to go that length,) but with 
very copious and circumstantial traditions, which are allowed, 
by all men of sense, to be scandalous and ridiculous impostures. 
(3.) The style  and genius  of  these  pretended  poems  are 
another sufficient proof of the in~position. The Lapland and 
Runic odes, conveyed to us, besides their small compass, have 
a savage rudeness, and sometimes  grandeur, suited to those  ESSAY 
111.  ages.  But this Erse poetry has an insipid correctness, and  --+ 
regularity,  and  uniformity,  which  betrays  a  man without 
genius,  that has  been  acquainted  with  the productions  of 
civilized nations, and had his imagination so limited to that 
tract, that it was impossible for hiin even to mimic the cha- 
racter which he pretended to assume. 
The manners are still a more  striking proof of  their want 
of  authenticity.  We see nothing but the affected generosity 
and gallantry of  chivalry, which are quite unknown, not only 
to all savage people, but to every nation not trained in these 
artificial modes of  thinking.  In Homer, for  instance,  and 
Virgil, and Ariosto, the heroes  are represented ae making a, 
nocturnal incursion into the camp of  the enemy.  Homer and 
Virgil, who certainly were educated in  much  more  ci~ilized 
ages than those of  Ossian, make no scruple of  representing 
their heroes as committing undistinguished slaughter on the 
sleeping  foe.  But Orlando walks quietly through the camp 
of the Saracens, and scorns to kill even an infidel who cannot 
defend  himself.  Gaul  and  Oscar  are knight-errants,  still 
more romantic :  they make a noise in the midst of the enemy'a 
camp, that they may waken  them, and thereby have a right 
to  fight with  them and to kill  them.  Nay, Fingal carries 
his ideas of  chivalry  still farther;  much  beyond  what  was 
ever  dreamt of  by  Amadis  de  Gaul  or  Lancelot  de  Lake. 
When his territory is invaded, he scorns to repel the enemy 
with his whole force : he sends only an equal number against 
them, under an inferior captain : when these are repulsed, he 
sends a second detachment; and it is not till after a double 
defeat, that he deigns himself to descend from the hill, where 
he  had  remained,  all  the while,  an idle  spectator, and to 
attack the enemy.  Fingal and Swaran combat  each other 
all day, with the greatest  fury.  When  darkness  suspends 
the  fight, they feast together with  the greatest amity, and 
then renew the combat with the return of  light.  Are these 
the manners of barbarous nations, or even of people that have 
common sense P  We may remark, that all this narrative ia 
supposed to be given us by a contemporary poet.  The facts, 
therefore, must be supposed entirely, or nearly, conforinable 
to truth.  The gallantry and extreme delicacy towards  the 
women, which  is'found  in these productions, is, if  possible, 
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ESSAY  all rude nations, force and courage are the predominant vir-  . ,  tues ;  and the inferiority of the females, in these particulars, 
renders  them  an object of  contempt,  not of  deference and 
regard. 
(4.) But I derive a new asgument against the antiquity of 
these poems, from the general tenor of the narrative.  Where 
manners are represented in them, probability, or even possi- 
bility, are totally disregarded : but in all other respects, the 
events are within  the course of  nature; no giants, no mon- 
sters, no  magic, no incredible feats of  strength or activity. 
Every transaction is conformable to familiar experience, and 
scarcely even deserves the name of wonderful.  Did this ever 
happen  in  ancient  and  barbarous  poetry?  Why  is  this 
characteristic wanting,  so  essential  to  rude  and  ignorant 
ages?  Ossian, you say, was singing the exploits of  his con- 
temporaries, and therefore could not falsify them in any great 
degree.  But if  this had been  a  restraint, your  pretended 
Ossian had never sung the exploits of his contemporaries ;  he 
had gone back a  generation or two, which mould have been 
sufficient to throrr an entire obscurity on the events ;  and he 
would thereby have  attained the marvellous, which is alone 
striking to barbarians.  I desire it may be  observed, that 
manners are the only  circumstances which  a  rude  people 
cannot falsify ;  because they have no notion of  any manners 
beside their own: but it is easy for  them to let loose their 
imagination, and violate the course of  nature, in every other 
particular;  and  indeed  they take no pleasure  in any other 
kind of narrative.  In Ossian, nature is violated, where alone 
she ought to have been preserved;  is preserved where alone 
she ought to have been violated. 
(5.)  But there is another species of the marvellous, wanting 
in Ossian, which is inseparable  from all nations, civilized ae 
well as barbarous, but  still more, if  possible,  from the bar- 
barous,  and that is religion ;  no religious sentiment in this 
Erse  poetry.  All  those  Celtic  heroes  are  more  complete 
atheists than ever were bred in the school of  Epicurus.  To 
account for this singularity, we are told that a few generatioils 
before Ossian,  the people  quarrelled  with  their  Druidical 
~riests,  and having expelled them, never afterwards  adopted 
any other species of  religion.  It  is  not  quite unnatural, 1 
own, for the people to quarrel with their  priests,-as  we did 
with  ours  at the Reformation;  but  we  attached  ourselves 
with fresh zeal to our  new  preachers and new system;  and  ESSAY 
111. 
this passion increased in proportion to our hatred of  the old.  --+ 
But I suppose the reason of this strange absurdity in our new 
Erse poetry, is, that the author, finding by the assumed age 
of  his heroes, that he must have  given  then1 the ~ruidical 
religion,  and not trusting  to  his  literature,  (which  seenls 
indeed  to be  very  slenderj for  making the representatiolls 
consistent with antiquity, thought it  safest to give them 110 
religion at all ;  a circumstance so wonderfully unnaturitl, that 
it is sufficient alone, if men had eyes, to detect the imposition. 
(6.) The state of the arts, as represented in those poems, 
is totally incompatible with the age  assigned to them.  We 
know, that the houses even of the Southern Britons, till con- 
quered by the Romans, were nothing but huts erectecl in the 
woods ;  but a stately stone building is mentioned  by Ossiaal, 
of  which the walls remain, after  it is  consumed with fire. 
The n~elancholy  circumstance of a fox is described, who looks 
out at the windows ;  an image, if I be not mistaken, borrowed 
from the Scriptures.  The Caledonians, as well as the Irish, 
had no shipping but currachs, or wicker  boats  covered with 
hides : jet are they represented RY passing, in great military 
expeditions,  from the Hebrides  to Denmark,  Norway,  and 
Sweden ;  a  most  glaring absurdity.  They live entirely  by 
hunting, yet muster armies, which make incursions  to these 
countries as well as to Ireland : though  it is certain from 
the experience of  America, that the whole Highlands would 
scarce  subsist  a  hundred  persons  by  hunting.  They  are 
totally  unacquainted with fishing ;  though  that occupation 
first tempts all rude nations  to venture on the sea.  Ossia~l 
alludes  to a wind or water-mill, s  machine then uiiknown to 
the  Greeks  and Romans, according to the opinion  of  the 
best antiquaries.  His barbarians, though ignorant of tillage, 
are well acquainted with the method of  working all kinds of 
metals.  The harp is the musical instrument of  Ossian; but 
the bagpipe,  from time  immemorial, has been  the instru- 
ment of the Highlanders.  If ever the harp had been kllow~~ 
among them, it never had given place to the other barbarous 
discord. 
Strident1 miserum stipula disperdere carmen. 
(7.)  All the historical  facts of  this poem  are opposed  by 
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BAY ible, seem  to merit much  more  attention.  The Irish Scoti  -md  are the undoubted ancestors of the present Highlanders, who 
are but a small coldny of that ancient people.  But the Irish 
traditions  make  Fingal,  Ossian,  Oscar,  all  Irishmen,  and 
place  them  some  centuries  distant from  the  Erse  heroes. 
They represent them as giants, and monsters, and enchanters, 
a sure mark of  a  considerable  antiquity of  these traditions. 
1 ask the partisans of  Erse poetry, since the names of  these 
heroes  have  crept  over to Ireland, and  have  become  quite 
familiar to the natives of  that country, how it happens, that 
not a  line of  this poetry, in which  they are all  celebrated, 
which, it is pretended, alone  preserves  their  memory with 
our  Highlanders,  and which  is  cornposed by  one  of  these 
heroes  themselves in  the Irish language, ever found its way 
thither?  The  songs and  traditions  of  the  Senachies,  the 
genuine  poetry  of  the Irish,  carry  in  their  rudeness  and 
absurdity  the inseparable  attendants  of  barbarism,  a  yery 
different aspect  from  the  insipid  correctness  of  Ossian ; 
where  the incidents, if  you  will  pardon  the antithesis,  are 
the most  unnatural, merely because  they are natural.  The 
same  observation  extends  to  the  Welsh,  another  Celtic 
nation. 
(8.)  The fiction  of  these  poems  is, if  possible, still  more 
palpably detected, by the great numbers of  other traditions, 
which, the author pretends, are still fresh in the Highlands, 
with regard to all the personages.  The poems, composed in 
the age of  Truthil and  Cormac, ancestors of  Ossian, are, he 
says, full of  complaints against the roguery and tyranny of 
*  the  Druids.  He talks as  familiarly of  the poetry of  that 
period as Lucian  or  Longinus would of  the Greek poetry of 
the  Socratic age.  I  suppose  here  is  a,  new  rich  mine of 
poetry ready to break  out upon  us, if  the author thinks it 
can turn to account.  For  probably he does not  mind the 
danger of  detection, which he has little reason to apprehend 
from  his  experience of  the public  credulity.  But I shall 
venture to assert, without  any reserve  or  further inquiry, 
that there is no Highlander who is not, in some  degree, a 
man of letters, that ever so much as heard there was a Druid 
in the world.  The margin of every page almost of this won- 
derful  production  is  supported,  as  he  pretends,  by  minute 
oral traditions with regard to the personages.  To the poem 
of  Dar-thula, there is  prefixed  a  long account of  the pedi- 
gree, marriages, and  adventures  of  three  brothers, Nathos,  ESSAY 
Althos, and Ardan, heroes  that lived  fifteen hundred years ,  _, 
ago  in Argyleshire,  and  whose  metnory, it  seems,  is  still 
celebrated there, and in every part of  the Highlands.  How 
ridiculous to advance such a pretension  to the learned, who 
know that there is no tradition of  Alexander  the great all 
over the East ;  that the Turks, who have heard of  him from 
their coinmunication  with  the Greeks, believe  him to have 
been the captain of  Solomon's  guard; that the  Greek and 
Roman  story,  the  monient  it  departs from  the  historical 
ages, becomes a  heap of  fiction  and absurdity;  that Cyrus 
himself,  the  conqueror  of  the  East, became  so  much  un- 
known, even in little more than half a century, that Iierodotus 
himself,  born  and  bred  in  Asia,  within  the limits  of  the 
Persian  empire,  could  tell  nothing  of  him,  more  than of 
Croesus, the contemporary of  Cyrus, and who reigned in the 
neighbourhood  of  the  historian,  but  the  most  ridiculous 
fables;  and that the grandfather of  Hengist and Horsa, the 
first  Saxon  conquerors, was  conceived  to be  a divinity.  I 
suppose it is  sufficiently evident, that without  the help  of 
books  and history, the very name of  Julius  C~esar  would  at 
present be totally unknown  in Europe.  A  gentleman, who 
travelled  into Italy,  told  me,  that in  visiting  Frescati  or 
Tusculum, his cicerone showed him the foundation and ruins 
of  Cicero's  country house.  He asked  the  fellow  who  this 
Cicero might be, '  Un grandissimo gigante,'  satid he. 
(9.)  I ask, since  the memory of  Fingal  and his ancestors 
and descendants is  still  so  fresh in the Highlands, how  it 
happens, that none of  the conipilers of  the Scotch  fabulous 
history ever laid hold of  them, and inserted them in the list 
of  our  ancient  nionarchs, but  we  were  obliged to have  re- 
course to direct fiction and lying to make out their genealo- 
gies P  It is to be remarked, that the Highlanders, who  are 
now but an inferior part of  the nation, anciently con~posed 
the whole ;  so that no tradition of  theirs could be unknown 
to the court, the nobility, and the whole  kingdom.  Where, 
then,  have  these  wonderful  traditions  skulked  during  so 
many  centuries,  that  they  have  never  come  to light till 
yesterday P  And  the very names of  our  ancient kings  are 
unknown ; though  it is  pretended,  that a  very  particular 
narrative of  their  transactions  was still preserved, and uni- 
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ESSAY  original stem of the nation.  Father Innes, the only judicious 
I:'.  writer that ever touched  our  ancient history, finds in mon- 
astic records the names, and little more  than the names, of 
kings from  Fergus, whom  we  call  Fergus the Second, who 
lived long after the supposed Fingal : and he thence  begins 
the true history of  the nation.  He had  too  good  sense to 
give  any attention  to pretended  traditions  even  of  kings, 
much  less would be have believed  that the memory and ad- 
ventures  of  every leader  of  banditti  in  every  valley of  the 
Highlands, could be circumstantially preserved by oral tradi- 
tion through more than fifteen centuries. 
(10.) I shall observe,  that  the  character  of  the author, 
from all his publications, (for I shall mention nothing else,) 
gives us the greatest reason  to suspect him of  such a ludi- 
crous  imposition on the public.  For to be  sure it is only 
ludicrous ;  or at most a trial of wit, like that of  the sophist, 
who gave us Phalaris'  Epistles, or of  him that counterfeited 
Cicero's Consolation, or supplied the fragments of Petronius. 
These  literary  amusements  have  been  very  common ;  and 
unless supported by too violent asseverations, or persisted  in 
too long, never drew the opprobrious appellation of impostor 
on the author. 
He writes an ancient history of  Britain, which  is plainly 
ludicrous.  He gives us a long circumstantial history of  the 
emigrations of  the Belgae, Cimbri, and Sarmatae, so unsup- 
ported  by any author of  antiquity that nothing but  a pu- 
ticular  revelation  could warrant  it; and yet it is delivered 
with  such  seeming  confidence, (for we  must  not  think he 
was  in earnest,) that the history of  the  Punic  wars  is not 
related with greater  seriousness by Livy.  He has even left 
palpable contradictions  in his narrative, in order to try the 
faith of his reader.  He tells us, for instance, that the present 
inhabitants  of  Germany  have no  more connexion with  the 
Germans  mentioned  by Tacitus, than  with  the  ancient in- 
hk~bitants  of  Peloponnesus : the Saxons  and Angles, in  par- 
ticular, were all Sarmatians, a  quite different tribe from the 
Germans, in  manners, laws, language, and  customs.  Yet a 
few  pages after, when  he  pretends to deliver the  origin  of 
the  Anglo-Saxon  constitution,  he  professedly  derives  the 
whole account from  Tacitus.  All  this  was  only an experi- 
ment to see how far the force of  affirmation could impose on 
the credulity of  the public : but it did  not succeed ;  he was 
here irr  the open  daylight of  Greek  and Roman erudition, 
not in the obscurity of  his Erse poetry and traditions.  Find- 
ing the style of  his Ossian admired by some, he attempts a, 
translation  of  Homer  in the  very same style.  He begins 
and finishes,  in  six  weeks,  a  work  that was  for  ever  to 
eclipse  the translation  of  Pope,  whom  he  does  not  even 
deign to mention in his preface ;  but this joke was still more 
unsuccessful:  he made  a  shift, however, to bring the work 
to a second edition, where he says, that, notwithstanding all 
the envy  of  his  malignant  opponents, his name  alone  will 
preserve the work to a more equitable posterity ! 
In short, let him now  take off  the mask,  and fairly and 
openly  laugh  at the  credulity  of  the  public,  who  could 
believe that long Erse epics had been  secretly preserved in 
the Highlands of  Scotland, from  the age of  Severus till  his 
time. 
The  imposition  is so  gross,  that he  may  well  ask  the 
world  how  they  could  ever  possibly  believe  him  to be  in 
earnest  P 
But it may reasonably be  expected  that I should mention 
the external positive evidence, which is brought by Dr. Blair 
to support the authenticity of these poems.  I own, that this 
evidence, considered  in itself, is very respectable, and suffi- 
cient to support any fact, that both lies within the bounds of 
credibility, and has not become a matter of  party.  But will 
any man  pretend to  bring human testimony to prove, that 
above twenty  thousand  verses  have  been  transmitted,  by 
tradition  and  memory,  dnring  more  than fifteen hundred 
years;  that is,  above  fifty  generations,  according  to the 
ordinary course of  nature? verses,  too,  which  have not, in 
their  subject, any thing  alluring or inviting to the people, 
no miracle, no wonders, no  superstitions, no useful instruc- 
tion ;  a people, too, who, during twelve centuries, at  least, of 
that period, had no writing, no  alphabet ;  and who, even in 
the other three centuries, made very little use of that imper- 
fect  alphabet  for  any  purpose;  a  people who,  from  the 
miserable disadvantages of  their soil and climate, were per- 
petually struggling with the greatest necessities of  naiure ; 
who, from the imperfections of  government, lived in a con- 
tinual  state of  internal hostility;  ever  harassed  with the 
incursions of neighbouring tribes, or meditating revenge and 
retaliation on their neighbours.  Have  such a people leisure 
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to think of any poetry, except, perhaps, a miserable song or 
ballad,  in praise of  their own  chieftain, or to the disparage- 
merit of his rivals ? 
I should  be  sorry  to  be  suspected  of  saying any  thiiig 
against the manners of  the present  Highlanders.  I really 
believe that, besides  their  signal  bravery, there is not any 
people  in Europe, not even excepting the Swiss, who  have 
]nore  plain  honesty and  fidelity, are more capable of  grati- 
tude  and  attachment, than that race of  men.  Yet it was, 
no  doubt, a  great  surprise to then1 to  hear  that, over  and 
above their known  good  qualities, they were also  possessed 
of  an excellence  which  they  never  dreamt  of,  an  elegant 
taste  in poetry,  and inherited from  the most  remote  anti- 
quity the finest compositions of  that kind, far surpassing the 
popular traditional poems of any other language;  no wonder 
they crowded  to give  testimony in favour  of  their  authen- 
ticity.  Most of them, no doubt, were sincere in the delusion ; 
the  same  names  that were  to  be  found  in  their  popular 
ballads  were  carefully  preserved  in  the new  publication ; 
some  incidents, too, were perhaps  transferred  from  the one 
to the other; some  sentiments  also  might  be  copied ;  and, 
on the  whole, they were willing to believe,  and still more 
willing to persuade others, that the whole was genuine.  On 
such  occasions, the greatest  cloud  of  witnesses  niakes  no 
manner  of  evidence.  What Jansenist was  there in Paris, 
which contains several thousands, that would not have given 
evidence  for  the miracles of  Abbe  Paris ?  The miracle is 
greater, but not the evidence, with regard to the authenticity 
of  Ossian. 
The  late President  Forbes  was  a  greak  believer  in the 
second  sight; and I make no  question  but  he  could, on a 
month's  warning, have overpowered you with evidence in its 
favour.  But as finite  added  to finite  never  approaches  a 
hair's breadth nearer to infinite ;  so a fact, incredible in itself, 
;Lcquires  not the smallest accession of probability by the accu- 
mulation of testimony. 
The only real wonder in the whole  affair is, that a person 
of so fine a tnste as Dr. Blair, should be so great an admirer 
of  these  productions ;  and one of  so clear and  cool a judg- 
ment collect evidence of  their authenticity. 
LETTER TO  THE AUTHORS OF THE 
CRITICAL REVIEW CONCERNING THE EPIGONIAD 
To the Authors of  the Critical Review. 
April, 1760. 
GENTLEMEN,  The great  advantages  which  result  from 
literary  journals  have  recommended  the use  of  them  all 
over Europe ;  but as nothing is free from  abuse, it must be 
confessed that some inconveniences have also attended these 
undertakings.  The works of  the learned multiply in such a 
surprising manner, that a journalist,  in order to give an ac- 
count to the public  of  ail  liew performanc-es, is  obliged  to 
peruse a. small library every month, and  as it is  impossible 
for him to bestow equal attention on  every  piece which  he 
critioises,  he may readily  be  surprised  into mistakes,  and 
give to a book such a character as, on a more careful perusal, 
he  would  willingly  retract.  Even  perforniances  of  the 
greatest merit are not secure  against this injury ;  and, per- 
haps, are sometimes the most  exposed  to it.  An  author of 
genius scorrrs the vulgar arts of  catching applause : he pays 
no court to the great : gives no adula'tion to  those celebrated 
for learning : takes no care to provide himself  of  partisans, 
or pronetors, as the French call them : and by that means his 
work  steals  unobserved  into  the  world : and it is  some 
time before the public, and even men of penetration, are sen- 
sible of its merit.  We take up the book with prepossession, 
peruse it carelessly, are feebly affected by its beauties,  and 
lay it down with neglect, perhaps with disapprobation. 
The public has done so milch justice to the gentlemen en- 
gaged  ill  the Cr tical  Review,  as  to  acknowledge  that no 
literary journal  was  ever  carried  on  in this  country  with 
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equal spirit and  impartiality : yet, I must  confess that an 
article published  in your  Review  of  1757,  gave  me  great 
surprise,  and not a  little  uneasiness.  It  regarded  a  book 
called  the  Epigoniad,  a  poem  of  the epic kind, which was 
at that time  published with great  applause at Edinburgh, 
and of which a few copies had been sent up to London.  The 
author of  that article had  surely  been  lying  under  strong 
prspossessions,  when  he  spoke  so  negligently  of  a  work 
which abounds in snch sublime beauties, and could endeavour 
to discredit a poem, consisting of  near six thousand lines, on 
account of  a few mistakes  in expression  and  prosody, pro- 
ceeding  entirely from the author's being  a Scotchman, who 
had never been out of  his own  country.  As there is  a new 
edition published of  this poem,  wherein all or most of  these 
trivial mistakes are corrected, I flatter myself  that you will 
gladly lay hold of  this opportunity of  retracting your  over- 
sight, and doing justice  to a performance, which may, per- 
ba,ps, be regarded as one of  the ornaments  of  our language. 
I appeal  from your sentence, as  an old woman  did  from a 
eentence pronounced by Philip of  Macedon :-I  appeal from 
Philip, ill-counselled and in a hurry, to Philip, well-advised, 
and judging  with  deliberation.  The authority  which  you 
possess with the public makes your censure fall with weight : 
and I question  not but you will be the more ready, on that 
account, to redress any injury into which  either negligence, 
prejudice, or mistake, may have betrayed  you.  As I profess 
myself to be an admirer of this performance, it  will afford me 
pleasure to give you a short analysis of  it, and to collect  a 
few specimens of those great beauties in which it abounds. 
The author, who appears throughout his whole work to be 
a great admirer and imitator of  Homer, drew the subject of 
this  poem  from  the  fourth  Iliad,  where  Sthenelus  gives 
Agamemr.on  a short account of the sacking of  Thebes.  After 
the fall of those heroes, celebrated by Statius, their sons, and 
among the rest  Diomede, undertook  the siege  of  that city, 
atld were so fortunate  as to sncceed in their enterprize, and 
to  revenge on the Thebans and the  tyrant Creon the death of 
their fathers.  These young heroes were known to  the Greeks 
under the title  of  the Epigoni,  or tlhe descendants ;  and for 
this reason the author has  given  to his poem  the  title  of 
Epigoniad,  a  name,  itl must  be  confessed  somewhat un- 
fortunately chosen, fix as  thie  particular was known orAly  to 
a very few of  the learned, the public were not  able to con- 
jecture what could be the subject of  the poem, and were apt 
to neglect what it was impossible for them to understand. 
There remained a tradition among the Greeks, that Homer 
had taken the siege of  Thebes for the subject of a poem, which 
is lost ;  and our author seems to have pleased  himself  with 
the thought of  reviving the work,  as well  as of  treading in 
the footsteps of his favourite author.  The actors are mostly 
the  same  with  those  of  the Iliad : Diomede  is  the hero: 
Ulysses, Agamemnon, Menelaus, Nestor, Idomeneus, Merion, 
even Thersites, all appear in different passages of  the poem, 
and act parts suitable to the lively characters drawn of them 
by that  great master.  The  whole  turn of  this  new poem 
would almost lead us to imagine that the Scottish bard  had 
found the lost manuscript of  that father of  poetry, and had 
made a  faithful translation  of  it into  English.  Longinus 
imagines that the Odyssey was executed by Homer in his old 
age ;  we  shall allow the Iliad to be the work of  his middle 
age; and we  shall suppose that the Epigoniad was the essay 
of  his  youth, tvhere  his  noble  and  sublime  genius  breaks 
forth by frequent  intervals, and  gives  strong syniptoms  of 
that constant flame which distinguished its meridian. 
The poem consists of nine books.  We shall open the sub- 
ject of it in the author's  own words : 
Ye pow'rs  of song ! with whose immortal fire 
Your bard enraptur'd  sung Pelides' ire, 
To Greece so fatal, when in evil hour, 
He brav'd,  in stern debate, the sov'reign  pow'r, 
By like example teach me now to show 
From love, no less, what dire disasters flow. 
For when the youth of Greece, by Theseus led, 
Return'd to conquer where their fathers bled, 
And punish guilty  Thebcs, by Heav'n  ordain'd 
For perfidy to fall, and oath:  profan'd ; 
Venus, still partial to the Theban arms, 
Tydeus' son seduc'd by female charms ; 
Who, from his plightcd faith  by passion sway'd, 
The chiefs, the army, and himself betray'd. 
This theme did once your favourite bard employ, 
Whose verse immortaiiz'd  the fall of Troy : 
But time's oblivious gulf, whose circle draws 
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In whose wide vortex worlds themselves are toat, 
And rounding swift successively are lost, 
This song hath snatch7d.  I now resume the strain, 
Not from proud hope and emulation vain, 
By this attempt to merit equal praise 
With worth heroic, born in happier days. 
Sooner the weed, that with the Spring appears, 
And in the Summer's heat its blossom bears, 
But, shriv'ling at the touch of Winter hoar, 
Sinks to its native earth, and is no more ; 
Might match the lofty oak, which long hath stood, 
From age to age, the monarch of the wood. 
But love excites me, and desire to trace 
Kis glorious steps, tho' with unequal pace. 
Before me still I see his awful shade, 
With garlands crown'd  of leaves which never fade; 
He points the path to fame, and bids me scale 
Parnassus'  slipp'ry  height, where thousands fail: 
I follow trembling ; for the cliffs are.  high, 
And hov'ring round them watchful harpies fly, 
To snatch the poet's wreath with envious claws, 
And hiss contempt for merited applause. 
The poet  supposes that Cassandra, the  daughcer  of  the 
King of  Pelignium  in  Italy,  was  pursued  by  the love  of 
Ectretus, a barbarous tyrant in  the neighbourhood ;  and as 
her father rejected his addresses, he drew on himself the re- 
sentment of  the tyrant, who made war upon him, and forced 
him  to  retire  into  Etolia,  where  Diomede gave  him  pro- 
tection.  This hero falls himself in love with Cassandra, and 
is so fortunate as to make equal impression on her heart ;  but 
before the completion  of  his  marriage, he  is  called  to the 
siege of  Thebes, and leaves,  as he  supposes, Cassandra  in 
Etolia  with her  father.  But  Cassandra,  anxious  for  her 
lover's safety, and unwilling  to part from the object  of  her 
affections, had secretly put on a  nian's  habit, had  attended 
hinl  in  the  camp,  and had  fought  by his  side in  all  his 
battles.  Meanwhile the siege of  Thebes is drawn out to some 
length, and Venus,  who  favours  that  city, in  opposition to 
Juno and  Pallas, who seek  its destruction, deliberates con- 
cerning the proper method  of  raising the siege.  The fittest 
expedient seems to be the exciting in Diomede a jeadousy  of 
Cassandra,  and  persuading  him  that  her  affections  were 
secretly engaged too  Ectrctus, and that the tyrmt had invaded 
Etolia in  pursuit  of  his  mistress.  For this purpose Venus 
sends down Jealousy, whom the author personifies under the 
name of  ZelotypB.  Her person al~d  flight are painted in the 
most splendid colours that poetry affords : 
First to her feet the winged shoes she binds, 
Which tread the air, and mount the rapid winds: 
Aloft they bear her thro' th' ethereal plain, 
Above the solid earth and licluid main : 
Her arrows next she takes of  pointed  steel, 
For sight too small, but terrible to feel : 
Rous'd  by  their smart the savage lion roars, 
And mad to combat rush the tusky boars, 
Of wounds secure ; for where their venom lights, 
What feels their power all other torments slights. 
A fignr'd  zone, mysteriously  design'd, 
Around her waist her yellow robe confin'd : 
There dark Suspicion lurk'd, of sable hue; 
There hasty Rage his deadly dagger drew ; 
Pale Envy inly pin'd : and by her side 
Stood Phrenzy, raging with his chains unty'd ; 
~ffron(ed  Pride with thirst of vengeance burn'd, 
And Love's excess to deepest hatred turn'd. 
All these the artist's curious hand express'd, 
The work divine his matchless skill confess'd. 
The  virgin last, around her shoulders flung 
The bow ; and by her side the quiver hung ; 
Then, springing up, her airy course she bends, 
For Thebes;  and lightly o'er  the tents descends. 
The son of Tydeus, 'midst his bands, she found 
In  arms complete, reposing on the ground : 
And, as he slept, the hero thus addrese'd, 
Her form to fancy's waking eye express'd. 
Diomede, moved by the instigations of jealousy, and eager 
t,o defend his  mistress and his country, calls an  assembly of 
the princes, and proposes to raise the siege of  Thebes, on  ac- 
count of  the  difficulty of  the enterprize, a'nd dangers which 
surround  the army.  Theseus,  the general, breaks out  into 
a  passion  at  this  proposal:  but  is  pacified  by  Nestor. 
Idomeneus rises,  and reproaches Diomede for his dishonour- 
able counsel, and among other topics, upbraids him with his 
degeneracy from his father's bravery. 
Should now, from hence arriv'd, some warrior's ghont 
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And tell, when danger or distress is near, 
That Diomed persuades the rest to  fear : 
He'd shun the synod of  the mighty dead, 
And hide his anguish in the deepest shade : 
Nature in all an equal course ma.intains : 
The lion's whelp succeeds to awe the plains : 
Pards gender pards : from tigers tigers spring, 
Nor doves are hatch'd  beneath a vultur's wing: 
Each parent's image in his offspring lives : 
But nought cf Tydeus in his son survives. 
The  debate is  closed  by Ulysses, who  informs  tho  princes 
that the Thebans  are preparing  to march  out in order to 
attack them; and that it is vain for them to deliberate any 
longer  concerning thc conclusion of  the war. 
We have next a  description of  a battle  between the The- 
bans,  under  Creon,  and  the  confederate  Greeks,  under 
Theseus.  The battle is full of the spirit of Homer.  We shail 
not trouble our reader with  particulars, which would  appear 
insipid in prose, especially if  compared to the lively poetry of 
our  author.  We shall  only  transcribe  one  passage,  as  a, 
specimen of his happy choice of  circumstances : 
Next Arcas, Cleon, valiant Chromeus dy'd ; 
With Dares, to the Spartan chiefs ally'd. 
And Phcemius, whom the gods in earIy youth 
Had form'd for virtue and the love of truth ; 
His gen'roua soul to noble deeds they turn'd, 
And love to mankind in his bosom burn'd: 
Cold thro' his throat the hissing weapon glidee, 
And on his neck the waving locks divides. 
His fate the Graces mourn'd.  The gods above, 
Who sit around the starry throne of Jove, 
On high Olympus bending from the skies, 
His fate beheld with sorrow-streaming  eyes. 
Pallas alone, unalter'd  and serene, 
With secret triumph saw the mournhl scene. 
Not hard of heart : for none of all the pow're, 
In earth or ocean, or th' Olympian tow'rs, 
Holds equal sympathy with human grief, 
Or with a freer hand bestows relief: 
But conscious that a mind by virtue steel'd 
To no impression of distress will yield ; 
That, still unconquer'd,  in its awful hour 
O'er  death it triumphs with immortal pow'r. 
The battle ends with advantage to the confederate Greeks : 
but the approach of night prevents their total victory. 
Creon,  king  of  Thebes,  sends  next  an  embassy  to the 
confederate  Greeks,  desiring  a  truce  of  seven  days,  in 
order  to  bury  the  dead.  Diomede,  impatient  to  return 
home,  and  stimulated  by  jealousy,  violently  opposes  this 
overture,  but it is over-ruled by the other princes,  and  the 
truce  is  concluded.  The  author,  in imitation of  Homer, 
and the  other  ancient  poets, takes  here  an opportunity  of 
describing games  celebrated  for honouring  the dead.  The 
games  he  has chosen  are  different  from  those  which  are 
to be found  among the ancients, and the incidents  are new 
and curious. 
Diomede  took no  share in  these  games : his  impatient 
spirit could not brook the delay which arose from the truce : 
he pretends that he consented not to it, and is not included 
in it: he therefore proposes to his troops to attack the The- 
bans while they are employed in performing the funeral rites 
of the dead; but is opposed in this design by  Deiphobus  his 
tutor, who represents to him in the severest  terms the rash- 
ness and iniquity of  his proposal.  After  some altercation, 
Diomede, impatient of  contradiction in his favourite  object, 
and stung by the free reproaches of his tutor, breaks out into 
a violent passion, and throws his spear at Deiphobus, which 
pierced him to the heart. 
This incident, which  is apt to  surprize us, seems to have 
been copied by our author, from that circumstance in the life 
of Alexander, where this heroic  conqueror, moved  by s  sud- 
den passion, stabs Clytus his ancient friend, by whom his life 
had  been  formerly  saved  in  battle.  The  repentance  of 
Diomede is equal to that  of  Alexander.  No sooner had he 
struck the fatal blow than his eyes are opened :  he is sensible 
of  his guilt and shame ;  he refuses all consolation ;  abstains 
even from food :  and shutfi himself up alone in his tent.  Hia 
followers,  amazed  at the violence  of  his passion, keep at a 
distance from him : all but  Cassandra, who  enters  his tent 
with a potion, which she had prepared  for him.  While she 
stands before him alone, her timidity and passion betray her 
sex : and Diomede immediately perceives her to be Cassandra, 
who had followed him to the camp, under a warlike disguise. 
As his repentance for the murder of  Deiphobus was now  the 
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for Cassandra :  on the contrary, he considers her as the cause, 
however  innocent, of  the murder  of  his  friend, and  of  his 
own guilt; and he treats her with such coldness that she re- 
tires in confusion.  She even  leaves the camp, and  resolves 
to return to her father in Etolia ;  but is taken on the road by 
a party of  Thebans, who  carry her  to Creon.  That tyrant 
determines to make the most  political use  of  this incident : 
he sends privately a message to Diomede, threatening to put 
Cassandra to death, if that hero would not agree to a separate 
truce with Thebes.  This proposal is at first rejected by Dio- 
mede,  who  threatens  immediate  destruction  to  Creon and 
all his race.  Nothing can be more artfully managed by the 
poet  than this  incident.  We shall  hear  him  in  his  own 
words : 
Sternly the hero ended, and resign'd, 
To fierce disorder, all his mighty mind. 
Already in his thoughts, with vengeful hands, 
He dealt destruction 'midst  the Theban bande, 
In fancy saw the tott'ring turrets fall, 
And led his warriors o'er the level'd  wall. 
Kcus'd with the thought, from his high seat he sprung, 
And grasp'd the sword, which on a colunln hung; 
The shining blade he balanc'd  thrice in air ; 
His lances next he view'd, and armour fair. 
When, hanging 'midst the costly panoply, 
A scarf embroider'd met the hero's eye, 
Which fair Cassandra's skilful hands had wrought, 
A present for her lord, in secret brought 
That day, when first he led his martial train 
In arms, to combat on the Theban plain. 
As some strong charm, which magic sounds compose, 
Suspends a downward torrent as it flows ; 
Checks in the precipice its headlong course, 
And calls it trembling upwards to its source : 
Such seem'd  the robe, which, to the hero's  eyes, 
Made the fair artist in her charms to rise. 
His rage, suspended in its full career, 
To love resigns, to grief and tender fear. 
Glad would he now his former words revoke, 
And change the purpose which in wrath he spoke; 
From hostile hands his captive fair to gain, 
Prom fate to save her, or the servile chain : 
But pride, and shame, the fond design supprest ; 
Silent he stood, and lock'd  it in his breast. 
Yet had the wary Theban well divin7d, 
By symptoms sure, each motion of his mind : 
With joy he saw the heat of rage suppress7d  ; 
And thus again his artful words address'd. 
The truce is concluded for twenty days ;  but the perfidious 
Creon, hoping that Diomede would be overawed by the danger 
of his mistress, resolves to surprise the Greeks;  and accord- 
ingly makes a  sudden  attack upon  them, breaks  into their 
camp, and carries everything before him.  Diomede at first 
stands neuter ;  but when Ulysses suggests to him, that after 
the defeat of the confederate Greeks, he has no security ;  and 
that so treacherous a prince  as Creon will  not spare,  much 
less restore Cassandra, he takes to arms, assaults the Thebans, 
and obliges them, to seek shelter within their walls.  Creon, 
in revenge, puts Cassandra  to death,  and shews  her head 
over  the  walls.  This sight so  inflames  Diomede, that  he 
attacks Thebes with double fury, takes the town  by scalade, 
and gratifies his vengeance by the death of Creon. 
This is a  short abstract of  the story on which  this new 
poem is founded.  The reader may perhaps conjecture (what 
I am not very anxious to conceal) that the execution of  the 
Epigoniad is better  than the design, the poetry superior to 
the  fable,  and  the colouring  of  the particular  parts  more 
excellent  than the general plan  of  the whole.  Of  all the 
great epic poems which  have  been  the admiration  of  inan- 
kind, the Jerusalem of  Tasso  alone would  make  a  tolerable 
novel, if reduced to prose, and related without that splendour 
of  versification and imagery by which  it is supported: yet 
in the opinion of  many great judges, the Jerusalem  is the 
least perfect of  all these productions :  chiefly, because it has 
least nature  and  simplicity  in the sentiments, and is most 
liable to the objection of  affectation and conceit.  The story 
of  a poem,  whatever may be imagined, is the least essential 
part of  it :  the force of  the versification, the vivacity of  the 
images, the justness  of  the descriptions, the iiatural play of 
the passions, are the chief  circumstances which distinguish 
hhe  great poet  from  the prosaic  novelist,  and give  him  so 
high a rank among the heroes in literature ;  and I will ven- 
ture to affirm, that all these advantages, especially the three 
former, are to be  found in an eminent  degree  in the  Epi- 
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and smit with the most profound veneration for Homer, dis- 
dains all  frivolous ornaments ;  and relying  entirely  on  his 
sublime imagination,  and his nervous  and harmonious  ex- 
pression, has ventured  to present to  his  reader  the  naked 
beauties of  nature, and challenges for  his partizans  all the 
admirers of  genuine antiquity. 
There is one circumstance  in which  the poet  has carried 
his boldness  of  copying  antiquity  beyond  the practice  of 
many,  even  judicious  moderns.  He has  drawn  his  per- 
sonages,  not  only  with  all the  simplicity  of  the  Grecian 
heroes, but also  with  some  degree  of  their roughness,  and 
even of their ferocity.  This is a circumstance which a mere 
modern  is  apt to find  fault  with  in  Homer,  and  which 
perhaps he will not easily excuse in his imitator.  It  is cer- 
tain, that the ideas of  manners are so much changed  since 
the age of  Homer, that though the Iliad was always arnong 
the ancients co~lceived  to be a panegyric on the Greeks, yet the 
reade;.  is now  almost always on the side of the Trojans, and is 
much more interested for the humane and soft  ma,nners of 
Priain,  Hector,  Andromache,  Sarpedon,  Xneas,  Glaucus, 
nay, even of  Paris and Helen, than for the severe and cruel 
bravery  of  Achilles,  Agamemnon,  and  the  other  Grecian 
heroes.  Sensible  of  this  inconvenience,  Fenelon,  in  his 
elegant  romance,  has  softened  extremely the harsh  man- 
ners  of  the  heroic  ages,  and  has  contented  himself  with 
retaining that amiable  simplicity by which those ages were 
distinguished.  If the reader be displeased, that the British 
poet has not followed  the example of  the French writer, he 
must, at least, allow that he has drawn  a  more  exact and 
faithful copy of  antiquity, and has made  fewer  sacrifices of 
truth to ornament. 
There is another circumstance of  our author's choice which 
will be liable to dispute.  It may be  thought that by intro- 
ducing the heroes  of  Homer, he has lost all the charin of 
novelty,  and leads us into fictions which are somewhat stale 
and thread-bare.  Boileau, the greatest critic of  the French 
nation, was of a very different opinion : 
La fable offre  l'esprit  mille agrements divers 
La tous les noms heureux semblent nez pour les vers : 
Ulysse, Agamernnon, Oreste, Idomenee, 
Helene, Menelas, Paris, Hector, Enee. 
It is certain that there is in that poetic ground a kind of 
enchantment  which  allures  every  person  of  a  tender  and 
lively  imagination ;  nor is this impression diminished, but 
rather much increased, by our early introduction to  the know- 
ledge of it in our perusal of the Greek and Latin classics. 
The same great French critic makes  the apology of  our 
poet in his use of  the ancient mythology : 
Ainsi dans cet amas de nobles fictions, 
Le poet s'egeye en mille inventions, 
Orne, eleve, embellit, aggrandit toutes choses, 
Et  trouve sous sa  main des fleurs toujours ecloses. 
It would seem, indeed, that if the machinery of the heathen 
gods be not admitted, epic poetry, at least all the marvellous 
part of it, must be entirely abandoned.  The Christian reli- 
gion, for many reasons, is unfit  for  the fabulous  ornaments 
of  poetry :  the introduction of  allegory, after the manner of 
Voltaire, is liable to many objections :  and though a  mere 
historica,l epic poem, like Leonidas, may have  its beauties, 
it will always be inferior to the force and pathetic of tragedy, 
and must resign  to that species  of  poetry  the precedency 
which the former composition has always challenged among 
the productions of  human genius.  But with regard to these 
particulars, the author has himself  made a sufficient apology 
in the  judicious  and spirited preface which accolnpanies  his 
poem. 
But though our poet has in  general follow$  so  success- 
fully the footsteps of  Homer, he has, in particular passages, 
chosen other ancient poets for his model.  His seventh book 
contains an episode, very  artfully  inserted,  concerning  the 
death of  Hercules: where  he has plainly had  Sophocles in 
his riew, and has ventured to engage in a rivalship with that 
great master  of  the tragic scene.  If the sublimity of  our 
poet's  imagination, and the energy of  his style, appear any 
where conspicuous, it is in this episode, which we  shall not 
scruple to compare with aiiy poetry in the Engli~h  langua,ge. 
Nothing  can be  more  patthetic than the complaint of  Her- 
cules, when the poison oi' the centaur's  robe  begins first to 
prey upon him : 
Sov'reign  of Heav'n  and Earth 1 whose boundless sway 
The fates of  rnen and mortal things obey, 436  LETTER TO  THE  CRITICAL  REVIEW 
If e'er delighted from the courts above, 
In human form you sought Alcmene's love ; 
If fame's unchanging voice to all the Earth, 
With truth, proclaims you author of my birth ; 
Whence, from a course of spotless glory run, 
Successful toils and wreaths of triumph won, 
Am I thus wretched ? better that before 
Some monster fierce had drank my streaming gore; 
Or crush'd  by Cacus, foe to gods and men, 
My batter'd  brains had strew'd his rocky den : 
Than, from my glorious toils and triumphs past, 
To fall subdu'd  by female arts, at last. 
0  cool my boiling blood, ye winds, that blow 
From mountains loaded with eternal snow, 
And crack the icy cliffs ; in vain ! in vain ! 
Your rigour cannot quench my raging pain ! 
Por round this heart the furies wave their branas, 
And wring my entrails with their burning hands. 
Now bending from the skies, 0  wife of  Jove ! 
Enjoy the vengeance of thy injur'd  love : 
For fate, by me, the Thund'rer's  guilt atones ; 
And, punish'd  in her son, Alcmene groans : 
The object of  your hate shall soon expire, 
Fix'd on my shoulders preys a net of fire ; 
Whom nor the toils nor dangers could subdue, 
By false Eurystheus dictated from you ; 
Nor tyrants lawless, nor the monstrous brood 
Which haunts the desert or infests the flood, 
Nor Greece, nor all the barb'rous climes that lie 
Where Phebus ever points his golden eye ; 
A woman hath o'erthrown ! ye gods ! I yield 
To female arts, unconquer'd  in the field. 
My arms--alas  ! are these the same that bow'd 
Anteus, and his giant force subdu'd ? 
That dragg'd .NemeaYs  monster from his den ? 
And slew the dragon in his native fen ? 
Alas ! alas ! their mighty muscles fail, 
While pains infernal ev'ry  nerve assail : 
Alas, alas ! I feel in streams of woe 
These eyes dissolve, before untaught to flow. 
Awake my virtue, oft in dangers try'd, 
Patient in toils, in deaths unterrify'd, 
Itouse to my aid ;  nor let my labours past, 
With fame achiev'd, be blotted by the last: 
Firm and unmov'd,  the present shock endure ; 
Once triumph, and for ever rest secure. 
CONCERNING  WILKIE'S  EPIQONIAD. 
Our  poet,  though  his  genius  be  in  many  respects  very 
original,  has not  disdained  to imitate even  modern  poets. 
He has added to his heroic poem  a  dream, in the manner of 
Spenser, where  the poet  supposes  himself  to be introduced 
to Homer, who  censures  his poem  in some particulars, and 
excuses  it  in  others.  This  poem  is  indeed  a  species  of 
apology for the Epigoniad, wrote in a very lively and elegant 
manlier: it may be compared to a well-polished gem, of  the 
purest water, and cut into the most beautiful form.  Those 
who would judge of  our author's t,alents for poetry, without 
perusing  his  larger  work,  may  satisfy  their  curiosity,  by 
running over this short poem.  They will see the same force 
of  inlagination and harmony of  numbers, which  distinguish 
his longer performance:  and may thence, with  small  appli- 
U  ... 
cation, receive a favourable impression of our author's genius.  - - DEDICATION  OF  THE  ' FOUR  DISSERTATIONS,' 
1757.l 
To  the Reverend  Mr. Hume,l Author  of  '  Douglas,'  a Tragedy. 
MY DEAR  SIR,-It  was the practice of the antients to ad- 
dress their compositions  only to friends  and equals, and to 
render their dedications monuments of  regard and affection, 
not of se~vility  and flattery.  In  those days of ingenuous and 
candid  liberty,  a  dedication  did  honour to the person  to 
whom  it  was  addressed, without  degrading the author.  If 
any partiality appeared  towards  the patron, it was  at least 
the partiality of  friendship and affection. 
Another  instance of  true liberty, of  which  antient times 
can alone afford  us an example,  is tohe  liberty of  thought, 
which  engaged  men  of  letters,  however  different  in their 
abstract opinions, to maintain a  mutual friendship and re- 
gard ; and  never  to quarrel  about  principles,  while  they 
agreed  in inclinations and manners.  Science was often tho 
subject of  disputation, never  of  animosity.  Cicero, an aca- 
demic,  addressed  his  philosophical  treatises,  sometimes  to 
Brutus, a stoic;  sometimes to Atticus, an epicurean. 
I have been seized with a strong desire of  renewing these 
laudable practices  of  antiquity, by addressing the following 
dissertations to you, my good  friend : For such I will ever 
call and esteem you, notwithstanding  the opposition, which 
prevails between us, with regard to many of  our speculative 
tenets.  These  differences  of  opinion I have  only found to 
1  [The circumstances  attending  the  may stand by the side of his sanction of 
publication  of  this  ' Dedication '  are  the Epigoniad and of  his condemnation 
given in the  '  History of  the Editions,'  of the koenlr, of  0ssicn.-En.] 
Vol. 111. p.  65,  where  it has Already  L2 So Hunle chose to spell the name : 
been  printed.  It is repeated  here, in  Burton's  Life of H-ue,  Vol. 11. p. 606. 
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enliven  our  conversation ; while  our  common  passion  for 
science and letters served as a cement to our friendship.  I 
still admired  your genius, even when I imagined, that you 
lay under the influence  of  prejudice;  and  you  sonletimea 
told  me,  that you  excused  my  errors,  on  account  of  the 
candor and sincerity, which, you thought, accompanied them. 
But  to tell truth,  it is less  my admiration  of  your  fine 
genius, which has engaged me to make this address  to you, 
than my esteem of  your  character and my affection  to your 
person.  That generosity of  mind  which  ever  accompanies 
you ;  that cordiality of  friendship, that spirited honour and 
integrity, have  long interested me  strongly in your  behalf, 
and have mede me desirous, that a monument of our mutual 
amit'y  should be publicly erected, and, if possible, be preserved 
to posterity. 
I own  too, thalt I have the ambition  to be  the first who 
shall in public express his admiration of your noble tragedy of 
DOUGLAS  ;  one of  the most  interesting  and pathetic  pieces, 
that was  ever  exhibited on  any theatre.  Should I give  it 
the preference  to the Merope of Mafei,  and to that of  VoZ- 
taire, which it resembles in its subject; should I affirm, that it 
contained more fire and spirit than the former, more tender- 
ness and sinlplicity tha,n the latter; I might be  accused  of 
partiality ;  And how could I entirely acquit myself, after the 
professions of  friendship, which I have made you?  But the 
unfeigned tears which flowed from every eye, in the numerous 
representations which were  made of  it on  this theatre; the 
unparalleled  command,  which  you  appeared  to have  over 
every affection of  the human breast : These are incontestible 
prdofs, that you possess the true theatric genius of Shalcespear 
and Otway, refined  from the unhappy barbarism of  the one, 
and licentiousness of  the other. 
M.y  enemies,  you know, and, I own, even  sometimes  my 
friends, have reproached me with the love of  paradoxes  and 
singular opinions ;  and I expect to be exposed to the seine 
imputation, on account of  the character which I have  here 
given of your DOUGLAS.  I shall be told, no doubt, that I had 
artfully chossn the only time, when this high esteem of  that 
piece could be regarded as a paradox, to wit, before its publi- 
eatioll; and that not being able to contradict in  this particular 
the sentiments of  the public, I have, at least, resolved to go 
before them.  But I shall be amply compensated for all these 
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pleasantries, if you accept this testimony of  my regard, and 
believe me to be, with the greatest sincerity, 
Dear Sir, 
Your most affectionate Friend, 
and humble Servant, 
DAVID  HUME. 
llhumrma: 3 January, 1757.' FRAGMENTS  OF  A  PAPER  IN  HUME'S  HAND- 
WRITING, DESCRIBING THE DESCENT  ON  THE 
COAST  OF BBRITTANY,  IN 1746, AND THE CAUSES 
OF ITS FAILURE.' 
THE forces under Lieutenant General St. Clair  consisted of 
five battalions, viz. the first battalion  of  the 1st Royal,  the 
5th  Highlanders, 3rd  Brag's,  4th Richbell's,  2d Harrison's, 
together with  part  of  Frampton's, and  some  companies of 
Marines, making in all about 4500 men.  The fleet consisted 
of  Though  this army and fleet had  been at 
first  fitted out  for  entering  upon  action  in  summer 1746, 
and making conquest of  Canada, it was  found,  after several 
vain  efforts to get out  of  the  Channel,  first  under  Com- 
modore  Cotes, then under  Admiral  Listock,  that  so  much 
time  had  been  una-i-oidably lost,  from contrary  winds  and 
contrary orders, as to render it dangerous for so large a body 
of  ships to  proceed  thither.  The  middle  of  May was the 
last day of  rendezvous  appointed  at Spithead ;  and  in the 
latter end  of  August, the fleet had  yet  got no fart'her than 
St. Helen's,  about a league below it.  It  is  an observation, 
that in the latter end of  autumn, or  beginning  of  winter, 
the north-west winds blow so furiously onthe  coast of North 
America, as to render it always difficult, and often impossible, 
for  ships  that set out late  to reach  any harbour  in those 
parts.  Instances have been found of  vessels that have been 
obliged  to  take shelter from these storms, even in the Lee- 
ward Islands.  It was therefore become necessary to abandon 
all thoughts of  proceeding  to America that season ; and  as 
the transports  were  fitted  out and  fleet  equipped  at great 
expense, an attempt was hastily made to turn them to some 
account in Europe, during the small remainder of  the sum- 
[' This narrative,  published  as Ap-  took  Hume  with  him as Secretary and 
pendix A to the ' Life of  Hume,'  Vol.  1.  Judge Advo&te  of all the Forces under 
p.  441,  is supposed  by  Mr. Burton to  his comman<t. See '  Life of  Hume,' VoL 
have been '  drawn  up as a vindication  I. py. 208 and seq.-ED.] 
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mer.  The distress  of  the allies in  Flanders demanded the 
more immediate attention of the English nation and ministry, 
and required, if possible, some speedy remedy.  'Twas too late 
to think  of  sending the  six  battalions under  General  St. 
Clair, to reinforce  Prince  Charles  of  Lorraine,  who  com- 
manded  the armies  of  the allies;  and  their number  was, 
besides, too inconsiderable to hope for  any great advantages 
from that expedient.  'Twas more to be expected, that falling 
on the parts of  France, supposed  to be defenceless  and dis- 
armed, they might make a diversion, and occasion the send- 
ing a  considerable  detachment  from the enemy's  army  i11 
Flanders.  But as time pressed,  and allowed  not leisure to 
concert  and prepare this  measure, the Duke  of  Newcastle, 
Secretary of  State, hoped to find  that General St. Clair had 
already planned and projected some enterprise of this nature. 
He formed this presumption on a hint which had been started 
very casually, and which  had been  immediately dropped by 
the General. 
In the spring, when the obstructions  and delays  thrown 
in the way  of  the An~erican  enterprise were partly felt and 
partly foreseen, the Secretary, lamenting the  great and, he 
feared, useless expense to which the nation had been  put by 
that undertaking, gave occasion to the General to throw out 
a thought, which would naturally occur in such  a  situation. 
He said, '  Why may you not send the squadron and troops to 
some part of  the coast of  France, and at least frighten and 
alarm  them  as  they have  done us ;  and, as all their troops 
are on the Flanders and German frontiers, 'tis most probable 
that such an alarm may make  them recall  some of  them? ' 
The  subject was  then no farther prosecuted;  but the King, 
being informed  of  this casual  hint of  the  General's,  asked 
him  if  he had  formed  any  plan  or project  by which  the 
service above-mentioned  miglit  be effectuated.  He assured 
his majesty that he had never so much as thought of  it ;  but 
that, if it was  his pleasure, he would  confer with  Sir John 
Ligonier,  and  endeavour  to find  other people  in Lolidon 
who  could  let him  into some  knowledge  of  the  coast  of 
France.  To this the King replied, '  No,  no ;  you  need  not 
give  yourself  any  trouble  about  it.'  And  accordingly  the 
General never more thought of it, farther than to inform the 
Duke of  Newcastle  of  this conference  with  his  majesty. 
However, the Duke  being willing  that the person who waa 
to execute the undertaking should also be the projector of it, 
by which means both  greater success might  be  hoped  from 
it, and every body else be  screened from reflection in case of 
its miscarriage, desired, in  his letter of  the 22d of  August, 
that both the Admiral and General should give their opinioil 
of  such  an  invasion;  and particularly the General,  who, 
having,  he said,  formed  some time  ago  a  project  of  this 
nature, might be the better prepared  to give  his  thoughts 
with regard to it.  They both jointly replied, that their utter 
ignorance  made  th~lll  incapable  of  delivering  their  senti- 
ments on so delicate a subject ;  and  the General, in a sepa- 
rate letter, recalled to the Duke's  memory the circumstances 
of  the story, as above related. 
Though  they  declined  proposing  a  project,  they  both 
cheerfully  offered, that if  his  majesty would  honour  them 
with any plan of  operation for a descent, they would do their 
best to caiTy it into execution.  They hoped that the Secretary 
of  State,  who,  by his  office, is led  to turn his eyes  every 
where,  and who  lives  at London, the centre of  commerce 
and  intelligence, could  better  form  and digest such a plan, 
than they who were  cooped  up in their  ships, in a  remote 
sea-port  town,  without  any  former  acquaintance  with  the 
coast  of  France,  and without  any  possibility  of  acquiring 
new knowledge.  They at least hoped, that so difficult a task 
would not be required of  them as either to give their  senti- 
ments without  any materials  afforded  them to judge upon, 
or to collect materials, while the most inviolable  secrecy was 
strictly enjoined on them.  It is remarkable, that the Duke 
of  Newcastle,  among  other  advantages  proposed  by  this 
expedition,  mentions  the  giving  assistance  to  such  Pro- 
testants as are already in arms, or may be  disposed to rise 
on the appearance  of  the English, as  if  we were  living  in 
the time of  the League, or during the confusion of  Francis 
the Second's minority. 
Full  of  these  reflections,  they sailed from St. Helen's  611 
the 23d of  August, and arrived at  Plyn~outh  on the 29th, in 
obedience to their orders, which required  them to put  into 
tha't harbour  for  farther  instructions.  They there found 
positive orders  to sail immediately, with the first fair wind, 
to the coast  of  France, and make an attempt  on  L'Orient, 
or Rochefort, or Rochelle, or sail up theriver of  Bourdeaux ; 
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sail to  whatever other place on the  western coast they should 
think proper.  Such unbounded  discretionary powers  could 
not but be  agreeable  to the commanders,  had it been ac- 
companied with better, or indeed with any intelligence.  As 
the wind  was  then  contrary, they had leisure  to reply  in 
their letters of the 29th and 30th.  They jointly represented 
the  difficulties, or rather impossibilities, of  any attempt on 
L'Qrient,  Rochefort,  and  Rochelle,  by  reason  of  the real 
strength  of  these  places, so far as their imperfect informa- 
tion could  reach;  or, if  that were  erroneous, by  reason  of 
their  own  absolute want of  intelligence, guides, and pilots, 
which are the soul of  all military operations, 
The General, in a separate letter, enforced the same topics, 
and added many other reflections of moment.  He said, that 
of  all the places mentioned  in his  orders, Bourdeaux, if  ac- 
cessible,  appeared  to him  the properest  to be  attempted; 
both as it is one of the towns of  greatest comnlerce and riches 
in  France,  and  as it  is  the  farthest situated  from  their 
Flanders' army, and on these accounts an attack on it would 
most probably produce the wished-for  alarm and  diversion. 
He added,  that  he  himself  knew  the  town to be  of  no 
strength, and that the  only place  there capable of  making 
any  defence,  is  Chateau  Trompette,  which serves  it  as  a 
citadel, and was intended, as almost all  citadels are, inore as 
a curb,  than  a  defence,  on  the  inhabitants.  But  though 
these circumstances promised some success, he observed that 
t!here were  many other  difficulties  to struggle with,  which 
threw a mighty damp on these promising expectations.  In  the 
first place, he  much questioned if there was in  the fleet any one 
person who had been ashore on the western coast of  France, 
except himself, who was once at  Bourdeaux ;  and he, too, was 
a stranger to all the country betwixt the town  and the sea. 
He had no single map of  any part of  France on board with 
him; and what  intelligence  he ]nay be  able to force  from 
the people of  the country can be  but  little to be  depended 
on,  as  it must  be  their interest to mislead  him.  And  if 
money  prove  necessary,  either  for  obtaining  intelligence, 
carrying  on  of  works,  ar even  subsisting  the officers,  he 
must  raise it  in the country;  for,  except  a  few chests  of 
Mexican  dollars,  consigned  to  other  uses,  he  carried  no 
money with him.  If he advanced any where into the conntry, 
he must be at a very great  loss  for want  of  horses  to draw 
the artillery ;  as  the inhabitants mill undonbtedly carry off 
as many of  them as they could, and he had neither hussars 
nor dragoons to force them back again.  And as to the pre- 
serving any conquests  he niight  make, (of  which the Duke 
had dropped some hints,) lie observed that every place which 
was  not  impregnable  to him, with  such small force,  must 
be  untenable  by  him.  On  the  whole,  he  engaged  for 
nothing but obedience ;  he promised no success ;  he professed 
absolute ignorance with regard to every circumstance of  the 
undertaking ;  he even could not fix on any particular under- 
taking ;  and yet he lay under positive orders to sail with the 
first  fair  wind,  to  approach  the  unknown  coast,  march 
through  the unlrnown  country,  and attack  the  unknown 
cities of  the nost potent nation of  the universe. 
Meanwhile, Admiral Anson, who had  put into Plymouth, 
and  had  been  detained  there by the same contrary winds, 
which still prevailed,  had  a  conversation with  the General 
and  Adrniral  on  the subject  of  their  enterprise.  He told 
them, that he remembered to have once casually heard from 
Mr.  Hume,  member  for  Southwark,  that he had been  at 
L'Orient,  and that, though it be very strong by sea, it is not 
so by land.  Though Mr. Hume, the gentleman  mentioned, 
be bred  to a mercantile  profession,  not to war, and though 
the intelligence received froin him was only casual, imperfect, 
and by second-hand, yet it gave pleasure to the Admiral and 
General, as it afforded  them a faint glimmering ray in their 
present obscurity  and  ignorance ;  and they accordingly re- 
solved to follow it.  They wrote to the Duke of  Newcastle, 
September the 3d, that 'twas  to L'Orient  they intended  to 
bend their course, as soon as the wind  offered.  To remedy 
the ignorance of  the coast and want of  pilots, as far as pos- 
sible, Commodore Cotes in the Ruby, together with Captain 
Steward in the  Bastings, and a sloop and tender, was imme- 
diately despatched by the Admiral to view Port L'Orient and 
all the places near it, so far as might regard the safe approach 
and anchorage of the ships.  The ignorance of the country, and 
want of  guides, was a desperate  evil, for which the General 
could provide no remedy.  But  as the wind  still contiilued 
contrary to the fleet  and transports, though single ships of 
war might work  their way  against it, the General  had  oc- 
casion  to see  farther  alterations  made by the ministry in 
their project of  an invasion. 
The Dulre  of  Newcastle,  who  had  before  informed  the 
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coast of  France, two battalions of  the Guards, and  General 
IIuske's regiment, should be despatched after him, now says, 
(Sept. 3), that these  three  battalions  have  got  immediate 
orders  to follow him.  He farther adds, that if  the Genera,] 
finds it impracticable  to make any descent on  the  coast  of 
Brittany, or higher up in the Bay of Biscay, he would probably 
find, 011  his return, some intelligence sent him, by the rein- 
forcement, with regard to the coast of  Normandy.  Next day 
the Duke changes his mind, and sends immediately this in- 
telligence with regard to the coast of  Normandy, and a plan 
for annoying the French on  that quarter, proposed by Major 
Macdonald;  and to this plan  he seems entirely to give the 
preference to the other, of making an attempt on the western 
coast of France, to which he had before confined the Admiral 
and General.  They considered the plan, and conversed with 
Major Macdonald, who came down to Plymouth a  few days 
after.  They found that this  plan  had  been given in some 
years before, and was not in the least calculated for the pre- 
sent expedition, but required a body of  cavalry as an essential 
point  towards  its execution;  an advantage  of  which  the 
General was entirely destitute.  They found that Major Mac- 
donald had had so few opportunities of  improving himself in 
-bhe art of  war, that it would  be  dangerous, without  farther 
information,  to follow his  plan  in any  military  operations. 
Tlley found that he pretended  only to know the strength of 
the town, and  nature of  the country, in that  province, but 
bad never acquainted himself  with the sea-coast, or pitched 
apon any proper place for disembarkation.  They considered 
that a very considerable step had been already taken towards 
the execution of  the other project  on the coast of  Brittany, 
viz. the sending Comlnodore Cotes to inspect and sound the 
coast; and that the same step must now be taken anew, in so 
late a season, with regard to the coast of  Norlnandy.  They 
thought that, if their whole operations were  to begin, an at- 
tempt  on  the western coast  was  preferable, chiefly because 
of  its remoteness from  the Flanders' army, which  must in- 
crease and  spread the alarm, if  the  country were  really so 
defenceless as  was  believed.  They  represented  all  those 
reasons to the  Secretary; but  at the same  time  expressed 
their intentions of  remaining  at Plymouth till  they should 
receive his majesty's positive orders with regard to the enter- 
prise on which they were to engage. 
The Duke inlmediately despatched a  messenger, with full 
powers to them to  go whithersoever  they pleased.  During 
this interval, the General was obliged, to his great regret, to 
remain in a  manner wholly inactive.  Plymouth was  so re- 
mote a place, that it was not to be expected  he  could there 
get any proper intelligence.  He was bound up by his orders 
to such  inviolable secrecy, that he  could  not  make any in- 
quiries for it, or scarce receive it, if  offered.  The Secretary 
had  sent  Major  Macdonald,  and one  Cooke,  captain  of  a 
privateer, who, 'twas found, could be of no manner of  service 
in this undertaking.  These, he said, were  the only persons 
he could find in London that pretended to know any thing of 
the coast of  France, as if  the question had been with regard 
to the coast of Japan or of  California.  The General desired 
to have  maps  of  France,  chiefly of  Gascony and  Brittany. 
He receives only a  niap  of  Gascony, together  with  one  of 
Normandy.  No  map of  Brittany; none  of  France;  he is 
obliged to set out on so important  an enterprise without in- 
telligence, without  pilots, without guides, without  any map 
of the country to which he was bound, except a common map, 
on a small scale, of  the kingdom  of  France, which  his Aid- 
de-camp had  been able  to pick  up in a  shop at Plymouth. 
He  represented  all  these  difficulties to  the ministry;  he 
begged them not to flatter themselves with any success from 
a  General who  had  such  obstacles  to surmount,  and  who 
~nust  leave his conduct to the  government  of  chance  more 
than prudence.  He was answered, that nothing was expected 
of him, but to land any where he pleased  in France, to pro- 
duce  an  alarm, and to return safe, with the fleet and trans- 
ports,  to  the British  dominions.  Though he  was sensible 
that more would be expected by the people, yet he cheerfully 
despised their rash judgments, while he acted in  obedience 
to orders, and  in  the  prosecution  of  his  duty.  The  fleet 
sailed from Plymouth on the 15th of  September, and, after a 
short voyage of three days, arrived, in the evening of the 18th, 
off  the island of  Groa, where  they fouild  Coninlodore Cotes 
and Captain Stuart, who gave them an account of  the suc- 
cess which they had met with in the survey of the coast near 
L'Orient.  The place they had pitched  on for  landing, was 
ten miles from that town, at  the mouth of the river of Quim- 
perlay.  They represented it as a  flat open shore, with deep 
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but a daiigerous place for the ships to ride in, on account of 
the rocks with wllich it was every where sluronnded, and the 
high swell wliioll was tllrowll in,  fiom the Bay of  Biscay, by 
the west and south-west winds. 
It mas the11 about eight in the evening, a full moon and a 
clear sky, with a gentle breeze  blowing in shore.  The ques- 
tion was, whether to sail directly to the landing-place, or hold 
off  till morning.  The two  officers who  had  surveyed  the 
coast were divided in opinion : one recommended the former 
measure, the other suggested  some scruples, by representing 
the dangerous rocks that lay on every side of  them, and the 
ignorance of  all the pilots with regard  to their number and 
situation.  The Admiral was determined, by these reasons, to 
agree to this opinion.  The question seemed little important, 
as it regarded only a  short  delay ;  but really was of  the ut- 
inost consequence, and was, indeed, the spring whence all the 
ill success in this expedition flowed. 
The great age of Admiral Listock, as it increased  his ex- 
perience, should make us cautious of  censuring his opinion in 
sea affairs, where he was allowed to have  such  consummate 
knowledge.  But at the same time, it may beget a suspicion, 
that being now in the decline of life, he was thence naturally 
inclined rather to the prudent  counsels which  suit a  con- 
certed enterprise, than to the bold temerity which belongs to 
such  hasty  and  blind  undertakings.  The unhappy conse- 
quences of this over-cautious measure immediately appeared. 
The Admiral  had  laid  his account,  that by a  delay, which 
procured  a  greater  safety to the fleet  and  transports, only 
four or five  hours would  be  lost; but the wind  changing in 
t,he morning, and blowing fresh off  shore, all next  day, and 
part of next night, was spent before the ships could reach the 
landing-place.  Some of  them were  not able to reach it till 
two days after. 
During this time, the fleet lay full in view of the coast, and 
preparatiorrs were making in Port Louis, L'Orient,  and over 
the  whole  country,  for  the reception  of  an  enemy,  who 
threatened them with ao unexpected an invasion. 
The force of  France, eit'her for offence or defence, consists 
chiefly in three different bodies of  men : first, in a numerous 
veteran army, which was then en  tirely employed in Italy and 
on  their  frontiers, except  some  shattered regiments,  which 
were dispersed  about the country, for the advantage  of  re- 
cruiting, and of  which there were two regiments of dragoons 
at  that time in Brittany ;  secondly, in  a  regular  and disci- 
plined militia, with  which all  the fortified  cities along the 
sea-coast were  garrisoned, and  many of  the frontier-towns, 
that seemed not to be threatened with any immediate attack. 
Some bodies of  this  militia  had  also been  employed  in the 
field with the regular troops, and had acquired honour, which 
gave spirits and courage to the rest: thirdly, in a numerous 
body of  coast militia, or  gardes-du-cote, amouliting to near 
200,000, ill  armed  and  ill disciplined, formidable  alone  by 
their numbers ;  and  in Brittany, by the  ferocity of  the in- 
habitants, esteemed of  old and at  present, the most warlike 
and  least  civilized  of  all the  French  peasants.  Regular 
signals were concerted  for the assembling of  these forces by 
alarm guns, flags, and fires ;  and in the morning of the 20th 
of  September, by break  of  day,  a  considerable  body  of  all 
these different kinds of troops, but chiefly of the last, amount- 
ing to  above  3,000  men, were  seen upoil  the sea-shore  to 
oppose the disembarkation of the British forces. Adisposition, 
therefore, of  ships and boats must  be  made  for  the regular 
landing of  the army ; and as  the weather  was  then  very 
blustering, and  the wind  blew  almost  off  shore,  this could 
not be effected till afternoon. 
There  appeared, in view  of  the  fleet, three places which 
seemed proper for a disembarkation, and which were separated 
from each other either by a rising ground, or by a sillall arm of 
the sea.  The French militia had posted themselves in the two 
places which  lay nearest to L'Orient ;  and finding that they 
were not numerous enough to cover  the whole, they left the 
third, which lay to the windward, almost wholly defenceless. 
The General ordered the boats to rendezvous opposite to this 
beach ;,  and he  saw the  French troops march off  from  the 
next contiguous landing-place, and take post opposite to him. 
They placed  themselves  behind  some  sand-banks in such a 
manner as to be entirely sheltered from the cannon of  those 
English ships which covered  the landing, while at the saine 
time they could  rush  in upon  the  troops, as  soon  as their 
approach  to the shore  had  obliged  the  ships  to leave off 
firing. 
The General remarked  their plan of  defence, and was de- 
termined to disappoint  them.  He observed, that, the  next 
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though the troops which had been posted on the more distant 
beach had  quitted their station, and were  making  a  circuit 
round  an arm of  the  sea,  in order  to  occupy  the  place 
deserted by the others, they had not as yet reached  it.  He 
ilnl~lediately  seized the opportunity.  He ordered his boats to 
row directly forward, as if  he intended to land on the beach 
opposite to hiin; but while the enemy were expecting him to 
advance, he  ordered  the boats  to turn,  at a  signal;  and, 
making  all the  speed that both oars  and  sails  could  give 
them,  to steer directly to the place  deserted  by the enemy. 
In order  to render  the  disembarkation  more  safe, he had 
previously ordered two tenders to attack a battery, which had 
been placed on  a  mount  towards the right, and which was 
well situated for annoying the boats on their approach.  The 
tenders succeeded in chasing the French from their guns ;  the 
boats reached the shore before any of the French could be op- 
posite to them.  The soldiers landed, to the number of about 
six hundred  men,  and  formed  in  an  instant ; immediately 
upon which the whole militia dispersed and fled up into the 
country.  The English followed them regularly and in  good 
order ;  prognosticating success to the enterprise from such a 
fortunate beginning. 
There was a creek, or arm of  the sea,  dry at low  water, 
whicli lay on the right hand of the landing-place, and through 
which ran the nearest road to L'Orient,  and the only one fit 
for the march of troops, or the draught of  cannon and heavy 
carriages.  As it was then high water, the French runaways 
were obliged, by this creek, to make a circuit of some miles; 
and they thereby misled the general,  who, justly concluding 
they would take shelter in that town,  and having  no  other 
guides to conduct him, thought that, by following their foot- 
steps, he  would  be  led  the  readiest  and  shortest  way  to 
L'Orient.  He detached,  therefore,  in pursuit of  the flying 
militia, about a thousand men,  under  the  command of Bri- 
gadier  O'Farrel;  who,  after being  harassed  by  some  firing 
from  the hedges,  (by  which  Lieut.-Col.  Erskine,  Quarter- 
Master  Gencbml,  was  dangerously  wounded,)  arrived  that 
evening at Guidel, a village  about a league distant from the 
landing-place.  The general  himself  lay near the sea-shore, 
to wait for the landing of  the rest of the forces.  By break of 
day he led them up to join the brigadier at Guidel.  He  there 
learned from some pea.sants, taken prisoners,  and who spoke 
the French language, (which few  of  the common people in 
Brittany are able to do,)  that the road  into which  he  had 
been  led, by the reasons  above  specified, wan the longest by 
four or five miles.  He was also informed, what he had partly 
seen, that the road was very dangerous and difficult, running 
through narrow lanes and defiles, betwixt high hedges, faced 
with stone walls,  and bordered  in many  places  with thick 
woods and brushes, where a very  few  disciplined  and brave 
troops  inight stop  a  whole  army;  and where  even a few, 
without discipline or bravery, might, by firing suddenly upon 
the forces, throw them into confusion. 
In  order  to acquire  a  more  thorough  knowledge  of  the 
country, of which he and the whole army were  utterly igno- 
rant, he here divided the troops into two  equal bodies,  and 
marched them up to L'Orient, by  two different roads, which 
were pointed out to him.  The one  part, which he himself 
conducted,  passed  without  inuch  molestation.  The other, 
under Brigadier O'Farrel,  was  not  so  fortunate.  Two bat- 
talions of  that detachment, Richbell's and Frampton's,  partly 
from their  want  of  experience,  and partly  from  the terror 
naturally inspired into soldiers  by  finding  themselves  in a 
difficult  country unknown  both  to  themselves  and leaders, 
and partly, perhaps, from accident,  to which the courage of 
men is extremely liable, fell intc confusion, before a handful 
of  French peasants who fired at  them from behind the hedges. 
Notwithstanding all the endeavours of the Brigadier, many of 
them threw down their a>rms  and ran  away;  others fired in 
confusion, and wounded each other ;  and if any regular forces 
had been present to take advantage of  this disorder, the most 
fatal consequences might have  ensued.  And  though  they 
were  at last  led  on,  and joined  the general that evening 
before L'Orient,  the panic still remained in these two batta- 
lions afterwards, and comnlunicated itself to others ;  kept the 
whole army in anxiety, even when they were not in danger, 
and threw a mighty damp on the expectations of  siccess, con- 
ceived from this undertaking.  L'Orient, lately a small village, 
now a considerable town, on the coast of Brittany, lies in the 
extremity of  a fine bay, the mouth  of  which is very narrow, 
and guarded by the strong citadel of Port Louis.  This town 
has become the centre  of  the French East India trade, the 
seat of the company  estal~lished  for that comnlerce, and the 
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The great prizes made upon them by the English, during the 
course of the mar, had given a  check  to this growing  com- 
merce ;  yet still the town was esteemed a valuable acquisition. 
were it only on account  of  the wealth it contained, and the 
store-houses  of  the company,  a  range of  stately buildings, 
erected at public charge, both  for  use  and ornament.  The 
town itself is far from being strong.  Two sides of  it, which 
are not protected with water, are defended only with a plain 
wall, near thirty feet high, of no great thickness, and without 
any fosse or parapet.  But the water which covers the other 
two sides, rendered it impossible to be invested, and gave an 
opportunity for multitudes of people to throw themselves into 
it from every corner of that populous country.  And though 
these, for  want  of  discipline,  could  not be  trusted  in  the 
field  against regular forces,  yet  became  they  of  great use 
in a  defence behind  walls,  by throwing up works, erecting 
batteries, and digging trenches, to secure (what was sufficient) 
for a few days, a weak town against a small and ill-provided 
army.  The East India Coinpany had numbers of  cannon in 
their magazines, and had there erected a school of en,'  cnneers, 
for the service of their ships and  settlements ;  the vessels in 
the harbour supplied them with more cannon, and with sea- 
men accustomed to their management and use ;  and whatever 
was wanting, either in artillery or warlike stores, could easily 
be brought by water from Port Louis,  with  which the town 
of L'Orient  kept always an open communication. 
But  as these advantages,  though great, require  both  a 
sufficient  presence  of  mind,  and soiile time, to be employed 
against an enemy, 'tis  not  improbable,  that if  the admiral 
Elad  been supplied with proper pilots,  and the general  with 
proper guides, which could have led the English inimediately 
upon the coastl, and to the town,  the very terror of  so unex- 
pected  an invasion  would  have  rendered  the  inhabitants 
incapable of  resistance,  and made them surrender at discre- 
tion.  The want of  these advantages  had  already lost two 
days ;  and more time must yet be consumed, before they could 
so much as n~alre  the appearance of an attack.  Cannon was 
wanting, and the road by  which the army had marched, was 
absolutely unfit for the conveyance  of  them.  The general, 
therefore,  having  first despatched an officer  and a  party to 
reconnoitre the country,  and find  a  nearer and better road, 
September 22d,  vent lliinself next d:~y  to the sea-shore, for the 
same purpose, and also in order to concert  with the admiral 
the proper method of bringing up cannon ; as almost all the 
horses in the country,  which are extremely  weak  and of  a 
diminutive  size,  had  been  driven  away  by  the  peasants. 
Accordingly,  a  road  was  found,  much nearer,  though still 
ten miles of length ;  and much better, though easily rendered 
impassable by rainy weather, as was afterwards experienced. 
A council of war was held on board the Princessa, consist- 
ing of the admiral and general, Brigadier O'Farrel and Com- 
modore Cotes.  The engineers, Director-General Armstrong, 
and Captain Watson, who had surveyed the town of L'Orient, 
being called in, were asked their opinion with regard to the 
practicability of  an attempt on it, together  with  the time, 
and artillery,  and  ammunition,  requisite  for  that purpose. 
Their answer was,  that with two twelve pounders and a ten 
inch mortar,  planted on the spot which they had pitched on 
for erecting a battery, they engaged either to make  a prac- 
ticable breach in the walls,  or with  cartridges, bombs, and 
red-hot  balls,  destroy  the town,  by  laying it  in ashes in 
twenty-four hours.  Captain  Chalmers,  the captain  of  the 
artillery, who had not then seen the town, was  of  the same 
opinion,  from their  description of  it,  provided  the battery 
was within the proper distance.  Had the king's orders been 
less positive for making an attempt on some part of the coast 
of  France, yet such flattering views offered by illen who pro- 
mised what lay  within the sphere  of  their own  profession, 
must have engaged the attention of the admiral and general, 
and induced them to venture on a much rnore hazardous and 
difficult undertaking.  'Twas  accordingly  agreed that four 
twelve pounders, and a ten inch  mortar, together with three 
field-pieces,  should be drawn up to the camp by  sailors,  in 
order  to make,  with  still  greater assurance,  the attempt, 
whose success  seemed  so  certain  to the engineers.  These 
pixes of artillery, with the stores demanded, notwithstanding 
all difficulties,  were drawn  to the camp in two days, except 
two twelve pounders, which arrived not till the day afterwards. 
A third part of the sailors of the whole  fleet,  together with 
all the marines, were employed in this drudgery ;  the admiral 
gave all assistance in his power to the general; and the public, 
in  one instance,  saw  that it was not impossible for land and 
sea officers to live in harmony  together,  and concur in pro- 
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The general, on his arrival in the camp,  found the officer 
returned whom he had sent to summon the town of L'Orient. 
By his information, it appeared that the inhabitants were SO 
much alarmed by the suddenness of  this incursion,  and the 
terror of a force which their fears  magnified,  as to think of 
surrendering, though upon conditions, which would have ren- 
dered the conquest of  no  avail to their enemies.  The inha- 
bitants insisted upon an absolute security to their houses and 
goods;  the  East India Company  to  their  magazines  and 
store-houses ;  and the  garrison,  consisting  of  about  seven 
hundred regular militia  and troops, besides a great number 
of irregulars, demanded a liberty of marching out with all the 
honours of war.  A weak town that opened its gates on such 
conditions was  not worth the entering ;  since it must imme- 
diately be abandoned, leaving only to its conquerors the shame 
of  their  own  folly,  and perhaps the reproach  of  treachery. 
The general, therefore, partly trusting to the promise of  the 
engineers, and partly desirous  of  improving the advantages 
gained by the present danger, when the deputies arrived next 
daj-, September 23d, from the governor, from  the town, and 
from the East India Company, refused to receive any articles 
but those from the governor,  who  commanded  in the name 
of his most  Christian majesty.  He even  refused  liberty  to 
the garrison to march out; well knowing  that, as the town 
was'not  invested, they could take that liberty whenever they 
pleased. 
Meanwhile, every accident concurred to render the enter- 
prise of  the English abortive.  Some  deserters  got into the 
town,  who  informed  the garrison of  the true force  of  the 
English, which, conjecturiilg frorn the greatness and number 
of  the  ships,  they had  much  magnified.  Even  this  small 
body  diminished  daily,  from the fatigue of  excessive duty, 
and from the great rains  that began  to fall.  Scarce three 
thousand  were  left  to do  duty, which  still augmented  the 
fatigue to the few that remained ;  especially when joined  to 
the frequent alarms, that the unaccountable panic they were 
struck with made but too frequent.  Rains had so spoilt the 
roads as to nmder it impracticable  to bring up any heavier 
cannon, or more  of  the same  calibre, so long a way, by the 
me re force of seamen.  But what, above all things, made the 
enterprise appear desperate, was the discovery of the ignorance 
of  the engineers, cliiofly of  the director-general, who  in the 
whole  course  of  his  proceediilgs  appeared  neither  to have 
skill  in  contrivance,  nor  order  and  diligeiice  in  execution. 
His own want of  capacity and experience, inade his projects 
of  no  use;  his  blind  obstinacy  rendered  him  incapable  of 
making use of  the capacity of  others.  Though  the general 
offered  to place  and  support  the battery wherever the en- 
gineer thought proper, he chose to set it above  six  hundred 
yards from the wall, where  such  s~null  cannon  could  do no 
manner of  execution.  He planted  it at so oblique an angle 
to the wall  that the ball  thrown  from  the largest  cannon 
must  have  recoiled,  witho'ut  making  any  impression.  He 
trusted much  to the red-hot balls, with which he promised 
to lay the town  in asks in twenty-four  hours; yet, by his 
negligence, or that of  others, the furnace with which  these 
balls were to be  heated, was  forgot.  After the furnace was 
brought,  he  found  that the bellows, and  other  implements 
necessary for the execution  of  that work, were  also left  on 
board  the store-ships.  With  great  difficulty, and  infinite 
pains, ammunition  and artillery stores were drawn up from 
the sea-shore in tumbrels.  He was totally ignorant, till some 
days after, that he had  along with him aminunition wagons, 
which would have much  facilitated this labour.  His orders 
to the officers of the train were so confused, or so ill obeyed, 
that no ammunition canie regularly up to the camp, to serve 
the few cannon and the mortars that played upon the town. 
Not only fascines, piquets, and every thing necessary for the 
battery,  were  slipplied  him  beyond  his  demand;  but  even 
workmen, notwitllstaiiding the great fatigue and small nurn- 
1)el.s  of  the army.  These worknien found no addition to their 
fatigue  in  obeying  his orders.  He left then1 often  unem- 
ploj ed,  for  want  of  knowing  in what  business  he  should 
occupy them. 
Meanwhile the French garrison, being so weakly attacked, 
had leisure to prepare for a defence, and make proper use of 
their great number  of  workmen, if  not  of  soldiers, and the 
nearness  and  plenty of  their military  stores.  By throwing 
up  earth in the inside of  the wall, they had planted a g~eat 
nlally cannon, some of  a large calibre, and  opened six bat- 
teries against one that played  upoil them from the English. 
The  distance  alone  of  the  besiegers'  battery,  made  these 
cannon  of' the enemy do  less execution ;  but that same dis- 
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battery  brought  nearer,  to  a  hundred  paces  for  instance, 
'twould be requisite to make  it  communicate with the camp 
by trenches  and a  covered way, to dig which was  the work 
of  some days for so small  an army.  During this time, the 
besieged, foreseeing  the place  to which the attack must be 
directed,  could  easily  fortify  it  by  retrenchments  in  the 
inside of  the wall;  and planting  ten cannon to one, could 
silence  the besiegers'  feeble battery in ,z  few hours.  They 
would not even have had leisure to make a breach in the thin 
wall, which first discovered itself;  and that breach, if  made, 
could  not  possibly  serve  to  any  purpose.  Above  fifteen 
thousand  men,  coinpletely armed by  the East India Com- 
pany,  and brave  while protected  by  cannon  and ramparts, 
still stood in opposition to three thousand, discouraged with 
fatigue, with sickness, and with despair of  ever  succeeding 
in so unequal a contest. 
A certain foreign writer, ulore  anxious to tell his stories 
in an entertaining manner  than to assure himself of  their 
reality, has endeavoured to put this expedition in a ridiculous 
light ;  but as there is not one circumstance of  his narration, 
which has truth in it, or even the least appearance of  truth, 
it would be needless to lose time in refuting it.'  With regard 
to the prejudices of the public, a few questions may suffice. 
Was the attempt altogether impracticable from tlle begin- 
ning?  The general neither proposed it, nor planned  it, nor 
approved it, nor  answered  for  its success.  Did  the disap- 
pointment  proceed  from  want  of  expedition?  He had no 
pilots, guides, nor intelligence,  afforded him ;  and could not 
possibly  provide  himself  in  any  of  these  advantages,  so 
necessary  to  all  military  operations.  Were the engineers 
blamable P  This has always been considered as a branch of 
military knowledge, distinct from that of  a commander, and 
which is altogether intrusted  to those to whose profession 
it peculiarly belongs.  By his vigour  in combating the vain 
terrors spread amongst the troops, and by his  prudence  in 
timely desisting from  a  fruitless  enterprise, the misfortune 
was  confined  merely to a disappointment, without  any loss 
or any dishonour to the British  arms.  Commanders, from 
[Mr. Burton proves from a passage  narration  is  found  among  Voltaire's 
in Hume's Correspondence that the re-  acknowledged  works.  Life:  vol.  ii. 
ference is to l'oltaire,  although no s11cli  p. 2: 9.  -ED.] 
the situation of  affairs, have had opportunities of  acquuing 
more honour;  yet  there is no one whose  coliduct, in  every 
circumstance,  could  be  more  free  from  reproach.  Oil  the 
first  of  October,  the fleet  sailed  out of  Qaimperlay  Road, 
from one of  the most  dangerous  situations  that so large a 
fleet had ever lain in, at so late a  season, and in  so stormy 
a sea as the Bay of  Biscay.  The reflection  on this danger 
had been  no  inconsiderable  cause  of  hastening the re-em- 
barkation of  the troops.  And  the more  so, that the secre- 
tary had given express orders to the admiral not to bring the 
fleet into any hazard.  The prudence of  the hasty departure 
appeared the n~ore  visibly the very day the fleet sailed, when 
a violent storm ari~ing  from the south west, it was concluded, 
that  if the ships had been lying at anchor on the coast, many 
of  them  must  have  necessarily  been  driven  ashore,  and 
wrecked on the rocks that surrounded  them.  The fleet was 
dispersed, and six transports being  separated from  the rest, 
went  immediately for  England,  carrying with  them  about 
right hundred  of  the forces.  The rest put  into Quiberon 
Bay, and the general landed his small body on the peninsula 
of  that name.  By erecting a battery of  some  guns on the 
narrow neck of  land, which joins  the peninsula to the con- 
tinent, he rendered his situation almost  impregnable, while 
he saw the fleet riding secure in his neighbourhood, in one 
of the finest bays in the world. 
The  industry  and  spirit  of  the  general  supported  both 
himself and the army against all these disadvantages, while 
there was  the smallest  prospect  of  success.  But his pru- 
dence  determined  him  to  abandon  it,  when  it appeared 
altogether desperate. 
The engineers, seeing no manner of effect from their shells 
and red-hot balls, and sensible  that 'twas  impossible  either 
to make a breach from a battery, erected at so  great a dis- 
tance, or to place the battery nearer, under such a superiority 
of  French cannon, at last unanimously brought  a  report to 
the general, that they had no longer any hope  of  success; 
and  that  even  all  the  ammunition,  which,  with  infinite 
labour,  had  been  brought,  was  expended:  no  prospect  re- 
mained-  of  being farther supplied, on account of  the broken 
roads, which lay between  them and the fleet.  The council 
of  war  held  in  consequence  of  this  report,  balanced  the 
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can be said to balance where  they find  nothing on the one 
side but an extreme desire to serve their king and country,  . 
and on the other every maxim of  war  and prudence.  They 
ullanimously agreed to abandon the attempt, and return on 
board  the trausports.  The whole  troops  were  accordingly 
re-embarked by the 28th of September, with the loss of  near 
twenty men killed and wounded,  on the whole entersrise.  SCOTTICISMS.' 
WilI, in the first person, as I  will  walk,  we will  walk,  ex- 
pyesses the intention or resolution of  the person, along with 
the future event: In the second  and third person,  as,  you 
will, he  will, they will, it expresses the future action or event, 
without comprehending or excluding the volition. 
Shall, in the first person,  whether  singular or plural, ex- 
presses  the future  action  or event,  without  excluding  or 
comprehending the intention or resolution :  But in the  second 
or t.hird person, it marks a necessity, and commonly a neces- 
sity proceeding from the person  who  speaks; as,  he  shall 
walk, you shall repent it. 
These variations seen1 to have proceeded  from a politeness 
in the English, who, in speaking to others, or of others, made 
use of the term will, which implies volition,  even  where  the 
event may be the subject  of  necessity and constraint.  And 
in speaking of themselves, made use of the term shall, which 
implies constraint,  even though the event may be the object 
of choice. 
Wou'd  and shou'd  are  conjunctive n~oods,  subject  to the 
same rule ;  only, we may observe, that in a sentence, where 
there is a condition exprest, and a consecluence of  that con- 
ditior,,  the  former  always  req~zires  shozc'd,  and the latter 
wozc'd,  in the second and third persons ;  as,  i;f he  shou'd full, 
he  wou'd  break. his leg,  etc. 
These  is  the plural  of  this;  those  of  tlrnt.  The former, 
[This List  of  Scofticisn~s,  printatl  Edition  publishr~l  during Hume's  life- 
from the Edinburgh EdiLion of  1826, is  time.-"I  told  llini  tlli~t  Da\-i(l Hume 
said  to  occur  in  some  copies  of  the  hati made  a  short collection  of Scotti- 
'Political Discourses,'  Edition H.  Tlie  cisms.  ' I wonder  (said  Juhmon) th;~t 
present Editor has not  found it in ally  he  should find tlrem.' "-BOSWELL.] 462  SCOTTICISMS.  SCOTTICISMS.  403 
therefore,  expresses what is near:  the  latter what is more 
remote.  As, in these lines of  the Duke of  Buckingham, 
"  Philosophers and poets vainly strove, 
In every age, the lumpish mass to move. 
But THOSE were pedants if compared with  THESE 
Who knew riot only to instruct, but please." 
\\%ere  a relative is to follow, and the subject has not been 
mentioned  immediately  before,  those  is  always  required. 
Those  observations  which  7~e  made.  Those  kir~gdoms  which 
Alexander conquered. 
In  the verbs,  which  end  in  t, or te, we  frequently o~iiit  ed 
in the preterperfect and in the participle ;  as,  he operate,  it 
was cultivate.  Milton says,  in thought more elevate ;  but he 
is the only author who uses that expression. 
Notice should not be used as a verb.  The proper  phrase 
is take notice.  Yet I find Lord Shaftesbury uses notic'd, the 
participle :  And un~totic'd  is very common. 
Hinder  to  do,  is  Rcotch.  The English phrase  is,  hinder 
from doing.  Yet Milton says,  Hindered not Satan to pervert 
the mind.  Book IX. 
SCOTCH. 
Conform to 
Friends and acquaintances 
Ma1  treat 
Advert to 
Proven, improven, approven 
Pled 
Incarcerate 




In the long run 
Notwithstanding oi that 
Contented himself to do 
'Tis a question if 
Discretion 
With child to ,.  man 
Out of 11:tnd 
Siniply ililpossible 
A park 
In time coming 
ENGLISH. 
Conformable to 
Friends and acquaintance 
Abuse 
Attend to 
Prov'd, improv'd,  approv'd 
Pleaded 
Imprison 




At long run 
Notwithstandilig that 
Contented himself with doing 
'Tis a question whether 
Civility 













Alongst.  Yet  the  English  say 
both amid,  amidst, among,  and 
amongst 
Evenly 
As I shall answer 
Cause  him  do it.  Yet  'tis  good 




Effectuate.  This word in English 
means to  effect with pains  and 
difficulty 
A wright.  Yet  'tis  good English 
to say a wheelwright 
Defunct 
Evite  . 
Part with child 
Notour 
To want it 









To  remeed 
Bankier 
Adduce a proof 
Superplus 
Forfaulture 
In no event 
Common soldiers 
Big with a man 
ENGLISH. 









I protest or declare 










To be  without  a  thing,  even 
though it be not desirable 
To be puzzled 
Discouraged by repulses 
Usually 
Asham'd 
In favour of 
Doubtfulness 
EIur t 




Produce a proof 
Surplus 
Forfeiture 
In no case 
Private men 








Annualren  t 
Tenible argument 
Amissing 
To condescend upon 
To discharge 
To extinguish an obligation 
To depone 
A compliment 
To inquire at a man 
To be angry at a man 
To send an errand 
To  furnish goods to him 
To open up 
Thucydide, Herodot, Sueton 
Butter and bread 
Pepper and vinegar 
Paper, pen, and ink 
Readily 
On a sudden 
As ever I saw 
For my share 
Misgive 
Rather chuse to buy as sell 
Deduce 
Look't over the window 
4.  pretty enough girl 
'Tis a week since he left this 
Come in to the fire  . 
To take off a new coat 
Alwise 
Cut out his hair 
Cry him 
To crave 














To cancel an obligation 
To depose 
A present 
To inquire of a man 
To be angry with a man 
To send off an errand 
To furnish him with goods 
To open, or lay open 
Thuc~ydides,  IIerodot  us,  Suetmius 
Bread and butter 
Vinegar and pepper 
Pen, ink, and paper 
Probably 
Of a sudden 
As I ever saw 
For my part 
Fail 
Rather chuse to buy than sell 
Deduct 
Look't  out at the window 
A pretty girl enough 
'Tis a week since he left this place 
Come near the fire 
To make up a new suit 
Always 
Cut off his hair 
Call him 
To dun, to ask payment 
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in human  actions, 70, f.;  property, a 
epecies of, 151 
Cause and Eff~t,  reasoning on, 24 ;  dis- 
coverable  by experience  only, 25, f., 
36 ; ultimate  cause  undiscoverable, 
27, 62 ;  maxim as to, 119; definition 
of cause, 63, 64, 78 ; idea of  relation 
of, 64 
Charles XII., influence  of  his bravery, 
238 
Chastity, laws of,  198 ;  its virtue  con- 
eists in its utility, ib.;  marriage laws 
in Greece and Rome,  199 ;  reason of 
the blame attaching to failure in, 222 
Chatillon, evidence of the Duc de, as to 
a miracle, 103 
Cheerfulness,  great merit  of,  231 ;  ex- 
cessive, 237 
Christian Religion,  founded  on  faith, 
not reason, 107 ; miracles of the, 108 
Cicero, 5, 45,  175,  177,  184, 224, 242, 
284,  285,  300,  345,  347,  350,  351, 
352, 407 
Condd, Prince of, 232 
Congreve, 22 
Connection, idea of necessary,  50, 52 
Contiguity,  principle  of  connection  of 
ideas, 18, 23, 43, 46 
Contrariety, a  connection  among ideas, 
18, 22 
Cordeliers, the, 331 
Cosmogony, of the ancients, 322 
Courage, merit of, 234, f. 
Crime, definition oC 260 
Critical Review, an unpublished letter of 
Hume's to, 425, f., 
Custom, effect of, 37 ; the guide of life, 
39 ;  link of ideas, 46, 49 
HanniW. character of, by Livy,  286 
Hewn' IV., amours of, 237 
BEN 
Effect,  principle of  connection  of id- 
18.-See  Cause and effect 
Emotions.-See  Passions 
Energy, idea of in Metaphysics, 51 
Epamonidas, character of, 227 
Epictetus,  35, 236, 285, 350, 372 
Epicurus,  110, 11  1, f., 267, 324 
Equality, political, impracticable, 188 
Esaays,  Hume's : on  Essay  Writing, 
367, f.;  on Moral Prejudices, 371, f , 
on a Middle Station in Life, 375, f.; 
on Impudence  and Modesty, 380, f. ; 
Love and Marriage, 383, f.; the Study 
of  History, 388, f. ; Avarice, 392, f. ; 
on  Sir R. Walpole, 395, f. ; Immor- 
tality of  the Soul,  399,  f.;  Suicide, 
406,  f. ; Authenticity  of  Ossian's 
Poems 415, f. 
Euclid, 263 
Euripides, 233, 285, 318 
Experience, basis of reasoning on matter 
of fact, 28 ;  teaching of, 30, 34 ;  argu- 
ments  from,  founded  on  iimilarity, 
31 ;  inference  from,  32, f. ; effect of 
custom, 38 ; not distinct from reason, 
ib. ; value of, 69 ;  not always  infal- 
lible, 89, f. 
Fanatics, religious, 187 
Fontewelle, 269, 321 
Force,  idea  of,  in  Metaphysics,  51 ; 
physical, 227 
Frugality,  quality  of,  221 ; extremes 
of, ib, 
Future  State,  109,  f.;  hypothetical 
apology  of  Epicurus,  11  1, f. ; a?- 
ments on, 118, f.-See  Immortdzty 
 an  Na ture,  unvarying principles of, 
6  8 
Human Reason, division  of  objects  of, 
20 ; its utmost effort, 27 
Hume, D.,  dedication  of  his Four Dis- 
sertations to the author of '  Douglas,' 
439,  f. ; his  essays,  367.  f.-See 
Essays ;  his account of British descent 
upon  coast of Brittany, 443, f. 
Hume, Mr., M.P. for Southwark, 446 
Hutcheson, Mr., taught that morality is 
only relative, 10 
Hyde,  de  Relig.  Veterum  Persarum, 
333, 338 
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HEN  MEN 
Ideas, origin of, 13  ; dependent on  sen- 
sation,  15 ; of  colours,  16; all  are 
faint, i6. ;  innate, 17; loose meaning 
of  in  Locke, ib. ; association  of,  17, 
144; principles  connecting,  18, 43; 
effects of their connection on the pas- 
sions and  imagination,  19,  145,  f., 
199 ;  relations of,  20, 161 ;  copies of 
impressions, 51, 64 
Idolatry.-See  Polytheism. 
Imagination, its freedom, 40, f.; its dis- 
tinction from belief, 41, f.; painful or 
pleasant stimulants of, 209, f. ; effect 
of  physical accomplishments on, 227 ; 
of  high  position  and  wealth,  228; 
influence  of  cheerfulness  on,  231.- 
See Ideas 
lmmortality of  the Soul, natural reasons 
against, 400 ;  moral arguments, 400, 
f. ;  physical reasons, 403.-See  Future 
State. 
Impressions, all vivid,  17.-See  Ideas 
Impudence and Modesty, 380, f.; allegory 
on, 382 
Industry, quality of, 221 
Inference,  foundation  of,  32,  f. ; effect 
of custom, 38 
hstinct, in animals, 88 
bternational law, cases justifying  vio- 
lation of, 198 
Iphicmtes, the Athenian, 242 
Irish Ethics, 235.-See  Morals 
Henriade, 20 
Herodian, 327 
Herodotus,  235,  321,  322,  334,  337, 
342, 354, 357 
Ilesiod, 315, 322, 326 
History, comparison of with epic poetry, 
19, f. ; study of, 388, f.;  Machiavel 
as an historian, 391 
Hohbes, 184, 267 
Homer, 22, 232, 326 
Horace,  142, 208,  250,  267,  286, 299, 
301. 345 
La Bruykre, 5 
Laced~monians,  early devotions of the, 
322 
La Fontaine, 22, 302 
Laocoon, statue of, 3  14 
Laws, subordinate to public safety, 190 ; 
designed for good of  society,  19  1 ;  of 
justice and property,  193,  f.; inter- 
national,  198 ; of  social intercornit, 
200, f. ; of war, 201 
Lecompte, Pdre, 32 1 
Levellers, the, 188 
Liberty  and Necessity, 65 ;  controversy 
on, 66, f. ; belief in liberty accounted 
for, 77 ;  definition, 78 
Listock, Admiral, 450 
Literature, plan necessary  in composi- 
tions, 19  :  union proposed between men 
of learning and conversation, 367, f. ; 
women  best  judges  of,  369.--See 
Essays 
Livy, 285, 350, 357 
Locke, 5, 17, 47, 53,61, 267 
Longinus, 232, 321 
L'Orient, British attack on Port, 453 
Louis XIY., 345 
Love and Marriage,  383,  f. ;  origin  of, 
385, f. ;  allegory, 386, f. 
Luciaa, 97, 98, 225, 322, 354, 355 
Lucretius, 352, 391 
Luxury, different opinions of, 178 
Lysias, 301 
Jacobins, the, 331 
Jansenist Miracles,  101, f.;  attempts by 
Molinists to discredit,  102 
Jesuits, subtleties of  the, 193 
Justice, founded on utility, 179, f.; lawe 
of,  187, f. ; whimsicalities  of,  191 ; 
considerations  on,  194,  272,  f. ;  it6 
real value,  196 ;  international,  197 ; 
a  rule  having  exceptions,  257,  f.; 
conventional, f  74 ;  origin of, 275, f. 
Juuenal,  175, 352 
Machiavel, 221, 340, 391 
Macrobius, 336 
Malebranch, 5, 61, 191 
Manicheans, the  two principles of the, 21  3 
Mathematics, based on a supposition, 28; 
their  advantage  over  moral  science, 
50 ;  absurdities of, 128, f. 
Matter, vis inertis of, 60 
Matters of  fact,  22,  f.; reasoning  on, 
24, f.,  85, 28 ;  nature of belief in, 40 ; 
incapable of demonstration,  134 
i 
Memo y,  quality of, 224 
Mental  science,  province  of,  g.-See 
Morals lationa  in, 171 ; methodv of  angysis, 
173 ;  qualities determining,  176, f.; 
rules  of,  200,  f. ; sceptical  view  of, 
203 ; origin  of,  204,  207 ; qualities 
useful  to  ourselves,  217,  f. ;  their 
connection with physical endowments, 
226, f. ;  qualities  agreeable  to  our- 
selves,  231, f. ; agreeable to others, 
239 ;  monkishvirtues, 246; savage and 
civilized,  250,  f.; the social virtues, 
253, f.; general principles of, 258, f.; 
definition of  virtue, 261 ;  mental and 
physical  beauty,  263,  f. ;  selfish 
system of, 266 ;  verbal disputes about, 
278, f. ;  virtuous and vicious, 282, f. ; 
dialogue  on, 289, f.;  French, 297, f., 
301,  different  opinions  and customs, 
300 ;  modesty of Greek, 301 ; English 
and  Roman,  202; bad  influence  of 
popular religion  on, 357, f;  a philo- 
sophic reformer of, 373 
468  INDEX, 
Natural History 0.-  Religion, 309 f. 
Nature, her secret powers,  29, 32, 37 
Necessity,  our  idea  of,  67 ; in  human 
conduct,  71 ;  definitions  of,  79,-See 
Liberty and Necessity 
MET 
Metaphysics, 8 ; compared with mathe- 
matics, 58 ;  absurdities of, 128, f. 
Milton, 22, 311 
Mind,  its  operation  involved  in  ob- 
scurity, 9;  its faculties,  10; its pas- 
sions divided  into two classes,  11- 
their scope,  ib. ;  difference of  its per- 
ceptions,  13 ; power  of,  54,  f. ;  its 
relation  to the passions,  140 ; pro- 
perties  of,  144 ; strength  of,  222 ; 
greatness of, 232.-See  Morals 
Miracles, evidence of, 88, f.,  94, f., 102, 
f. ;  definitions of, 93 ;  none in all his- 
tory, 94, f.; natural  tendency  to be- 
lieve in,  95,  and to invent,  96 ; the 
product  of  barbarism,  97;  reasons 
against, 99 ; hypothetical,  106 ;  said 
to have been  wrought by Vespasian, 
99, f.; door-keeper of  Saragossa, 101 ; 
the  Abbe  Paris,  101,  f. ;  Bacon's 
reasoning upon, 107 ; scriptural, 108 
Molinists, try to discredit the Jansenist 
miracles, 102 
Monks, their virtues rejected by men of 
sense, 246 ; an order of Pagan, 319 
Montaigne, 242 
Montesquku, 190 
Montgernon, M., 101 
Morality, relation of self-love to, 207 
Morals, science of, compared with ma- 
thematics, 50, f. ;  ideas of, 51 ;  theories 
of, in reference to the passions, 139- 
166 ;  general  principles  of,  169, f. ; 
distinctions in, 170, f.; object of s~ecu-  ,  -- 
Persecution,  religious,  336  f. ; among 
Egyptians, 337 ;  among the Persians, 
338 
PLU 
Newcastle, Duke of, 445 f. 
Newton, 60, 196 
Noailles, Cardinal, 102 
Numitianus,  Claudius Rutilius, 347 
Orange, Maurice, Prince of, 242 
Ossian's  Poems, Hume  on  authenticity 
of,  415  f. ;  a  tiresome  performance, 
8. ;  arguments against their gehuine- 
ness, 416 f. 
Ouid, 19, 321, 322, 357 
Paganism,-See  Theism, Polytheism 
Pantetius, the Stoic, 350 
Paris, FAbbk,  alleged miracles of,  101 f. 
Pascal, compared with Diogenes, 304 
Passions, theories  of  the,  139 f.;  good 
and evil, ib. ;  mixed, 144 f. ;  associa- 
tion  of  ideas in  producing,  145  f. ; 
pride and  humility,  146  f. ; human 
sympathy,  208  f. ;  influence  of 
maxims on, 155 ; calming or exciting 
causes, 162 f., 209 f. ;  effect of power 
and riches upon, 230 ;  vulgar, 248 f. ; 
humane, 249 ; their influence in life, 
251 ; none disinterested, 266 
Pastoral Poetry, cause  of  the  pleasure 
it  gives, 209 
Perceptions,  difference  of,  13 ; two 
classes  of,  13,  14;  reasoning  on, 
124 f. 
Pericles. 175 
~ersoial  Merit,-See  Morals,  Passions, 
Qualities 
Petronius, 299 
Philip  of  Macedon,  described  by 
Demosthenes,  234 
Philosophers,  two  species  of,  1, 2 ; en- 
couragement of  in Greece and Rome, 
109 
Philosophy,  different  kinds  of,  1 f.; 
study  of, 7 ; accurate  and just  rea- 
soning,  9 ; abstract  speculations, l l, 
12 ;  how  to test  its  terms,  17 ; un- 
able to reconcile human actions with 
God,  84 ; birth  of, 100 ; jealousy of, 
109  f. ; the  Academic  or  Sceptical, 
35,  122  f.,  132 ; selfish  system  of, 
266  f. ; difference  between  modern 
and ancient methods, 287 
Physical endowments, their influence on 
the moral sentiments, 226 f. 
Pluto, 184, 198, 221, 286, 351, 385 
Pliny, 314, 315, 324, 405, 414 
Plutarch  92,  175,  198,  233, 285, 298 
340 
POE 
Poetry,  epic,  2G  ; dramatic,  21 ; pas- 
toral, 209 ;  charm and merit of, 238 
Politeness, rules of, 239 
Polybius, 204, 223, 286 
Polytheism,  the  primary  religion  of 
man,  310 f. ;  origin  of, 313 f.,  334 ; 
distinctive  powers  of  the gods, 315 ; 
deification of  causes, 3  17 ; medisval, 
320 ; gross  ideat  of  Deity,  321 ; 
taking  revenge  on  the  gods,  322; 
various  forms  of,  325  f. ; general 
principles  of,  326  f. ;  originates 
Theism, 328 f. ;  tutelar  deities,  336 ; 
inconvenience  of,  ib.;  tolerance  of, 
338 ; pagan  heroes  and  Christian 
saints,  339 ; Brasidas  and  Bellar- 
mine, 340 
Pompey,  his  blunders,  284 ;  his  reli- 
gious devotion, 347 
Pope, 394 
Power,  idea of,  in  Metaphysics,  51 f.; 
of  the  will,  53 ;  Locke  on,  ib. ; 
mental, 54 f. ;  idea of relative, 64 
Prejudices, moral, 37 1 f. 
Pride and humility, passions  of, 146 f. ; 
meanings  of  pride,  281,-See  Pas- 
sions 
Prior, M., 160 
I'robnbility,  47 f. 
Froperty,  laws  regulating,  189 f. ;  not 
transferable  by the will  alone, 193 ; 
methods  of  acquisition,  194 ; origin 
of, 275 f. 
Prophecies,--See  Miracles 
Provence, parliament of  love in, 201 
Providence,  of  a  particular,  109  f. ; 
supposed apology of Epicurus, 11  1 f. ; 
arguments, 118 f 
Pufendorf,  184 
Pyrrhonism,  130 f. 
INDEX.  469 
Qualities, of  objects,  126 f. ;  useful to 
ourselves,  217  f. ; physical,  226  f. ; 
agreeable to ourselves, 231 f. ;  nega- 
tive,  234;  companionable,  239  f. ; 
personal merit,  245  f. ; verbal  dis- 
put,es  concerning,  278  f. ; virtuous 
and vicious, 282 f. 
Quintilian, 21 1 
Quintus Curtius, 69, 322 
Racine, account of  a  miracle given  by, 
103 
Rnmsay,  Chevalier,  on  free-thinking, 
355 ; his Origenism, 356 
Xeal  Presence,  Tillotson's  argument 
against, 88 
lr'enson,  demonstrative  and  moral  rea- 
eoning,  31,  47 ; inference,  38; links 
SCIC 
in,  39 ; of  animals,  85 f. ; proceeds 
in part  from  custom,  87 ; differe~ce 
in men  and  animals, ib. ;  concerning 
miracles,  88 f. ; arises  in  part from 
nature,  ib.;  objection  against  ab- 
stract reasoning,  128 ; a  calm  pas- 
sion, 161 f. 
Reason  and experience,  distinction  of, 
erroneous, 38 
Reason and taste, 265 
Rcynard, Voyage de Laponie, 321 
Religio~,,  ceremonies  of  the  Roman 
Catholic,  44 ; Natural  History  of, 
309  f. ;  nations  without,  ib. ;  poly- 
theism  primary  religion, 310 ;  influ- 
ence  of  affliction  in, 310 ;  origin  of, 
334 ; alternations  of  Theism  and 
Polytheism,  335 f. ;  in  reference to 
persecution  and  toleration,  336  f. ; 
reason  or absurdity  of,  340; doubt 
or  conviction,  342;  varieties  of 
doctrine,  343;  resemblance  of  the 
Jewish  and  Egyptian,  344 ;  tra- 
ditional  and  scriptural,  342,  352 
belief  more affected than real, 348; 
character of  the Pagan,  349 f. ;  in- 
fluence of popular  on  morality, 357 ; 
rise  and growth  of, 361,-See  Poly- 
th.eism, Theism, Romaga  Catholics 
Resemblance, principle of  connection of 
ideas, 18, 23, 43 
Rochefoz~cault,  28 1 
Roman Catholics, religious doctrines of, 
343 
Romans, their appreciation  of  courage, 
234 
Sacrifies,  human,  338; idea  of  sacri- 
fice, ib. 
Saints, Roman Catholic, compared with 
Pagan heroes,  339 f. 
Sallust, 227, 352 
Snnnazarius, 21  0 
Scepticism,  philosophy of,  35 f.;  122; 
of Des Cartes, 123 ; topics  employed 
by,  124  f.; sceptics  try to  destroy 
reason  by  argument, 127 ; sceptic's 
objections  to moral  evidence,  130 ; 
no good  resulting  from, 131 ;  objec- 
tions  fatal  to,  ib. ; academical  or 
mitigated,  132  f.;  assertion  as to 
origin  of  religious  worship,  177 ; 
during  Ciceronian  age,  347,-See 
Philosophy 
Schoolmea,  their  ambiguity  and  cir- 
cumlocution, 17 
Sciences,  abstract,  objects  of,  133 f.; 
other sciences, 135 
Scotticisms, list of, 461 f. 
Scriptures, miracles related, 108 470  INDEX. 
SCY 
Ekythialts, martla1 custom of, 235 ;  the 
men blinded by the women, 384 
Self-Love, its relation  to Morals, 207 ; 
266 f. ;  vulgar  passions  included in, 
248 
Self-Satisfaction,  quality of, 223 
Seneca, 302, 322, 410 
Sense, perceptions of, 124 f. 
Shakespeare, 232 
Shaftesbuy,  Lord, 170 
Sign, a, what it is, 64 
Social Virtues, their  utility their  chief 
merit,  203  f.;  different feelings  ex- 
cited  by,  214; pretensions  to,  225 
their merit beyond dispute, ib. 
Xociety,  of  political,  197 ; rules  of 
justice in, ib. 
~5'ocrates,  236, 242, 351 
Solon, 250 
Soul,  its  union  with  the  body,  54 ; 
essay on  immortality of, 399 f.-See 
Immrtality 
Sparta, equality in, 188 
Spartian, 347 
Spencer, 235 
Statilius, maxim, 3721 
Station  in  Life,  advantages  of  the 
middle, 375 
St.  Clair,  Lie&.-Gen.,  his  expedition 
against Brittany described by Hume, 
443 ;  his  interview  with the  King, 
444 ;  his failure, 458 
St. Evremond, 220,  232 
Strabo, 310 
Suetonius,  100,  203,  211,  322,  338, 
345, 347, 403 
Suevi, their  dress  designed  to  terrify 
their enemies, 235 
Suicide,  essay  on,  406  f. ;  arguments 
for  and  against,  407  f.; not  pro- 
-  hibited  by  Scripture,  414.--See 
fisays 
Stqerstitiorn,  vagaries  of,  191,  344  f., 
357 ; growth  of,  318 ; women  the 
leaders  of,  319 ; medizeval,  320 ; 
Egyptian,  345; of  the  Stoics,  350; 
instances of Xenophon's, 351 ; causes 
of,  359 ;  ignorance  the  mother  of 
devotion, 363 
Sympathy, degrees  of,  214 f. ;  no  one 
without, 219 
Tacitw,  99,  100,  211,  233,  328,  345, 
350, 410 
Talents.-See  Qualities, Morals 
Terence,  22 
Tcrentia  Cicero's wife, 347 
XEN 
176eism, origin  of,  328  f. ;  advantages 
and disadvantages  of,  336 ;  intoler- 
ance of, 337,-See  Polytheism 
Theists, ancient philosophical, 324 
Thoughts,  confined  within  narrow 
limits,  14; analysis  of,  15.-See 
Ideas 
Thucydides, 210, 235, 340 
~llotson,  his  argument  against  the 
Real Presence,  88 
Timon, why  he  embraced  Alcibiades, 
213 
Timotheus, 354 
Toleration, ~eligious, 336  f.;  of  idols- 
tors, 337; English and Dutch, 338 
Tranquillity, philosophical,  235 f. 
Turenne, Marshal, 220 
Tyrannicide,  extolled  in ancient times, 
178 
Ultimate Cause.-See  Cause and Effect 
LTnderstanding,  doubts as to the opera- 
tion of, 20 ;  its ignorance and weak- 
ness, 63 
Unity oj' action in literary compositions, 
20, 21 
Universe,  system  of,  82;  geometrical 
and metaphysical absurdities, 128 
Utility, why it  pleanses, 202  f. ;  in ani- 
mate and inanimate objects, ib. 
Vanity, q~ality  of, 241 f. 
Varro, 346, 405 
Verrius Flaccus, 336 
Vespasian,  said  to  have  wrought 
miracles, 99 f. 
Vice,  compared with Virtue, 256 
Virgil, 163, 227 
Virtue,  character and  utility  of,  253, 
282 
Vitellius, humiliation of, 233 
Volition, influence of, 54 f. 
Walpole, Sir R., character of, 395 f. 
WiZkk's Epigoniad,  unpublished  letter 
of Hume to '  Critical Review,' 425 f. 
Will,  influence  of, 54 f. ;  does  not  by 
itself transfer property, 193 ;  Roman 
Catholic doctrine as to, ib. 
Wwlastorn, Mr., 184 
Xenophon,  203,  227,  354; his  super- 
stition, 351 